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संस्कृतविमर्शः

नवशृङ्खला

विश्वसंस्कृतसम्मेलनविशेषाङ्कः

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Saṃskṛtavimarśaḥ

World Sanskrit Conference
Special



Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan

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Sanskritavimarsah

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परामर्शदातृ-समिति:

१. आचार्य: रामकरणशर्मा, कुलपतिचरः,
सम्पूर्णानन्द-दरभङ्गासंस्कृतविश्वविद्यालययोः,
६३, विज्ञानविहारः, नवदेहली
 २. आचार्य: गयाचरणः त्रिपाठी,
भारतीय उच्च अध्ययनसंस्थान,
राष्ट्रपतिनिवासः, शिमला, हिमाचलप्रदेशः
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हजरतगंज, लखनऊ, उत्तरप्रदेशः
 ४. आचार्या दीप्ति त्रिपाठी, निदेशिका,
राष्ट्रिय-पाण्डुलिपि-मिशन,
इन्दिरागाँधीराष्ट्रीयकलाकेन्द्रे, नवदेहली
ई-२३२५, पालमविहारः, गुडगाँव, हरियाणा
 ५. आचार्य: अभिराजराजेन्द्रमिश्रः, कुलपतिचरः,
सम्पूर्णानन्दसंस्कृतविश्वविद्यालयस्य,
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१. आचार्य: राधावल्लभः त्रिपाठी
कुलपतिः,
राष्ट्रियसंस्कृतसंस्थानमानितविश्वविद्यालयस्य,
२. आचार्य: वेम्पटिकुटुम्बशास्त्री
प्राचार्यः, श्रीराजीवगान्धीपरिसरस्य,
राष्ट्रियसंस्कृतसंस्थानमानितविश्वविद्यालयस्य,
३. आचार्य: प्रकाशपाण्डेयः
प्राचार्य: विशेषकार्याधिकारी च
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EDITORIAL NOTES

It is a matter of great satisfaction for me that this special number of *Samskṛtavimarśaḥ* is being released on the occasion of the 15th World Sanskrit Conference being jointly organized by International Association of Sanskrit Studies and the Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan at New Delhi. The papers collected in this volume unfold the vast panorama of Sanskrit studies in the present global scenario. They evince the multi-dimensional spaces and interdisciplinary nature of Sanskrit studies.

The volume includes three papers related to Vedic studies. The authors of these papers have drawn our attention towards certain fundamental questions and key concepts and have also brought out the world view of Vedic seers. Nicholas Kazanas, known for his researches on the theory of the so called Āryan immigration has given considerable data to prove that the Āryans did not immigrate into Saptasindhu during 1700-1500 BCE; they belonged to this region itself. His arguments are based on literary, archeological, anthropological and genetic evidences and they can also be viewed in the light of what Bal Gangadhar Tilak was trying to prove in his *Orion - the Arctic Home of Vedas*. The linguistic studies by Kazanas show the antiquity of the archaic forms in Sanskrit in comparison to other Indo-Āryan languages. Gaya Charan Tripathi in his exposition of *Poets and Poetry in the R̥gveda* re-discovers the foundations of Indian aesthetics through Vedic sources. The paper not only corroborates the theses presented by T.G. Mainekar in his *R̥gvedic Foundations of Classical Sanskrit Poetics* as well as by Shendye in his *Kavi and Kāvya in Atharvaveda*, it also emphasizes the need to look at the hymns of the *R̥gveda* from the view point of aesthetics. It was Rājaśekhara amongst the ācāryas of Alaṅkāraśāstra who established the concept of mutual interdependence between Veda and Alaṅkāraśāstra. Shashiprabha Kumar shows how the idea of trans-mortality (ati-mṛtyu) has been unique in our tradition.

George Cardona is known for his monumental work on Pāṇini. In his article 'Naṭasya Śṛṇoti' he has made brilliant

analysis of a number of sentences that were a part of a vibrantly spoken language from the axioms of grammatical system. Hock in his article on Pāṇini investigates upon the regional variations of Sanskrit and also draws a picture of linguistic pluralism that always existed in our tradition right from hoary past.

The focus of the papers collected here has rightly shifted to the scientific and intellectual traditions that Sanskrit literature envisages. S.R Sarma has substantially contributed to the studies in the ancient Indian science and technology as revealed through Sanskrit sources. His paper on *Dhruvabhramayantra* not only introduces rare and very important unpublished texts on astronomy, it also proves that the undaunted spirit for scientific investigation and experimentation which Āryabhaṭṭa, Varāhamihira and Brahmagupta had exhibited was further carried on by less known savants like Nīlakaṇṭha and Padmanābha in 15th and 16th centuries. Gyula Wojtilla in his paper on *Agricultural Knowledge as it is Reflected in the Śaunakīya Atharvaveda* gives an authentic account of agriculture as gleaned from Atharvaveda. His work also draws our attention to the craft and techniques that were developed with regard to manufacturing of ploughs and other agricultural appliances. Incidentally, Dharmapala, who has worked on India in eighteenth century, has drawn our attention to the fact that the quality of wood work in the tools and appliances in our country during that century was considered technologically so perfect that even the British rulers sent the model of Indian plough for the farmers of their country. Simon Brodbeck in *Putrikā: Interpretation of the Mahābhārata* raises very significant issues related to Dharmaśāstra.

There are two articles related to Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra in this volume. Tieken has discovered the interrelationships between two very important texts of Sanskrit that were produced in BCE - Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra and Vatsyāyana's Kāmasūtra. With regard to the interrelationships between Arthaśāstra, the Tantrākhyāyikā, the Sattasāi and the Kāmasūtra, he finds a process of traversing 'from śāstra to didactic animal fable, and from śāstra to mock-śāstra.' Interesting though it is, but quite debatable also. There can be no doubt that Arthaśāstra and Kāmasūtra both are very important from the point of view of a powerful prose style

that was adopted for intellectual discourses in ancient India. In fact Kauṭilya, Patañjali and Vatsyāyana – these three are pioneers of śāstric prose in Sanskrit in the BCE, and the vivacity of their prose is an attestation to the fact that Sanskrit remained a powerful vehicle of expression not only for the intellectual discourses but for all sorts of pragmatic discussions as well in the BCE. The correspondences in the prose style of these three stalwarts also offer interesting studies. Manabendu Banerjee considers Arthaśāstra from the view point of forest management and revenue that could be generated out of it. Kauṭilya's concepts for preservation and cultivation of forests are also quite evident in his treatment of forest economy.

Some of the papers published here also raise issues with regards to India's past and present in a larger perspective. T.S. Rukmani examines the spaces for intellectual freedom in India and establishes the democracy of ideas that is reflected through the multiplicity and pluralistic approach to life, a holistic perspective and admittance of the incomprehensible nature of the ultimate reality and the meaning of life. G.C. Pande in his monograph *Ekam sad viprā bahudhā vadanti* had earlier given insights into this idealism in Indian traditions. Rukmini rightly admits the gap between the ideology and the stark realities of Indian society. She holds that the 'disjunction between theory and practice' always comes there 'when dealing with actualities on the ground'. The point is very well made, but it does leave scope for several questions. Does the emphasis on individual salvation create a breach in social organizations? When highest notions and sublimation and sanctity of individual life were being conceived, were norms and ethics for the society at large visualized on the same level? Navjivan Rastogi's brilliant exposition in *Tāntric Thought of Kashmir : A Framework of Humanistic Culture* offers a rejoinder to these questions to an extent. Rastogi does agree that the concept of Mokṣa requiring psycho-spiritual pursuit (*sāadhanā*), as a purely personal and asocial process culminates into a sort of life-negation.

Raffaele Torella in his paper *Passions and Emotions in the Indian Philosophical- Religious Traditions: Some Preliminary Remarks* raises an important issue – the supposed absence of psychology as a discipline in Sanskrit learning. He investigates

some of the concepts in Yoga and Āgamas from this point of view. However, a very important text – Vātsyayana's *Kāmasūtra* – is not given adequate attention.

Mehta in her article on Naturalism in Indian Philosophy investigates upon the perspectives of naturalist view that found expression in Vedic samhitās developed through various philosophical systems. She also re-examines the question of influence of Buddhist philosophy on Gauḍapāda. Entirely different approach to the problem of interrelations between the concept of Advaita in Buddhism and Vedānta is provided by Shohei Ichimura in his 'Critique of Prof. Murthy's attempt of equation between concept of Advaita in Buddhist Yogācāra system and Vedānta'. Prof. Lokesh Chandra provides authentic documentation of *Royal attributes of the nirmāṇakaya Śākyamuni and the dharmakāya Buddhas*.

Veeranarayana Pandurangi in his paper *A Review of Jaina Background of Dvaita Vedānta* challenges the claim of Robert Zydenbos with regard to Jaina background of Dvaita Vedānta. His brilliant critique of the thesis of Robert Zydenbos is based on the issues related to the concepts of *mukti* and *pramāṇa* in Jainism and in Mādhva Vedānta. Pandurangi has questioned Zydenbos's interpretations on *Tāratamya* and *Bhavyābhavyatva*, *Anupramāṇa* and *Karaṇapramāṇa*, *Kevala* and *Sākṣin*, *Manas*, *Smṛti*, *Viśeṣa* and *Anekāntavāda*. I believe this paper, taken together with the rejoinder from Robert Zydenbos, will insinuate a meaningful debate on interactions and dialogue between diverse philosophical traditions. There is already a controversy with regard to Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara being *pracchanna bauddhas*, and the issues raised by Veeranarayana Pandurangi may receive a further rebuttal by questions and cross-questions. Such debates should be looked in the larger perspective of interdisciplinary dialogues between diverse philosophical systems. This resume on the views of Robert Zydenbos should also be seen in the context of the traditional pundit from India preparing to come out and entering into a global debate.

This debate should also be considered significant in the light of the efforts that are being made to insinuate dialogue between traditional Sanskrit pundits and modern philosophers. Towards the

end of the last century Dayakrishna had organized workshops and symposia to initiate such dialogues.

In his earlier publications Sheldon Pollock has rediscovered Bhaṭṭanāyaka and has also made an attempt to restore his lost *Hṛdayadarpaṇa*. In his article *Vyakti and History of Rasa* he re-examines the views of Bhaṭṭanāyaka, Abhinavagupta and Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha. No doubt Bhaṭṭanāyaka represents a great turning point in the history of Indian Aesthetics and Pollock deserves credit for placing him in a right perspective.

Celebrating Divinity in Pāñcarātra by Sudhir Kumar Lall once again draws our attention to practices of Vaiṣṇavāite Āgamas that have been becoming relevant in the light of recent religious movements. It evinces the flexible and accommodative outlook imbued in the Pāñcarātra system and the practices of a mahotsava at the Cheluva Narayanasvami temple at Melkote as a powerful expression of the collective consciousness of the devotees and a re-affirmation of their faith in divinity. This paper also brings out subtle linkages between the śāstra and prayoga in Āgamic systems.

Coming to the area of performing arts, we are privileged to offer three very illuminating papers covering living traditions in classical and modern theatre. While Saroja Bhate re-opens the issue of use of Prakrit in Sanskrit drama, Lyne Bansat-Boudon in her article *Artaud and Balinese Theatre, or the Influence of the Eastern on the Western Stage* reveals the process of dialogue with Asian and Indian theatre-traditions envisaged by some of the greatest theatre directors of modern times. Curiously enough; Brecht, Stanislavsky, Artaud and Richard Shechner have established a rapport with Asian spirit of theatre and have exemplified the importance of Bharata and his Nāṭyaśāstra. This did not happen in the same way in philosophy and dissemination of knowledge in other areas. Kūṭiyāṭṭam has been one of the most important re-discoveries for the modern world. It was in the seventies of the last century that the cākyārs from Kerala who have been practicing Sanskrit theatre started to come from the precincts of the temples and this opened an area of immense possibilities. At the same time, the shifting of the area of performance not only changed the performative circumstances, it also led to subtle

changes in the structural designs in Kūṭiyāṭṭam. C. Rajendran, one of the few Sanskrit scholars who have also studied this art form, makes an attempt to analyze the conflict between tradition and modernity and its resolution through Kūṭiyāṭṭam. Vijay Pandya has been working on various aspects of Sanskrit drama and his paper on Kālidāsa and Āhārya Abhinaya provides interesting details of properties and apparatus that were to be used in the theatre as per the prescriptions of Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra.

Much of the wealth of manuscripts still remains unexplored in India. Malhar Kulkarni has done considerable research work on the Malayalam Manuscripts of Kāśikā and this number of Vimarśa incorporates interesting results of his researches.

In review section of this special number, we chose to take notice of a few publications which are going to cast an everlasting impact on Sanskrit studies in the coming times.

I express my sincere gratitude to the veteran scholars who have contributed their valuable articles for this special number of Vimarśa at my request. My esteemed colleagues, V. Kutumba Sastry, K.B. Subbarayudu and Prakash Pandey have rendered valuable help in bringing this volume out. V. Kutumba Sastry went through the proofs, looked into issues related with the possible editorial format and prepared draft of Sanskrit summaries. Prakash Pandey looked into issues related to layout and printing.

The *Samskṛtavimarśaḥ* will hopefully stimulate the process of dialogue amongst the Sanskritists and the intellectuals at the international level.

- Radhavallabh Tripathi

CONTENTS

Editorial Notes	vii-xii
1. The Poet and the Poetry in the Ṛgveda G.C. Tripathi	1-16
2. Ṛgvedic All-Comprehensiveness N. Kazanas	17-38
3. Agricultural Knowledge as it is Reflected in The Śaunakīya Atharvaveda : A Reappraisal Gyula Wojtilla	39-50
4. Morality, Trans-Mortality and Immortality In Vedic Thought Shashiprabha Kumar	51-64
5. On the Construction Type <i>naṭasya śṛṇoti</i> George Cardona	65-84
6. Sanskrit and Pāṇini – Core and Periphery H.H. Hock	85-102
7. Malayalam manuscripts of the <i>Kāśikāvṛtti</i> : A study. Malhar Kulkarni	103-112
8. The <i>Arthaśāstra</i> as a Fount of Fun Herman Tieken	113-120
9. Kauṭilya's <i>Arthaśāstra</i> on Forestry Manubendu Banerjee	121-132
10. Language of Sanskrit Drama Saroja Bhate	133-142
11. <i>Putrikā</i> Interpretation of the <i>Mahābhārata</i> Simon Brodbeck	143-159
12. Passions and Emotions in the Indian Philosophical-Religious Traditions: Some Preliminary Remarks Raffaele Torella	160-175

13. Kālidāsa and Āhārya Abhinaya Vijay Pandya	176-182
14. Intellectual Freedom in Ancient India : Some Random Thoughts T.S.Rukmani	183-197
15. A Critique to Prof. Murti's Attempt of Equation between Buddhist Yogācāra Theory of Advaya and that of Hindu Advaita Theory Shohei Ichimura	198-231
16. <i>Vyakti and the History of Rasa</i> Sheldon Pollock	232-253
17. Changing Paradigms in Performance : Kūṭiyāṭṭam in Historical Perspective C. Rajendran	254-263
18. Tantric Thought of Kashmir : A Framework of Humanistic Culture Navjivan Rastogi	264-279
19. A Review of "Jaina Background of Dvaita Vedānta" by Robert Zydenbos Veeranarayana Pandurangi COMMENTS — Robert Zydenbos	280-320 318-320
20. The Dhruvabhrama-Yantra of Padmanābha Sreeramula Rajeswara Sarma	321-343
21. Artaud and Balinese Theatre, or the Influence of the Eastern on the Western Stage Lyne Bansat-Boudon	344-354
22. Royal Attributes of the Nirmāṇakaya Śākyamuni and the Dharmakāya Buddhas Lokesh Chandra	355-368
23. Celebrating Divinity in Pāñcarātra Tradition Sudhir Kumar Lall	369-377
Reviews	379-400
Contributors	401-404

The Poet and the Poetry in the Ṛgveda

G.C. Tripathi

गयाचरणत्रिपाठीमहाभागः ऋग्वेदसंहितामवलम्ब्य वेदकवीनां, तेषां मन्त्ररूपकवितायां विद्यमानानां काव्यधर्माणां विशदं व्याख्यानं सोदाहरणं प्रस्तौति। आदौ कविस्वरूपं स्रष्टृ-द्रष्टृ-मन्तृ-विज्ञातृ-रूपं ऋग्वेदे तत्र प्रोक्तं संगृह्य, काव्यस्वरूपञ्च कान्त्यात्मकं, प्रेरयितृ-बुद्ध्यात्मकं, कलात्मकं च विशदय्य, आन्तरं साक्षात्कारं, देवतानुग्रहरूपां शक्तिं च काव्यकारणत्वेन प्रदर्श्य, ऋग्वेदकवितायां गुणालङ्काररसभावादीनां निरूपणं कृत्वा यशआदीनां काव्यप्रयोजनानां प्रदर्शनं विधाय, तस्याः उपदेशरूपतां व्यवस्थापयति। निबन्धेनानेन अलङ्कारशास्त्रस्य स्रोतो विकासक्रमश्च विज्ञातुं शक्यते।

Among the ancient-most religious texts of literary character, the Ṛgveda occupies the topmost place of pride, not only because of its spiritually inspired religious favour and its sublime philosophy, but also for an unexcelled beauty of its poetry couched in a wonderfully well structured language with highly artistic literary expressions. The Ṛṣi-poet of the Ṛgveda is an arrived sage and an accomplished poet rolled into one.

The Poet

Interrelationship between the poet and the gods

The spiritual preceptors of India have always underlined the importance of a direct experience of transcendental reality and have accepted it not only as the basic source but also the very substratum of all mundane reality. The Vedic poet is a Ṛṣi who perceives and directly experiences such a transcendental reality through his inner vision, a vision that transcends both time and space, with the result that he is capable of visualizing the mysteries of the gods and the universe and reveals them to us. His speech is revelation, revelation of the highest spiritual truth. For this unique capability, he is often equated with gods and so the gods with poets. "Our umbilical cord is with gods" (*asmākaṃ teṣu [deveṣu] nābhayḥ*) says the poet of RV 1.39.9. In RV

7.52.13 the poet exhorts the people to glorify and make obeisance to the brilliant group of Maruts who are 'kavi' and 'vedhasaḥ' (creators) in their own right:

ये ऋष्व्वा ऋष्टिविद्युतः कवयः सन्ति वेधसः।

तमृषे मारुतं गणं नमस्या रमया गिरा॥

God Agni has also been addressed as *kavi* (*kaviṃ samrājamatithiṃ janānām....*) because he is *jātavedas*, i.e. knows everyone who is born in the world, being present in their bodies.

The occasional use of the expression *kavi* ('visionary') for a poet in the Vedic hymns, a word which denotes the sense of a person capable of looking beyond time and space (*krāntadarśin*) and which is meant to be applied primarily and mainly for the Supreme Creator, underlines the importance of the creative activity of a poet in the minds of Vedic literati which was not considered to be lesser or lower in any respect than that of the creator.

Kavi: the creator

The following, realatively well known, sentence from the *Īśāvāsyā-Upaniṣad* (=YV 40.8) stating that 'the self-born, all-surrounding, wise and visionary [Creator] goes on creating perpetually the worldly objects in their proper form – as they ought to be', has justifiably been understood as applicable to the literary activities of a poet as well:

कविर्मनीषी परिभूः स्वयंभूः

याथातथ्यतोऽर्थान् व्यदधात् शाश्वतीभ्यः समाभ्यः।

The expression '*vyadadhāt*' (created) needs attention here. This is an activity which is connected with its agent *Vedhas*, the Creator, but which is also a homonym for poet. *Vedhas* is someone who combines in himself the elements of both knowledge and action. The poet also has both. He has thoughts, emotions, feelings and visions combined with the creative capability of expressing them in a nicely structured verbal form – form which conjures up and recreates the vision of the poet in the mind of the reader/listener. This capability to 'create' poetry, not common to all, is the quality which is termed as *Śakti* by Mammaṭa in his *Kāvyaprakāśa* (I.3) and is considered to be a divine gift.

The idea of according an exalted status similar to that of the creator god comes down to the classical period where we meet with the following famous statement:

अपारे काव्यसंसारे कविरेकः प्रजापतिः।

यथास्मै रोचते विश्वं तथेदं परिकल्पते॥

Kavi and *Vedhas* are not the only expressions used for the Vedic poets. There are at least four more terms used for a Vedic poet which are *Ṛṣi*, *Vipra*, *Sūri* and *Kāru*.

Kavi: the divine visionary

Ṛṣi is a sage, a person endowed with Intuitive knowledge (*prātibha-jñānavān*); nothing is hidden from him. He is the one who is in direct touch with the supreme powers and receives inspirations from them.

Gods are the protectors of *Ṛta* (Cosmic order) which is the source of those laws (*dharmāṇi*) which govern and hold this universe. A *Ṛṣi* has intimate knowledge of these *dharmāṇi* which he propagates through his sayings. His words and spells have magical effect. *Ṛṣi Viśvāmitra* is capable of checking the flow of the rivers *Vipāś* and *Śutudrī* at their confluence so that the clan of *Bharatas* could wade through their beds and cross over to the other side (RV III.33).

Kavi: the inspired one

The word *Vipra* is derived from the root 'vepr-kampane', He is the one who gets emotionally charged, stirred up, moved. He is distinguished from others because of for his fervency and enthusiasm, has had experience of spiritual rapture, and enlightenment and is inspired to put his experience in words. A *Ṛṣi* could be a *vipra*, but a *vipra* is not necessarily a *Ṛṣi* (cf. *ṛṣiḥ ko vipra ohate....*, RV 8.3.14).

Kavi: the enlightened one

Sūri is a knowledgeable and wise person, an enlightened one. The word is connected with the term 'svar' which means light – also the lighted space, the heaven (cf. the word *Sūrya*). He is mostly given to contemplation and meditation in his quest to discover the mysteries of the Universe (cf. *tad viṣṇoḥ paramaṃ padaṃ, sadā paśyanti sūrayaḥ....* RV 1.22.16).

Kavi: the technician

Kāru (=the 'maker' from the root *kr*) is simply a 'composer', a skillful professional poet who can create poetry on any subject at the behest of his benefactor. The composer RV 9.121.3, declares himself as such (*kārur ahaṃ pitā bhiṣak...*). Sometimes the activity of such a poet is compared to the work of a craftsman or carpenter (*taṣṭā, tvaṣṭā*) who fashions a chariot out of wooden material, and as such these two words *taṣṭa* and *tvaṣṭā* also occur in the Ṛgveda in the sense of poet and the expression *sutaṣṭam* (well crafted) is often used as an adjective to a prayer or hymn in the sense of 'well composed'.

The Composition (Poetry)

Synonyms of Poetry

A number of words and expressions occur in the Ṛgveda to denote poetic compositions, some of them are nouns, but many of them are adjectives used independently as nouns. I have spotted around 27 of the most commonly occurring expressions on a random checking of the text of the Ṛgveda which are listed below:

Sūktam, kāvyam, ṛk, arkah, goḥ, Brahman, gīr (gīrah), dhīh (dhiyah), dhenā, suṣṭuti, stotram, stoma, mantraḥ, matiḥ (matayah), manman, manīṣā, sumnam, dyumnam, suśasti, praśasti, suvrkti, uktham, vaktvam, sukīrti, apas and dhenuḥ.

One may also add *vāc* to the list.

If one were to classify these terms into certain groups according to various aspects stressed in them, there would emerge roughly the following picture: Terms denoting activities or associated with aspects related to the under mentioned categories are listed in front of them:

Mystic, spiritual knowledge	: ब्रह्मन्, काव्यम् ।
Light, brilliance, consciousness	: ऋक्, अर्कः, गोः, द्युम्नम् ।
Intellect	: धीः, धेना, धेनुः ।
Mind	: मन्त्रः, [सु]मतिः, मनीषा, सुम्नम्, मन्मन् ।
Speech	: गीः, उक्थ, वक्त्वम्, सूक्तम् ।

Labor-intensive activity : अपस् ।

Craftsmanship, form : सुवृक्तिः, सुतष्टम्, अरंकृतम् ।

A short note on some of these terms may not be out of place here:

Poetry as supporting principle :

Brahman, derived from the root *bṛṇh*, is 'inherently firm and supporting principle which sustains the world. It is also the fundamental power inherent in the holy word and the ritual'. In the latter sense it denotes the Vedic verses and the prayer in general (cf. *tat tvā yāmi brahmaṇā vandamānaḥ*.... 1.24.11, *yasyedaṃ brahma vardhanaṃ yasya somaḥ*.... 2.12.14, etc.)

As light :

The most commonly used word for Vedic verses is *Ṛk/Ṛcā* which originally means a 'streak or flash of light', 'a ray'. Very often is said to emanate in the highest heaven (cf. *ṛco akṣare parame vyoman*...1.164.39). A cognate word derived from the same root (*ṛc*) is *arkaḥ* which also means 'a small poetic composition,' 'a couplet' or so and later in the classical Sanskrit, it is used to denote the Sun. *Gōḥ* has a twin meaning of 'cow' and 'ray', both – sometimes both meanings are intended (cf. *tā vāṃ vāstūni uśmasi gamadhyai, yatra gāvo bhūriśṛṅgā ayāsaḥ*. RV. 1.154.6). The word is preserved in the classical Sanskrit as well in such words as *Śītaguḥ* (=moon). *Dyumnam* is derived from the root *dyu* which means 'brilliance'. *Pradyumna* in the sense of 'dazzling' is quite a common word in Sanskrit.

As inspired thought :

The words which appear to be related to intellect like *dhīḥ*, *dhenā*, *dhenuḥ* etc. are to be understood in the sense of 'inspired vision' which is 'inspired thoughts' or 'thoughts full of reverence for the divinity'. Reverence and faith are the main contents of this group of words. The Avesto-Persian version of the Vedic *dhenā* (i.e. *dīn*) has acquired the meaning of 'religion' in general and is quite well known in colloquial language and Muslim names in India. The words coined from the root '*man*' to ponder', 'to think' like *mantra*, *manman* etc. denote the products of a mental set-up full of reverence for the deity. It may also mean that the

poem is a well thought out composition created after a long mental exercise. However the term *manīṣā* is perhaps separated from this group so far as it is not purely a mental exercise, but contains element of emotion and also inspiration (cf. *sato bandhum asati nir avindan hr̥di pratiṣyā kavayo manīṣā*, RV. 10.129.4).

As a craft :

The word *apas* meaning 'work' 'task' 'product' etc. is of Indo-European origin and is found in Latin as well in the form of *opus* (pl. *operā*, cf. *magnum opus* = great work). A Vedic poet often calls his poetry an *apas*, 'a creation' with which he implies that he has worked hard on its composition and form, even though the inspiration might have come from above. The one desirous of producing *apas* is *apasyu* in the Ṛgveda and the one performing mighty and heroic deeds is *svapas/svaphāḥ* (cf. RV 1.85.9). Careful and attractive handling of a poetic composition is expressed in the terms like *Suvṛkti* (Well pruned, trimmed, neat) and *sutaṣṭa* (Well fashioned, well chiseled out) etc.

As well-uttered word in praise of gods :

The element of speech is expressed most commonly in the terms like *sūktam* ('well uttered'), *uktham* and *vaktavam*, all derived from the root *vac* = to speak, whereas the idea of the poem being primarily a 'praise', a glorification of god, is expressed in a number of terms mostly derived from the root *stu*. Glorification of divinities in order to placate them or to make them grant favours is a common phenomenon in all religions. The nature of a *stotra* is also best suited to communicate the devotional and emotional outpourings of a worshiper to his deity.

Nature of Poetry

Righteous and truthful

According to the poets of the Ṛgveda, the first and the foremost characteristic of a good poetry is its being righteous and in accordance with the cosmic law or *Ṛta* and it should contain and propagate the truth (*satyam*). Sage *Dīrghatamāḥ* directs his nicely flowing outpourings born of *Ṛta* towards god *Agni* (RV 1.141.1):

यदीम् उपह्वस्ते साधते मतिर्ऋतस्य धेना अनयन्त सस्तुतः।

Only the poetry which contains Ṛta lights up the Universe and the poets who compose it, shine in the world (7.7.6) :

एते द्युम्नेभिर्विश्वमातिरन्त [मन्त्रं ये वारं नर्या अतक्षन् ।
प्र ये विशस्तिरन्त श्रोषमाणाः] आ ये मे दीधयन्तृतस्य ॥

The hundredfold inexhaustible treasure of truth is the primeval source, the father, of poetry (RV 3.26.9):

शतधारमुत्समक्षीयमाणं विपश्चितं पितरं वक्त्वानाम्।
... तं रोदसी पिपृतं सत्यवाचम्॥

Even the sun shines more brilliantly, if words full of Ṛta are addressed to it (10.138.2):

अवर्धयो वनिनो अस्य दंससा शुशोच सूर्य ऋतजातया गिरा।

The word *sūnṛtam/sūnṛtā vāk* also occurs in the Ṛgveda (and Atharvaveda) and is usually understood to be an antonym of *anṛtam*. As such it yields the meanings of 'that which corresponds to Ṛta, as well as of 'nice' and 'pleasing'. In RV 3.31.2 Indra is said to dispel adversities through *sūnṛtā (vāk)* combined with *ṛta*:

प्र सूनृता दिशमानः ऋतेन दुरश्च विश्वा अवृणोद् अप स्वाः।

The shining goddess Uṣas is praised for attaining pleasing and beneficial speech (RV 1.92.7)

भास्वती नेत्री सूनृतानां दिवः स्तवे दुहिता गोतमेभिः।

One of the frequent requests of a poet unto his deity is to bless him with *sūnṛtā* speech: *so asmai sūnṛtām duhe* (AV 10.6.13)-

Taking cue from such Vedic references, poet Bhavabhūti in his *Uttararāmacaritam* (5.31) remarks that a *sūnṛtā Vāk* is known to fulfill all desires of a human being:

..... धेनुं धीरां सूनृतां वाचमाहुः ।

Needs inspiration from above :

The Ṛgvedic poet knows well that unless there is inspiration from above, poetry cannot take shape. No amount of mechanical effort would bring about good poetry. Therefore he prays gods, especially Brahmanāspati or Bṛhaspati (cf. RV. I. 18, the whole poem) to inspire him. Bṛhaspati not only inspires him but also reveals the first form of Vāc (perhaps *paśyantī* is meant, not *parā*) to him (RV 10.71.1):

बृहस्पते प्रथमं वाचो अग्रं यत् प्रैरत नामधेयं दधानाः।

Only then the best of the thoughts of the Ṛṣi, which is also beneficial to the world, comes out of the cave of his heart (10.71.1cd):

यदेषां श्रेष्ठ यदरिप्रमासीत् प्रेणा तदेषां निहितं गुहाविः।

In another hymn (2.33.6) the poet declares that god Rudra has inspired him (*unmā mamand vṛiṣbho marutvān*) after he requested him to do so with an emotionally charged conscience (*tvakṣīyasā vayasā nādhamānam*). In fact, the poet asks for the favour of god himself, whom he is going to praise, to inspire him. Sage Agastya prays Aśvins to gift him with honeyed speech in order to be able to compose a nice hymn in their praise (RV I. 184.4)

अस्मे सा वां माध्वी रातिरस्तु स्तोमं हिनोतं मान्यस्य कारोः।

Poetry and visionary insight :

The Sūkta X.177 of the Ṛgveda deserves a special mention in this regards where this inner light of visionary insight is symbolically represented as *Pataṅga* which has the core meaning of “a flying object” and as such has later been used for a ‘bird’, ‘the sun’ or a ‘moth’. However in the present hymn it refers to the flight of poetic imagination. This ‘deity’ *Pataṅga* contains in himself the divinely inspired, shining speech which has its source in heaven where it is firmly established and well protected within the sphere of Rta (RV 10.177.2) :

पतंगो वाचं मनसा बिभर्ति तां गन्धर्वो अवदद् गर्भे अन्तः।

तां द्योतमानां स्वर्यं मनीषाम् ऋतस्य पदे कवयो नि पान्ति॥

“As soon as the *vipaścits* achieve this intuitive insight, the mysteries of the Supreme power start unfolding themselves to their hearts and their minds, the *kavis* start descending right up to the depth of the ocean and the *vedhasas* desire to reach the pinnacle of light” (X.177.1) :

पतङ्गमक्तमसुरस्य मायया हृदा पश्यन्ति मनसा विपश्चितः।
समुद्रे अन्तः कवयो विचक्षते मरीचीनां पदमिच्छन्ति वेधसः॥

That such an inner light emerging in the heart of a poet enables him to see and visualize everything in the heaven and earth is corroborated by Ṛṣi Viśvāmitra in the following verse (RV 3.26.8):

...हृदा मतिं ज्योतिरनुप्रजान् ।
वर्षिष्ठं रत्नमकृत स्वधाभिरादिद् द्यावापृथिवी पर्यपश्यत् ॥

Dhīḥ : the inner light as source of poetry :

On closely looking at the meaning of the word *Dhīḥ*, it appears that it is the exceptional faculty of acquiring knowledge of transcendent truth or reality; the inner light. This is the reason why Uṣas, the goddess of light, is frequently requested to grant *Dhīḥ* to the poets (cf 7.79.5) and Savitr, another god connected with light, has been requested to channelize those *dhiyas* in the right direction (cf. the famous Gāyatrīmantra 3.62.10). Ṛṣi Nābhāka requests god Varuṇa to grant *dhiḥ*, wonderful ideas (*kratu*) and efficiency (*dakṣam*) to a budding poet, *śikṣamāṇasya*—one who has just started composing poetry, with which he perhaps means his own self (RV 8.42.3):

इमां धियं शिक्षमाणस्य देव क्रतुं दक्षं वरुण सं शिशाधि ।

The word *śikṣamāṇa* (=still learning) reminds us here of the ‘*kāvyaajñāśikṣayā abhyāsaḥ*’ of Mammaṭa (cf. *Kāvyaaprakāśa*, I.3) as well as the expression ‘*amandaścābhiyogaḥ*’ along with ‘*naisargikī pratibhā*’ and ‘*nirmalaṃ śrutam*’ (*naisargikī ca pratibhā śrutam ca bahu nirmalaṃ. amandaścābhiyogaḥ...*) as sources of poetry, where *pratibhā* or *śakti* can be equated with *dhiyaḥ*.

Not every attempt at writing a poetry or not every literary composition of even a *vipaścīt* meets with the expected success. There is a complete hymn in the RV (I.18) starting with ‘*somānam*

svaraṇaṃ kṛṇuhi brahmaṇaspate....’ in which poet Medhātithi prays to god Brahmaṇaspati to crown his poetic utterings with success:

यस्माद् ऋते न सिध्यति यज्ञो विपश्चितश्चन।
स धीनां योगमिन्वति॥ (RV 1.18.6)

Unbroken tradition of poetry

A Ṛgvedic poet is not only well aware of the long and unbroken tradition of the composition of poetry in his community, he is also proud of it. In the very first hymn of the Ṛgveda we hear the words:

अग्निः पूर्व्यभिर्ऋषिभिरीड्यो नूतनैरुत...।

These are the words of Madhucchandasa who belongs to the lineage of Viśvāmitra. He is well aware of the contribution of his great ancestors, the chief priests of the Bharatas, whose poems are mostly collected in the third book of the Ṛgveda. He has perhaps done “Kāvyaajñā-śikṣayābhyāḥ” under the guidance of his parents. Poet Śaṃyu of Brhaspati gotra addressing Indra remarks (RV 6.44.13):

य पूर्व्याभिरुत नूतनाभिः गीर्भिर्वावृधे गृणतामृषीणाम्।

Although some poets like Agastya are modest to state that they are repeating what the veterans have also uttered (*asarji vāṃ sthavirā vedhasā gīḥ* RV 1.181.7), the others like Parucchepa entreat Indra that he ought to listen to a new composition by a new poet rather than to remain content with the poems of the old generation (RV I.131.6):

आ मे अस्य वेधसो नवीयसो मन्म श्रुधि नवीयसः।

Mark here the word *vedhas* which the ‘new’ (=young) poet uses for himself. It is this very word which is used later for the creator God Prajapati and justifies a close similarity between the two.

Language of poetry : Choice of words

We know that the language of poetry can neither be the colloquial dialect nor the language of prose. The Ṛgvedic poet is very fastidious and choosy about the words and expression that he uses in his poetry. As soon as he visualizes a truth, god

Brhaspati kindles up his linguistic faculty and suggest him an array of words out of what he makes a careful selection of most appropriate words and expressions leaving aside the rest, with the sieve of his mind as one does in the case of saktu (flour of parched gram and barely) which is cleaned by passing through a sieve (RV 10.71.1,2):

बृहस्पते प्रथमं वाचो अग्रं यत् प्रैत नामधेयं दधाना.....(1 ab)

सक्तुमिव तितउना पुनन्तो यत्र धीरा मनसा वाचमक्रत.....(2 ab)

A poem is to be 'gīrbhiḥ pariṣkṛtaḥ' as the poet of RV 10.135.7 says, the sage-like poets purify the sacrificial ingredients through their purified speech (RV 9, 86.4,20):

...ये त्वा मृजन्ति ऋषिषाण वेधसः (4 cd)

मनीषिभिः पवते पूर्व्यः कविः....(20 ab)

The inspired poems when cleaned and purified through [the sieve of] mind, flow out of the hearts of the Ṛṣi in the manner the streams of water gush forth or like the antelopes running madly when chased by a hunter (RV 4.58.6):

सम्यक् स्रवन्ति सरितो न धेना अन्तर्हृदा मनसा पूयमानाः।

एते अर्षन्त्यूर्मयो घृतस्य मृगा इव क्षिपणोरीषमाणाः॥

Attention is drawn here towards the beautiful expression 'waves of clarified butter' (*ūrmayo ghṛtasya*) used for poetry. According to the view of Vedic poets, the poetry should not only be refined, sophisticated and pure, but also butter-like smooth and soft. It is not the only place where the Vedic Ṛṣi uses the simile of butter to his poetic words. The '*ghṛtasnū girah*' appears elsewhere too, e.g. in the following verse addressed to Ādityāḥ (RV 2.27.1):

इमा गिर आदित्येभ्यो घृतस्नूः सनाद् राजभ्यो जुह्वा जुहोमि।

The Kāvyaḡunas (merits of poetry)

The verse 3.1.8 makes mention of not only butter but also of honey in the context of a poetic composition. Poet Viśvāmitra remarks that when poets start glorifying Indra with their poetry, streams of honey and clarified butter start flowing:

श्चोतन्ति धारा मधुनो घृतस्य वृषा यत्र वावृधे काव्येन।

The verse 4.58.1 makes mention of not only butter but also of honey in the context of poetic composition:

समुद्रादूर्मिर्मधुमाँ उदारद् उपांशुना समममृतत्वामानद्।

घृतस्य नाम गुह्यं यदस्ति जिह्वा देवानाममृतस्य नाभिः॥

Butter and honey again feature in verse 43 of the 6th Sūkta of the 8th Maṇḍala, ascribed to poet Vatsa of Kaṇva's lineage who reminds Indra that in the past his forefather have composed poetry 'dripping with ghee and honey' in his praise:

इमां सुपूर्व्या धियं मधोर्घृतस्य पिप्युषीम्।

कण्वा उक्थेन वावृधुः॥

In the above quoted verses likening the poetry with ghr̥ta and madhu, one may find the foreshadows of the poetic qualities (kāvyaguṇas) *saukumārya* and *mādhurya*, discovered later by Bhāmaha and dealt with him in detail.

Even the traces of the concept of *Ojas* in the sense of a 'vigorous and powerful construction of right words' (cf. 'tour de force' = 'feat of strength', forceful piece of art) – which is considered to be the 'life substance' (*jīvitam*) of the poetry by Daṇḍin (cf. *Kāvyādarśa* I.8 : *ojaḥ samāsabhūyastvametat kāvyasya jīvitam*) is found to be mentioned as a desirable quality of poetry in the Ṛgveda, as, for example, in RV 8.12.4:

इमं स्तोममभिष्टये घृतं न पूतमद्रिवः।

येना नु सद्य ओजसा ववक्षिथ।

'Words purified as ghee passed through a strainer, spoken with vigour and vitality....'.

Also the guṇa *prasāda* (clarity, simplicity) of the later theoreticians of poetics is hinted at in such adjectives as *sumṛṣṭam* (well cleaned, smooth), *śukram* (brilliant) and *śvetam* (whit, clear, clean, unmuddled) used for poetry:

शुक्रवर्णाम् उदु नो यंसते धियम् (1.143.7)

प्रेमं वर्णम् अतिरच्छुक्रम् आसाम् (3.34.5)

स्मदेतया सुकीर्त्या अश्विना श्वेतया धिया,
वहेथे शुभ्र यावाना। (8.26.19)

Thus all three main qualities of good poetry (*mādhurya*, *ojas* and *prasāda*) highlighted by Mammaṭa (Kāvyaaprakāśa VIII.67) seem to have not only been known but also greatly valued by Vedic poets.

The Embellishments (Alaṅkāras) :

That the poetry, especially that which is to be directed towards gods, should be well-adorned, embellished (*supeśalam*), not deficient or wanting (*akharvam*) in any respect and well composed (*sudhitam*) is also mentioned in the RV 7.32.13:

मन्त्रमखर्व सुधितं सुपेशलं दधात यज्ञियेषु आ।

The expression '*aram kṛtaḥ*' (alaṅkāraḥ of later period) in the sense of 'well arranged' 'proper' 'appropriate' is met with often in the Ṛgveda, especially in the context of sacrifice, e.g. '*yamaḥ ha yajño gachatyagnidūto amkṛtaḥ*' (10.14.13). The sense of properly arranged or 'embellished' is obviously also intended in RV 10.51.5.:

एहि मनुदेवयुर्यज्ञकामो अरंकृत्या तमसि क्षेप्यग्ने...।

The idea that a poem should be 'well fashioned' (*sutaṣṭa*), well formed and well arranged without any loose ends is quite common in the Ṛgveda as the following illustrations shall show:

इमा हि त्वा मतयः स्तोमतष्टा इन्द्र हवन्ते सख्यं जुषाणाः। (3.43.2)

इमं स्वस्मै हृद आ सुतष्टं मन्त्रं वोचेम कुविदस्य वेदत्। (2.35.2)

Should be free of blemishes (adoṣa) :

The desirability of poetry being flawless, without any blemishes (*adoṣam*) which is highly stressed upon by Mammaṭa and Bhojarāja in their respective works is also frequently found to be mentioned in the Ṛgveda, e.g. in the passage like '*anehasaḥ stubha indro duvasyati*' (3.51.3) or in the statements like 'one does not achieve any gains by bad poem/ bad praise : '*na duṣṭutī martyo vindate vasu*' (7.32.2) or 'it not considered good to utter a

blemished poem unto those who are munificent' (Indra is meant : *na duṣṭutirdraṇodeṣu śasyate.*)

Gains from poetry : fame and prosperity

The main worldly achievements of a literary composition for a poet, according to Mammaṭa, are fame and money: *kāvyam yaśase arthakṛte* (*Kāvyaprakāśa* 1.2). It looks like as if Mammaṭa has been inspired in his statement by the following words of the RV (I.31.8 ab) in which the poet *Hiraṇyastūpa* expresses the same desire unto god *Agni*:

त्वं नो अग्ने सनये धनानां यशसं कारुं कृणुहि स्तवानः ।

In RV I.9.7 Ṛṣi *Madhucchandasa* expresses a similar wish while addressing his prayer to *Indra*:

सं गोमद् इन्द्र वाजवद् अस्मे पृथुश्रवो बृहत् ।
विश्वा युधेहि अक्षितम् ॥

Bharadvāja also has the same desire which he wants to be fulfilled by *Indra*:

स नो वाजाय श्रवसे इषे च राये धेहि द्युमतः इन्द्र विप्रान् ।

Another Kavi named *Suparṇa* wants *Indra* and *Varuṇa* to grant friendly nature without pride (*saumanasam adṛptam*) and prosperity (*rāyaspoṣa*) short of arrogance to his *yajamāna* but wishes progeny, prosperity and long life for himself (RV 8.59.7)

Advisory faculty of the poetry

The *prayojana* 'upadeśayuje' was also not lost sight of the Vedic poets. A number of verses of the RV contain directives and even injunctions about moral and social conduct. One of the beautiful verses of this kind is RV 5.47.1 by poet *Pratiratha* of *Atri's* clan addressed to *Viśvedevāḥ*. He compares his poetry (*manīṣā*) with the pleasing words of an old mother resounding in the ears of the daughter much later as if descending from heavens above or like the soft words of a beautiful young daughter calling out to her father at home:

प्रयुञ्जती दिव एति ब्रुवाणा मही माता दुहितुर्बोधयन्ती ।
आ विवासन्ती युवतिर्मनीषा पितृभ्य आ सदने जोहुवाना ॥

Among the instructions given directly to human beings, the best known example is perhaps the advice given to a gambler, and through him to all human beings (RV 10.34.13). Such instructions occurring in the Veda are considered as 'ādeśa' (command) in our Smṛti literature and are meant to be followed assiduously :

अक्षैर्मा दीव्यः कृषिमित् कृषस्व वित्ते रमस्व बहु मन्यमानः।

तत्र गावः कितव तत्र जाया..... ॥

“Don't indulge in gambling, till the land, be satisfied with you earn or get, considering it much. This will bring you wealth (lit. cows) and keep your wife satisfied.....”

Poetry : an emotive eloquence

The emotional aspect (bhāva-pakṣa) of the poetry has been highlighted in the poems of the Ṛgveda quite frequently and strongly. According to Vedic poets the poetry should come directly from the heart (*hṛdā-taṣṭam*, composed from heart). This is a considered opinion of many a poet of the Ṛgveda. The element of emotional exuberance is important for good poetry. The poet of RV 6.16.47 (Bharadvāja) offers an oblation to god Agni in the form of a poem composed through his heart : *ā te agna ṛcā havir hṛdā taṣṭam bharāmasi*.

The light of the excellent gem of the real poetry originates in heart (3.26.8):

हृदा मतिं ज्योतिरनु प्रजानन् वर्षिष्ठं रत्नमकृत स्वधाभिः।

Only when the poetry emanates from the heart of the poet, it is beautiful enough to touch the heart of listener and embrace him like a beloved embraces her lover:

परिष्वजन्ते जनयो यथा पतिं मर्यं न शुन्ध्युं मघवानमूतये।

This is one of the most beautiful depictions of the characteristics of good poetry that one can think of. Unless the poetry touches ones heart, it is not equisite and unless it comes from the heart of the poet, it cannot do so.

But it is not so easy to compose such a poetry, admits, at the same time, another poet (4.5.6) : *guruṃ bhāraṃ na manma....* ('It is a kind of great burden to create good poetry'). A literary critic of

classical period agrees with him fully and corroborates it using almost the same words : *aho bhāro mahān kaveḥ*.

Let me conclude with pointing out a fundamental difference between the views of Vedic poets and the literary critics regarding the nature and purpose of the poetry.

The highest aim of poetry, according to classical aestheticians is to immerse the reader/listener in the ocean of absolute bliss comparable to *brahmānanda*, the rapture which one experiences when one realizes the identity of his self with the supreme consciousness. For a Vedic poet *ānanda* or bliss is not a product or effect of poetry, but it's its very cause. Instead of *leading to ānanda*, the vedic poetry rather ensues or *originates from* the ecstasy of spiritual experience. A Vedic poet becomes eloquent and starts pouring out when he has visualized the supreme truth, seen that brilliant light (...*aganma jyotir uttamam*, 1.50.10) and has understood the mysteries of gods (...*aganma jyotir avidāma devān*, 8.43.3). The poetry of a Vedic seer is, therefore, the vocal expression of his spiritual experience under the inspiration of divinities who impel his *dhiyaḥ* (imaginative and creative faculty) and with whom he identifies himself in the state of divine elevation, so beautifully expressed by the sage Viśvāmitra in the famous Gāyatrī (3.62.10):

तत्सवितुर्वरेण्यं भर्गो देवस्य धीमहि
धियो यो नः प्रचोदयात् ॥

Rgvedic All-Comprehensiveness

N. Kazanas

कजानस्-महाभागः बहुविधप्रमाणोपष्टम्भिते अस्मिन् शोधपत्रे भारतस्य सप्तसिन्धुप्रदेश एव आर्याणाम् उत्पत्तेः विकासस्य च स्थानमिति, आर्याणां मध्य-एशियादेशात् आक्रामकरूपेण युद्धमाध्यमेन सप्तसिन्धुदेशे आगमनविषयकाः सिद्धान्ताः नृतत्त्वानुवंशिकीशास्त्रादिशास्त्रसिद्धान्त-विरुद्धाः इति, ऋग्वेद-बौधायन-श्रौतसूत्रादि विश्वस्य प्राचीनतम-वाङ्मयगत-भाषाशास्त्रीयसिद्धान्तानां, देवतासंज्ञानां, कवितासादृश्यवैसादृश्यानां, व्याकरणसादृश्यवैसादृश्यानां, बन्धुवाचकपदसादृश्य-वैसादृश्यानां, तात्त्विकविचारधारायाः स्वरूपस्वभावानां च निश्चितपरिशीलनेन पूर्वोक्तसिद्धान्तः सुप्रतिष्ठापितः भवति इति, सप्तसिन्धुदेशादेव प्रत्युत केचन आर्यजातीयाः ऋषयः पूर्वदिशं प्रति पश्चिमदिशं प्रति अभिव्याप्य भारोपीयभाषासु संस्कृतस्य प्रभावं जनयामासुः इत्येव स्वीकारः प्रामाणिकः इति प्रतिष्ठापयति दृढं प्रत्यादिशति च मैक्समूलर-इमेनो-ब्यूलर-प्रभृतीन् प्रथितान् पाश्चात्य-विपश्चिदपश्चिमान्।

0. Argument. The *Rgveda* contains or preserves more elements from the Proto-Indo-European Culture than any other branch of the family. Here, the focus is on language and poetry and philosophy. This indicates that the Vedic people, as they themselves state in the hymns, did not immigrate into Saptasindhu c1700-1500 BCE as mainstream doctrine would have it, but were indigenous and the *Rgveda* is much older than 1200 BCE. But the bulk of the essay examines various grammatical and poetic aspects in the RV.

1. Indo-Āryan Indigenism

For more than 10 years I have been writing articles and giving lectures arguing against the AIT (=Aryan Invasion, now Immigration, Theory) and in favour of Indo-Āryan indigenism within the frame of the IE (=Indo-European) branches. The present study belongs to this general effort. For when I studied thoroughly the literature connected with this subject, mainly archaeological and historical but also linguistic, I found not one scrap of evidence of any kind to indicate, let alone prove, that c1700-1500 BCE the IAs (=Indo-Āryans) entered Saptasindhu, the

region of the Seven Rivers in what is today N-W India and Pakistan. Different kinds of evidence show, on the contrary, that the IAs are much more indigenous in India than Americans (except Red-Indians) in North America, English in England, French in France, Germans in Germany etc. These evidences come from Archeology, Anthropology, Genetics, Literature and Linguistics (Kazanas 2009).




Fig 1: Map of the IE branches and the alleged journey of the IAs

In Literature, in the RV, with whose language and virtues I shall be dealing shortly, we find no memory at all of any journey southward across Eurasia. On the contrary, in one hymn of the Angiras family (4.1.3) and another of the Vaśiṣṭhas (7.76.4) the ṛṣis state that their ancestors lived here, in Saptasindhu. In other hymns we read that the Āryan laws should be and are diffused over the earth: e.g. *asmākasaś ca sūrāyo víśvā āśās tarīṣāṇi* 'that our sages pervade all regions' (5.10.6) or *Suryam divi rohayantaḥ nava*

sudā āryā vratā visrjanto adhi kṣami 'the bounteous ones made the sun mount heaven and diversely released (*vi-srj-*) the Āryan laws over the earth' (10.65.11). Then, in one of the older hymns the poet proclaims that the five Vedic tribes (Anus, Turvasas, Druhyus, Pūrus and Yadus) have spread out beyond the Seven Rivers : RV 6.61.9, 12 :

sā no víśvā ati dviṣaḥ She [Sarasvatī] has spread us all
svasṛ anyā ṛtāvarī beyond the other [7] sister[-rivers]
atannaheva sūryaḥ as the sun spreads out days.

This is the situation approximately:




Fig 2 : The Five Vedic tribes expanding beyond Saptasindhu.

This early IA expansion covered Bactria and beyond according to Baudhāyana's *Śrauta Sūtra* 18.14. Many scholars mention this westward movement in the Purāṇas (e.g. Bryant 2001: 138, 328, n37) and dismiss it since these texts were very late but do not refer to the Ṛgvedic or Baudhāyana texts. Some use

the isoglosses as a counter-argument and the difficulty of having them move out of the northwest narrow mountain passes Saptasindhu (Bryant 2001: 146-7; Drinka 2009: 30-31); Jamison likened it to toothpaste spilling out of a tube (2005). Drinka, Jamison and Bryant lay emphasis on Hock's presentation of the isoglosses (1999) and all invoke "Occam's razor" which means that the right solution is the simplest one, all ignoring the simple facts that real life does not always behave in simplistic events and sequences and that "Occam's razor" had been refuted even in Occam's own time. Then, Hock himself repeatedly pointed out that even in historical times at least four languages emigrated out of N-W India, one of them, the Gypsy language reaching England (Fraser 1995).

However, linguists (not historians, mind you, nor archaeologists) insisted dogmatically that the IAs not merely came but actually invaded and conquered the Saptasindhu c-1700-1500.

"At some time in the second millennium BC... a band or bands of speakers of an Indo-European language, later to be called Sanskrit, entered India over the north west passes. This is our *linguistic doctrine* which has been held now for more than a century and a half. There seems to be no reason to distrust the *arguments* for it, in spite of the traditional Hindu ignorance of any such invasion." (M.B. Emeneau 1954: emphasis added).

Note here that this distinguished linguist does not bother to follow the discipline of historians and examine the actual sources for this mater. Although he deals with an historical event (an alleged invasion) he writes about a "linguistic doctrine" and "arguments for it", not about original texts, archaeological evidence and other relevant data used by historians. The next excerpt from another linguist is even worse because the man ought to know better.

"The Āryan invasion of India is recorded in no written document and it cannot yet be traced archaeologically but it is nevertheless established as a historical fact on the basis of comparative philology" (Th. Burrow 1975:21)

The arrogance of both was belied by archaeological finds.

Indeed, 12 years after Emeneau's statement and 9 years before Burrow's, George Dales published in 1966 his seminal article showing that there had never been an invasion nor fighting and destruction in Saptasindhu. All expert archaeologists of the ISC (=Indus-Sarasvati Civilisation) insist now on the unbroken continuity of the culture there. It developed naturally without any significant entry of foreigners. (Gupta & Lal 1984, Shaffer & Lichtenstein 1995, 1999, Allchin B & R 1997, Kenoyer 1998, Chakrabarti 1999, McIntosh 2001, Possehl 2002, Lal 2002, 2005, 2009) Anthropological studies also show that there was no change in the cranioskeletal features of the ISC inhabitants from at least 4500 to c600 BCE. (Kennedy 1995).

Then, in their own field, geneticists affirm in various studies that there was no significant flow of foreign genes into the Indian sub-continent before the sixth cent BCE: Oppenheimer 2003; Sahoo et al 2006; Chaubey 2009. To take the last reference, Dr G Chaubey worked with a team under Thomas Kivisild for four years in the Institute of Molecular and Cell Biology, University of Tartu (Estonia): they analysed 12,200 samples from all over India and found only common genetic traits on the basis both of the paternal Y chromosome and the maternal DNA's; there was no significant influx other than the arrival of people from Africa c60 000 BP. (See Chaubey 2009.)

Summary of the evidences

Archaeologists stress the unbroken continuity of ISC.

Anthropologists find no change in the cranioskeletal features of the ISC inhabitants 4500-600 BCE.

Genetic studies assure us of no inflow of genes into Saptasindhu before 600 up to 60000.

Linguistics also support indigenism:

Sanskritisation of whole area (names of rivers, etc: e.g. Sarasvatī, Himavat, Viśvāmitra, Bharadvāja, Vāśiṣṭha, and so on).

Sanskrit more archaic than others (Burrow 1973).

A bad historian, but great sanskritist, Burrow wrote in his authoritative study *The Sanskrit Language*: Sanskrit is a “language which in most respects is more archaic and less altered from original Indo-European than any other member of the family”. Later he adds: Root-nouns are “very much in decline in the earliest recorded IE languages” but “in Sanskrit they are preserved much better” (1973: 34,123).

Nonetheless, linguists persisted in their “doctrine” writing profusely about invasion and conquest even in the mid 1990’s (e.g. O’Flaherty 1981, Winn 1995). In the late 1990’s the “invasion” became “(im-)migration” and because archaeologists would have none of this, linguists concocted small waves of immigrants who had already absorbed the indigenous culture (but not the language) and so would not show up on the archaeological record! Some even claim that these waves could bring in the Vedic language without showing up in the genetic record! But they don’t explain ever how such insignificant numbers would have āryanised/sanskritised an area as large as France and Germany together. Nonetheless, despite the massive evidences against any entry from all disciplines that deal with historical facts like History, Genetics, Anthropology and literary sources, linguists continue to regard the matter of linguistic affair and pay no attention to the others (e.g. Drinka 2009, Jamison 2005, Huld 2002, etc, etc) as if they do not exist!

Here, I shall apply what I call the Preservation Principle and show that apart from root-nouns Sanskrit (or Vedic or Old Indic) retains many more archaic features than other IE branches.

2. Theonyms: names of deities in the RV and other branches.

There are more than 20 such theonyms in the RV alone (Kazanas 2009: ch3). Here we shall look at 6 of them only: Agni, Aryaman, Dyaus, (Apām)-Nápāt, Sūrya, Uṣas.

Agní : Hit Agnis; Sl Ogon/Ogun.

Lat *ignis*, Lith *ugnis*, Lett *uguns* - all ‘fire’. Iranians had as demons Indra, Saurva but, despite their fire worship, preserved only in proper name *Dašt-ayni*. For ‘fire’ Ht has *pahhur*, Gk *pur* and Gmc *fyr* and variants; so it would have been more natural for Hittite to have a fire-god whose name was related to *pahhur*!

Aryamán : Av Airyaman; Myc Areimene (Gk Are-s?); Celt Ariomanus (Gaul), Eramon (Ireland); Germanic Irmin. The stem ar-/or- 'move, rise' in most IE branches: Gk or-numi 'rise', Lat orior, Gmc rinn- 'run'; Arm y-ar-ne 'rise'; etc .

Dyàus : Hit D-Siu-s ; Gk Zeus/Difa-; Lat Ju[s]-pitar/Iov-; Gmc Tîwaz; Rus Divu (?); Av dyaoš;

Apām-Nápāt : Av Apām-Napā; Lat Nept-unus; Irish Necht/-an (-p changes to other consonants).

Sūrya : Kassites Šuriaš; Gk Hēli(F)os ; Lat Sol ; Gmc savil/sol; Welsh saul; Slavic slunice/solnce: all 'sun'.

Uśās : Gk Ēōs ; Lat Au[s]-rora ; Gmc Eoś-tre. Av uśah-; Lith auśra, Lett ausma; Celtic gwaur; etc.

Vedic 6; Greek 4; Latin 4; Germanic 3; Hittite 2; Slavic 2; Celtic 2.

But, moreover, the stem for the natural phenomenon 'fire' does exist again in some of them, like ignis in Latin, uguns/ugnis in Baltic; or the 'sun' in Gmc savil/ sol, Celtic saul, Slavic solnce; and so on. Clearly, the other branches lost the theonyms.

3. Poetic Art

Germanic had alliterative poetry. E.g. in Modern English *Roll on, roll on you restless waves* where the *r* repeats; or *Do not go gentle into the good night* where the *g* repeats. *If all would lead their lives in love like me* where the *l* repeats.

Greek had strict metrical structure. Homer's heroic hexameter in his epics and others with variants of iambic, dactylic, trachaic metre etc.

pán tas gar phi lé es ken ho dōi é pi oi kí a naí ōn

- - | - ~ ~ | - ~ ~ | - ~ ~ | - -

'he entertained all living in a house on the high road':

Homer: *Iliad* 6, 15 (no alliteration).

hós min xeì non e ón ta ka te kta nen hōi ē ñi ói kōi

- - | - ~ ~ | - ~ ~ | - ~ ~ | - -

'he killed him who was a guest in his house':

Odyssey 21.27 (some as above) strict metre only.

In Germanic poetry we find the opposite: alliterative verses but no strict metre. Take an example from *The Seafarer* 44-45, an Old English poem:

*Ne bi. him to hearpan hyge ne to hring.ege,
ne to wife wyn ne to worulde hyht...*

‘His thought is not for the harp nor the receiving
of rings, nor joy in a woman nor pleasure in the world’.

Modern English verse has metre and alliteration:

If all would lead their lives in love like me :

˘ × | ˘ × | ˘ × | ˘ × | ˘ × |

This is the Iambic pentameter with stress, which substitutes the length of vowels.

Vedic has both alliteration and fairly strict metre: e.g. from *RV* 6.47.29, with *Triṣṭubh* structure, i.e. eleven syllables and strict cadence - - -

sa dundubhe sajūrindreṇa devair

˘ - ˘ - ˘ - - - ˘ - -

dūrād davīyo apa sedha śatrūn

- - ˘ - - ˘ ˘ - ˘ - -

‘O drum, along with Indra and the gods, do
drive our foes to farthest distance’.

(It has both alliteration and the fairly strict metre of *Triṣṭubh* 11 syllables in each quarter of the stanza and also assonance u,u,ū,e,e,e;ā,a,a,a,a.)

Riddles are found in all traditions, all nations. Here are two from *RV* 8.29.5:

tigmam eko bibharti hasta āyudham

śucirugro jalāṣabheṣajaḥ:

‘One, bright [and] fierce, with cooling remedies,

Carries in his hand a sharp weapon'. (*Jalāśabheṣajah*)

trīṇyēka urugāyo vicakrame

yatra devāso madanti: (8.29.7)

'One, far-going has made three strides

to where the gods rejoice'. (*urugāyah*)

The two clues signal Rudra and Viṣṇu respectively.

I close this section with the words of Calvert Watkins: "The language of India from its earliest documentation in the *Ṛgveda* has raised the art of the phonetic figure to what many would consider its highest form" (2001: 109).

One of many splendid stanzas: 3.54.8

viśvedete janimā sām vivikto

maho devān bibhratī no, vyathete;

ejaddhrvaṃ patyate viśvamekaṃ

carat patatri viṣuṇaṃ vi jātam.

'The two truly encompass (*sām*-) and sift all births/beings, bearing the mighty devas, yet do not stagger. Moving yet fixed, the One governs the whole, what walks and flies- the manifold manifest creation.'

Apart from alliteration and rich assonance with *vi* especially, note that the neuter gender affords multiple interpretations (*viśvam ekam*). Or take 4.40.5:

haṃsaḥ śuciśad vasurantarikṣasād

hotā vediśad atithir duroṇasat;

nṛśad varasad ṛtasad vyomasad

abjā gojā ṛtajā adrijā ṛtam.

'The swan in the clear brightness, the Vasu in midsky, the summoner at the altar, the guest in the house; what is in men, what is in excellence, what is in Natural Order, what is in heaven; what are born of Waters, of light, of Cosmic Order, of the Unbreakable – that is the Law'.

Here the art is based on the repetition of -sat 'being, dwelling, sitting in' and -já 'born of'. In the first two pādas we see a descent from the brightness of the sky down to a house; then in each of the other two we see an ascent. Of course *go* commonly means 'cow' but often denotes 'light' and this must be the sense here; similarly *ádri-* usually means 'rock, stone, mountain' even 'cloud, lightning' but the basic sense is 'unbreakable' (probably from a form of *dṛ* 'breaking (through), piercing' and the negative *á-*). Natural Law shapes and runs through all phenomena and this alone has permanence – it is implied – whereas all else is like a passing guest.

There are many other passages I can cite, like 2.21.1 where we find the repetition of *-gite* or 10.67.13 with repetition of *svasti* etc. We find also all figures of speech that form fine poetry from *atiśayokti* (eg 3.55.7 etc) and *upamā* (with *iva*, *na*, etc) to *yamaka* (4.1.2 etc) and *śleṣa* (6.75.17 etc) but discussing them would lengthen this essay unnecessarily. The words of Watkins would suffice.

4. Grammar

Sanskrit, according to Burrow is "more readily analysable, and its roots [=dhātu] more easily separable from accretionary elements than is the case with any other IE language" (1973: 289). Indeed, consider how from simple *dhātus*, that are also nominal stems, arise nouns and adjectives and verbs in tenses and moods. Or as Elizarenkova put it, "the verb-root is basic to both inflexion and derivation ... it is irrelevant that for some roots such nouns are not attested" (1995: 50) – except that simple "root" and even "seedform" would be better translations for *dhātu*.

a) Dhātu or root-form and derivatives.

cit 'perceiving, being conscious of' > *cit* adj 'one cognizant, perceiving' or (f) 'awareness, cognizance, perception'; '*citi* 'understanding', *citra* 'bright, excellent, variegated', *cetas* 'splendour, intelligence' *caitanya* 'consciousness'; verb forms – *cétati*, *cittá*, *cikéta*, *ácait* etc etc, where the principal or vowel gradation (i>e>ai) unfolds in regular order. We could take also *ad* 'eating', *īs* 'ruling', *ṛc* 'praising, reciting', *krudh* 'anger', *jñā* 'knowing' etc etc. But compare S *hu* and Greek *cheō*. S *hu*

‘sacrificing, pouring into fire’ > verb and noun forms *jú-hu-ati*, *hutá*, *hótum*, *hótṛ*, *hóma*, *áhausit* – etc, etc, where the principle of vowel gradation (*u>o/au*) unfolds regularly and beautifully. Now compare this with the chaos in –

Greek *ché-ō* ‘I pour’: *che-û-ma* ‘flow, stream’; *chû-ma* ‘fluid’;

cho-é ‘libation, pouring’; *choû-s* ‘earth, soil’:

Root? *che-*, *cho-*, *chû-* (=S *hu > juhóti*)?

Sanskrit: *dhṛ* > *dhariṣyáte*, *dadhré*, *dhṛtvā*, *dhṛtí*, *dhṛti*, *dharā*, *dhārṭṛ*, *dharmāṣi*, *dharma*, *dhārā*, *dhāraṇa* etc.

Greek: *thranío* ‘stool’, *thrónos* ‘throne’, with vowels *a*, *o* but no root or verb.

b) Negation & prohibition

Some IE branches have *na/ne/no* for ‘do/must not’ (e.g. Latin, Celtic, Slavic, and Germanic).

Some have *mā/mi/mē* (e.g. Tocharian, Armenian, and Greek).

Sanskrit and Avestan have both *na* and *mā*.

c) The Augment in past tenses.

Armenian have it (with initial consonant in monosyllabic stems only) and Greek have it: e.g. Arm *e-likh* ‘left’, Gk *é-lipe* ‘left’. On the other hand Hittite (*dais* ‘he set’), Gothic and Old English *band* ‘one bound’) and others did not have it.

Vedic has both forms : *ábhet/bhét* ‘one feared’, *ádur/dúr* ‘they gave’ etc.

d) Perfect.

Some branches did not have one (Toch, Arm).

a) Reduplicated perf: Av *ta-taš-a* ‘has fashioned’; Gk *dé-dork-a* ‘I have seen’; Gmc *hait-hait* ‘has been named’

b) Simple perf: Av *vaēḍa*, Gmc *wait* ‘has known’;

Lat *gnōv-it* ‘has learnt, knows’ (=S *jñā-*) etc.

- c) Periphrastic perf: (fem. form of) main verb + auxiliary verb
 –as in Engl ‘have’ aux + ‘gone’ main. Ht: *markan* (main)
 + *harteni* (aux) ‘cut you have’.

Vedic and Avestan have all three perfect forms.

- e) **Significant difference between Vedic and Avestan.**

Vedic redupl: *ta-takṣa* ‘has fashioned’, *da-darśa* ‘has seen’; Av
tataša;

simple: *veda* ‘has known, knows’; Av *vaēda*;

Periphr: *gamayām cakāra* ‘has caused someone to go’
 (AV 18.27.2);

mantrayām āsa (Brāhmaṇas etc) ‘has advised’: i.e. main
 verb, fem. acc sing + auxiliary *kṛ-* ‘do’, *as-* ‘be’. BUT in this form –

Av has only with *ah-* (=S *as-*) ‘be’: *āstara yeintīm* + *ah-* ‘must
 have corrupted’. Since Av has only verb + aux *ah-*, this indicates
 that Av separated from Vedic after Vedic developed *as-* as
 auxiliary. Otherwise Vedic would have aux *as-* first! Let us see.

Mainstream doctrine teaches that original homeland of IEs
 is the Pontic (South Russian) Steppe, just above the Black Sea. But
 the direction of movement should be reversed.




Fig 3.

According to the mainstream Doctrine (the AIT, actually), the Indo-Iranians formed one unified people then and moved to Iran passing from the Urals. Then the Indoaryans left the common Iranian homeland and moved into Saptasindhu. But if this is true, then they should have had developed first the periphrastic perfect with auxiliary verb *as-* 'to be' like the Iranians, and afterwards the aux *kṛ-*. This evidence shows that first they developed main verb + auxiliary *kṛ-* in *Atharva Veda* and long afterwards main verb + aux *as-* in the *Brahmaṇas*. Since the Vedics and Iranians are supposed to have been together and since they certainly appear to share so many features in common, this means that they, the Iranians, left the common fold, not the IAs!

Avestan & Sanskrit common features.

	Avestan	Sanskrit	
Prohibitive	<i>mā</i>	<i>mā</i>	'must not';
Perfect	<i>ta-taša</i>	<i>ta-takṣa</i>	'has fashioned';
	<i>Vaēḍa</i>	<i>veda</i>	'has known, knows';
Noun	<i>haoma</i>	<i>soma</i>	'sacrificial drink';
	<i>Ahura</i>	<i>asura</i>	'lord' (later S 'demon');
Country	<i>Haptahandu</i>	<i>Saptasindhu</i>	'land of 7 rivers'

Now consider *-handu* and *-sindhu*.

In Sanskrit the word *sindhu* has several related words: e.g. compounds *sindhukṣit*, *sindhu-ja*, *sindhu-pati* etc and derivatives like *saindhava*, and so on. It is thought to derive from the root *syand* 'flowing' or *sidh* 'reaching, having success'. In Avestan *-handu* stands isolated, and the word for river is commonly *ṡraotah* (=S *srotas*) and *raodah*. This again is indicative of the Iranians moving away from the IAs and taking with them the memory that they had lived in a region with Seven Rivers. This was spotted even as early as Max Muller: "Zoroastrians were a colony from Northern India...[who] migrated westward to Arachosia and

Persia" (1875:248)¹ We shall examine this from another angle in §7, below.

5. Eight words of closest human relations.

1. brother : S *bhrātṛ*; Av *brātār*-; Toch *pracar*; Arm *elbayr*; Gk *phratēr*; Lt *frāter*; Celt *brathir*; Gmc *broðar*; Sl *bratrъ*; Lith *broter*-; Not Hit.
2. daughter : S *duhitṛ*; Av *dugədar-/duyðar*-; Toch *ckācar*; Arm *dustr*; G *thugátēr*; lt *futir*; Gmc *daúhtar*; Lith *dukte* Sl *dъšti*. Not Hit, Celt.
3. father : S *pitṛ*; Av *pitar/(p)tar*-; Toch *pācar*; Arm *hair*; Gk *patēr*; lt *pater*; Celt *athir*; Gmc *fadar*. Not Baltic, Sl, Ht.
4. Husband, lord: S *pāti*; Av *paītiš*; Toch *pats*; Gk *posis*; lt *potis* (=capable); Gmc *-fa.(s)*; Lith *pats/patis*; Sl *-podъ*. Not Arm, Celt, Hit (but Hit *pat* -'just').
5. mother : S *mātṛ*; Av *mātār*-; Toch *mācar*; Arm *mair*; G *mētēr*; lt *māter*; Celt *māthir*; Gmc *mōdor*; Sl *mati.*, Not Hit; Lith *mote* 'wife'.
6. sister : S *svasṛ*; Av *x'anhar*; Toch *sar*; Arm *k'oir*; It *soror*; Celt *siur*; Gmc *swister*; Lith *sesuo*; Sl *sestra*. Not Hit; Gk *eór* 'daughter'.
7. son : S *sūnú*; Av *humuš*; Gmc *sunus*; Lith *sūnus*; Sl *synъ*; Not Toch, Ht, Arm, G (*hui-ός?*), It, Celt.
8. wife/mistress : S *pātnī*; Av *paθnī*; G *pótnia*; Lith *-patni*. Not Toch, Arm, Hit, It, Celt, Gmc, Sl.

Only S & Av have them all. Hit has none! Yet comparativists persist in calling Hittite the most archaic IE tongue! How is it possible not to have even one of these nouns for the most common of human relations yet be the most archaic IE tongue? Why would all the others innovate suddenly?

1. Müller did make several blunders, of course, in having the Āryans invade India and in assigning the RV c1200 - something which he repudiated later giving dates as early as 3000 and even 5000 BCE.

6. Philosophy: One and Many.

For last, but certainly not least, I have left a philosophical subject. There are many more issues: cosmogony and anthropogony, reincarnation, ethics and the like. But consideration of all these issues would take much much longer. So let us look at only one more aspect. There are many cosmogonies in the RV but underlying them all is the idea of One from which arise the Many. Obviously there is polytheism with many gods; also henotheism, as one clan or family *gotra* worships a particular deity and ascribes to him (or her, in the case of *Aditi* or *Jñāna/ Vāc*) the emergence of the creation. But there are also several references to the One from which all deities arise: so there is also monotheism or the one Absolute.

Summary.

Polytheism: many deities as in all other IE branches.

Henotheism: one clan worships a particular deity and this is said to be the best (and creator)

Monotheism: all deities, all worlds, all creatures come from One, which remains unmanifest. Deities have divinity only by partaking of the power of the One.

3.55.2 *mahād devānām asuratvām ékam* : 'single and great is the high-lord-power of the gods (in which they partake to be gods or asuras).

1.164.46: *ékam sād víprā bahudhá vadanti* (also 10.114.5): 'it is One but the sages call it by many expressions.'

10.90 : everything is produced from *Puruṣa*'s parts.

10.129 *Nāsadiya: ānid avātām svadháyā tád ékam* : 'that One breathed without air of its own.

8.58.2 *ékam vā idám víbabhuva sárvam*. 'Being One it became all'.

3.54.8 *éjad dhruvám patyate ékam víśvam*, 'Moving yet unmoving the One *carát patatṛi víṣṇam víjātám*. Rules the whole, what walks and flies, all this manifest multiplicity'.

Obviously, when the IE speakers that emerge from the mists of pre-historic Europe and come to be known as Greeks, Germans, Celts etc, they are barbarians, fond of war, pillage and conquest. The RV also speaks frequently of war and battles. Here the weapon of victory is more often than not *bráhman*, the mystic power inherent in ritual and prayer, an inner force of the spirit or “silent meditation” as Puhvel calls it (1989: 153) in referring to sage Atri’s rehabilitation of the sun (RV 5, 40,6). This is the power used by the sage Vaśiṣṭha when helping King Sudas defeat his numerous enemies (RV 7.33) and, of course, by the Ṛbhus when accomplishing the wondrous deeds that earned them godhood. And hymn 6.75.19 says “My closest/inner armour is *bráhma*” (=this same mystic power). This very word *brahman* becomes, not without good reason, the name of the Absolute in post- Ṛgvedic literature, mainly the Upanishads. Yet, the Absolute is not entirely absent from the RV, as Keith observed: “...India developed the conception of a power common to the various gods ... just as the unity of the gods even by the time of certain Rigvedic hymns” (1925: 446).

Hymn RV 10.90. shows how creatures and world-elements are produced from different parts of the Puruṣa, the primordial Man: thus multiplicity comes from unity. More so, the *nāsadiya* hymn 10.129. describes the evolution of the whole creation including the gods from the One *ekam*. Taking cosmogonic myths from Iran, Greece, Rome and/or North Europe, some scholars rightly state that the creation arises from two primordial elements, “the action of heat on water”, and that this “reflects a multi-layered dualism that pervades Indo-European myth and religion” (Stone 1997, ch 5; see also Puhvel 1989: 277). But in the RV *Creation Hymn* 10.129. it is out of the One alone, breathing without air, of Its own power (*ānid avātām svadhāyā tād ékam*), that arose all else; only in the third stanza appears *salilám* (water?) and *tápas* (heat?)² within *támas* ‘darkness’, within *tuchyá*

-
2. I put question-marks because I feel certain, against the received notions, that *salilá* here does not mean ‘water’ but ‘flux (of energy)’ generally and *tápas* ‘power of transformation’ – as I argue in my 2009 (pp 86-7 and note 1; or ch 2, §11). I repeat here that there is still nothing material in this third stanza within ‘darkness’ *támas* and ‘void’ *tuchyá*.

'void'; and then follows one existence, desire and so on. Here at least it is the Unity that is the basic primordial substratum. This is no different from the Absolute of the Upaniṣhads. And this we meet in other hymns also. RV 8.58.2 says *ékam vā idám ví babhūva sárvaṃ* 'It being One has variously (ví) become this All (and Everything)'. Hymns 1.164.6 and 10.114.5. say that the wise poets speak of It, being One, in many ways/forms – naming it Agni, Yama, Indra, etc. Thus the different divinities are the manifestations of that One. This is reinforced by the acknowledgement that the gods are gods by virtue of a single godhood or god-power, as the refrain in 3.55. states plainly: *mahád devānāṃ asuratvám ékam* 'Single is the great god-power (asuratvá) of the gods'. Utilizing different material in the *R̥gveda*, K Werner makes the same point (1989).

This notion of a Single One, of which all divine and mundane phenomena are manifestations, is absent from all other IE branches. Thus the Vedic Āryas, far from being bloodthirsty or primitive barbarians deifying out of fear of natural phenomena like the storm or the fire, would seem to belong among the most highly cultured people on earth with a culture that consisted not so much of material artifacts as of inner spiritual power.

7. Finally the true situation.

Thus in all the spheres we have examined the R̥gvedic all-comprehensiveness is very palpable. As Max Müller put it 150 years ago: the Vedic man "has preserved something of what seems peculiar to each of the northern [Indo-European] dialects singly as he agrees with the Greek and the German where the Greek and the German seem to differ from all the rest, and as no other language has carried off so large a share of the common Āryan heirloom - whether roots, grammar, words, myths or legends" (Müller 1859: 14)³. This indicates that the Vedic people (or Indo-Aryans) did not move much travelling thousands of miles: thus they had the leisure to pass on their ancient lore to the new generations and had no memories of sojourns into alien lands. But they did preserve the memory of the tribes expanding,

3. Please see note 1.

of their sages going abroad and of embarking on two migrations eastward and westward.




Fig 4 (=2): The five Vedic tribes expanding beyond Sapt

As we saw earlier (§1), RV 6.61.9,12 says: The five tribes spread beyond the Seven Rivers. Other hymns state that the sages and their ancestors had always been “here” (Aṅgiras family 4.1.3; Vasiṣṭha 7.76.4). And the vast Vedic corpus does not contain one single reference to an immigration, not one memory of a different previous habitat unlike the Hebrews who, in their *Old Testament*, record previous homelands, sojourns into other lands and other people met on the way to their historical habitat.

On the contrary, apart from the Ṛigvedic references of Āryan sages and laws spreading abroad (§1, above), Baudhāyana’s *Śrautasūtra* 18.14 says, there were two migrations of the Āryans: the eastern one called Āyava moving into the Gangetic plains and

further; the western one Āmāvasa engendering the Gāndhāris, Parśus (=Persians) and Arāttas (=people of Ararat, by the Black sea, or Urartu, just South of Ararat). Note, that the Iranians record in *Avesta* that they had passed from Haptahendū (=Saptasindhu) and Haraxvaiti (=Sarasvatī) whereas the IAs do not mention any travel from Iran into Saptasindhu, nor, more important, from northwestern regions into Iran.

Back in 1997 Joahna Nichols, an accomplished linguist and by no means a supporter of Indo-Āryan indigenism, had calculated on linguistic types of evidence (loanwords, isoglosses etc) that the area of dispersal was in Bactria. She probably would be very pleased to know that Vedic and Avestan literary sources provide historical evidence as well for her conclusions. Yes, from Saptasindhu proper the IAs spread west and north but it was from Bactria, the much wider Saptasindhu, that they dispersed even farther.

Apparently this then is the final situation. And I certainly prefer to follow the evidence in the ancient sources, i.e. *Avesta*, the R̥gvedic hymns and Baudhāyana's sūtras, rather than superficial and supercilious modern scholars.




Fig 5: Indoaryan migrations, eastward and westward.

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Agricultural Knowledge as it is Reflected in The Śaunakīya Atharvaveda

A Reappraisal

Gyula Wojtilla

वोज्टिल्ला महाभागः शौनकीयाथर्ववेदसंहितायाम् ऐदम्प्राथम्येन
उपलभ्यमानानां कृषिसम्बद्धानां पारिभाषिकपदानां साहाय्येन क्रिस्तोः पूर्वं
१२००-८५० मध्यकाले प्रयाग-कौशाम्बी-वाराणसी मध्यदेशे सज्जातां
कृषेः समुन्नतिं प्रमाणपुरस्सरं व्यवस्थापयति। लाङ्गलीयफालभागस्य
अयोनिर्मितत्वदारुनिर्मितत्वरूपपक्षद्वयं परिशील्य दिलीपचक्रवर्त्यादि-
पुरातत्त्वविदां मतं निराकुर्वश्च स्वाभिमतं द्वितीये पक्षे दर्शयति।

Due to the scarcity of archaeological evidence the Vedic corpus is an indispensable tool for research into the stand of agricultural technology in the period between c. 1500-700 B.C. Accordingly, there is a wide range of scholarly endeavours dealing with the evaluation of references to agriculture as well as of the agricultural terms inlaid in the texts belonging to this corpus.

The relevant part of Zimmer's classical book still has great merits (Zimmer 1879, 235-243), however, it suffers from a shortage: it treats the Vedic corpus as a whole irrespective of whether the data are from texts of different ages and geographical place of origin. The same statement is valid for Acchelāl's treatment of the subject (Acchelāl 1980, 31-60). It is a pity that this fine book is available only in Hindi. In his monumental work Randhawa discusses this period in two independent chapters (1980, 290-300 and 301- 322). A great advantage of this book is the author's professional skill and his wide knowledge of the archaeological evidence. On the other hand, the philological material in the book is taken from second hand and far from exhausting. Kansara's way of treatment is similar to that of Zimmer and Acchelāl. Being a practising

agriculturist, he is tempted to offer modern explanations of old things at places (Kansara 1995). In his book, data from different sources and ages are intermingled and therefore it can be used only with criticism. Ayer's book (Ayer 1949) and some short papers (Gopalaswamy Aiyangar 1967, Bhattacharjee 1978 and Sagar 1982) were not available to me.

This stand of studies urgently calls for a refinement of research: the individual texts inside the Vedic corpus must be investigated separately; the possibly most precise date and provenance of the given texts must be ascertained; the relevant data must be extracted from them; archaeological correlations must be sought for the picture emerging from the collected and meticulously interpreted data.

The first steps in this direction have been already made: the agricultural data have been thoroughly researched from the Ṛgveda (Wojtilla 2003), the Śatapathabrāhmaṇa (Mylius 1964, 51-54) and a series of Brāhmaṇa-texts (Rau 1957, 25-26; Mylius 1971, 174-176).

On the other hand, these data of the Atharvaveda, 'an irreplaceable source of material culture' (Witzel 1997, 275), has been investigated only at random (cf. Karambelkar 1959, 59; Kharade 1997, 13-22). In short, a reappraisal of the Atharvaveda material is well in order.

It's common knowledge that the Atharvaveda has come down to us in two versions. The considerable differences in the text of the Śaunakīya and Paippalāda schools and their slightly different provenance call for separate studies. As the stand of studies of the Śaunakīya version is more advanced, my present choice fell on it.

Following Witzel, the provenance of the Śaunaka version must be sought in the land of the Pañcālas (eastern Uttar Pradesh, up to Kausambi/Allahabad/Kāśī)' (Witzel 1997, 280). On the basis of the phrase *śyāma ayas* (XI, 3, 7), which he takes iron, Witzel dates it from c. 1200 BC (Witzel 1995, 4). Recent work on the archaeological evidence of iron industry in India reveals that there are levels yielding iron objects at Kausambi datable to 1100-1000 B.C. (Tripathi, 2008b, 42). Taking into account that the Atharvaveda as a whole is later than the Ṛgveda and earlier than

the Śatapathabrāhmaṇa and the possibility of dating the Late Vedic Age c. from 800-540 (Mylius 1970, 368), we may tentatively put the genesis of it in the period between 1200-850 BC. This approximately covers the period which Witzel calls Middle Vedic Period (cf. Witzel 1997).

A cursory glance at the contents of the corpus is sufficient to see the increasing importance of agriculture in everyday life. Prthī Vainya, the inventor of agriculture (VINS II, 16), milks from earth both cultivation (*kṛṣi*) and rice (*sasya*) and upon those two men subsist 'successful by what is cultivated (*kṛṣṭarādhi*), one to subsisted upon' VIII, 10, 24? (Whitney 1905, 514). This is a manifesto of a new way of life in which agriculture gradually became the chief means of livelihood of the people.

Verse 5 of hymn II, 4 makes a clear distinction between the forest products and that of ploughing. Special hymns have been recited in order to make agriculture successful (III, 17), to promote the abundance of grain (III, 24), to increase barley (VI, 142). The king of gods, Indra, holds down the furrow and Pūṣan defends it (III, 17, 4). Indra has a hundred abilities (*Śatakrātu*), is called *sīrāpati* the master of the plough (VI, 30, 1). Viṣṇu's stride is 'stirred up by ploughing' (X, 5, 34). Hymn XII, 1 extols the earth. Verse 3 and 4 say that the earth is 'on whom food, plowing, came into being' (Whitney 1905, 661). According to verse 17 she is 'the all-producing mother of herbs' (Whitney 1905, 664).

Much more rewarding is a scrutiny of the agricultural vocabulary containing terms concerning the soil, the agricultural implements and operations, cultivated plants and men and animals employed in agricultural work. Terms connected with gardening and animal husbandry keep out of the scope of the present paper, for they do not pertain to agriculture (*kṛṣi*) strictly speaking (cf. Wojtilla 2006, 11-13).

*ĀBHRI f. a spade IV, 7, 5. 6. It is used to dig up herbs.

*ĀBAYU m. name of a plant VI, 16, 1. Both form and meaning are quite uncertain (VINS I, 59). The hymn where the term can be attested is unintelligible (Whitney 1905, 292). Bloomfield takes it as mustard plant (Bloomfield 1897, 465).

*IKṢU m. sugar-cane, *Saccharum officinarum* L. I, 34, 5.

*ĪṢĀ f. the pole of a plough II, 8, 4.

URVĀRĀ f. a fertile soil X, 6, 33; X, 10, 8; XIV, 2, 14.

*URVĀRU m. cucumber, *Cucumis utilissimus* Roxb. VI, 14, 2.

URVĀRUKĀ m. cucumber, *Cucumis utilissimus* Roxb. XIV, 1, 17.

ULŪKHALA n. a wooden mortar X, 9, 26; XI, 3, 3.

KĀṆA m. corn XI, 3, 5.

KĪNĀŚA m. a cultivator of the soil IV, 11, 10; VI, 30, 1.

KṚṢI f. cultivation II, 4, 5; VIII, 2, 19; VIII, 10, 24; X, 5, 34; X, 6, 12; XII, 2, 37.

KṚṢṬA mfn. cultivated (of a fertile soil) X, 633.

*KṚṢṬARĀDHI mfn. Successful by what is cultivated (a man) VIII, 10, 24.

KṢETRA n. a field IV, 18, 5; V, 31, 4; X, 1, 18; XI, 1, 22; XIV, 2, 7.

KṢMĀ f. ground XVIII, 1, 39.

KHANITRĪMA mfn. produced by digging (of water) I, 6, 4; XIX, 2, 2.

KHĀLA m. n. a threshing-floor XI, 3, 9.

*KHĀLVA m. black chick-pea, *Dolichus lablab* L. II, 31, 1; V, 23, 8.

*TANĀULĀ m. grain (after threshing and winnowing) esp. rice X, 9, 26; XI, 1, 18; XI, 3, 5; XII, 3, 18; XII, 3, 29-30.

*TILA m. sesame, *Sesamum indicum* L. II, 8, 3; VI, 140, 2.

*TILAPINJĪ f. Problematic word. Whitney hypothetically renders it as 'sesame-stalk' (Whitney 1905, 49) II, 8, 3.

*TUṢA m. the chaff of grain or rice XI, 1, 12; XI, 3, 5.

*TSARU m. Problematic word. On the basis of some commentaries Whitney renders it as the handle of a plough (Whitney 1905, 115-116) III, 17, 3.

DHĀNYA n. grain, mainly rice, *Oryza sativa* L. II, 26, 3. 5; III, 24, 2. 4; V, 29, 7; VI, 117, 2; VIII, 2, 19; XIX, 31, 5. 10.

*PARŚU n. a sickle XII, 3, 31.

PALĀVA m. chaff XII, 3, 19.

*PAVANA n. an instrument for purifying grain, a sieve, a strainer IV, 34, 2.

*PAVĪRAVAT mfn having a lance-shaped ploughshare (of a plough) III, 17, 3.

*PIPPALĪ f. a berry. It is used as a remedy for wounds (VINS I, 531). Zysk takes it as pepper-corn, long pepper, *Piper longum* L. (Zysk 1985, 259), however, it seems to be unlikely because pepper was not a product of the place of genesis of the Śaunakīya Atharvaveda. The import of pepper from the South India must be also ruled out in the Middle Vedic Period.

PHĀLA m. a ploughshare, X, 6, 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 33. Cf. SUPHĀLA a good ploughshare III, 17, 5.

*BAJĀ m. a plant used against a demon of disease (VINS I, 59), On the basis of some commentaries on the Kauśīkasūtra Whitney thinks of a sort of mustard (Whitney 1905, 494) VIII, 6, 6. 7. 24.

BĪJA n. seed X, 8, 33; XIV, 2, 14.

BHŪMI f. the earth, soil III, 17, 5.

MĀṢA m. a sort of bean, *Vigna mungo* (L.) Hepper VI, 140, 2.

YAVA m. barley, *Hordeum vulgare* L. emend. Bourden II, 8, 3; VI, 30, 1; VI, 142, 1. 2; XII, 1, 42.

YUGA n. the yoke of a plough II, 8, 4.

RĀŚĪ m. a heap (of barley) VI, 142, 3.

LĀṄGALA n. a plough II, 8, 4.

VĀHA m. a bull or ox for drawing the plough VI, 102, 1.

VRĪHI m. rice, *Oryza sativa* L. VI, 140, 2; VIII, 7, 20; IX, 1, 22; IX, 6, 14; XII, 1, 42.

*ŚAṆA a sort of hemp, *Crotaria juncia* L. II, 4, 5.

*ŚŪRPA n. a sieve IX, 6, 16; X, 9, 26; XI, 3, 4; XII, 3, 19; XX, 136, 8.

ŚYĀMAKA m. millet-seed, *Panicum frumentaceum* Roxb. XIX, 50, 4.

SASYA n. grain, mainly rice, *Oryza sativa* L. VIII, 10, 24.

SĪTĀ f. a furrow XI, 3, 12.

SĪRA n. a plough VI, 30, 1; VI, 91, 1; VIII, 9, 16.

*STEGA m. Problematic word. Whitney hypothetically makes it signify a ploughshare (Whitney 1905, 824). XVIII, 1, 39.

The vocabulary which is extracted from the Śaunakīya Atharvaveda is relatively meagre. Among the forty-seven items - the Ṛgveda contains forty- nine items (Wojtilla 2003, 43) - there are terms which are problematic both morphologically and semantically (*ābaya*, *tsaru*, *stega*) or only semantically (*tilapīñjī*, *bajā*).

The number of attestations is edifying: *dhānya* is attested nine times, *phāla* seven times, *kṛṣi* and *taṇḍula* six times, *kṣetra*, *yava*, *vṛhi* and *śūrpa* five times, *urvārā*, *bajā* and *sīra* three times, *kīnāśa*, *khanitrīma*, *khālva*, *tila*, *tuṣa*, *pippalī*, *bīja* two times, while the remaining twenty-nine only once. It indicates the established position of agriculture among other economic activities, the preponderance of rice cultivation indicated by the terms *dhānya*, *vṛhi* and *sasya* and the strong position of barley (*yava*) production. The unambiguous term for wheat (*godhūma*) is missing here, but it can be attested in the Paippalāda Atharvaveda (IX, 11, 12).

Although the internal chronology of the Śaunakīya Atharvaveda is 'an utterly difficult problem' (Gonda 1975, 273, fn. 16), it can be assumed that books I-VII can be regarded as the original nucleus, then VIII-XII, XIII-XVIII and XIX are separate blocks (Gonda 1975, 273), while book XX 'with some exemptions seems to be a verbatim repetition of Ṛgveda' (Bloomfield 1897, LXXI). It is noteworthy that thirty-six items can be attested in the nucleus (some of them also in other blocks), nine items in books VIII-XII, one item occurs in book XIV, two items occur in book XVIII, one item is attested in book XIX. This circumstance speaks in favour of the genuineness of this vocabulary. This genuineness gets further corroboration by the fact that seventeen items pertaining to the basic agricultural vocabulary are first attested

here in Sanskrit. In other words, the text bears the testimony of significant contemporary changes in agricultural production. The main points of these changes are as follows.

New tools such as spade, (*ābhri*), or probably varieties of tools or new names for already known tools appear: sickle (*parśu*), sieve (*pavana*, *śūrpa*).

There are formerly unknown plant names: some of them are not satisfactorily explained such as *ābayu*, *pippalī* and *bajā*, while other are of great economical importance such as sugar-cane (*ikṣu*), cucumber (*urvāru*), black chick-pea (*khālva*), sesame (*tila*) and hemp (*śaṇa*).

There is a full-fledged inventory of the place, implements, products and by-products of rice processing: threshing-floor (*khāla*), sieve (*pavana*, *śūrpa*), grain after threshing and winnowing (*taṇḍula*) and chaff (*tuṣa*).

As Romila Thapar rightly puts it the plough 'became an icon of power and fertility' (Thapar 2002, 116). Its name is *lāṅgala* or *sīra* as in the Ṛgveda, however, the number of constituent parts of the plough is higher. It means that the description of the plough is more detailed i.e. the Śaunakīya Atharvaveda likely refers to a more sophisticated plough than the Ṛgveda. This plough has handle (*tsaru*), a pole (*iṣā*), a yoke to which the draught animals are tied, and a lance-shaped (*pavīravat*) ploughshare. Otherwise the ploughshare is called either *phāla* or *stega*.

The interpretation of the term *pavīravat* is a highly intricate issue worth dwelling upon for a short while. Zimmer thinks of a metal share (Zimmer 1879, 236), Macdonell and Keith render it as 'having a metal share' (VINS I, 509). Although Rau vigorously maintained long ago that the word *pavīra* does not sufficed this meaning (Rau, 1957, 25), this translation has still adherents. Mylius, a leading expert in the Late Vedic Period, first did not find Rau's argumentation convincing (Mylius 1964, 54). Shaping his opinion, he might have overrated the proportion of the use of iron in the early phase of the Late Vedic Age. Later, in his unpublished habilitation thesis, he inclined to accept Rau's standpoint (Mylius 1967, 120). After that is somehow strange that in the published form of this thesis he definitely subscribed to the existence of a metal share (Mylius 1971, 174) even after Ruben

had accepted Rau's opinion and noted that Mylius refutation had been made without arguments (Ruben 1967, 67 and 92, n. 96).

Quite independently, Dilip K. Chakrabarti, the noted archaeologist, suggests that the ploughshare mentioned in the Atharvaveda might have been made of iron (Chakrabarti 1992, 122). He bases this assumption on the textual evidence of X, 6, 2-3. Unfortunately, he fully misunderstands the context: the hymn praises the virtues of an amulet made of *khadira*-wood in the shape of a ploughshare (Bloomfield 1897, 84-85). It is carved by a wood-cutter with a knife (*takṣan*). It means that there is no reason to question Rau's standpoint strongly backed by the testimony of the Śatapathabrāhmaṇa VII, 2, 2 (where it means, a 'share-shod' which might have been a metal-shod Eggeling 1894, 328, n. 3), the Taittirīyaśaṁhitā IV, 2, 5 (where it means a 'keen shore': Keith 1914, 315) and the Vājasaneyīśaṁhitā XII, 71 where according to the commentaries by Uvaṭa and Mahīdhara it simply means 'endowed with a ploughshare' without specifying the material it was made of. The word *pavīra* must be derived from *pavī* a noun the etymology of which is waiting for a quite convincing explanation. Some scholars connect it with the verb *punāti*, *pāvate* 'to make clean or bright' and take it as something shining, a metal. Others put it beside the terms of ancient Indo-European weaponry (KEWA II, 238-39). *Pavīra* denotes in the Nirukta XII, 30 definitely a lance (VINS I, 509) which has a metallic point (Monier-Williams 1960, 611). In the second half of the first millennium B.C. when the Nirukta was composed by Yāska the use of metals or even that of iron was widespread. Nevertheless, this circumstance does not compel us to refer back this technical know-how to the late Vedic age or in particular to the age of the Śaunakīya Atharvaveda. It is a definite proof of the uncertainty around the term in Sanskrit tradition that the Vasiṣṭhasmṛti 86 calls the plough (*lāṅgala*) *pravīravat* and *vīravat*. This text can be dated from around the fourth century B.C.

The archaeological evidence to be gathered from the place and time of genesis of the Śaunakīya Atharvaveda lacks any proof of the use of iron for making ploughshares. The full use of iron for quite different purposes appears in the Ganges valley only after the 6th century B.C (Erdosy, 1995, 84). The earliest known specimens of iron ploughshares from Ganwaria in District

Gorakhpur, U. P. can be dated from 700 BC (Vibha Tripathi 2008 a, 372), 4th period of Atranjikhhera, U. P. from 600-50 BC (Gaur 1983, 427) and Jakhera in District Etah, U. P. from not earlier than the middle of the first millennium B. C. (Sharma 1983, 121; cf. Vibha Tripathi 2008 b, 44) In short, the plough and its ploughshare described in the Śaunakīya Atharvaveda were made of wood. As R. S. Sharma justly observes wooden ploughshare could work in the light soil of the upper Gangetic basin (Sharma 1980, 54). As to its form it had the shape of a lance.

The plough is drawn by draught animals (*vāha*). They were bulls or oxen, however, their name is not specified here. Neither mentions our text how many were yoked to the plough. The emerging role of the buffalo in animal husbandry (Thapar 2002, 116) is truly reflected by the frequent attestation of the terms *mahiṣa* and *mahiṣī* in the text.

To sum up, the picture of agricultural production which emerges from the Śaunakīya Atharvaveda shows the initial phase of the Middle Vedic Period when under the changed geographical milieu a new form of material culture started making which is called by many scholars as Gangetic culture (cf. Ruben 1974). At this stage forest and cultivated field play almost equally important role in the life of the people (cf. II, 4, 5), sugar-cane grew either wild or it was cultivated (VINS I, 74), hemp (*Śaṇa*) grew in the forest (VINS II, 350) and *ābayu*, *pippalī* and *bajā* may also grow wild.

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* The first occurrence of the word as an agricultural technical term.

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Morality, Trans-Mortality and Immortality In Vedic Thought

Shashiprabha Kumar

शशिप्रभाकुमारमहाभागा वेदसंहिताभ्यः चितानां मृत्यु-अतिमृत्यु-
अमृतत्वसम्बन्धिनां मन्त्राणां साहाय्येन मर्त्ये शरीरे एव विराजमानम् अमृतं
ब्रह्म ज्ञानरूपस्य अतिमृत्योः साहाय्येन सर्वैरेव प्राप्तुं शक्यमित्यर्थं
विशदयति।

The present paper aims at expounding and examining some salient features of Vedic thought with special reference to the concept of mortality (=mṛtyu) vis-a-vis trans-mortality (=atimṛtyu) and immortality (= amṛta).

Apparently the three terms denote three separate ideas but actually they are so closely interconnected and intertwined in Vedic philosophy that it is difficult to understand any one of them in an exclusive and isolated manner. Hence there will be an effort to bring out the integral essence of these concepts which are so vitally concerned to humanity across time and clime.

The proposed methodology for the exposition will be mainly descriptive and referential to the primary sources only, i.e., four Vedic Saṃhitās, namely Ṛgveda (RV), Yajurveda (YV), Sāmaveda (SV) and Atharvaveda (AV).

II

The Vedic view exhorts human beings as 'amṛtasya putrāḥ' (RV, 10/13/01) i.e., 'Sons of Immortality' and propounds that although mortality is given to human beings, yet there is a possibility to transcend it via transmortality which is a midway sojourn between the two extreme ends of mortality and immortality. In other words, mortality belongs to the body, but immortality is the nature of soul and anyone can attain it, provided one has realised it as the ultimate goal of life and has

acquired the requisite eligibility, i.e., trans-mortality or the capability to transcend death. This technique of transcendence is nothing short of a certain kind of knowledge, knowledge of the Supreme.

In brief, the Vedic conception of immortality as the highest aim of human life delineates a dominantly optimistic spirit which not only craves to crush death and live a fully accomplished life of hundred years, but also aspire to cross over the bondage of mortality. This is the secret of famous Vedic prayer termed as 'Mṛtyuñjaya Mantra' (RV, 7/59/12), a verse chanted for conquering death.

The Vedas represent a balanced, optimistic and spirited view of life and death. Accordingly, mortality is given to the humanity while immortality is sought after; transmortality is the *via media* through which a mortal being can fulfill this aspiration. In fact, there are two visible approaches to death: according to one view, if death is the be all and end-all of life, then what is the joy in living. Therefore, life itself should be rejected as a meaningless existence. In contrast to this pessimistic view, there is another view which holds that when death is inexorable and final, then one should enjoy life to the brim and not bother about anything else. Obviously, both these views are extreme and one-sided only, hence none of these two can satisfy the eternally pertinent quest of humanity which not only seeks a solace from mortality but also aspires to attain immortality.

The uniqueness of Vedic view lies in the fact that on the one hand it does not deny death and accepts it as an eternal, divine norm:

Nakirasya praminanti vratāni.

(AV, 18/1/5)

i.e., None can deny His ordinances but on the other hand, and more significantly so, it propounds that there is no reason to be disappointed, since there is a possibility of overcoming death and attaining an eternal state of perfect bliss. Therefore, during one's lifetime, one should live with full enthusiasm:

Ārohaṇamākramaṇaṃ jīvato jīvato'yanam. (AV, 5/30/7)

i.e., Ascent and aggression (against evil or disease) is the way of each and every living being.

III

It is in the above background that the Vedas represent a ascendant human will to live as well as reflect a natural acceptance of death. There are several prayers in the Vedas which convey a universally relevant, strong message of hope for humanity such as follow:

- (i) *Śataṃ jīvantu śaradaḥ purūcīrantarmṛtyuṃ dadhatā parvatena.*

(RV, 10/18/4)

i.e., May the living creatures
live for hundred bounteous autumns,
May they keep death far away from them,
hidden behind the ridge.

- (ii) *Śatāyusaṃ kṛṇuhi cīyamānaḥ.*

(YV, 13/41)

i.e., O Lord, flourishing here, may you grant me life of a hundred years!

Mortality is the inevitable fact of life and the unavoidable fate of animate beings; all the bipeds and quadrupeds are under control of death, but the Veda assures that the lord of life himself will bear one up, so there is no need to be afraid of death. The universal human aspiration to avoid death is expressed in the Veda with a positive goal to be obtained:

*Mṛtyurīśe dwipadāṃ mṛtyurīśe catuṣpadāṃ
Tasmāt tvaṃ mṛtyorgopaterudbharāmi sa mā bibheh.*

(AV, 8/2/23)

i.e., Death rules over bipeds, death rules over quadrupeds, from that death, the master of the earth, I (the Lord of Life) bear you up. Now, do not be afraid.

Obviously, the fear of death is the greatest fear for human beings but the optimistic vision of Vedas provides a bright ray of hope by proclaiming that the mortals can immortality:

Martāsaḥ santo amṛtatvamānaśuḥ.

(RV 1/110/4)

i.e., They (Ṛbhus, the wise ones), though mortals, attained immortality. Although the Vedas do not overlook the fact that human beings, like other creatures, are born mortal and they have death as their life-long companion:

Ye ciddhi mṛtyubandhavaḥ Āditya manavaḥ smasi.

(RV, 8/18/22)

i.e., As we, O Adityas, are humans, with death as our companion.

Yet it is aspired that one should live an entire, unimpaired and accomplished life. There are several prayers in the Vedas which not only indicate a strong will to life but also reflect an intense desire to avoid death, such as follow:

(i) *Pra sū na āyurjīvase tiretana.*

(RV, 8/18/22)

i.e., Graciously lengthen our life so that we may live.

(ii) *Paraṃ mṛtyo anu parehi panthāyaste sva itaro devayānāt
Cakṣuṣmate śṛṇvate te bravīmi mā naḥ prajāṃ rīriṣo mota
vīrān.*

(RV, 10/18/01)

i.e., Depart O death, go from here and pursue your own path which is distinct from the path of gods or enlightened ones.

O, death, I pray to you, who has eyes to see and ears to hear, not to injure our offsprings and heroes.

(iii) *Āyusāyuhkṛtāṃ jīvāyusmān jīva mā mṛthāḥ*

Prāṇenātmanvatā jīva mā mṛtyorudagā vaśam.

(AV, 19/27/8)

i.e., Live your life with a full life-span provided by the life-givers. Live a long life, do not die! Live with the life of the spirited ones. Do not submit to death.

(iv) *Mā tantuśchedi vayato dhiyaṃ me mātrā śārpayasah
pura ṛtoḥ.*

(RV, 2/28/5)

i.e., O Venerable one, cut not the thread of my life, engaged in weaving it. And may not the measure of my work be shattered before the season!

IV

Since the Vedic sages have set a standard of hundred years with a hale and hearty body and sound mind as an optimum period for life, hence there are insistent invocations for longevity as well:

(i) *Śataminnu śarado anti devā yatrā naścakrā jarasaṃ tanūnām*

Putrāso yatra pitaro bhavanti mā no madhyā rīṣatāyur gantoḥ.

(RV, 1/89/9)

i.e., Verily a hundred autumns lie before us, Gods!
Within which you cause decay of our bodies;

Within which the sons become fathers. Do not break in the middle the course of our fleeting life.

(iii) *Paśyema śaradaḥ śatam.*
Īvema śaradaḥ śatam.
Budhyema śaradaḥ śatam.
Rohema śaradaḥ śatam.
Pūṣema śaradaḥ śatam.
Bhavema śaradaḥ śatam.
Bhūyema śaradaḥ śatam.
Bhūyasīḥ śaradaḥ śatāt.

(AV, 19/67/1-8)

i.e., May we see through a hundred autumns!

May we live through a hundred autumns!
May we know through a hundred autumns!
May we rise through a hundred autumns!
May we prosper through a hundred autumns!
May we remain established a hundred autumns!
May we grow through a hundred autumns!

Even more than a hundred autumns!

It is also noteworthy here that although the dominant will to live is radiantly expressed in the Vedic verses, yet it is not just dragging on the existence of body; rather it is a living with all the bodily organs in the fittest condition and the head held high. In other words, the Vedic view propounds that one should not only live a long life but also have perpetual physical vigour and perfect mental alertness:

*Vān ma āsannasoḥ prāṇaścakṣuḥ akṣṇoḥ śrotraṃ karṇayoḥ
Apalitāḥ keśā aśonā dantā bahu bāhvorbalam.
Ūrvoorjo jaṅghayorjavaḥ pādayoḥ
Pratiṣṭhā ariṣṭāni me sarvātmānibhrṣṭaḥ.*

(AV 19/60/1-2)

i.e., May I have voice in my mouth, breath in my nostrils, Sight in my eyes, hearing in my ears; Hair that has not turned grey, teeth that have not decayed, and great strength in my arms. May I have power in my thighs, swiftness in my legs, steadfastness in my feet. May all my members be uninjured and my soul unimpaired.

Besides, there are also prayers in the Vedas which not only reflect the human will to live a full term of life for enabling him to complete his work (as quoted above, RV, 2/28/5) but also a sick man's will to life which is sought to be aroused by the following exhortation:

*Ayaṃ lokaḥ priyatamaḥ devānāmaparājitaḥ
tvamiha mṛtyave diṣṭaḥ puruṣa jajñiṣe
ca tvāmanu hvayāmasi mā purā jaraso mṛthāḥ.*

(AV, 5/30/17)

i.e., This world, the unconquered one, is the most beloved of all the enlightened ones. O man, we call you back from the death, destined for which you were born here. We call you back, May you not die before reaching old age.

V

Rudra is depicted to be the God of Death in Vedic verses. In the well-known *Śatarudrīya* of Yajurveda, homage is paid to death in hundred forms of Rudra wherein two aspects of him are presented: the benign as well as the terrible. This is in a way, suggestive of the fact that Rudra represents both life as well as

death. It is therefore, aspired that the fierce form of Rudra be pleased and the benevolent aspect of him bestow grace upon all:

*Avatatya dhanuṣṭvaṃ sahastrākṣa śateṣudhe
Niśīrya śalyānāṃ mukhā śivo naḥ sumanā bhava.*

(YV, 16/13)

i.e., Having unbent your bow, and dulled the points of your arrows, You, O thousand-eyed, hundred-quivered, Be benevolent and gracious to us!

Yama, the son of Vivasvān Āditya is also described as the deity of death in the Vedas and strangely enough, it is suggested that he was the first one to have chosen to die and desert mortal life for an immortal abode:

*Yamo no gātum prathamō viveda
naiṣā gavyūtirapabhartavā u.
Yatrā naḥ pūrve pitaraḥ pareyurenā
jajñānāḥ pathyā anu svāḥ.*

(RV, 10/14/02)

i.e., Yama was the first to find us our abode, a place that can never be taken away, Where our ancient fathers have departed, All who are born, go there by that path, treading their own.

VI

The Vedic view vindicates that death or mortality is, in fact, the divine statute, no one, even though he had a hundred selves, can outlive the statute of Devas:

*Na devānāmati vrataṃ śatātmā cana jīvati
Tathā Yujā vi vā vṛte.*

(RV, 10/33/9)

i.e., One cannot live indefinitely, since it is not so designed by the Devas.

Keeping in view the inescapable fact that the human being is destined to die, the Vedic view approaches death from two angles: one being the physical and material which has briefly been dealt with above and which propounds that death is just an end of the body, *dehānta*. Hence, till such time that one is living, one should live with full zeal and in a positive, sanguine way. In

fact the funeral hymn of the Ṛgveda asserts that the death of one member of the society should not take away the joy of living from others, since the loss of someone's life shall be compensated by a new life:

*Yathāhānyanupūrvam bhavanti yathā
ṛtava ṛtubhiryanti sādhu
Yathā na pūrvamaparo jahātyevā
dhātarāyūṇṣi kalpayaiṣām.* (RV, 10/18/05)

i.e., As days follow days, one after another, as seasons follow seasons in order, as the successor does not fail the predecessor, similarly, the Ordainer, from the lives of these (will create new lives).

It means that even at the physical level, continuity of life from one person to another is a significant source for transcending mortality according to Vedic thought:

*Devebhyo hi prathamam yajñiyebhyo'mṛtatvam suvasi
bhāgamuttamam Ādiddānāmam savitarvyūrṇuṣe'nucīnā
jīvitā mānuṣebhyaḥ.* (RV, 4/54/2)

i.e., For holy Devas you had at first produced immortality, the noblest of all portions, then, as a gift to men, O Savitr, you open, mortal existence, life succeeding life.

From the conceptual point of view, the Vedic idea of death proclaims that the innermost, indomitable spirit of human beings is immortal, while the body of course is mortal. It is an undeniable fact that essentially the physical body can never attain immortality; it has to decay and de cease. Nevertheless, the Veda says that the body should not die before its full life, rather it should die after living a full life and drop off like a ripe cucumber from its stem, while the spirit immortal should reach out to the Immortal:

*Tryambakam yajāmahe sugandhim puṣṭivardhanam
Urvārukamiva bandhanāt mṛtyormukṣīya māmṛtāt.*

(RV, 7/59/12)

i.e., To Tryambaka our offerings, to the fragrance-bearer, the increaser of nourishment. May he release me, like the

cucumber (is released) from its stem, from mortal life, not from immortality.

VII

This promise of lifting a mortal being upto the level of immortality, where the fear of death cannot affect him, is the foremost contribution of Vedic philosophy. According to the Vedas, immortality as well as mortality is a shadow of the divine:

Yasyacchāyā amṛtaṃ yasya mṛtyuḥ. (RV, 10/121/2)

i.e., Immortality and mortality are the shadow of Him alone. The same feeling is echoed in the following verse which elucidates that even the natural forces like Savitā are governed by divine norms and act as observers under the cosmic order of darkness and effulgence, of mortality and immortality:

*Ākr̥ṣṇena rajasā vartamāno
Niveśayannamṛtaṃ martyaṃ ca
Hiranyayena Savitā Rathenā
Devo yāti bhuvanāni paśyan.* (RV, 1/35/2)

i.e., The refulgent sun, springing through the obscure regions, arousing both the mortal as well as immortal, beholding the several worlds, comes as if mounted on a golden chariot. Since a person is not just the body, but also the soul, hence death is only the giving up of physical mortality while the soul remains immortal. It is therefore that one, who has realized this truth and known the *Ātman* as ageless, deathless, has no fear of death:

*Akāmo dhīro amṛtaḥ svayambhū
rasena tṛptaḥ na kutaścanonaḥ
Tameva vidwān na bibhāya
mṛtyorātmānaṃ dhīramajaraṃ yuvānam*
(AV, 10/8/44)

i.e.,

The Supreme is free from desire, self-possessed, immortal, self-existing, Contented with bliss and lacking nothing in any respect; It is only by knowing Him, who is the self-possessed,

undecaying and ever young self, that one does not have any fear of death.

VIII

The journey for the ultimate goal of immortality begins at the level of mortality only; it is here that the indwelling spirit can be realized, hence the mortal body is not something to be despised or denounced. Rather, it being the limited abode of the unlimited immortal consciousness has to be worshipped like a divine region. It is with this idea that the Atharvaveda states:

- (i) *Ūrdhvo nu sṛṣṭāstiryaṇ nu sṛṣṭāḥ*
Sarvā diśaḥ puruṣa ā babhūva
Puraṃ yo brahmaṇo veda yasyāḥ puruṣa ucyatye.
 (AV, 10/2/28)

i.e., Whether created vertically or created horizontally, All the quarters the cosmic man pervades. He who knows the castle of the Lord Supreme, Is called Puruṣa due to this.

- (ii) *Aṣṭācakraṇā navadvārā devānāṃ pūrayodhyā*
Tasyāṃ hiraṇyayaḥ kośaḥ svargo jyotiṣāvṛtaḥ.
 (AV, 10/2/31)

i.e., With eight circles and nine gates is the castle of the enlightened ones impregnated. Therein lies the golden chest, conductor of the world of bliss, encompassed by brilliant light.

IX

In fact the relationship between mortality and immortality is so close that both of them have been described as dwelling in the same abode:

- Anacchaye turagātu jīvamejadbhuvam*
madhya ā pastyānām
Jīvo mṛtasya carati svadhābhiramartyo
martyenā sayoniḥ.
 (AV, 9/10/8)

i.e., The soul endowed with life-breath and fast speed, goes out and the dead body is left behind in the dwelling.

The immortal soul, hitherto living in the mortal body, keeps on moving from life to life by its own nature.

Therefore it is implied in the Vedic thought that the secret of trans-mortality has to be unraveled within one's own existence where the mortal and the immortal inhere inseparably:

*Apāṇi prāṇeti svadhayā gr̥bhīto'martyo
martyenā sayoniḥ
Tā śāsvantā viṣūcīnā viyantānyanyaṃ
cikyurna cikyuranyam.*

(AV, 9/10/16)

i.e., The immortal soul, associated with the mortal body ceaselessly moves the lower (inferior) or the upper (superior) bodies according to its own actions. They both go always together, and everywhere together; (we the humans) have comprehended the one (whilst in the physical body) but have not comprehended the other (the soul free from body).

X

As mentioned above, the bridge between the extreme ends of mortality and immortality is the knowledge of the Supreme. It is only after knowing the real nature of the Absolute that the mortal being can attain immortality. Mortality is **given** to the human beings while immortality is their ultimate **goal**, but the wide gap between these two opposite ends of the same stream has to be crossed through the **gateway** of knowledge; there is no other way out:

*Tameva viditvātimṛtyumeti nānyaḥ
panthā vidyate' yanāya.*

(YV, 31/18)

i.e., By knowing Him alone, one transcends death, there is no other way to go. The term 'atimṛtyumeti' (= transcending death) used in the above Vedic verse is a vital clue for transmortality; this is the only means for attaining immortality. No mortal can attain immortality unless he transcends death and death can only be transcended by realizing the essential truth that it is the body which dies while the indwelling spirit or soul is beyond death:

*Iyaṃ kalyāṇyajarā martyasyāmṛtā gr̥he
Yasmai kṛtā śāye sa yaścakāra jajāra saḥ.*

(AV, 10/8/26)

i.e., This auspicious one (female) is not affected by age; an immortal in the home of a mortal. For whom she was made, he sleeps. And he who made her, has grown old.

*Puṇḍarīkaṃ navadvāraṃ tribhiraṅgubhirāvṛtam
Tasminyadyakṣamātmanvattadvai brahmavido viduḥ.*
(AV, 10/8/43)

i.e., The nine-portalled lotus (that is the body of man) Covered over by three bands in which lives the Spirit with the Ātman. That, verily, the Brahman-knowers know. Hence, there should not be any doubt about the fact that not only death can be transcended but also that the goal of immortality can be attained, as is evidenced by Vedic statements such as follow:

(i) *Yatra devā amṛtamānaśānāstrīye
dhāmannadhyairayanta.* (YV, 32/10)

i.e., Where the enlightened ones reside in the third abode enjoying immortality.

(ii) *Yatrānandāśca modāśca mudāḥ prāmuda āsate
Kāmasya yatrāptāḥ kāmāḥ tatra māmamṛtaṃ kṛdhi.*
(RV, 9/113/7)

i.e., Make me immortal in that realm, Where there is lasting happiness, pleasure and supreme joy and where the wishes of the wisher have been completely fulfilled.

(iii) *Yatrānukāmaṃ caraṇaṃ trināke tridive divaḥ
Lokāḥ yatra jyotiṣmantastatra māmamṛtaṃ kṛdhi.*
(RV, 9/113/9)

i.e., Make me immortal in that realm, in the third sphere, in the third heaven, where worlds are brightened with radiance!

(iv) *Apāma somamamṛtā abhūmāganma
jyotiravidāma devān
Kiṃ nūnamasmān kṛṇavadarātīḥ
kimu dhūrtiramṛta martyasya.*

(RV, 8/48/3)

i.e., As we drink the elixir of divine love, we become immortal; we attain the heavenly light, we have known the secrets of divine

forces. Now what would the malignant do to harm us? O Immortal one, what (can) the mortal man's deception now (do) to us?

XI

What follows from the above is that although human beings are born mortal, yet there is an essential inner quest which perpetually propels them to rise higher and further higher so as to reach the eternal, immortal aspect of their existence. From this point of view, mortality and immortality are two sides of the same truth, inseparably intertwined. It is not without reason then that the twin terms *mṛtyu* and *amṛta* have repeatedly occurred together in the Vedic verses (RV, 7/59/12; 10/13/4; AV, 18/3/41).

In the words of Veda itself, although the body has to die ultimately, yet when employed in the pursuit of immortality, this mortal body does not remain a cause of bondage, rather it acts as a well-structured boat for crossing over the ocean of world:

*Sutrāmāṇaṃ pṛthivīm dyāmanehasaṃ suśarmāṇamaditiṃ
supraṇītiṃ
Daivīm nāvaṃ svaritrāmanāgasamasravantīmāruhemā
svastaye.* (AV, 7/7/1)

i.e., May we, the sinless, embark upon this divine boat for our weal, which is fitted with good oars, unleaking well protected like earth, unblemished like sky, full of comforts and conducting wisely.

In brief, there lies beneath this finite, physical body, an essence which is endless, pure and perfect; that is verily the source as well as treasure of immortal bliss. Anyone who has realised this truth, can transcend death and attain immortality:

Avidyayā mṛtyuṃ tīrtvā vidyayāmṛtamaśnute.

(YV, 40/01)

i.e., One, (who pursues worldly knowledge and the Spiritual one side by side), overcomes death by worldly knowledge and gains immortality through the spiritual one.

To conclude, a Vedic prayer for immortality is worth quoting:

*Vivasvān no amṛtatve dadhātu
paraitu mṛtyuramṛtatvaṃ na aitu*

*Imān rakṣatu puruṣān ā jarimṇo
moṣveṣāṃ asavo yamaṃ guh.* (AV, 18/3/62)

i.e., May Vivasvān set us all in Immortality; let what is mortal, go away from us and what is immortal come to us. Let (him) defend all these persons until old age; let not their life-breaths go to Yama.

Note:

English translation of Vedic verses quoted above is based on the following two sources:

1. Bose, A.C., *Hymns From The Vedas*, Asia publishing House, Bombay, 1966
 2. Sarasvati, Satya Prakash and Vidyalankar, Satyakam,
 - (i) Ṛgveda Saṃhitā, Vols. I-XIII, 1977-1987
 - (ii) Yajurveda Saṃhitā, Vols. I-III, 1989-1996
 - (iii) Sāmaveda Saṃhitā, Vols. I-II, 1991-1995
 - (iv) Atharvaveda Saṃhitā, Vols. I-IV, 1996
- Veda Pratishthan, New Delhi.

On the Construction Type *naṭasya śṛṇoti*¹

George Cardona

जार्ज कार्डोना महाभागः “उपाध्यायात् अधीते” “नटस्य शृणोति” इति
व्यवहारद्वयस्य व्याकरणशास्त्रसम्मतया रीत्या व्यवस्थाकरणे प्रवृत्तः,

1. Abbreviations: A: Aṣṭādhyāyī; AV: Śaunaka recension of the Atharvaveda, (Vishveshvaranand Vedic Research Institute edition with padapāṭha and commentary attributed to Sāyaṇa, 1961); AVS: Sāyaṇa's commentary on the Atharvaveda; Bh.: Mahābhāṣya (vol., page, line of Kielhorn's edition, revised by K. V. Abhyankar); DhPr.: Maitreyarākṣita's Dhātupradīpa (gaṇa and dhātu in Shrish Chandra Chakravarti's edition, reedited by Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka, Sonipat, 1986); Kāś.: Kāśikāvṛtti (Osmania edition); KṣT: Kṣīrasvāmin's Kṣīratarāṅgiṇī (gaṇa and dhātu in Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka's edition); MDhVr.: Mādhavīyadhātuvṛtti (gaṇa and dhātu in Dwarikadas Shastri's edition); N: Jinendrabuddhi's Kāśikāvivarāṇapañjikā *alias* Nyāsa (sūtra, vol., page of Dwarika Das and Kalika Prasad Shukla's edition); PM: Haradatta's Padamañjarī (sūtra, vol., page of Dwarika Das and Kalika Prasad Shukla's edition); PK: Rāmacandra's Prakriyākaumudī (sūtra, vol., page in K. P. Trivedi's edition); Pr.: Kaiyaṭa's Pradīpa (vol., page of the Rohtak edition); RVS: Sāyaṇa's commentary on the Ṛgveda; SK: Bhaṭṭoji's Siddhāntakaumudī (sūtra, vol., page of Giridhar Sharma and Parameshvar Anand Sharma's edition, 1975); SKŚ.: the Laghuśabdenduśekhara on the Siddhāntakaumudī (vol., page of the text with six commentaries, edited by Guruprasad Shastri); SKŚC: Vaidyanātha's Cidasthimālā on the Laghuśabdenduśekhara (vol., page in Guruprasad Shastri's edition); SKŚCK: Bhairavamiśra's Candrakalā on the Laghuśabdenduśekhara (vol., page of the Kashi Sanskrit Series edition, reprinted 1987); SKT: Jñānendrasarasvatī's Tattvabodhinī on the Siddhāntakaumudī (edition noted for SK); TĀ: Taittirīyāraṇyaka (Ānandāśrama edition/Mysore edition); TĀBh.: Bhaṭṭabhāskara's commentary on the Taittirīyāraṇyaka; TĀS: Sāyaṇa's commentary on the Taittirīyāraṇyaka; TS: Taittirīyasamhitā (Vaidika Saṁśodhana Maṇḍala edition with Bhaṭṭabhāskara's and Sāyaṇa's commentaries); TSBh.: Bhaṭṭabhāskara's commentary on the Taittirīyasamhitā; TSS: Sāyaṇa's commentary on the Taittirīyasamhitā; Ud.: Nāgeśa's Uddyota (vol., page of Rohtak edition); Uṇ.: Uṇādisūtra (Aufrecht's edition); VS: Vājasaneyisamhitā (edition with Uvaṭa's and Mahīdhara's commentaries, reprinted, Motilal Banarsidass, 1971); VSM: Mahīdhara's commentary on the Vājasaneyisamhitā; VSU: Uvaṭa's commentary on the Vājasaneyisamhitā. For bibliographic details on works of grammar, see Pāṇini, A Survey of Research.

तत्सम्बद्धान् उपत्रिंशद्व्यवहारान् तत्तत्सूत्रसञ्चारक्रमप्रदर्शनपूर्वकं व्याख्याय केषां शृणोति सुग्रीव इति वाल्मीकेर्वचनमुद्धृत्य अधिपूर्वकधातूनां स्मरणार्थकानां स्थले कर्मकारकस्य प्रसङ्गं व्याख्याय क्वचिद्वैदिकप्रयोगेषु अधिपूर्वकाणां श्रवणादीनां ज्ञानार्थकानाञ्च धातूनां प्रयोगे षष्ठीप्रयोगस्य निर्वाहार्थं भाष्यकर्तृभिः आश्रितानुपायान् प्रतिपाद्य निगमयति यत् 'इक्' धातोः "स्मरणे" इत्यर्थव्युत्पादनं वार्तिककारस्य कात्यायनस्य काले नासीदित्यतः पाणिनेरपि अनभिमतं भवितुमर्हतीति, ततश्च पदान्तराध्याहाराद्युपायाश्रयणं विनैव षष्ठीप्रयोगः सुवच इति।

1. Pāṇini's sūtra A 1.4.29: *ākhyātopayoge* (*apādānam* 24, *kārake* 23) assigns the class name *apādāna* to someone who relates or conveys something (*ākhyātā*) and in doing so plays a role as a direct participant (*kāraka*) in the accomplishment of a particular action, referred to by *upayoge*. After a brief discussion that need not be considered here, Patañjali considers that *upayoga* (loc. sg. *upayoge*) refers to an action which involves certain restrictions (*niyamapūrvakaḥ* 'preceded by restrictions'). By the example he uses to illustrate this, Patañjali also shows that what is involved is the traditional acquisition of knowledge by students from teachers.² Thus, by A 1.4.29, a teacher who, with respect to the act of acquiring traditional knowledge, plays the role of one who imparts this knowledge is called *apādāna*.³ This accounts for usages such as

(1) *upādhyāyād adhīte* '(A student) is studying with a teacher.'

The teacher is an *apādāna*, so that the nominal *upādhyāya* which refers to him is followed by an ending of the fifth triplet

2. Bh. I.329.10-11: *athavopayogaḥ ko bhavitum arhati | yo niyamapūrvakaḥ | tad yathā upayuktā māṇavakā ity ucyante ya ete niyamapūrvakam adhītavanto bhavanti* 'Alternatively, what should be an *upayoga*? (An action) that is preceded by restrictions. For example, *upayuktāḥ* is said of young men who have acquired learning while observing restrictions.' The traditional restrictions are a student's sleeping on the ground, begging, and others.
3. Cf., for example, Kāś. 1.4.29: *ākhyātā pratipādayitā | upayogo niyamapūrvakam vidyāgrahaṇam | upayoge sādhye ya ākhyātā tat kārakam apādānasañjñam bhavati*.

(*pañcamī*):⁴ *upādhyāya-as (NasI) → ... upādhyāyāt.*

2. Patañjali begins his discussion of A 1.4.29 by questioning the purpose behind saying *upayoge* in the sūtra and he notes that the formulation is meant to preclude the assignment of the class name *apādāna* to an actor or a story teller. The rule thereby does not allow for

(2) *naṭāc chrṇoti*

(3) *granthikāc chrṇoti*

instead of

(4) *naṭasya śṛṇoti* ‘... listens to/hears the actor’

(5) *granthikasya śṛṇoti* ‘... listens to/hears the story teller.’⁵

If a member of an audience listens to and hears the actor singing a *gāthā* but this is not given the status of traditional acquisition of knowledge, then (4) is in order. Similarly, if someone listens to and hears a story being told from a book by a story teller and this is not given such status, then (5) is appropriate. (2)-(3) would be appropriate if one granted to the actor and storyteller a respected status comparable to that of a teacher.⁶

3. A central topic of Kātyāyana’s and Patañjali’s discussion of A 1.4.29 is whether someone who relates something (*ākhyātā*) under circumstances such that traditional restrictions that apply to students are inapplicable (*anupayoge*) is or is not a *kāraka*.⁷ Kaiyaṭa merely observes that both of these alternatives are possible, but Nāgeśa brings out how they are possible, taking (4) as an example. It is not possible that a verse sung by an actor

4. A 2.3.28: *apādāne pañcamī*.

5. Bh. I.329.6: *upayoga iti kimartham | naṭasya śṛṇoti granthikasya śṛṇoti*.

6. Nāgeśa makes this point: *yadā tu naṭādibhyo’pi tathādhyayanam tadā naṭāc chrṇotīti bhavaty eveti bodhyam* (Ud. II.396) Jayanta Bhaṭṭa plays on the contrast between the use of *naṭāt* and *naṭasya* in his *Āgamaḍambara* (ed. V. Raghavan and A. Thakur, Darbhanga, 1964, p. 14).

7. Bh. I.329.12: *kim punar ākhyātānupayoge kārakam āhosvid akārakam*.

should be heard without the actor; since he produces the singing, he is qualified by the property of being a *kāraka*, one that brings about an action. On the other hand, one can consider that he is not immediately what brings about hearing. Instead, he may be viewed in a manner comparable to the way one conceives of a potmaker's father: a potmaker is the immediate cause of a pot's production and his father is indirectly the cause of this by virtue of producing the potmaker. Similarly, an actor's role with respect to an audience's hearing what he sings is an indirect one: he does not directly bring about the act of hearing; this role is played by a listener. He does, nevertheless indirectly contribute to this act by producing his song.⁸

4. Kātyāyana devotes two *vārttikas* to the issue, and the following argument takes place.

4.1. If the relater is a *kāraka*, since such a participant is not specifically given any other *kāraka* class name (*akathitam*), by A 1.4.51: *akathitam ca (karma 49)*, it will receive the class name *karman*.⁹ Consequently, A 2.3.2: *karmaṇi dvitīyā* would apply to introduce a second-triplet ending signifying a *karman*, so that one would allow only

(6) *naṭam śṛṇoti*

and not (4).

4.2. On the other hand, if the actor in question is not a *kāraka*, stating *upayoge* in A 1.4.29 serves no purpose.¹⁰ It is now not necessary to include the term in the *sūtra* in order to disallow usages such as (2) instead of (4). If the actor spoken of in (4) is not a direct participant (*kāraka*) in bringing about the act of

8. Pr. II. 397: *kiṃ punar iti : ubhayathā sambhavād doṣadarśanāc ca praśnaḥ*. Ud. II.397: *ubhayatheti : naṭam vinā gītaśravaṇādyayogāt tasya tajjanakatayā kārakatvam kulālapitravad anyathāsiddhatvasambhāvanayā cākarakatvam iti bhāvaḥ*.

9. 1.4.29 vt. 1: *ākhyātānupayoge kārakam iti ced akathitatvāt karmasañjñā-prasaṅgaḥ*. Bh. I.329.14-15: *ākhyātānupayoge kārakam iti ced akathitatvāt karmasañjñā prāpnoti*.

10. 1.4.29 vt. 2: *akārakam iti ced upayogavacanānarthakyam*. Bh. I.329.17: *yady akārakam upayogavacanam anarthakam*.

hearing, whatever relation he is involved in falls under the remainder (*śeṣa*) with respect to action-kāraka relations, so that the sixth-triplet ending is accounted for by A 2.3.50: *ṣaṣṭhī śeṣe*.

4.3. The above is all that Kātyāyana has to say on the question. Patañjali, on the other hand, continues the argumentation, first reverting to the position that the person who relates something, such as the actor spoken of in (4), is a kāraka. Now, however, he argues that the consequence brought up earlier does not obtain. Patañjali invokes an enumeration that is given in a śloka cited under A 1.4.51,¹¹ which specifies particular kārakas that are considered not assigned another class name by sūtras under the heading of A 1.4.23: *kārake*, so that they are given the name *karman* by this rule, as follows: (a) with respect to the actions denoted by *duh* 'milk', *yāc* 'ask', *rudh* 'enclose, hem in', *pracch* 'ask', *bhikṣ* 'beg', *ci* 'pick, pluck', the kāraka which is the cause or source of what results from the action; e.g., *pauravaṃ gāṃ yācate* '... asks a Paurava for a cow', *māṇavakaṃ panthānaṃ prcchati* '... asks the boy the way', *pauravaṃ gāṃ bhikṣate* '... begs a Paurava for a cow': the cow and the path for which one asks are the immediate objects;¹² (b) the participant that is associated with a kāraka relative to the acts signified by *brū* 'say', *śās* 'instruct'; e.g., *putraṃ brūte dharmam* '... tells his son his duty': the immediate object of saying is a duty, with which a son is associated. Since it is assumed that Pāṇini intended this set of kārakas to be referred to by *akathita* in A 1.4.51,¹³ the actor of (4), though he is considered a direct participant in the accomplishment of the act of hearing, is thereby not assigned to the *karman* class by this sūtra.

11. *duhiyācirudhipracchibhikṣiciñām upayoganimitam apūrvavidhau | bruviśāsiguṇena ca yat sacate tad akīrtitam ācaritaṃ kavinā ||* (Bh. I.334.1-2).

12. I have given the three examples which Patañjali admits concern kārakas that truly are not eligible for being assigned kāraka class names by other sūtras. Additional details are not important for the present discussion.

13. *tad akathitaṃ kavinā* is interpreted to mean 'that is said to be akathita by the author of the sūtra'; e.g., Kāś. 1.4.51: *tad akīrtitam ācaritaṃ kavinā tad akathitaṃ uktaṃ sūtrakāreṇa*.

5. Whether the claim that Pāṇini meant to limit the entities designated by *akathita* to those noted is ultimately acceptable or not is not crucial to my discussion. What is important is the view that the actor and story teller of (4) and (5) are indeed *kāraḥ* relative to the act of hearing denoted by *śru* of *śṛṇoti*. For, even if Pāṇini did indeed intend to refer to a set of *kāraḥ* relative to a specific group of actions as enumerated above, the fact remains that the *kāraḥ* spoken of in (4) and (5) are not covered by sūtras in the section headed by A 1.4.23.¹⁴ Under the assumption that the actor and story teller in question are *kāraḥ*, then, how is one to account for the syntax of such sentences, wherein genitive forms are construed with *śru*? This brings up an additional point to be taken into account.

5.1. Consider now

- (7) *naṭasya gāthāṃ śṛṇoti* ‘... is listening to the verse (sung by) the actor’
- (8) *granthikasya kathāṃ śṛṇoti* ‘... is listening to the story (told by) the story teller’
- (9) *keṣāṃ śṛṇoti sugrīvaḥ* ‘To which does Sugrīva listen?’¹⁵
- (10) *keṣāṃ vacaḥ/vacanāṃ śṛṇoti sugrīvaḥ* ‘To whose word does Sugrīva listen?’¹⁶

14. Pr. 1.4.23 (II.376): *ṣaḍvidhasyaiva ceṣyate | tadvyatiriktam ca kārakam asti yathā naṭasya śṛṇotīti ...* This is said in the context of Patañjali’s initial discussion on A 1.4.23 and the claim that this is a *sañjñāsūtra* whereby the name *kāraḥ* is given to entities specified in subsequent rules. This name should apply only to the six *kāraḥ* covered by these rules, but, notes Kaiyaṭa, there are *kāraḥ* additional to these, such as the actor of (4).
15. *ke pūrvam abhinivartante mahotsāhāḥ samantataḥ | keṣāṃ śṛṇoti sugrīvaḥ ke vā yūthapayūthapāḥ* ‘Which (monkeys) go first into battle always full of energy? To which does Sugrīva listen? Which are the troop leaders’ troop leaders?’ (Rāmāyaṇa critical edition 6.17.7cd-8ab, vulgate with the Tilaka of Rāma and the Bhūṣaṇa of Govindarāja 6.26.9).
16. According to the Gujarati Printing Press edition (reprinted 1991, Delhi: Parimal Publications), both the Bhūṣaṇa and the Tilaka say

Under the most straightforward syntactic analysis of (10), the referents of *keṣām* are linked with *vacaḥ* 'saying, statement'. In addition, if the derivate *vacas* is considered underived (*avyutpanna*) in the Pāṇinian system, although it could be considered to contain a suffix *asUN* included in the *uṇādi* set,¹⁷ the ending of *keṣām* (← *kim-ām*) is accounted for by A 2.3.50 (§ 4.2): an ending of the sixth triplet follows a nominal if a remainder (*śeṣe*) is involved, that is, if the nominal in question designates something that is not a direct participant in the accomplishment of an action. On the other hand, if *vacas* is treated as a derivate with a *kṛt* suffix, the end of *keṣām* is accounted for by A. 2.3.65: *karṭṛkarmanoh kṛti* (*śaṣṭhī* 50): it is introduced to signify agents relative to the act signified by *vac*, since the nominal base *kim* is here used with a derivate that ends in a *kṛt* suffix. In both cases, however, only *vacaḥ* (← *vacas-am*) here signifies a *kāraka* directly related to the act of hearing: a statement. The actor is directly linked to the statement, not to hearing. This applies also if *vacanam* is used instead of *vacaḥ* (see note 16), since *vac-ana-* in this term contains the *kṛt* suffix *Lyuṭ*.¹⁸

5.2. There are noteworthy textual variations in the *Kāśikā* and the *Siddhāntakaumudī* with respect to (4) (§2) and (7), and these are linked to possible different syntactic analyses.

5.2.1. According to Haradatta, the *Kāśikā*'s comments on A 1.4.29 ends with: *upayoga iti kim | naṭasya śṛṇoti* 'Why (does Pāṇini say) *upayoge*? (In order to preclude classifying as *apādana* the

that *vacanam* is to be supplied for *keṣām śṛṇoti*, and according to the Lakṣmī Venkaṭeśvara Press edition (Bombay, sarvat 1992) also Rāma supplies *vacanam*. In the Nirṇaya Sāgara Press edition (reprinted 1983, Varanasi: Indological Book House), however, the Tilaka gives *vacaḥ* as the supplement.

17. *sarvadhātubhyo'sun* (Uṇ. 4.188). As is well known, Pāṇinīyas entertain two views concerning *uṇādi* suffixes: that derivates with these are considered derived (*vyutpanna*) items and that they are single underived items; I cannot enter into a discussion of this issue here.

18. A 3.3.113: *kṛtyalyuṭo bahulam*.

actor spoken of in) *naṭasya śṛṇoti*.' This accords with what is said in the Mahābhāṣya (see p. 69 note 2). However, Haradatta goes on to remark that there is also a reading with (7) instead of (4) and (8) instead of (5).¹⁹ Moreover, the earlier commentator Jinendrabuddhi knew the Kāśikā text with (7).²⁰

This brings up the issue of which reading should be accepted as original in the text of the Kāśikāvṛtti. Given that *naṭasya śṛṇoti* is the example cited in the Mahābhāṣya and that the Kāśikā regularly cites examples as given therein, one could decide in favor of this reading. On the other hand, the Nyāsa antedates the Padamañjarī by about three centuries, so that on the basis of this chronology one could favor the reading *naṭasya gāthām śṛṇoti*. Based on the evidence of these two works, a reasonable hypothesis would be that the original text of the Kāśikā had (4), and that the text was modified to (7) early enough for Jinendrabuddhi to know this version, but that the original persisted in manuscripts up to the time of Haradatta. Editors of the Kāśikā have varied in their selection. Thus, the Kashi Sanskrit Series edition has *naṭasya śṛṇoti*,²¹ as does the Osmania University edition,²² which refers (I.81 n. 4) both to the Nyāsa and to two manuscripts for the variant reading with *gāthām*. In Vijayapāla's edition of the Kāśikā, this reading has been adopted on the basis of the Nyāsa.²³

Haradatta and Jinendrabuddhi also differ concerning the syntax of the example under consideration. The latter unambiguously states that the ending of *naṭasya* in (7) is a

19. PM I. 543: *kvacit tu naṭasya gāthām śṛṇoti granthikasya kathām śṛṇotīti pāṭhaḥ*.

20. N 1.4.29 (I.543): *naṭasya gāthām śṛṇotīti sambandhalakṣaṇā ṣaṣṭhī*.

21. This is the reading in the edition of 1952 by Śobhitamiśra and it has been retained in subsequent editions.

22. Edited by Aryendra Sharma, Khanderao Deshpande, and D. G. Upadhye, Sanskrit Academy, Osmania University, 1969, reprinted 2008.

23. Śrīvāmanajayādityaviracitā Pāṇinīyāṣṭādhyāyīsūtravṛttiḥ Kāśikā, Bahālgarh, 1997, p. 73 n. 1: '*gāthām*' *iti yathānyāsam*.

sixth-triplet ending whose occurrence is determined by a relation (*sambandhalakṣaṇā śaṣṭhī*).²⁴ That is, this ending occurs here according to A 2.3.50 and signifies a relation not involving a *kāraka*. Haradatta, on the other hand, explicitly rejects the position that the actor spoken of in (7) merely qualifies the verse signified by *gāthām*, noting that this would have the undesired consequence that the actor would not be a *kāraka*. Instead, he interprets (7) as denoting an act of listening that is brought about by a listener and also has an actor as a cause. (7) is said to mean: '... brings about the hearing of a verse which (hearing) has an actor as its cause'; a similar interpretation is given for (8).²⁵

5.2.2. A comparable issue arises concerning (7) and (4) with regard to the *Siddhāntakaumudī*. Under SK 592 (= A 1.4.29) *ākhyātopayoge*, published editions of this text give (7) as an example showing why the *sūtra* has to include *upayoge*.²⁶ Moreover, the *Tattvabodhinī* knew this as the example. For, *Jñānendrasarasvatī* refers to the example with the *pratīka naṭasya* and goes on to say the sentence signifies hearing that has a sung verse as its immediate object and is linked to an actor.²⁷ Nevertheless, the *Laghuśabdenduśekhara* indicates that *Nāgeśa* knew (4) as an example serving the purpose noted. He comments that the example conveys hearing which is brought about by an actor, so that this person is a *kāraka*.²⁸ Moreover, his student *Vaidyanātha* says this indicates *gāthām* was not part

24. See p. 74 note 2.

25. PM 1.4.29 (I.543): *kvacit tu naṭasya gāthām śṛṇoti granthikasya kathām śṛṇotīti pāṭhaḥ | tatrāpi naṭādinimittam gāthādeḥ śravaṇam karotīty arthaḥ | na tu gāthādiviśeṣaṇam naṭādiḥ akāratvaprasaṅgāt.*

26. SK 592 (I.662): *upayoge kim | naṭasya gāthām śṛṇoti.* Thus also the *Nirṇaya-Sāgara* Press eighth edition (Bombay, 1913), p. 57; the *Kaśhī Sanskrit Series* edition (4th ed., 1958), vol. 1, p. 448; *Śrīveṅkaṭeśvara* Press (samvat 1982, p. 187, 1983 ed., p. 185).

27. SKT 592 (I.662): *naṭasyeti : gāthākarmakam naṭasambandhi śravaṇam ity arthaḥ.*

28. SKŚ II.736: *naṭasyeti : naṭajanyam śravaṇam iti bodhāt kāratvam.*

of the example in the Siddhāntakaumudī,²⁹ that is, it shows that the text known to Nāgeśa had (4) instead of (7). Commenting on the same passage, Bhairavamiśra not only says the reading with *gāthām* is improper but also gives a reason for the absence of this term: if a genitive form — here *naṭasya* — is used together with a nominal whose meaning is appropriate for being linked with the meaning of the genitive in question, then it is considered related with that alone, so that one could not now justify the actor of (7) being a *kāraka*.³⁰ That is, in (7), *naṭasya* is appropriately linked with *gāthām*, which signifies the object of hearing, and the sixth-triplet ending of the form is accounted for by A 2.3.50, the actor not being a *kāraka* with respect to hearing.

5.3. Since the Rāmāyaṇa text has (9) *keṣām śṛṇoti sugrīvaḥ* and commentators consider that *vacāḥ* or *vacanam* is to be supplied, so that one understands (10) *keṣām vacāḥ/vacanam śṛṇoti sugrīvaḥ* (see § 5.1 with p. 73 note 1), it is reasonable to posit a comparable situation for the readings (4) *naṭasya śṛṇoti* and (7) *naṭasya gāthām śṛṇoti*. (4) is then to be considered the original reading, supported by its use in the Mahābhāṣya. In (4) there is no question of the actor not being a direct participant in the act of listening, and he is not the agent of the act: this is an unspecified person, designated by the verb ending *tiP*. Of course, someone listening to a person who is reciting or singing necessarily implies something recited or sung. In view of this expectation (*ākāṅkṣā*), then, a sentence like (4) implies one like (7), so that one is justified in considering that a term such as *gāthām*, referring to the immediate object (*karman*) of listening should be understood. Once *gāthām* is overtly supplied, however, as Bhairava points out (see note 2 below), this is syntactically to be connected with *naṭasya* and the actor now is no longer spoken of as a direct participant in the act of listening.

6. That Patañjali cites (4) in his discussion of A 1.4.29 is also of

29. Cidasthimālā II.736: *bodhād iti : etena mūle gāthām ity asyāpāṭhaḥ sūcitāḥ*.

30. SKŚCK I.691: *naṭajanyam iti | kvacit tu gāthām iti pāṭhaḥ sa cāyuktaḥ | ṣaṣṭhyantārthasya svānvayayogyānāmasamabhivvyāhāre tatraivānvayasya kṛptatayā kārakatvānupapādanāt*.

interest historically. For in early Sanskrit, as reflected in Vedic usage, verbs of cognition like *vid*, *adhi i*, and *śru* could be construed not only with accusative forms but also with genitives, referring to persons or things known, learned, or heard. Let us now consider Vedic examples, and let me begin with *śru*.³¹

1. Constructions with *śru*

This verb can be construed with an accusative referring to an object heard, as in (6), be it a person or an utterance. For example:

(11) 1.104.9d: *pītevā naḥ śṛṇuhi hūyamānaḥ* '(Indra,) listen to us as would a father, when you are called': *naḥ śṛṇuhi* 'listen to us'

(12) 1.89.8ab: *bhādraṇ karṇèbhiḥ śṛṇuyāma devā bhādrām pāśyemākṣabhīr yajatrāḥ* 'We would hear with our ears what is auspicious, o gods, see with our eyes what is auspicious, you worthy of worship': *bhādrām ... śṛṇuyāma* 'we would hear what is auspicious.'

The object which one hears or harkens to can also be referred to by a genitive, as in (4)-(5) and (9). For example:

(13) 1.37.13: *yad dha yānti marutaḥ saṁ hā bruvate'dhvann ā | śṛṇoti kaścid eṣām* 'When the Maruts go and make themselves heard on their path, any one hears them': *śṛṇoti eṣām* 'hears them'

(14) 4.22.10a: *asmākam it su śṛṇuhi tvam indra* 'Indra, listen well

31. Unless otherwise shown, citations are from the Ṛgveda. Accentuation marks in transliterations reflect the original: udātta unmarked, anudātta marked with an underline, svarita marked with a superscript grave accent. The constructions with genitives are well known and have been described briefly, with some examples, in standard works; see, for example, B. Delbrück, *Altindische Syntax* (Halle an der Saale, 1888, reprinted 1968: Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft) 158-59 (§ 109), A. A. Macdonell, *A Vedic Grammar for Students* (Oxford Univ. Press, 1916, reprinted 1958) 319 (§ 202c), L. Renou, *Grammaire de la langue védique* (Paris: IAC, 1952) 351 (§ 411). Comparable usage is found also in Iranian (see, e.g., H. Reichelt, *Awestisches Elementarbuch* (Heidelberg: Winter, 1909) 252 (§ 488) and elsewhere in Indo-European languages, but the comparative evidence is not of import to the present discussion.

to us alone': *asmākam ... śṛṇuhi* 'listen to us'

Further, the construction type seen in (8) and (10) also occurs in Vedic; for example:

(15) 7.29.3d: *adhā ma indra śṛṇavo havemā* 'Then, Indra, you should harken to these my calls': *me ... śṛṇavo havā* 'you should hear my calls'

(16) 8.61.1ab: *ubhayāṁ śṛṇavāc ca na indro ... vacaḥ* 'Indra shall hear ... our twofold speech':³² *śṛṇavat ... naḥ ... vacaḥ* 'will hear our speech.'

6.2. Other verbs of cognition occur in such constructions. Let us consider *vid*, *adhi gam*, *adhi gā* and *adhi i*.

6.2.1. *vid*

(17) 3.39.1d: *indra yat te jāyāte viddhi tasya* 'Indra, take note of that (praise)³³ which is produced for you': *viddhi tasya* 'take note of it'

(18) TS 1.3.6.1: ... *adhī tvā sthāsyati tasya vittāt* '... (The yūpa) will rest on you (the chip of wood); take note of it': *tasya vittāt* 'take note of it'³⁴

(19) 1.4.3ab: *athā te antāmānāv vidyāma sumatīnām* 'We would know your most intimate beneficences': *te ... vidyāma sumatīnām*

32. Sāyaṇa understands *ubhayam* 'both' of *ubhayam ... vacaḥ* as referring to two kinds of ritual utterance: chanted (*stotrātmakam*) and recited (*śastrātmakam*).

33. Sāyaṇa supplies *stotram*, in agreement with *yat*, as the complement to *jāyate*: RVS 3.39.1: *he indra te tvadarthaṁ yat stotraṁ mattaḥ jāyate tat viddhi jānīhi*.

34. Comparable mantras occur in a different order elsewhere, e.g., VS 6.2: *etasya vittād adhi tvā sthāsyati*. Uvaṭa and Mahīdhara understand *etasya* to refer to the yūpa's act of resting on the wood chip in the hole: VSU 6.2: *sa tvam he yūpaśakala etasya vittāt | vida jñāne | etasya karmaṇo viddhi viditārtho bhava | katamaṁ tat karma cet adhi tvā sthāsyati*, VSM 6.2: *sa tvam etasya karmaṇo vittāt | karmaṇi śaṣṭhī | etat karma viddhi jānīhi | kiṁ tat karma | yad yūpaḥ tvām adhi sthāsyati tvadupary avasthānaṁ kariṣyati tat tvayā boddhavyam ity arthaḥ*. See § 7.1.

‘we would know your ... beneficences.’

6.2.2. *adhi gam, adhi gā*

(20) 9.72.9d: *adhī stotrasya pavamāna no gahi* ‘(Soma) pavamāna, take note of our hymn of praise’

(21) 5.55.9c: *adhī stotrasya sakhyasya gātana* ‘(Maruts,) take note of the hymns of praise, the friendship.’³⁵

6.2.3. *adhi i*

The base *i* with the preverb *adhi* is used in the sense of remembering and construed with a genitive, as in

(22a) AV 7.62.3: *yeṣām adhy eti pravaśan yeṣu saumaṇaso bahuh | grhān upa hvayāmahe te nō jānantv āyataḥ* ‘We call on those homes which one recalls while on a voyage, in which there is much happiness. May they know us as we come (back): *yeṣām adhy eti* ‘which one remembers’

(22b) VS 3.42: *yeṣām adhy eti pravaśan yeṣu saumaṇaso bahuh | grhān upa hvayāmahe te nō jānantu jānataḥ ||* ‘... May they know us as we know (them).’

As can be seen, (22b) differs from (22a) only in the final *pāda*. Commenting on (22b), Uvaṭa and Mahīdhara note that *adhy eti* contains a verb form of the base *iK*, listed in the commonly known Pāṇinīya-dhātupāṭha with the gloss *smaraṇe* ‘in the meaning “remember”’ and the Atharvaveda commentary does this also.³⁶ In addition, Mahīdhara and Sāyaṇa cite the Pāṇinian

35. In 8.44.22c (*agnē sakhyasya bodhi naḥ*) Agni is asked to be aware (*bodhi* ‘be awake, be aware, take note’) of the friendship (*sakhyasya*) of the participants in a ritual. Sāyaṇa comments that *sakhya* refers to acts of friendship, praise and so on, and glosses *bodhi* with *budhyasva* (RVS 8.44.22: *naḥ asmākaṁ sakhyasya sakhyam sakhikarma stutyādikam bodhi budhyasva*).

36. VSU 3.42: *yeṣām grhāṇām adhy eti | ik smaraṇe ity etasyaitad rūpaṁ na tv iṇ adhyayane ity etasya | yeṣām grhāṇām smarati pravaśan grhapatiḥ*. VSM 3.42: *pravaśan deśāntaram gacchan yajamāno yeṣām adhy eti | ik smaraṇe | yān grhān smarati*. AVS 7.62.3: ... *yeṣām yān grhān adhyeti smarati | ik smaraṇe*. The entries *iṇ adhyayane* (*adhīte* etc.), *ik smaraṇe* (*adhy eti* etc.) appear in KṣT 2.39-40, DhPr. 2.37-38, MDhVr. 2.49-50.

sūtra which accounts for the genitive *yeṣām* in this passage: A 2.3.52: *adhīgartha-dayeṣām karmaṇi* (śeṣe 50).³⁷

According to the interpretation generally accepted by Pāṇinīyas, *adhīgartha* in this sūtra refers specifically to verbs with the meaning 'remember'.³⁸ This accords with the gloss accompanying *iK* in the Pāṇinīyadhātupāṭha as traditionally handed down by commentators such as Kṣīrasvāmin (see p. 79 note 2). However, as is also well known, the glosses which accompany verbal bases in this text were not part of the earliest text as known to Kātyāyana. Moreover, the parallel of *adhi i*, *adhi gam*, and *adhi gā*, all with verbs that, by themselves mean 'go',³⁹ invites the conclusion that in the usage exemplified by early texts *adhi i* also could be used in a cognitive sense other than remember. Thus, in

(23) 10.100.4ab: *indrò asme suṃanā astu viśvahā rājā somāḥ suvītasyādhy ètu naḥ* 'May Indra be well disposed towards us always, may king Soma pay attention to our well being'

suvitasya is construed with *adhy etu*, and in

(24) 7.1.24ab: *māho nò agne suvītasyā vidvān rayim sūribhya ā vāhā bṛhantam* 'Agni, take note of our great well being, bring large wealth to the sacrificers'⁴⁰

37. VSM 3.42: *adhīgarthadayeṣām karmaṇi iti ṣaṣṭhī*, Sāyaṇa: *adhīgarthadayeṣām karmaṇi iti yeṣām ity atra ṣaṣṭhī*.

38. For example, Kāś. 2.3.52: *adhīgarthāḥ smaraṇārthāḥ*, PK 2.3.52 (I.442): *adhīgarthāḥ smṛtyarthāḥ*.

39. Although *gam* used alone can also mean 'understand', as, for example, in the phrase *katham anucyamānam gamsyate* 'How will (this) be understood without being stated?' (e.g., Bh. 1.1.3 [I.44.2-3]).

40. Sāyaṇa paraphrases *vidvān* with *jānan* 'knowing' and understands — as elsewhere — *suvita* to mean a sacrificial act that is well carried out: RVS 7.1.24 *suvitasya kalyāṇasya karmaṇaḥ vidvān | asmādīyaṃ kalyāṇam karma jānannity arthaḥ*. He also understands *sūribhyaḥ* to refer to those who praise Agni, namely the sacrificers: *tvaṃ sūribhyaḥ stotṛbhyo 'smabhyam bṛhantam mahāntam rayim dhanam ā vaha*.

the same genitive is construed with *vidvān* 'knowing'.

7. Once the dhātupāṭha entry *ik smaraṇe* (see p. 79 note 2) was established, so that *adhīgartha* in A 2.3.52 (§ 6.2.3) was understood to refer to verbs meaning 'remember' (see p. 80 note 2), two major consequences ensue. First, Vedic commentators such as Sāyaṇa, Uvaṭa, Mahīdhara and Bhaṭṭabhāskara would not invoke this sūtra to account for the use of genitives in passages such as those considered above (§§ 6.1 - 6.2.2), except for (22a)-(22b). In addition, while A 2.3.52 as traditionally understood accounts for the use of a genitive in an example such as (22a)-(22b), this rule cannot account for genitives construed with *adhi i* in (23). Let us consider now how commentators interpret some of the passages considered above.

7.1. In some instances, a genitive referring to an immediate object (*karman*) is replaced by an accusative form in a paraphrase. This accords with the regular syntax accounted for by A 2.3.2: *karmaṇi dvitīyā*: an ending of the second triplet follows a nominal if a *karman* is to be singified. For example, commenting on (17) 3.39.1d: *indrag yat te jāyāte viddhi tasya* (§ 6.2.1), Sāyaṇa paraphrases *viddhi tasya* with *tat ... jānīhi: yat stotraṁ mattaḥ jāyate tat viddhi jānīhi*.⁴¹ Similarly, *etasya* of the passage *etasya vittād adhī tvā sthāsyati*, a variant of (18) (see § 6.2.1), is interpreted to mean the same as *etat karma jānīhi* (see p. 78 note 3). This assumes that the genitive signifies a *kāraka* classed as *karman* — as Mahīdhara says explicitly — which is regularly denoted by an accusative form. However, no Pāṇinian sūtra is cited to account for the use of a genitive instead of an accusative.

7.2. At other times, it is assumed that a genitive refers to something not directly related to an action, so that it is accounted for by A 2.3.50 (§ 4.2). In some cases, an accusative construed with the genitive is supplied in a paraphrase of type (7) *naṭasya gāthām śṛṇoti* (§ 5.1). For example: (13) 1.37.13: *yad dha yānti marutaḥ saṁ hā bruvāte'dhvann ā | śṛṇoti kaścid eṣām* (§

41. See p. 78 note 2. Similarly, in his commentary on 5.60.6cd (... *asyāgnē vittād dhaviṣo yad yajāma* 'Agni, be aware of the oblation we offer you in worship'), he paraphrases *asya vittād dhaviṣaḥ* with *etat dhaviḥ ... viddhi: he agne tvam asya haviṣaḥ etad dhaviḥ vittāt viddhi*.

6.2): RVS: *eṣām marutām sambandhinām śabdam kaścit yaḥ ko'pi śṛṇoti*.⁴²

A variation of this procedure is illustrated by examples such as RVS 4.22.10: *he indra tvam asmākam it asmadīyāḥ eva stutīḥ su suṣṭhu śṛṇuhi*, paraphrasing (14): *asmākam it su śṛṇuhi tvam indra* (§ 6.1). Not only is the accusative *stutīḥ* supplied but *asmākam* is also replaced by the adjectival *asmadīyāḥ*.

7.3. In still other instances, commentators' paraphrases involve a syntax different from that of the original; the genitive in question is considered to occur in place of a dative.

Consider first Sāyaṇa's commentary on

(25) 9.72.9d: *adhī stotrasya pavamāna no gahi* 'O pavamāna (Soma,) lend an ear to our praise,'

Which he paraphrases as follows:

(26) RVS 9.72.9: *he pavamāna naḥ asmākam svabhūtasya stotrasya śravaṇāya adhi gahi ā gaccha* '... come to hear our praise.'

Sāyaṇa here considers that *stotrasya* is a Vedic substitute for *stotrāya*⁴³ in a construction of the type

(27) *edhebhyaḥ vrajati* '... is going for firewood'

equivalent to

(28) *edhān āhartuṁ vrajati* '... is going to fetch firewood.'

If *ā hṛ* is used with the cooccurring verb *vraj* and signifies an action for the purpose of which the act denoted by the latter is

42. Similarly, 7.28.1cd: *viśvè cid dhi tvā vihavānta martā asmākam ic chṛṇuhi* ... 'All men call to you separately; listen to us alone ...': RVS: *viśve sarve martāḥ manuṣyāḥ cit hi yady api vihavanta pṛthag havante tathāpi asmākam it asmākam eva havam śṛṇuhi śṛṇu*.

43. The usage is accounted for by A 2.3.62: *caturthyarthe bahulam chandasi (ṣaṣṭhī 50)*, which Sāyaṇa quotes (*caturthyarthe bahulam chandasi iti ṣaṣṭhī*); this sūtra provides that in Vedic usage an ending of the sixth triplet occurs variously in a meaning where an ending of the fourth triplet otherwise is used.

performed, the base *hr* takes the suffix *tumUN*,⁴⁴ as in *āhartum* of (28). If, however, the verb signifying the act for which going is intended is not used, then a fourth-triplet ending follows a nominal that refers to the immediate object of this action,⁴⁵ as in *edhebhyaḥ* of (27). According to Sāyaṇa, *stotrasya* of (25) is a Vedic equivalent of *stotrāya* in a sentence

(29) *adhi ... stotrāya no gahi*

which has the same meaning as (26). In (26), *śravaṇāya* is used instead of *śrotum*,⁴⁶ just as

(30) *edhānām āharaṇāya vrajati*,

which conveys what (27) and (28) signify, has *āharaṇāya* in construction with the genitive *edhānām*.

Commenting on (18) TS 1.3.6.1: ... *adhī tvā sthāsyati tasya vittāt* (§ 6.2.1), Bhaṭṭabhāskara adopts an interpretation that also involves a sixth-triplet ending as a substitute for an ending of the fourth triplet. He considers *tasya* here a genitive accounted for by A 2.3.62 (p. 82 note 2), so that *tasya vittāt* is equivalent to

(31) *tasmai vittāt*.

In addition, Bhaṭṭabhāskara considers that *tasmai* here has a fourth-triplet ending introduced to signify a sampradāna, the *yūpa* being assigned to this *kāraka* category.⁴⁷ Moreover, the *yūpa* is categorized as a sampradāna by virtue of being that

44. A 3.3.10: *tumunṇvulau kriyāyām kriyārthāyām*. The rules provide also for the agentive suffix *ṇvuL*, which need not be considered here.

45. A 2.3.14: *kriyārthopapadasya ca karmaṇi sthāninah* (caturthī 13).

46. A 3.3.11: *bhāvavacanās ca* provides for the use of suffixes signifying an abstract action under the conditions stated in A 3.3.10 (note 1 above), and by A 2.3.15: *tumarthāc ca bhāvavacanāt*, an ending of the fourth triplet occurs after a derivate with such a suffix under the condition stated in A 2.3.14.

47. A 2.3.13: *caturthī sampradāne*, 1.4.32: *karmaṇā yam abhipraiti sa sampradānam*.

which an agent intends as a goal through his action.⁴⁸ Accordingly, (31) here is of the type

(32) *patye śete* (Bh. I.330.19) ‘... lies down for her husband.’

Thus, *tasya vittāt* in (18) is interpreted to mean ‘Be cognizant for it’ and to convey that the wood chip on which the yūpa will rest is asked to acknowledge that the yūpa represents its greatness.⁴⁹

In this context it is appropriate, I think, to bring in a couple of passages from the Taittirīyāraṇyaka:

(33) TĀ 10.1.5/6.1.5:

(a) *puruṣasya vidma sahasrākṣasya mahādevasya dhīmahi | tan nò rudraḥ pra codayāt ||*

(b) *tat puruṣāya vidmahè mahādevāya dhīmahi | tan nò rudraḥ pra codayāt ||*

Commenting on (33a), Sāyaṇa supplies *svarūpam* ‘proper form’ to be construed with *puruṣasya* and *mahādevasya* in constructions of type (7) (§ 5.1), interprets *vidma* to mean either ‘we are aware of’ (*jānīmahe*) or ‘we would gain’ (*labhemahi*), and understands *dhīmahi* to mean ‘we would meditate on’ (*dhyāyema*).⁵⁰ Bhaṭṭabhāskara interprets *vidma* and *dhīmahi* in

48. Bhaṭṭabhāskara refers to Patañjali’s statement (Bh 1.4.32 [I.330.18]: *kriyāgrahaṇam api kartavyam*) that A 1.4.32 should state *kriyayā yam abhipraiti* ‘which ... intends through his action’) in addition to *karmanā yam abhipraiti* (‘which ... intends through a karman’): TSBh. 1.3.6.1 (I.421.20-21): *kriyāgrahaṇam kartavyam iti sampradānatvāc caturthyarthe bahulam chandasīti caturthyarthe ṣaṣṭhī*. The Mahābhāṣya goes on to argue that *karman-* of *karmanā* in the sūtra as formulated includes reference not only to a karman but also to an action; this need not be discussed here.

49. TSBh. 1.3.6.1 (I.421.19-20): *tasya vittāt tad vijānīhi taṁ te mahimānam avagantum arhasīti*. Sāyaṇa (TSS I.421.25-26) simply paraphrases *tasya vittāt* of this passage with *taṁ yūpam anujānīhi* ‘Allow the yūpa’: *tasya vittāt taṁ yūpam anujānīhi*.

50. *tasya puruṣasya svarūpaṁ vidma jānīmahe labhemahi vā | tadarthaṁ tasya virāḍrūpasya mahādevasya svarūpaṁ dhīmahi dhyāyema* (TĀS 10.1.5).

the same way, but specifies for the second interpretation of *vidma* that the base is *vid* of the sixth gaṇa (*vindati* 'finds'), with deletion of the vikaraṇa *śa*.⁵¹ He differs from Sāyaṇa, however, in that he considers all the genitives *puruṣasya*, *sahasrākṣasya*, and *mahādevasya* all used in the sense that calls for a dative. The reason for this is that, in his opinion, although *Puruṣa* and *Mahādeva* are immediate objects (*karman*) of the acts in question, they are treated as being *sampradāna*.⁵² Conversely, in his commentary on (33b), Sāyaṇa considers not only that *tat* stands for *tam* but also that the datives *puruṣāya* and *mahādevāya* are equivalent to accusatives, referring to *Mahādeva* in the form of *Puruṣa*.⁵³ Bhaṭṭabhāskara here adopts the same interpretation. For he merely says that this passage is self explanatory,⁵⁴ which is best understood to mean that here, as in the previous passage, he interprets the datives as designating *karmans* treated as *sampradāna*.

8. In sum, commentators on Vedic passages that have genitive forms construed with finite forms of verbs of preception and awareness, like *śru* and *vid*, as well as *i* and *gam*, *gā* used with the preverb *adhi*, find it difficult to account for such a construction. In general, they either simply assume that a genitive form is used instead of an accusative, but without invoking a Pāṇinian rule to account for this, or they supply an accusative to be linked with the genitive in a construction of type (7) (§ 5.1). Where, however, the verb in question means 'remember', as in (22a,b) (§ 6.2.3), they do link this with a genitive, accounting for the syntax by A 2.3.52.

The basis for this exception is that the *sūtra* in question states *adhīgartha* and the *dhātupāṭha* known to the commentators

51. *puruṣam viśvasya pūrayitāram viśvātītam dhyānādyaviṣayam vastu vidma jānīma labhemahi vā | vindater vikaraṇavyatyaye śaluk* (TĀBh. 6.1.5).

52. *karmaṇas sampradānatvāt sarvā caturthyarthe ṣaṣṭhī* (TĀBh. 6.1.5).

53. *tam āgamaprasiddham puruṣākāram mahādevam jānīmo dhyāyāma ca* (TĀS 10.1.5).

54. *tatpuruṣāyetyādayaḥ pañca gāyatriyaḥ | tatra prathamā gatā* (TĀBh. 6.1.5).

concerned had an entry *ik smaraṇe*. Since, however, glosses such as *smaraṇe* did not constitute part of the earliest dhātupāṭha as transmitted to Kātyāyana, it is reasonable to consider that the verb catalog compiled by Pāṇini also lacked these. Accordingly, *adhīgartha* of A 2.3.52 does not have to be constrained by such a gloss in the dhātupāṭha. It means merely ‘having the meaning of *adhi ik*’. And, if *i* used with the preverb *adhi* meant not only ‘remember’ but also ‘be aware of, take note of’, as did *gam* and *gā* used with the same preverb as well as *vid* (see §§ 6.2.1-6.2.3), the same Pāṇinian rule accounts for the use of these verbs with genitives. Further, if by *adhīgartha* Pāṇini intended to refer also to other verbs related to cognitive acts, the sūtra would serve to account not only for the use of genitives with *smṛ* ‘remember’ but also *śru* ‘hear, listen’, as in (4) *naṭasya śṛṇoti*.

I suggest that this is indeed an appropriate interpretation of A 2.3.52.⁵⁵

55. I am grateful to David Buchta for carefully reading a draft of this paper.

Sanskrit and Pāṇini – Core and Periphery

H.H. Hock

एच्.एच्. हाक्महाभागः माधव देशपाण्डेमहाभागस्य सिद्धान्त-
मुपष्टम्भयन् ह्विटनी-कार्दोनाप्रभृतीनां विवेचनगतं वैशिष्ट्यं च विशदयन्
पाणिनेः संस्कृतभाषा मध्यदेशीय संस्कृतभाषातः अनेकत्र भिद्यते इति
व्याचष्ट। कारणञ्च तत्र पाणिनेः सीमान्तवायव्यदेशीयत्वमेवेति तन्मतम्।
वेदसंहितासु ब्राह्मणेषु शाङ्ख्यनश्रौतसूत्रेषु पञ्चतन्त्र-हितोपदेशादिषु च
तत्तत्प्रान्तग्रथितेषु भाषाप्रयोगेषु अनेकत्र लिटादिप्रयोगविषये परिदृश्यमानं
वैलक्षण्यं द्रढयति यत् प्रदेशभेदेन संस्कृतस्य भाषितभाषारूपाणि परस्परं
भिद्यन्ते। मध्यदेशीयसंस्कृतं पाणिनेः वायव्यसीमान्तसंस्कृतात् भिद्यते।
अनयैव दिशा मध्यदेशीयसंस्कृते अपि अवान्तरभेदाः परिलक्षयितुं
शक्यन्ते इति तस्य स्थापना।

1. Introduction

In an important paper on “Pāṇini as a Frontier Grammarian” (1983), Deshpande notes that in some cases the language described in Pāṇini’s *Aṣṭādhyāyī* differs from the grammatical practice of the mainstream of the Sanskrit textual tradition, and he attributes these differences to the fact that Pāṇini hailed from the extreme northwest, at the “frontier” of Old Indo-Aryan speech, while the mainstream of Sanskrit texts comes from what may be called the *Madhyadeśa*.

Especially striking is Pāṇini 3.3.10, which permits structures such as (1), with different agents for the *tumun-* infinitive and the matrix structure. As Deshpande notes, the *Madhyadeśa* tradition does not accept such structures, and this difference created major difficulties for the later commentators. What is especially interesting is that such structures do occur in the *Caraka Saṃhitā*, a text that has been claimed to hail from the extreme northwest (around Gandhāra), close to Pāṇini’s home. Deshpande concludes that the difference in grammar, thus, appears to reflect a genuine dialectal distinction between Pāṇini’s northwest “frontier”

language and the varieties of Sanskrit reflected in the *Madhyadeśa* tradition.

- (1) *pātum asmai prayacchet*

‘(One) should give (something) to drink to him.’

In this paper I highlight several other grammatical features that distinguish *Pāṇini's* Sanskrit from the *Madhyadeśa* tradition and, thus, demonstrate that the dialectal difference between the “core” of the Sanskrit tradition and the “periphery” of *Pāṇini's* speech is a more general phenomenon. I also discuss a few other features whose interpretation is less certain. I conclude by considering the implications of Deshpande's and my findings for the study of Sanskrit and its dialects.

2. Three further examples indicating a difference in dialect

In the following I add to Deshpande's evidence showing that *Pāṇini's* “frontier” language differed from the variety of Sanskrit represented by the *Madhyadeśa* tradition. Interestingly, although the Ṛg Veda is commonly assumed to be from the northwest, too, it seems to agree with the *Madhyadeśa* tradition, at least for two of the features.¹ This raises interesting questions regarding the dialectological affiliation of the Ṛg Vedic tradition.

2.1. Present participles plus nominative case

As we have seen in section I, as regards the syntax of the infinitive, it is the *Madhyadeśa* tradition that has greater restrictions than *Pāṇini*. By contrast, in the case of the present participle the situation is reversed. As shown by the *sūtras* in (2), *Pāṇini* restricts the use of present participles modifying a noun in the nominative case to situations where the participle indicates a special characteristic or cause of an action.² Example (3) presents a common illustration.

- (2) *laṭaḥ śatṛśānacāv aprathamāsamānādhikaraṇe* (3.2.124)

-
1. In the case of the third feature, the Ṛg Veda presents an earlier stage at which the full range of causative constructions in -aya- had not yet come into existence.
 2. Present participles are also permitted with the vocative which in *Pāṇini's* grammar is a variant of the first (or “nominative”) case.

‘The suffixes *śatr* and *śanac* substitute for *laṭ* in the case of co- reference with (a noun) not in the first case.’

lakṣaṇahetvoḥ kriyāyāḥ (3.2.126)

‘(The substitution takes place even in co reference with a noun in the first case) of a verb in case of indication of a (special) characteristic or cause,’

(3) *śayānā bhuñjate yāvanāḥ*

‘The *yāvanas* eat lying down.’

It is possible to find *Madhyadeśa* examples that could be interpreted as conforming to Pāṇini’s grammar. For instance, the passage in (4) is amenable to the interpretation that ‘desiring’ is a special characteristic of ‘our thought’ or the cause for our thoughts’ going off. But it is just as possible to view *icchāntīḥ* as a simple subsidiary action qualifying the action of the matrix clause, as indicated by the translation.

(4) *Pārā me yanti dhītāyo gāvo ná gavyūrtīr ānu / icchāntīḥ urucākṣasam* (RV 1.25.16)

‘My thoughts go off like the cows to (their) pasture, desiring the far-seeing one’

The overall evidence of the *Madhyadeśa* tradition, however, shows that the use of the present’s participle is not subject to the restrictions of Pāṇini’s grammar; consider the example in (5) to (7). Especially important are passage such as (7), where the context makes it clear that the participle simply expresses a subordinate action in the narrative, not a special characteristic or cause of the main action.

(5) *úpa tvāgne divé dive dōṣavastar dhiyā vayám / námo bharanta émasi*(RV 1.1.7)

‘To you, Agni, lighter of darkness, we come every day with our thought(s), offering devotion.’

(6) *...vīrayasvety evainam etām vācam vadanta upātiṣṭhan* (AB 3.20)

‘Saying this word “... be heroic”, they supported him.’

(7) *...iti vadann eva kāṣṭhāt patito gorakṣakair vyāpāditaḥ* (Hit.4.2)

‘... (as the turtle was) speaking thus and fell from the stick, it was killed by the cowherds.’

2.2 The case marking of the goal of motion verbs

Within Pāṇini’s system, the goal of verbs of motion is classified as *karman*, and by sūtra (2.3.12), this is realized as accusative or dative (8).

- (8) *gaty-artha-karmanī dvitīyā-caturthyau ceṣṭāyām anadhvani*
(2.3.12)

‘With the *karman* of a (verb) meaning “go”, accusative and dative (may be used both) in case of motion, (but) not in case of the road (traveled)’

While accusative marking is found also in *Madhyadeśa* Sanskrit, the usual alternative in this variety is the locative and not the dative, as in (9) and (10); see e.g. Delbrück 1888: 121-122 and Speijer 1886: 103-104. Speijer, to be sure, gives some examples of the dative (1886:79), such as (11), but he notes that the accusative or locative is preferred. One suspects that relatively rare dative examples of this type owe their existence to the influence of Pāṇini’s grammar.

- (9) *sá id devéṣu gacchati* (RV 1.1.4c)

‘... it surely goes to the Gods.’

- (10) *sa aṭavyām gataḥ* (Pañc.321)

‘He went to the forest.’

- (11) *vanāya gaccha* (Ragh. 12.7)

‘Go to the forest.’

2.3 Causee marking

There is a similar difference between Pāṇini’s account of causee (*aṇikartr*) case marking and the practice of the *Madhyadeśa* tradition. Pāṇini makes a distinction in terms of lexical classes, such that the causee of intransitives, sound-emitting verbs, ingestive verbs, verbs of cognition, and verbs of motion behaves

as a karman or underlying direct object (DO) (see(12a)),¹ while the causee of other verbs is in the instrumental, the case marking of the kartṛ/hetu. By contrast, the *Madhyadeśa* tradition assigns causee marking based on the basis of pragmatics, with instrumental indicating unwilling participation in the action or lack of benefit from it, while karman or direct-object marking represents the unmarked usage. See the quote from Speijer in (7b). For illustrations see (13) vs. (13') and the summary in Table I.

(12) a. *gati-buddhi-pratyavasānārtha-śabdakarma-akarmakāṇām aṇikartā sa ṇau* (1.4.52) 'the agent of the corresponding non-causative of verbs of going, knowing, consuming, making sounds, and intransitives (is karman, i.e. underlying direct object) in the causative.'

b. If one wants to say 'he causes me to do something, it is by his impulse I act' there is room for the (accusative causee), but if it be meant 'he gets something done by me. I am only the agent or instrument through which he acts', the instrumental is in its place ... (Speijer 1886: 36-37 with reference)

(13) *Madhyadeśa* tradition:

- a. i. *eke yajamānam avakhyāpayanti* (ŚB 1.3.1.26)
'Some make the sacrificer look down'
- ii. *enām somakrayanyā saṁkhyāpayati* (ŚB 3.3.1.1)
- b. i. *sa evāsmā imān lokān viśam pra dāpayati* (TS 2.1.4.8)
'He makes these world, the people give to him.'
- ii. *ahnā + evāsmāi rātrīm pra dāpayati* ... (TS 2.1.4.8)
'He makes day give him night...'

(13') Pāṇinian counterparts:

- a. i. *eke yajamānam avakhyāpayanti*
- ii. *enām somakrayaṇīm saṁkhyāpayati*

1. Rule 1.4.53 provides that two verbs, *hṛ* - 'take' and *kṛ* - 'make, do', optionally follow the same pattern. This exception need not detain us in the present discussion.

- b. i. *sa evāsmā imair lokair viśā pra dāpayati*
 ii. *ahnā + evāsmāi rātrim pra dāpayati...*

	Madhyadeśa tradition		Pāṇini
	Unmarked	Causee not benefiting	
<i>gati-buddhi</i> etc.	<i>karman</i>	Instrumental	<i>Karman</i>
Other transitivesß	<i>karman</i>	Instrumental	Instrumental

Table I: Causee marking: Madhyadeśa vs. Pāṇini

Especially illustrative of the pragmatic distinction in the *Madhyadeśa* tradition is the (near-) minimal pair that Spejier provides from *Mudrārākṣasa* (14.) Example (14b) comes from the beginning of the drama and represents Śakaṭadāsa as a mere instrument, caused to write a fictitious letter in *Rākṣasa*'s Kautiliyan scheme. The passage in (14a) comes from the end, when *Rākṣasa* has to set things right and see to it that Śakaṭadāsa is absolved of any apparent guilt. The focus now is on Śakaṭadāsa as a human being who has been severely affected by these machinations – hence the grammatical treatment as *Karman*.

- (14) a. *yena tādrśaṁ kapaṭalekham... lekhitāḥ tapasvī Śakaṭadāsaḥ*
 (Mudr. 7.9.5-6)

‘(I am the one) by whom poor Śakaṭadāsa was made to write such a fake letter.’

- b. *lekham Śakaṭadāsena lekhayitvā* (Mudr. 1.19.5)

Having had Śakaṭadāsa write the letter ...’

As the examples in (13b) and others like them show, the distinction goes back to the earliest Vedic prose and thus is not a late, post-Pāṇinian innovation. In Hock 1981 I therefore conclude that this difference, too, is dialectal and reflects the fact that Pāṇini was a “Frontier Grammarian”.¹

3. Two less certain cases

In the following section I focus on two constructions that could perhaps provide additional support for a dialectal

1. For speculations as to how the Pāṇinian and Madhyadeśa systems can be historically related to each other see Hock 1981, §6.2.

difference between Pāṇini's language and the *Madhyadeśa* tradition, but whose interpretation is not as certain. I ignore the issue of "non-Pāṇinian" usages such as prohibitive *mā* with the imperative, rather than the injunctive, or the use of genitive or locative instead of the dative, phenomena commonly found in post-Vedic Sanskrit, especially in the epic. These are at least as much reflexes of social differences as of regional ones. (See e.g. Hock & Pandharipande 1976/1978 with references to earlier literature.)

3.1. Modal agreement in conditional constructions

In several *sūtras* (3.3.139-40, 3.3.156), Pāṇini specifies that verbs in conditional structures must agree in modality; see e.g. (15). At first sight it might seem significant that a similar conclusion is reached by Whitney (16), in many ways miles apart from Pāṇini, but at the same time a keen expert on the corpus of the *Madhyadeśa* tradition.

(15) *hetuhetumator liṅ* (3.3.156)

'The optative is used in the protasis and apodosis of a conditional structure.'

(16) So at 101.2. In the apodosis of a sentence having an optative in its protasis, we must absolutely have the optative *ricyeta*: there is no exception in the older language to the rule that the mode, whether optative or subjunctive or conditional, is the same in both members of the sentence. (Whitney 1887 : ccxxvii)

As Keith (1909: 152) pointed out, agreement in modality may be prototypical, but patterns, with non-agreeing modality do occur. Keith supported his claim with examples from the *Maitrāyaṇī Samhitā* and other Vedic-prose texts; but structures with non-agreement are found throughout the history of *Madhyadeśa* Sanskrit, from the Rig-Veda to the post-Vedic period; see (17)-(19). (See also Hock 1986.)

(17) Rig-Veda a. *suryāṁ yó brahmā vidyāt sá íd vādhūyam arhati* (10.85.34)

'What priest/if a priest should know the *suryā*,

he deserves the bride's garment.'

b. *adyā murīya yādi yatundhāno āsmi* (7.104.15)

'May I die today if I am a warlock.'

(18) Vedic Prose a. *yād āsoma yājī saṁnāyet parimoṣā evā só 'nṛtaṁ karoti* (TS 2.5.5.1)

'If a non-soma-sacrificer should offer the *sāmnāyya*, he being a thief goes wrong.'

(Sim. TS 2.2.2.2, MS 1.4.14, 1.10.8, AB 3.46, 5.23, etc., KB 25.4, etc., ŚB 1.7.2.2, etc., etc.)

b. *yó 'gnīm citvānyāsyā strīyam upaiti yāthā haviḥ skannām evāṁ syād* (MS 3.4.7)

'If a man, having established the fire altar, has intercourse with the wife of another man, he would be like a spilled oblation.'

(Sim. *ibid.* 2.3.6, 4.1.14, etc., KS 35.16, TS 3.1.3.2, ŚB 1.3.2.15, etc., etc.)

(19) Post-Vedic *yo na hanyāt sa hanyate* (Pāñc. 1.271)

'Who/if someone should not (decide to) kill, he is killed'

While there may be some differences of opinion about some of these structures, especially the ones employing relative pronouns (rather than particles meaning 'if'), examples of this type (especially the a. structures) are far too numerous to be dismissed as grammatical mistakes. Rather, they suggest that like other languages, Sanskrit was able to make more subtle distinctions in conditional sentences than the ones conveyed by means of the more ordinary, prototypical type, i.e. with modal agreement.

It is thus clear that Whitney's assessment of the behavior of conditional constructions was mistaken, by focusing only on the prototypical type. For Pāṇini, the case is less certain. If we were to assume that he made a similar mistake as Whitney, based on the prototypical situation, then his grammar might be identical to that of the *Madhyadeśa* on this count. But what if his variety did not allow modality disagreement? If an examination of the

Caraka Saṁhitā were to produce examples with disagreement, the case could be solved. Otherwise, we would be faced with the problem referred to in section 4, namely that the mainstream of the Sanskrit textual tradition cannot be used to test *Pāṇini's* grammatical judgements.

3.2 The system of past tenses, or *parokṣe liṭ*

As is well known, *Pāṇini* assigns different values to the three finite past tenses of Sanskrit- the aorist (*luṅ*), the imperfect (*laṅ*), and the perfect (*liṭ*); see (20). As is also known, Whitney, who was a keen observer of the Sanskrit textual tradition, claimed that *Pāṇini's* distinction between imperfect and perfect does not hold for the Vedic period; see e.g. (21) and see Whitney 1892. (In post-Vedic, of course, the entire system collapses, and the three past tenses are used interchangeably.)

(20) *bhūte* (3.2.84)

‘(What follows, applies) in case of a past action.’

luṅ (3.2.110)

‘The suffix *luṅ* (aorist) (is introduced in reference to past action).’

anadyatve laṅ (3.2.111)

‘(In reference to past action not linked to the present day), *laṅ* (imperfect).’

Parokṣe liṭ (3.2.115)

‘(In reference to past action not linked to the present day and) not witnessed, *liṭ* (perfect).’

- (21) According to the Hindu grammarians, the perfect is used in the narration of facts not witnessed by the narrator; but there is no evidence of its being exclusively or distinctively so employed at any period. (Whitney 1889: 296)

On first blush we seem to be faced here with another case where *Pāṇini's* language differed from that of the *Madhyadeśa* (although Whitney may have had a less charitable assessment). In a recent publication, however, Cardona has claimed that *Pāṇini's* distinctions are valid for at least some of the Vedic tradition (Cardona 2002; see also Cardona 2003 and Cardona & Jain 2003).

Cardona finds evidence for this assessment in the story of *Śunaḥśepha*, as told in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (7.13-18) and the *Śāṅkhāyana Śrauta Sūtra* (15.17-25). Although the two versions differ in some detail, the general pattern is that the perfect is used in the frame-story narrative, which can be argued to report events not witnessed by the narrator (hence *parokṣe liṭ*), and the aorist (*luṇ*) is used to refer to actions that have just been completed (and hence are *adyatve*); see (21a, d) vs. (21e). Finally, in a passage where the speaker reports on a past action that he himself has witnessed, the imperfect (*lan*) is used; see (21f).

(21) a. *sa (aikṣvāko) varuṇam rājānam upasasāra* (perf.)

‘He (*Aikṣvāka*) approached king *Varuṇa*.’

b. *putro me jāyatām tena tvā yajā iti*

‘Let a son be born for me; with him I will sacrifice to you,’

c. *tatheti*

‘Yes’

d. *tasya ha putro jajñe* (perf.) *rohito nāma*

‘Of him a son was born, named *Rohita*,’

e. *tam hovāca* (perf.) *+ajani* (aor.) *vai te putro yajasva māneneti*

‘He (*Varuṇa*) said to him, “Your son has been born; sacrifice with him to me.”’

f. *tatāyam vai mahyam tvām adadād* (impf.)... *iti*

‘Dear (addressed to *Rohita*), this one (*Varuṇa*) gave you to me...’

Although recognizing that there are some exceptions to this distribution, especially in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (AB) version, Cardona claims that ‘these can be considered actually to support the archaic nature of the usage elsewhere in the telling of the legend: we have reversions occasionally to the later regular system (which loses the distinction between different past tenses), but the legend as a whole retains archaic usage. ‘(2002: 238)

If Cardona’s assessment is correct, we would have to conclude that, pace Whitney, there were at least some varieties of

the *Madhyadeśa* tradition that agreed with *Pāṇini* and that in this respect, *Pāṇini* was not a “Frontier Grammarian.”

Unfortunately, Cardona’s discussion focuses mainly on the contrast between the aorist as reporting an event in the immediate past (*adyatve*) and the perfect or, in some traditions, the imperfect as a tense used to narrate remote past events. This contrast, however, has not been under dispute; see e.g. Whitney 1892, as well as Delbrück 1888: 280-289. What has been under dispute is the question whether there is evidence in the *Madhyadeśa* Vedic tradition for *Pāṇini*’s distinction between the imperfect as a general remote past (*anadyatve*) and the perfect as conveying the special connotation of a past event not witnessed by the speaker. To refute Whitney’s claim that there is no such evidence, it would be important to show that there are *Madhyadeśa* texts that make the distinction. As it turns out, the only text for which Cardona tries to provide such evidence is the *Śunaḥśepha* story. It is this story, therefore, that I examine in greater detail. (A broader discussion is found in Molina Muñoz 2009.)

Closer examination of the *Śunaḥśepha* story leads to the conclusion that the evidence for a *Pāṇinian* contrast between perfect and imperfect in this text is less certain than Cardona believes.

A major problem is that the passage in (21f) is the only case of an imperfect used within the prose sections of the story that conforms to *Pāṇini* generalization, in so far as it is used to report a witnessed past event. If we include the verse portions, which may (or may not) come from different textual traditions, there are two other instances of a past event witnessed by the speaker; see (22). One of these has an imperfect too (22a),¹ the other has a perfect (22b).

1. It is preceded by two aorists; and the context does not make it clear why there is a switch in tense from aorist to imperfect.

- (22) a. *adarśus (aor.) tvā śāsahastaṁ na yac chūdreśv alapsata (aor.) / gavām trīṇi śatāni tvam avṛṇīthā (impf.) mad aṅgiraḥ (AB 7.17)*¹

‘They have seen you with knife in your hand, what has not obtained (even) among Śūdras: you chose three hundred cows instead of me, Aṅgiras.’

- b. *nānā srāntāya srīr astīti rohita śuśrūma (perf.) (AB 7.15)*

‘There is manifold good luck for the weary, Rohita, so we heard.’²

Even if these two additional passages are included, the number of examples that could be used to test the claim that our story conforms to Pāṇini’s rules is extremely limited. This makes it difficult to assess whether the distribution of imperfects and perfects, and the difference between them, is significant or simply random.

Another area where the claimed Pāṇinian use of perfect vs. imperfect needs to be tested is of course the frame-story narrative which, as noted earlier, can be assumed to report a story that has been handed down and whose events therefore have not been witnessed by the narrator.

Now, it is true that the perfect is used as narrative past throughout most of the story, not just in the dialogue portion exemplified in (21). However, there are a few places where the imperfect is used instead. One of these occurs in the prose portion of the AB version; see (23). Others are found in gnomic verses (24) and in verses that form the concluding narrative of the story (25). The “non-Pāṇinian” use of imperfects, thus, is found in all subtypes of the text. Note further that in (24a) and (25), imperfect and perfect occur next to each other, in the same context.

- (23) *tasya ha viśvāmitro hotāsīd (impf.) (AB 7.16)*

‘Of him, Viśvāmitra was the *hotṛ*.’

-
1. The ŚŚS version has *adrākṣur* and manuscript variation between *alipsata* and *alapsata*.
 2. The ŚŚS version in the same.

- (24) a. *śaśvat putreṇa pitaro atyāyan (impf.) bahulaṁ tamaḥ / ātmā hi jajña (perf.) ātmanaḥ ...*(AB 7.13)

‘Fathers have always crossed great darkness by means of a son; for he is born as a Self, from the Self.’

- b. *devāścaitām ṛṣayaśca tejaḥ samabharan (impf.) mahat / devā manuṣyān abruvann (impf.) eṣā vo jananiṁ punaḥ* (AB 7.13)

‘Both the Gods and the ṛṣis brought (her) together as great brilliance; the Gods said to the humans “This (mother) is your re-birth”.’

- (25) *te samyañco vaiśvāmitrāḥ sarve sākāṁ sarātayaḥ / devarātāya tashire (perf.) dhṛtyai śraiṣṭhyā gāthināḥ//*

adhīyata (impf.) devarāto rikthayor ubhayor ṛṣiḥ / jahnūnām cādhipatye daive vede ca gāthinām //(AB 7.17)

‘They, the descendants of Viśvāmitra, the Gāthinas, all together, stood by Devarāta (i.e. Śunaḥśepha) for firmness, for excellence.

‘Devarāta , the ṛṣi, was placed into both inheritances, both the lordship over the Jahnus and the divine knowledge of the Gāthins.’

In two cases, the ŚŚS version disagrees with the AB one and thus comes closer to the distribution predicted by Pāṇini’s rules. In one of these it has the expected perfect; see (23’). But in the other one (25’) it shows instead a present-tense form, employing a rare inflectional variant of the root *i-* (plus *adhi-*),¹ and in the process breaking the temporal continuity of the passage.

- (23’) *tasya ha viśvāmitro hotāsa (perf.)* (SSS 15.21)

‘Of him, Viśvāmitra was the hotṛ.’

- (25’) *te samyañco vaiśvāmitrāḥ sarve sākāṁ sarātayaḥ / devarātāya tashire (perf.) jyaiṣṭhye śraiṣṭhye ca gāthināḥ//*

adhīyate (pres) devarāto rikthayor ubhayor ṛṣiḥ ...// (ŚŚS 15.27)

1. The AB form *adhīyata* could, in principle, be the corresponding imperfect; but interpretation as an imperfect passive of *dhā-* ‘to put’ seems more natural.

‘They, the descendants of *Viśvāmitra*, the *Gāthinas*, all together, stood by *Devarāta* (i.e. *Śunaḥśepha*) for superiority and for excellence.

‘*Devarāta*, the ṛṣi, is (made to be?) knowledgeable (?) in both inheritances ...’

In the first case, it would be possible to adopt Cardona’s perspective and view the ŚŚS version, though later, as preserving the more archaic pattern and the AB version as reflecting the tendency of later texts to lose the original tense distinctions. In the second case, however, the break in temporal continuity creates difficulties.

Under the circumstances, it is tempting to speculate that the relationship between the two versions may have been different, with the AB presenting an earlier version, and the ŚŚS constituting an attempt to “correct” the AB version by bringing the text more in line with *Pāṇini*’s rules. In the case of (23)/ (23’) this was not difficult, since this is a prose passage where syllable count and metrical structure do not matter. In the case of (25)/ (25’) by contrast, substituting a perfect (*dadhe*¹) for *adhīyata* would reduce the syllable count and thus affect the meter. At the same time, since syllable weight distribution in the initial four syllables of the epic *anuṣṭubh* is quite free, substituting *adhīyate* creates no such difficulties, while at the same time avoiding a “non-*Pāṇinian*” imperfect (even if at some cost).

As for the other passages with “non-*Pāṇinian*” imperfects, (24a, b), where ŚŚS does not differ from AB, such a substitution either could be avoided by appealing to *Pāṇini* 3.1.116, which permits the imperfect under *parokṣe* conditions in the presence of *śaśvat* ‘always’, or it could not be carried out for metrical reasons: Substituting perfect *saṁjabhruḥ* for *samabharan* or *ūcuḥ* for *abruvan* would have affected the syllable count. (For similar reasons the “non-*Pāṇinian*” perfect *śuśrūma* in (22b) could not have been replaced by imperfect *aśṛṇuma*, since this would have substituted a pattern light-heavy (-light) in a context which requires the heavy-light (-light) of the extant text.)

1. Or possibly *adhīye*, if *adhīyata* should be from *adhi* + *i-*.

Clearly, this alternative account is speculative, and the limited size of our text and of relevant passages within that text, as well as the fact that there do not seem to exist any other texts that are comparable to our story, makes it difficult to evaluate Cardona's perspective and the alternative interpretation suggested here. Moreover, even if the alternative interpretation should be on the right track, it would raise the further question as to whether the "correction" of "non-Pāṇinian" forms results from an attempt to make the text conform better to Pāṇini's rules or from the fact that the editor's native dialect of Sanskrit had the same grammar as Pāṇini's.

The available evidence, thus, makes it difficult to support – or refute – the view that Pāṇini's distinction between perfect and imperfect (as *parokṣe* vs. unmarked) is also found in at least one variety of the *Madhyadeśa* tradition (the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* and *Śāṅkhāyana Śrauta Sūtra* versions of the *Śunaḥśepha* story). For the mainstream of *Madhyadeśa* Sanskrit, however, Whitney's denial of such a distinction seems to be correct. In fact, even as early as the *Ṛg Veda* we find imperfect and perfect used side by side, in the same temporal/aspectual context; see e.g. (26).

(26) *āhann* (impf.) *āhim ānv apās tatarda* (perf.)

prā vakṣāṇā abhinat (impf.) *pārvatānām* (RV 1.32.1)

'He slew the dragon, he bored out the waters after, he split the bellies of the mountains.'

4. Conclusions and implications

Whatever the correct interpretation of the issues presented in section 3 may be, there is ample evidence to provide further support for Deshpande's view of Pāṇini as a "Frontier Grammarian", whose variety of Sanskrit differed from that of the *Madhyadeśa* tradition.

Remarkably, the different behavior of the *Madhyadeśa* tradition persists into the post-Vedic period and is generally not affected¹ by the prevailing attitude that "good" Sanskrit must conform to the rules of Pāṇini's grammar. Perhaps this

1. Barring rare cases, such as the goal-datives with verbs of motion mentioned in §2.2.

persistence can be attributed to the fact that the features discussed here all involve syntax and that the influence of *Pāṇini's* śabdānuśāsana mainly affected morphology and phonology.

It is also remarkable that, as noted earlier, the Ṛg-Veda agrees with the *Madhyadeśa* tradition, even though commonly assumed to have originated in the northwest. This raises interesting questions regarding the dialectology of Sanskrit/old Indo-Aryan (for which see also further below).

The fact that difference between *Pāṇini's* language and that of the *Madhyadeśa* are not limited to just one or two features has further consequences and implications. First, it should inspire additional investigations to determine the extent to which the grammar of *Pāṇini* differs from that of the *Madhyadeśa* tradition. Second, it creates difficulties for attempts such as that of Kiparsky (1979/1980) to draw on late Vedic texts to test *Pāṇini's* grammar (in his case, an attempt to confirm his interpretation of different designations of optionality in *Pāṇini's* grammar as denoting different degrees of variability). Finally, there is the question as to whether there are varieties of *Madhyadeśa* that come closer to *Pāṇinian* usage than others. An answer to this question might make it possible to determine whether *Pāṇini's* variety was completely separate from the *Madhyadeśa* ones or whether there existed transitional *Madhyadeśa* varieties that are closer to *Pāṇini* in some of their features than other, more eastern varieties, i.e. whether there was some kind of dialect continuum.

The work by Witzel (1989) would seem to be a first step in that direction. In so far as it tries to determine dialect differences within the *Madhyadeśa* tradition. A propos of the discussion in section 3.2 above, Witzel finds that in the earliest Vedic prose texts, the narrative use of the perfect is an eastern phenomenon, while the more western (or central) texts prefer the imperfect. Moreover, he observes that the perfect begins to compete with, and replace, the narrative imperfect in the more western texts in later Vedic times. Unfortunately, however, his coverage of *Pāṇini's* variety is cursory and, as Cardona (2002) notes, is mistaken in claiming that the narrative imperfect originally characteristic of the more western varieties agrees with *Pāṇini's* usage. In the most recent treatment of the issue that I am aware

of, Molina Muñoz (2009) attempts to bridge the gap by suggesting that the *Pāṇinian* usage results from grammaticalization of the late Vedic tendency (observed by Whitney 1892) for the imperfect to be limited to reporting past tense events in cited discourse, while the (western/central) texts employ both perfect and imperfect in the narrative frame story. It is to be hoped that further, detailed work on the different varieties of *Madhyadeśa* tradition will increase our insights into this interesting issue.

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Malayalam manuscripts of the *Kāśikāvṛtti* : A study¹.

Malhar Kulkarni

मल्हारकुलकर्णीमहाभागाः काशिकावृत्तेः मुद्रितसंस्करणानां मातृकाणां च
परिचयं दत्त्वा मलयाक्षरलिखितानां मातृकाणां पाठसमीक्षण पुरस्सरं तासां
मातृकाणां वंशवृक्षं निर्धारयति।

In this paper, an attempt is made to study the manuscripts of the *Kāśikāvṛtti*, written in Malayalam characters. It is aimed to make a statement on the possible interrelation of these manuscripts with reference to their special features, if any.

Introduction :

It is a wellknown fact that the *Kāśikāvṛtti* (KV) is the known oldest complete commentary on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (A) of *Pāṇini* (P). Scholars from the west, for more than the last century and a quarter have been studying this text available to them in the printed format. The Indian tradition has studied it thoroughly and held it as a supreme authority after *Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya* of *Patañjali*. In fact there are two very important and now famous commentaries written on the KV, namely *Nyāsa* by *Jinendrabuddhi* and *Padamañjarī* by *Haradatta Miśra*. These two commentaries were further commented upon by scholars like *Maitreya Rakṣita* (*Tantrapradīpa*) etc. These subcommentaries were further commented upon by scholars like *Nandana Miśra* (*Tantrapradīpodyotana* on the *Tantrapradīpa*). I have dealt with these in detail in a separate article, published in Prof. G.U.Thite Felicitation volume, Pune, 2004.

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1. An earlier version of this paper was presented in the *Vyākaraṇa* section of the 13th World Sanskrit Conference held at Edinburgh in 2006. I wish to thank Dr. Eivind Kahrs for his encouragement which helped me revise the paper and publish it.

Ever since first publication of this important text in 1874 from Benares under the editorship of Pt. Balashastri Ranade, scholars have recognized and appreciated the importance of this work and have been engaged in serious research work related to this commentary.

Kielhorn, for example argued that- "the text of the Aṣṭādhyāyī which is given in the *Kāśīkāvṛtti* differs in the case of 58 rulesfrom the text which was known to *Kātyāyana* and *Patañjali*." (1887:178-184). Bhimasen Shastri, another example, in his book "*Nyāsaparyālocana*" (1979) devotes an entire chapter on the corrupt readings of the KV and proposes readings according to the records in *Nyāsa*(N).

Importance of the textual study of the KV

It is important for a serious scholar to have a text of the KV, edited with as much manuscript evidence available as possible, in front of him before making any decisive statement on the basis of the evidence based on the KV. There are more than 200 manuscripts of the KV, available in India and abroad. References of the tradition of the KV have been found in the inscriptions of Kambodia. The manuscript material is available in more than 8 different scripts. Use of such a huge amount of material and it's careful study is a gigantic task, perhaps as huge as the task of the edition of the *Mahābhārata*.

There are several cases where more detailed evidence could provide a decisive clue about the exact formation of the text of the KV. Thus on P.2.2.6, there appears a *vārttika* in almost all the editions of the KV namely, "nañō nalopas tiñi kṣepe". Further there appears by way of illustration, the examples of the said *vārttika*. Hyderabad edition omits this *vārttika*. It requires a strong reason to explain why it omits this *vārttika* when all other editions print it. The Hyderabad edition does not provide us with an adequate justification. In an article (2002), I have tried to explain the justification of the decision of omitting the said *vārttika* from the original text of the KV with the help of manuscript evidence.

It is the need of the hour to present the available manuscript evidence of the KV to the world of scholars to help

decide issues such as mentioned above. None of the editions available to date seem to address to undertake this task.

Printed editions :

So far, the KV has been printed and published in almost twelve editions by different publishing houses. Some are published along with the Sanskrit commentaries. Some are with the bare text of the KV. Some editions in their prefaces have mentioned the manuscript material used.

The first edition of the KV published in 1874, used three mss. In a separate article (2000), I have shown the manuscript material on which this first ever printed edition based itself upon. I have also shown elsewhere that all the following editions have used this first edition as their base. Puja Deo in her Ph.D. dissertation (2000) has confirmed this fact.

The edition that is published by the Osmania University, Hyderabad(Hy) in 1969 is an important edition from this point of view. It uses 9 manuscripts for its purpose and describes them briefly. It also mentions the first ever printed edition as one of its base materials.

One notices that Hy uses, apart from devanagari, only those mss which are written in south Indian scripts. It does not use any ms written in śāradā and bengali characters. It also does not take into account ms written kannada, tulu and nandināgarī characters.

Birwé (1973), in his critical review of this edition, made some strong observations.

Malayalam Manuscripts :

In totality, there are more than 50 mss of the KV written in the Malayalam characters of whose records are available. Most of them are to be found in the libraries in present Kerala. A few are deposited at Baroda and a few are at Chennai. Following manuscripts are used for the present analysis of the KV on 2.2. of the A.

M1- Adyar Library, Adyar. No. 70128. Palm leaf. P.-5

M2- Oriental Research Institute, Thiruvananthapuram. No. 18857. Palm leaf. P.-5.4.158.

M3- Oriental Research Institute, Thiruvananthapuram. No. 25A. Palm leaf. P.-2.4.80.

M4- Oriental Research Institute, Baroda. No. 25421. Palm leaf. P1-6.

M5- Oriental Research Institute, Thiruvananthapuram. No. 82. Palm leaf. P.-3.2

M6- Oriental Research Institute, Thiruvananthapuram. No. 22409. Palm leaf. P.6.1.206.

M7- Oriental Research Institute, Thiruvananthapuram. No. 28B. Palm leaf. 1.4-5.3

M8- Oriental Research Institute, Thiruvananthapuram. No. 11035A. Palm leaf. P.-2.

M9- Oriental Research Institute, Thiruvananthapuram. No. 14959. Palm leaf. P.-4.2.145.

M10- Oriental Research Institute, Thiruvananthapuram. No. 13476A. Palm leaf.

M11- Oriental Research Institute, Thiruvananthapuram. No. 18530. Palm leaf. P.-5.2.137.

M12- Oriental Research Institute, Thiruvananthapuram. No. 17440. Palm leaf. P.-3.2

There is another manuscript written in M characters which is consulted here. It is available only in fragments therefore it is not considered here for the study of possible interrelation of the mss.

M13- Oriental Research Institute, Thiruvananthapuram. No. 17738A. Palm leaf. P.-1.1.25- 3.3

Features of the Malayalam mss.

- (i) Date : The only dated ms is M1. It is copied down in 1547 AD. Unfortunately no information regarding the dates of the other mss is available.

- (ii) Colophons: Almost all these mss have a pattern not to mention the name of the author at the end of a *pāda*. This trend is visible in other mss. tradition. Only M1 is found mentioning the name of the author (Jayāditya) at the end of the fifth chapter fourth *pāda*.
- (iii) Shortest version of the KV : The text of the KV as preserved in M13 can be called as the shortest available version of the text of the KV. I now present a few portions of this ms.

a) २॥२॥२- अर्ध नपुंसकम्।

समप्रविभागे अर्धशब्दो नपुंसकमाविष्टलिङ्गः तस्येदं ग्रहणम्। अर्धं पिप्पल्याः अर्धपिप्पली। अर्धकोशातकी।

(Compare: एकदेशिनैकाधिकरण इति वर्तते। समप्रविभागे अर्धशब्दो नपुंसकमाविष्टलिङ्गः तस्येदं ग्रहणम्। अर्धम् इत्येतन्नपुंसकमेकदेशिनैकाधिकरणेन समस्यते तत्पुरुषश्च समासो भवति। षष्ठीसमासापवादोऽयं योगः। अर्धं पिप्पल्याः अर्धपिप्पली। अर्धकोशातकी। नपुंसकमिति किं ग्रामार्धः नगरार्धः। एकदेशिनेत्येव अर्धं पशोर्देवदत्तस्य। देवदत्तशब्देन सह समासो न भवति। एकाधिकरण इत्येव अर्धं पिप्पलीनाम्।

b) २॥२॥४- प्राप्तापन्ने च द्वितीयया।

एकदेशिनैकाधिकरण इति निवृत्तम्। प्राप्तो जीविकां प्राप्तजीविकः जीविकाप्राप्त इति वा। आपन्नो जीविकामापन्नजीविकः जीविकापन्न इति वा।

(Compare: प्राप्तापन्ने च द्वितीयया।

एकदेशिनैकाधिकरण इति निवृत्तम्। द्वितीयसमासे प्राप्ते वचनमिदम्। समासविधानात् सोऽपि भवति। प्राप्त आपन्न इत्येतौ द्वितीयान्तेन सह समस्यते तत्पुरुषश्च समासो भवति। प्राप्तो जीविकां प्राप्तजीविकः जीविकाप्राप्त इति वा। आपन्नो जीविकामापन्नजीविकः जीविकापन्न इति वा।

c) 3.1.91- धातोः। तृतीयाध्यायपरिसमाप्तेरयमधिकारः। कर्तव्यम् करणीयम्।

(Compare : धातोः। धातोरित्ययमधिकारो वेदितव्यः। आतृतीयाध्यायपरिसमाप्तेः यदित ऊर्ध्वम् अनुक्रमिष्यामो धातोरित्येवं तद् वेदितव्यम् वक्ष्यति तव्यत्तव्यानीयर इति। कर्तव्यम्। करणीयम्। धातुग्रहणम् अनर्थकं यद्विधौ धात्वधिकारात्। कृदुपपदसंज्ञार्थं तर्हि अस्मिन् धात्वधिकारे ते यथा स्यातां पूर्वत्र मा भूताम् इति। आर्धधातुकसंज्ञार्थं च

द्वितीयधातुग्रहणं कर्तव्यम्। धातोरित्येवं विहितस्य यथा स्यात्। इह मा भूत् लूभ्याम् लूभिर् इति।)

A detailed discussion on this issue is available in a separate article of mine, 1999. Available Portions of 2.2. and 3.1 of this ms. have been reproduced in the Ph.D. dissertations of myself (2000) and that of Puja Deo (2000).

(iv) Shorter version of the text: Apart from the abovementioned manuscript even otherwise the tendency of the mss written in M characters is to be as short as possible as far as recording the text of the KV is concerned. We record here some of the very significant passages which are not present in the mss written in M characters-

1. तुरीयशब्दस्यापीष्यते। तुरीयं भिक्षायाः तुरीयभिक्षा। भिक्षातुरीयं वा। on 2.2.3.
2. नञो नलोपस्तिङि क्षेपे। अपचसि त्वं जालम्। (वा) on 2.2.6.
3. गुणात्तरेण तरलोपश्चेति वक्तव्यम्। सर्वेषां श्वेततरः सर्वश्वेतः। सर्वेषां महत्तरः सर्वमहान्। न निर्धारण इति प्रतिषेधे प्राप्ते वचनमिदम्। सर्वशुक्ला गौः। on 2.2.9.
4. अनन्तरायां तु प्राप्तौ प्रतिषिद्धायां विशेषणं विशेष्येण बहुलमिति भवत्येव समासः। पूर्वनिपातश्च तदा नियोगतो विशेषणस्यैव। on 2.2.11.

In the KV on 3.1, there appear in all 13 *śloka-vārttikas*. Out of these, 2 (on 3.1.48 and on 3.1.134) are not mentioned in any of the mss written in Malayalam characters. A detailed picture of this fact is presented by Puja Deo (2000).

All these evidences point out that the text of the KV as preserved in M mss is much shorter than what is available today in the form of the printed texts.

Interrelation of these manuscripts :

Following is a list of variant readings found in 2.2. with the help of which a possible interrelation between these mss can be sketched.

1. नपुंसकलिङ्गम् for नपुंसकम् in 2.2.2 - M 4,5,6.

2. अर्धरजनी added to अर्धकोशातकी in 2.2.2 – M4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12.
3. परिचारक added to उद्धर्तक in 2.2.9- M1,2.
4. एते याजकादयः added to पत्तिगणक in 2.2.9- M10,11.
5. नवमः for पञ्चमः in 2.2.11- M7,10,11.
6. ध्रौव्यगतिप्रत्यवसानार्थेभ्यः omitted in 2.2.13- M4,5,6.
7. इति omitted in 2.2.13- M4,6.
8. कर्तृग्रहणम् added to सामर्थ्यात् in 2.2.16- M8,9.
9. समर्थम् added to अतिङ्न्तम् in 2.2.19- M8,9.
10. अव्ययेन सह समस्यते तत्पुरुषश्च समासो added to सोमैव in 2.2.20- M8,9.
11. समासो added to तस्य in 2.2.20 – M1,2,3,8,9,12.
12. कृञः त्वाणमुलौ omitted in 2.2.21 – M4,5.
13. इमम् added to उदकम् in 2.2.23- M8,12.
14. इमम् for यम् in 2.2.24 M4,5.
15. अश्वेन्द्रथाः added to द्वन्द्वे in 2.2.33 – M10,M11.
16. अश्वेन्द्रथाः added to बहुष्वनियमः in 2.2.33- M1,2.
17. अश्वेन्द्रथाः for इन्द्रथाश्वाः in 2.2.33- M10,11.
18. शङ्खवीणादुन्दुभयः for वीणाशङ्खदुन्दुभयः in 2.2.34 – M4,6.
19. सप्तमी added to प्रयोक्तव्यम् in 2.2.35- M4,5,6,8,10,11,12.
20. बहुव्रीहौ added to शबलगुः in 2.2.35- M8,9.
21. सर्वकृष्णः omitted in 2.2.35- M7, 8,9,10,11.
22. गडुचरण for गडुकण्ठः in 2.2.35- M 7,8,9,10,11.
23. जातपुत्रः omitted in 2.2.37- M1,2.
24. जातगण्डः for जातदन्तः in 2.2.37- M10,11.
25. विधानसामर्थ्यात् For समासविधानात् in 2.2.5 – M.

From this data following groups within the Malayalam manuscripts can be formed and these groups can be said to have a common source from which it got copied.

- (i) M 4,5,6 (1,6)
- (ii) M 4-12 (2)
- (iii) M 1-2 (3,16,23)
- (iv) M 10-11 (4,15,17,24)
- (v) M 4,6 (7,18)

- (vi) M 8,9 (8,9,10,20)
- (vii) M 1-3,8,9,12 (11)
- (viii) M 4-5 (12,14)
- (ix) M 4-6,8,10-12 (19)
- (x) M 7-11 (21,22).
- (xi) M (25)

Analysis :

In the above data, case “(xi)” clearly points out that all these mss must have been copied from a single source. We call it M. It is also observed that case “(ii)” provides us with the second largest group. The variant is quite significant to say that these mss must have copied it from another intermediary source, which can be shown on the lower point than M, but originating from M. We call it Ma. No other available mss tradition records this variant. The variant must then be considered as a feature of a ms belonging to M group of mss from which these 9 mss can be said to have been copied down. Case “(iii)” suggests that M1 and M2 can be considered as another group. We call the source of these two as Mb.

Throughout barring one exception we notice that mss M4-M12 have been behaving in a different manner than M1-M3. Therefore it is possible to treat M1-M3 differently. Out of them M1 and M2 share 3 variants exclusively. Therefore they can be grouped together.

M3 can be considered to have another source which is called Mc.

In Ma, M4-6 and 8-12 show common features. Case “(ix)” is an illustration of this fact. They can be considered as one group and their source can be called Ma1. M7 can be considered to have a source that is called “Ma2.


Ma1 can be further shown acting as node to Ma1p which is shown to act as source for M4,5,6 ; Ma1q which is shown to act as source of M8 and M9 ; Ma1r which is shown to act as a source of M 10 and M11 ; Ma1s which is shown to act as a source of M12.

“Cases “(iv)” and “(vi)” can be considered as evidence enough to say that M9 and M11 are copied down from M8 and M10 respectively. (or vice versa).

Thus we can claim to have arrived at a stemma of the Malayalam manuscripts for 2.2. of the KV.

The only case which can not be entirely satisfactorily explained with the help of this stemma is "(vii)". To explain this case we have to show some more strings in our picture.

Stemma of Malayalam manuscripts of the KV 2.2



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The Arthaśāstra as a Fount of Fun

Herman Tieken

हेरमन् टीकेन् महाभागः अर्थशास्त्र-कामसूत्रयोः निबन्धनविधानगतं सादृश्यं व्यवस्थाप्य कामसूत्राणामनन्तरकालिकत्वं निश्चित्य उभयोरपि अनयोः ग्रन्थयोः विषयविवेचनपद्धतौ केवल-सैद्धान्तिकदृष्टेः अवलम्बनेन उभावपि हास्यास्पदं जातौ इति सहजसिद्धशैल्या निरूपयति। अर्थशास्त्रपेक्षया तन्त्राख्यायिकायां पञ्चतन्त्रादिषु, कामसूत्राणामपेक्षया गाथासप्तशत्यादिषु च बोधनीयांशबोधने अतिशयितत्वमनुभूयते इत्यपि निरूपयति।

The *Arthaśāstra* presents itself as a well-organized, utterly serious scholarly treatise.¹ Thus, it opens with an enumeration of the 180 topics treated, as they are divided over its 15 books and 150 chapters. After that it defines its subject matter, *artha*, or statecraft, and its methodology, *ānvīkṣikī*, and it concludes with a list of the *tantra-yuktis*, or rhetorical methods, it has made use of. The *Arthaśāstra* is, however, not a handbook providing ready-made answers to specific problems. Instead, it teaches a method, which as such could be applied to any problem which might arise. This method, called *ānvīkṣikī*, consists of a thorough and dispassionate analysis of a problem and its possible solutions.² In itself this seems to be a highly efficient, and effective, approach. It is, however, belied by the text itself, which, while treating only a fraction of the entire field of statecraft, is already quite

1. References are to R.P. Kangle, *The Kauṭīliya Arthaśāstra*. Parts I and II. Bombay 1969-1972.
2. The term has been discussed by, among other scholars, Paul Hacker ("Ānvīkṣikī", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 2 (1958), pp. 54-83) and Wilhelm Halbfass ("Darśana, Ānvīkṣikī, Philosophy". In Charles Talliaferro and Paul J. Griffiths, *Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology*. Oxford 2003, pp. 299-312).

voluminous. What the *Arthaśāstra* does is showing *ānvīkṣikī* at work, or showing how a situation or problem may be analysed and tackled. However, as reality is endlessly varied and complex the *Arthaśāstra* proceeds of necessity by example. A case in point is the fictional discussion, or *kathā*, in 1.8 between a number of authorities on what type of person a king should attract as trusted courtier (*amātya*).¹ Several possible candidates are passed under review, and one after the other rejected as useful only in particular circumstances. For instance, Bhāradvāja suggests that the king attracts a fellow-student, as he can trust him and knows exactly what he is capable of. Next, Viśālākṣa is put on the stage, who rejects this suggestion on the ground that such a person might, through familiarity, lack in respect towards the king. Instead he had better choose a fellow in vice who will not dare to go against the king's wishes for fear of being exposed. This candidate is then rejected by Pārāśara on the ground that he has the same power over the king as the king has over him. Instead, Pārāśara comes up with a person who saved the king's life at the risk of his own. This goes on for some time more, after which the exercise is rounded off by Kauṭilya, who as the reputed author of the *Arthaśāstra* has the last say in such matters. Kauṭilya concludes by saying that the number of possible candidates is endless (*sarvam upapannam iti kauṭilyaḥ*). According to him the choice should depend on a person's capacities, on the one hand, and the particular situation, on the other.

An investigation of possible candidates for the position of trusted courtier as anticipated in the *Arthaśāstra* here is clearly a time-consuming affair. The *Arthaśāstra* has been criticized for this in the *Tantrākhyāyikā* and its derivatives, the *Pañcatantra* and *Hitopadeśa*. For preparing his sons for their future roles as kings Amaraśakti rejects the *Arthaśāstra* in favour of the *Nītiśāstra*. Mastering the art of *nīti* would require a mere six months, against mastering the *ānvīkṣikī* method of the *Arthaśāstra*, which requires twelve years to begin with. Instead of going over the hundreds of

1. On these *kathās*, see Friedrich Wilhelm, *Politische Polemiken im Staatslehrbuch des Kauṭilya*. Wiesbaden 1960 and, especially, Albrecht Wezler, "Über Form und Character der sogenannten 'Polemiken im Staatslehrbuch des Kauṭilya'", *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 143 (1993), pp. 106-134.

things that could happen, *nīti* consists of insight in concrete situations. The example referred to by Ruprecht Geib¹ is the story of how the king's former adviser, the jackal Damanaka, is able to persuade the lion king Piṅgalaka to kill his present trustworthy adviser, the bull Sañjīvaka, by using an argument derived from the *Arthaśāstra*. The jackal, who wants to regain his former position of adviser to the king, manages to plant suspicion in the king's mind with quotations from a prestigious text like the *Arthaśāstra* to the effect that it is dangerous for a king to rely on one adviser only, as in the absence of others the latter can do and say what he wants. The king for his part fails to recognize Damanaka's motives. He kills the utterly reliable Sañjīvaka, only to become again the plaything of the sanctimonious Damanaka. The story demonstrates how useless the theoretical knowledge of the *Arthaśāstra* is for recognizing a concrete situation.

Incidentally, while at one point Kauṭilya does indeed say that a king should not rely on one adviser only (1.15.35), immediately after that he also argues that the number of advisers with whom the king should consult is basically to be determined by the concrete circumstances and the competence of the persons concerned (1.15.41 and, again, in 50).

A similar relationship as that between *Arthaśāstra* and *Tantrākhyāyikā* exists between the *Kāmasūtra* and *Sattasaī*.² Though the *Kāmasūtra* has often been characterised, and advertised, as a handbook on sex and I do not want to deny that that treatise contains many tricks and suggestions which may be used for spicing up one's sex life, its primary aim, like that of the *Arthaśāstra*, is to explore, map and label everything one might in theory encounter in one's sex life. And the result, as in the *Arthaśāstra*, are endless lists, enumerating and naming things or breaking down actions in consecutive steps, which lists, again, do not pretend to be complete: they serve merely as examples. The list of eight nail scratches, for instance, given in the fourth chapter of book 2, is just one such list, as the variety of nail

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1. Ruprecht Geib, *Zur Frage nach der Urfassung des Pañcatantra*. Wiesbaden 1969: 30-34. The reference is to *Arthaśāstra* 1.15.
 2. See Herman Tieken, *Kāvya in South India: Old Tamil Caṅkam Poetry*. Groningen 2001, pp. 72-79.

scratches is in principle endless.¹ Vātsyāyana's enumeration of the various ways of embracing is concluded in a similar vein by the following stanza (2.2.30):

Of course also those techniques for raising passion
which have not been mentioned in this learned treatise,
may be applied here with similar zeal.

The underlying assumption of this making of lists is that a complete overview of all the possible sexual variations will enable one to choose that particular course of action which will yield the most gratifying result. An illustration of this is found at the beginning of book 2. There, both men and women are each distinguished into three types ("high", "middle", "low") on the basis of the sizes of their sexual organs, their temperaments and the time it takes for them to reach a climax respectively. For each of these categories there are nine combinations, in three of which the men and women are compatible and in six of which they are not. However, for the three categories taken together there are no fewer than 9 times 9 times 9, that is, 729 combinations. In order to have perfect sex prospective lovers are advised to go through all these possibilities, in the process identifying the ones which might apply to themselves.

This usefulness of making such lists has been questioned, and parodied, in the *Sattasāi*.² The short poems of this anthology present us with the counterpart of the ideal lover of the *Kāmasūtra*. The ideal lover is not a common man but a man who has the time, and interest, to spend all day in analyzing the complexities of love and sex. This sophisticated person is called *nāgaraka*, "man from town". In contrast to him the inexperienced and blundering lover in the *Sattasāi* is typically situated in small villages in the countryside. The people living in these villages have to work hard to make a living, which, as seen in poem 324, has predictably negative effects on their love lives:

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1. References are to Devadatta Śāstrī (ed.), *Kāmasūtram. Śrīyaśodharaviracita "jayamaṅgalā" vyākhyāsaḥ hitam hindīvyākhyābhāṣyopetañca. Vārāṇasī 1964.*
 2. Albrecht Weber, *Das Saptacatakam des Hāla. Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes. VII. Band, No. 4. Leipzig 1881.*

When he fell asleep,
 Exhausted after a day of dragging the plow through
 thick mud,
 His wife,
 Angry at missing the pleasures of love,
 Cursed the rainy season.¹

Whereas the *Kāmasūtra* presents the winning over of a young innocent girl as a process consisting of a number of discrete, consecutive steps which one has to go through one after the other, the *Sattasaī* ridicules this approach by showing instead the importance of insight in the situation at hand, or of seeing how experienced the woman actually is, or what she expects of the man at that moment. One of the steps mentioned in the *Kāmasūtra* in the process of a man winning over a bashful girl is to take her on his lap to make her accustomed to being fondled (3.2.23). The husband, in poem 767, follows this scheme to the letter, failing to recognize that he is dealing with a less than innocent bride:

As soon as her husband took her on his lap
 Sweat poured from her
 Like an attentive servant,
 Washing the mud of last night's assignation
 From her feet.²

One of the last steps to be taken before actually entering the girl is that of loosening her waistband, untying its knot and putting aside her clothes (*Kāmasūtra* 3.2.28). Again, it is vital to know if the time is right for such a drastic step, as shown in poem 648, in which the man acts too hastily and frightens the girl, so that he will probably have to start all over again:

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1. The translation is by Peter Khoroche and Herman Tieken, *Poems of Life and Love in Ancient India. Hāla's Sattasaī*. Albany 2009: no 543.
 2. Ibid. no 403.

Feigning sleep
 The husband turned over
 And let a trembling hand fall as if by accident
 On the knot of his young wife's skirt
 Which she held firmly between her thighs.¹

In poems 351, on the other hand, he makes himself ridiculous, having left the girl wondering when he would finally take some initiative:

He was embarrassed
 But I laughed and gave him a hug
 When he groped for the knot
 Of my skirt and found it
 Already undone.²

The pointes of these poems seem to lie in the implicit references they make to the *Kāmasūtra*. In this connection it should be noted that in the very beginning of the *Sattasaī*, in stanza 2, we are told to be prepared to make the connection with that learned treatise:

Shame on those who cannot appreciate
 This ambrosial Prakrit poem
 But pore instead
 Over treatises on love.³

It has long been recognized that the *Kāmasūtra* was largely modelled on the *Arthaśāstra*.⁴ For example, like the latter text, the

1. Ibid. no 149

2. Ibid. no. 158.

3. Ibid. no 2.

4. See, for instance, Maurice Winternitz, *History of Indian Literature*. Vol. III, Delhi 1967, pp. 657-663, Friedrich Wilhelm, "Die Beziehungen zwischen Kāmasūtra und Arthaśāstra". *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 116 (1966), pp. 291-310, and Jean Fezas, "Remarques sur la forme de deux traités de l'Inde Ancienne: l'Arthaśāstra et le Kāmasūtra". In: Nalini Balbir, *Genres*

Kāmasūtra begins with a table of contents, has been divided into books (*adhikaraṇas*), chapters (*adhyāyas*) and topics (*prakaraṇas*), and ends with a “book” on secret practices (*aupaniṣada*), and like the *Arthaśāstra*, the *Kāmasūtra* consists of prose passages summed up by verses. Furthermore, in the *Kāmasūtra* love and sex have been subjected to the same detailed analytical approach as in the *Arthaśāstra*, with the same result, namely lists and enumerations. The *Kāmasūtra* like the *Arthaśāstra* is ruthlessly practical. For instance, where in the *Kāmasūtra*, if a girl cannot be had in any other way, the man is advised to ply her with liquor or rape her in her sleep (3.5.25-26), in the *Arthaśāstra* under certain circumstances a king should not hesitate to eliminate his own son (1.17). In order to understand this macchiavellian element we should not forget, however, that in either case we are dealing only with possible courses of actions that one might take, and that they are part of a list, in which each following item tends to be more fantastic, though at the same time not necessarily less effective, than the preceding one.

Though both *Arthaśāstra* and *Kāmasūtra* defy exact dating, the *Kāmasūtra* is almost definitely later than the *Arthaśāstra*. In any case, in *Kāmasūtra* 1.2.10, which enumerates sources to which one might turn for information on *artha*, its reputed author, Vātsyāyana, seems to refer directly to the second book of the *Arthaśāstra*, called *adhyakṣapracāra*. And when in 1.4.34 Vātsyāyana describes the *pīṭhamarda*, *viṭa*, and *vidūṣaka* as *mantrins*, or “advisers”, of the courtezans and men from town, employed in their wars and truces (*sandhivigraha*; 1.4.34), he is transplanting terminology of the *Arthaśāstra* into the science of love and sex.

This resemblance of the *Kāmasūtra* to the *Arthaśāstra* is generally taken as the result of an inevitable development, as if Vātsyāyana did not have access to other models for the work. But there must have been other options open to him. If he had wanted to, he could easily have written a treatise entirely in didactic verse, like Manu's *śāstra* on *dharma*. As to the question what might have been behind Vātsyāyana's choice for the *Arthaśāstra* as a model we should, however, consider the effect

which must have been created by this choice: in the *Kāmasūtra* love and sex are treated as topics deserving of the very same treatment as such a serious matter as statecraft.¹ A gathering of *nāgarakas* enjoying themselves one evening by making a list of reasons for seducing another man's wife (*Kāmasūtra* 1.5.4-21) is implicitly compared to one of specialists in statecraft sitting in conclave discussing possible candidates for the position of trusted courtier. I believe that we should reckon with the possibility that the *Kāmasūtra* was intended as a parody of the *Arthaśāstra*. The lists of nail marks and sexual positions with such fanciful and evocative names such as the "hare's leap" and "splitting the bamboo" would thus be meant to make us laugh or at least draw a smile on our faces. The same would apply to the long list of reasons why one should seduce another man's wife or the learned exposé on economics in the book on the prostitute.

It is interesting to see how one text has ramified here into many others, and also how much sharp-witted humour was involved in all this. The *Tantrākhyāyikā* outsmarts the *Arthaśāstra*, making fun of its cumbersome *śāstric* approach of things. The *Sattasāi* does the same with the *Kāmasūtra*, while the latter text makes fun of the *Arthaśāstra* by subjecting love and sex to the same detailed, learned treatment as statecraft. In the process we go from one genre to the other: from *śāstra* to didactic animal fable, and from *śāstra* to mock-*śāstra*, and from the latter to erotic *kāvya* poetry. The authors of these texts seem to have been able to turn their hands at anything. And in doing so they were clearly not devoid of a sense of humour.

1. As one of the three *puruṣārthas*, *kāma* is as important as *artha*, but the *kāma* of the *Kāmasūtra* is a different *kāma* than that of the *puruṣārthas*.

Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra on Forestry

Manubendu Banerjee

मानवेन्दु बैनर्जीमहाभागः कौटिलीयेऽर्थशास्त्रे प्रतिपादितानां वनसम्बन्धिनां विचाराणां सङ्ग्रहणं कृत्वा, राज्यस्य समाजस्य च वनजन्यानाम् उपकाराणां विश्लेषणं कृत्वा, वनानां विभागं प्रदर्श्य, तज्जन्यसस्यानां, काष्ठादिसामग्रीणां, चर्मादिसाधनानां, खनिजानां सम्पत्त्या राजकोषस्य समृद्धतां प्रतिपाद्य, आटविकानां सामदानभेदाद्युपायैः वशीकारद्वारा राज्यसंरक्षणप्रयोजनसिद्धिं प्रतिपाद्य विभिन्नवनजन्यायद्वारा कोषवृद्धिं निरूपयति।

Haphazard handling of nature is often and again causing much loss to the existence of living beings throughout the world. Forest is the vital part of nature and its conservation and sustainable management help people and animal to live in healthy ecological atmosphere. Nowadays deforestation is bringing to us ecological imbalance and an overall deterioration of the resourceful world of nature. Since the time of the Vedas, the earliest literature of our country, minute attention was laid on the production, preservation and management of forests, and by this way, directly or indirectly, environmental consciousness was maintained by the people around their surroundings. Days of those pristine glories are no more in existence. In our society, wrong application of scientific and technological knowledge and subsequent human hazards leading to the mass annihilation of natural treasures, including the forests, has totally changed the global atmosphere. In India deforestation had been taking place on a large scale, causing thereby widespread environmental concern and forcing the Government to enact the forest conservation Act, 1980 with its subsequent amendments. Earlier in 1894 India introduced the forest policy, and it was revised in 1952 and again in 1988; the main plank of the last mentioned policy is protection, conservation and development of forests.

Early Indian texts such as the *Vedas*, *Upaniṣads*, *Āraṇyakas*, *Epics*, *Purāṇas* and the entire classical Sanskrit literature furnish as with innumerable instances on conservation, preservation and management of forests, which people considered to be the inseparable part of their life. Numerous descriptions of the bond between human beings and forest life are available in the Sanskrit writings.

Kauṭilya, the brilliant minister of the Maurya king Candragupta, has presented us the illustrious work *Arthaśāstra* which provides detailed instructions on afforestation (i.e. the scheme of plantation of new forests), non-injury to plants and emphasizes on the forests as the reservoirs of wealth, because the forest-produce was one of the main sources of income to the royal treasury. For the word “forest” (*vana*), Kauṭilya has given the definition that forests include enclosure for beasts, deer-parks, forests for produce and elephant-forests (*paśu-mṛga-dravya-hasti-vana-parigraho vanam* -AŚ.- 2.6.6). Forest was one of the sources of collection of revenues, the other ones being fort, country, mines, irrigation-works (*setu*) etc ; the *Samāhartā* i.e. Administrator was in charge of general administration of these centres of revenue-sources (AŚ.-2.6.1). Kauṭilya, while advising the king to select a place for establishing a new village, instructs that at the boundary line of such a village there should be a forest along with trees such as *śamī*, *śālmālī*, milky trees, etc (AŚ.2.1.3.), which give the village a sylvan beauty. On a land not suitable for agriculture, utilitarian forests were laid down, such as, an animal park, which perhaps is a type of reserved forest, for the purpose of the kings’ recreations. A special type of animal forest was advised to be constructed where various types of animals were given shelter with their full protection (*sarvātithi-mrgam mṛga-vanam*). This appears to be a kind of *Abhayāranya* or a zoological garden. Special forests with considerable areas were created for the settlement of ascetics and respected Brāhmaṇas devoted to the study of the Vedas. These two types are respectively called *tapovana* and *brahma-somāranya* (AŚ.2.2.2.).

Special care was taken while laying down the animal park which was one *goruta* (another name of *krośa* which is about 3.66 km.) in extent. It is an artificial forest having a single entrance, surrounded by a moat, having trees without thorns and some

trees bearing sweet fruits: it contains shallow pools of water, roaming deer and other animals, wild animals having their claws and teeth removed, and male and female elephants along with their cubs (AŚ.2.2.3.). Kauṭilya advises the king to establish several forests one each for the separate forest produce (*dravyavana*) i.e. each large forest was to contain the group of a special type of tree, such as mango, or śāla, etc. and also forests for factories for producing goods from trees and also forests for securing other forests objects (AŚ.2.2.5). Factories were constructed separately for turning therein raw materials into finished goods ; however not all the factories were established inside the forests ; some were constructed outside the forest-area and elsewhere in the city. (AŚ.2.17.17) Kauṭilya advises the *Kupyādhyaḥṣa* to make arrangements, within the boundary of the forest-area, for the settlement of the foresters or forest-dwellers connected with the produce forests (*aṭavīmśca dravyavanāpaśrayāḥ* - AŚ.2.2.5) and they were to preserve and protect forests from various hazards.

There was a Director of forest-produce (*Kupyādhyaḥṣa*) who was assisted by his subordinate officers acting as guards in the produce forests (*dravyavanapāla*). The Chapter named *bhūmichidravidhāna* (AŚ.2.2) gives us the impression that new forests were to be planned, at the time of a new state having been established, on an unoccupied land and the land unsuitable for agriculture.. The Director of forest-produce was evidently under the control of *Samāhartā*, and in charge of setting up factories in the forests for producing serviceable articles from forest trees (AŚ.2.17.2). It is interesting to note that the Chief Ordnance Officer (*Āyudhāgārādhyakṣa*) used to supervise the business carrying out in respect of various types of forest-produce in the factories (AŚ. 2.18.20). It appears that as most of the weapons were produced in these factories, the said officer had to be conversant with the functioning in the factories. For the protection of the forests and of the production in the factories, large number of men including the *Vanapālas* were evidently employed for whom huge sums of money were spent. Dues (*deyam*) were fixed to those who used to cut forest trees and penalty (*atyayam*) was imposed on them for cutting or taking trees without paying the dues (AŚ. 2.17.3). In this connection

Kauṭilya maintains that dues, penalty, etc. may be waived in cases of distress (*anyatra āpadbhyah* –AŚ. 2.17.3).

It is suggested in the above statements that forest produce, such as, timber and various trees were to be freely used at the time of calamities like flood, attacks from tigers, fear from dacoits, etc. It appears that forests constituted a separate department under the supervision of the *Kupyādhyakṣa* and it may be presumed that all forests belonged to public sector. The way Kauṭilya has dealt with forest land and forest produce gives us the idea that the then country possessed vast forest areas and the King or the Government had indisputable sway over these natural resources.

The *Arthaśāstra* furnishes us with lists of principal forest produce (*kupya-varga*) starting with those of timber and plants. The group of trees with strong timber (*sāradāru-varga*) is as follows-

Kupyavargah : *śāka-tiniśa-dhanvana-arjuna-madhūka-tilaka-sāla-śim śapa—arimeda-rājādāna-śirīśa-khadira-sarala-tāla-sarja-aśvakarṇa-somavalka-kuśa-āmra-priyaka-dhavādih* (AS.2.17.4). Some of these trees have been identified as-

Śāka (teek)

Tiniśa (*Dalbergia Ougeinensis*)

Dhanvana

Arjuna (*Terminalia Arjuna*)

Madhūka (*Bassia Latifolia*)

Tilaka (*Berleria Cristata*)

Sāla

Simsapa (*Dalbergia Sissu*)

Arimeda (*Fetid Mimosa*)

Rājādāna (*Mimosops Kauki*)

Śirīśa (*Mimosa Sirisha*)

Khadira (*Mimosa Cetechu*)

Sarala (*Pinus Longifolia*)

Tāla (palmyra)

Sarja

Aśvakarṇa (*Vatica Robesta*)

Somavalka (a kind of white *khadira*)

Kuśa

Āmra (mango)

Priyaka (yellow *sāla* tree)

Dhava (*Mimosa Hexandra*) and such others.

Here in the above list, we find more than twenty varieties of timber. It has earlier been prescribed that each class of the above mentioned timbers having variform appearances was planted in separate enclosures, thus making divergent types of produce-forests (*dravyavana*). It is evident, therefore, that forestry as a practice originated in India in a remote period and much developed at the time of Kauṭilya, and at the same time the principals of forest conservation and sustainable management were well entrenched and guaranteed by the authorities of the state..

A list of bamboos and reeds of long diameter (*veṇuvarga*) is provided in the text –(*uṭaja-cimiya-cāpa-veṇu-vamśa-sātina-kaṇṭaka-bhāllūkādir veṇuvargah*) constituting *uṭaja* (a kind of bamboo, with soft thorns), *cimiya* (a kind of bamboo with thick bark and with no thorns), *cāpa*, *veṇu* (it is very hard and has a very small central aperture), *vamśa* (it has thorns and the space between any two of its knots is long), *sātina* (it is similar to that of *vamśa* but smaller than the latter), *kaṇṭaka* (according to the commentator *kunaṭṭa*, meaning a very big and long type of bamboo, bearing seeds like wheat), and *bhāllūka* (according to the commentator, *halluka*, which is a big and long type of bamboo having no thorns) (AŚ. 2.17.5). Those varieties of bamboos which are with big or small holes, soft surface, long space between the joints and without thorns, are meant for making flutes and bows.

The group of creeping plants (*vallivarga*) includes *vetra* (cane), *śākavallī*, *vāsī* (*Justicia Ganderussa* ; it bears flowers like

those of Arjuna), *śyāmalatā* (*Ichnocarpus*), *nāgalatā* (betel) etc. (AŚ. 2.17.6).

The group of fibrous plants (*valkavarga*) includes *mālatī* (*Jasminum Grandiflorum*) *Mūrvā* or *dūrvā* (panic grass), *arka* (*Calotropis Gigantea*), *śaṇa* (hemp), *gavedhuka* (*Coix Barbata*), *atasī* (*Linum Usitatis Simum*) and others (AŚ.2.17.7). *Muñja* (*Saccharum munja*), *balbaja* (*Eleusine Indica*) etc. are raw materials for preparing ropes (*rajjubhāṇḍa*) (AŚ.2.17.8).

Leaves purported for writing material and for other use are *tālī* (*Corypha Taliera*), *tāla* (*Palmyra* or *Borassus Flabelliformis*) and *bhūrja* (birch) (AŚ.2.17.9). Flowers giving concoction for preparing colour material are *kimśuka* (*Butea Frondosa*), *kusumbha* (*Carthamus Tinctorius*) and *kuṅkuma* (*Crocus Sativus*) (AŚ.2.17.10)..

Medicinal plants (*oṣadhavarga*) include Bulbous roots, roots, fruits, etc. (AŚ.2.17.11).

Kauṭilya has often advised the Kings to use poisons against their enemies. For the purpose of collecting poison various plants were made to grow in the forests. All the plants however cannot be identified. The group of these plants (*viṣavarga*) includes *kālakūṭa* (it is the secretion from leaves of fig-like tree), *vatsanābha* having leaves like those of *Nirgundi*; *hālāhala* having blue and elongated leaves; *meṣa-śṛṅga* looking like the bud of a blue lotus; *mustā* - a variety of plant which is white as conch-shell; *mahāviṣa* bearing flesh colored fruit of the form of breast-nipple; *vellitaka* having the root like a monkey's testicles; *haimavata* being the product of the Himalayas and having long leaves; *kālīṅgaka* - a product of the Kalinga country and is like the yava (barley); *colasāraka* having fruits like those of rose-apple (*jambū*); *auṣṭraka* - a fruit shaped like the testicles of the camel; *gaurādara* - a bulbous root of black colour; *bālaka* (also called *palaga* or *palanga* in the commentaries) having the shape of the long pepper and similar other poisonous plants. It is likely that all these plants were put in one and the same forest, and separate forests for the implantation of each of these trees are not obviously meant here. Likewise poisonous snakes and insects were kept in jars (*sarpāśca kīṭāḥ te eva kumbhagatāḥ*) somewhere in the forests. (AŚ.2.17.12).

Kauṭilya gives a list of skins flayed out of some forest animals for the use of domestic or other purposes. These animals are *godhā* (lizard), *seraka* or *sīraka* (porpoise or white-skinned *godhā*), *dvīpi* (leopard), *ṛkṣa* (bear), *śimśumāra* (dolphin), *simha* (lion), *vyāghra* (tiger), *haṣṭī* (elephant), *mahiṣa* (buffalo), *camara*, *śṛmāra khadga* (rhinoceros), *gomṛga* (bison) and *gavaya* (gayal). Kauṭilya adds that bones (*asthi*), bile (*pitta*), tendons (*snāyu*), eyes (*akṣi*), teeth (*danta*), horns (*śṛṅga*), hooves (*khura*), tails (*pucchā*) of the above-mentioned animals and also of other beasts including deer, birds, and wild animals (*vyāla*) are also said to be collected by the officers under the supervision of Kupyādhyakṣas (*carma-asthi-pitta-snāyu-akṣi-danta-śṛṅga-khura-pucchāni, anyeṣāṃ vāpi mṛga-paśu-pakṣi-vyālānām* - AŚ. 2.17.13). In the 14th *Adhikarana*, named *Aupanīṣadika*, Kauṭilya has shown how bones and other materials taken out of forest-animals were used for secret practices against the enemies.

Kālāyasa (iron), *tāmra* (copper), *vṛtta* (steel), *kāmsa* (bronze), *sīsa* (lead), *trapu* (tin), *vaikṛntaka* (mercury) and *ārakūṭa* (brass) are included in the group of base metals. These metals were intended for preparing ploughs, pestles, which provided livelihood (*ājīva*), and machines, weapons, etc. for protection of the city (*purarakṣā*) (AŚ. 2.17.17). It may be presumed that separate factories were established in forest zones for each class of production. In this context, Kauṭilya advises the Master of the Armoury (*Āyudhāgārdhyakṣa*) to be conversant with the raw, defence material in the forests and their qualities and to avoid any adulteration (AŚ. 2.18.20).

Although these metals come from mines, which are under the direct control of the Director of mines (*Ākarādhyakṣa*) (AŚ. 2.12), yet these have been noted here for the reason that forests or forest land at the time perhaps contained a number of mines. The Kupyādhyakṣa had nothing to do with these mines, but he was in charge of *kupyagrha* stationed in the city where wood etc. collected from the forests and processed in the factories were stored.

Among the forest-produce, there was also the group of containers (*bhāṇḍa*) made of *vidala* i.e. bamboo or cane

(*vam śavetrādīkr tam vidalam* – Mysore commentary) and of clay (*mṛttikā*) (AŚ.2.17.15).

Charcoal (*angāra*), husks (*tuṣa*) and ashes (*bhaṣma*) are the by-products from wood etc, for which some parts of the forests were allotted; special areas (*vāta*) were constructed for deer, beasts, birds and wild animals (*vyāla*); the forest land also provided enclosed space for fuel and grass (*kāṣṭha-trṇa-vātāh*) (AŚ.2.17.16).

Factories established in and outside forests area as already mentioned, were obviously purposed for manufacturing wares from the above forests such as wood, metal, cane, ropes and so on. The king had to depend on the Kupyādhyakṣa, for the latter was responsible not only for the protection and nourishment of the forests, but also for utilizing the forest produce to help the king in the welfare of his kingdom. Product of forests and also of the factories established therein or outside the forest greatly met the social requirements and also checked the possible damage that might be caused by the kings' opponents. Undoubtedly quite a substantial income came to the state from the forest wealth.

In the capital there was a store-house for forest produce (*kupyagrha*), built under the supervision of the Director of Stores (*Sannidhātā*) (AŚ.2.5.1). The store-house for forest produce of which timber was the principal commodity, was required to possess many long halls (*dīrghabahula-śālā*); adjacent to the walls of the halls some rooms were constructed, perhaps, for storing therein minor forest products (AŚ. 2.5.5).

Kauṭilya has not explicitly stated the importance of forests, for the very reason that since the Vedic period survival of the beings much depended on the forests and forest-produce. It is obvious that materials taken out of the forests meted the needs of the people of the city and these were exported outside the kingdom for exchange of other commodities. The importance of the forests has been upheld by Kauṭilya when he states that the king should protect the produce-forests (*dravyavana*), elephant forests (*hastivana*), irrigation works and mines which had been made in early times, and even if they existed in later times without any major interruption, attempt should be made to

establish new forests, factories etc, (AŚ. 2.1.39) to sustain larger extent of the breathing society.

A few years after the composition of AŚ, the great emperor Aśoka made it mandatory to plant medicinal herbs and trees, besides shade-trees along the roads and fruit plants on the water lands. In his second Rock Edict, Aśoka records his decision and execution of planting medicinal trees for the treatment of humans and animals. In some cases, when suitable medical herbs for humans or animals were not available, Aśoka had caused to import them and grown. Kauṭilya distinguishes two principal types of forests. The descriptions given above are concerned with the *dravyavana* or produce-forest; the other forest being the *hastivana* or elephant-forest which in Kauṭilya's time was probably a sanctuary.

Kauṭilya instructs the king to establish elephant-forests (*hastivana*) on the border of the kingdom and there chosen foresters were to guard the elephants (*aṭavyārakṣa*). The elephant-forests were under the supervision of a superintendent (*Nāgavanādhyakṣa*) who, with the assistance of the guards, protected the environment of these forests so that the elephants remained healthy and active. It may be pointed out that this *Nāgavanādhyakṣa* was different from *Hastyadhakṣa* (Superintendent of Elephants) whose duty was to train king's elephants and look after their physical fitness, for, a king's victory over his enemies largely depended on the elephants (*hastipradhāno hi vijayo rājñām* – AŚ.2.2.13) Elephant-forest could be made on mountains, along a river, beside lakes or a swampy land (AŚ.2.2.7).

It is evident that the *hastivana* had little economic value, for, elephants required to be maintained mainly for the purpose of war. It may be presumed that both kinds of forests (*dravyavana* and *hastivana*) belonged to the state. Besides the *mṛgavana* mentioned in AŚ.2.2.4, referring to the animal park, another *mṛgavana* (deer-park) has also been mentioned (AŚ.8.4.44) where deer lived in plenty (*mṛgāḥ prabhūtāḥ*) and benefited the countrymen with abundant meat and skin (*prabhūtamāmsa-carmopakāriṇaḥ*) and who could be easily controlled. Kauṭilya

advises that rogue elephants are to be cautiously caught from the elephant-forests, otherwise they ruin the country (AŚ.8..4.45).

Kauṭilya has not specified any strong measure for the protection of forest or forest-trees. But he has prescribed different types of punishment for causing injury to trees, their branches, fruits, creepers, etc. that constitute various parts of the forest or a park, Kauṭilya instructs the administration that in the case of putting fire to the produce-forest (*dravyavana*) or an elephant-forest (*hastivana*), the incendiary is to be burnt in fire (AŚ.4.11.20). This is a glaring example of serious concern of the state to protect forests. Under no circumstances destruction of a forest was not tolerated by the Administration.

For cutting off the shoots of trees in the parks in and near a city, that bore flowers and fruits, a fine of six *paṇas* was slapped on the wrong-doer; for cutting small branches the fine of twelve *paṇas* and for cutting big branches that of twenty four *paṇas* were imposed. Cutting of trunks and uprooting trees were considered serious offence for which due punishment is recommended by Kauṭilya. In the cases of damage caused to bushes and creepers carrying fruits and flowers, suitable fines were slapped. Fines were also levied in the cases of destroying trees in the holy places, in the forests meant for penance- groves and trees grown in the cremation ground. Kauṭilya has urged upon the people to preserve the prominent trees marked with royal seal ; distinguishable signs were to be put on trees to ascertain the boundaries (*sīmāvrkṣeṣu*) and also on those grown in sanctuaries (*caityeṣu*) as also in the royal enclosures (*rājavanēṣu*). By such various courses of action Kauṭilya directly tried to restrict people's intentional or unintentional attempts at wrong-doings to the forest-property and at the same time endeavoured to check the problem of forest-ecosystem by not allowing setting fire to the forest, illicit felling of trees, encroachment and other unscientific treatment to the forest life.

Kauṭilya has often referred to Aṭavī and Āṭavika in the sense of the forest tribes who used to settle in forests beyond the boundaries of towns and villages. These tribes are said to be engaged in attacking people under cover of night, and robbed them in cash; generally they were many in number, fought

openly, and seized and ruined neighboring localities (AŚ. 8.4.41.43). An allusion to the forest chieftain's aspiration for seizing the throne from the king has been made; if the chieftain gathered power or strength to establish his own territory, the king is advised to win over other forest-lords with money or honour (AŚ.12.3.17). The king sometimes recruited troops from wild tribes (*aṭavībala*), but they were seen to be more anxious for plunder (*vilopārtham*) than for fight for the king. Such troops were apparently under the leadership of their own chieftains. (AŚ.9.3.18-20). There is enough reason to believe from Kauṭilya's statements that the forest-troops procured by the king to fight on his side maintained their detachment from the general army. For defensive fortifications, forest was one of the places where forts (*vanadurga*) were advised to be constructed for strategic reasons. The *vanadurga* was to be full of wagtail, water and thicket (*khañjanodakam stambhagahanam*). This fort was generally used as places for foresters or places of retreat of the royal persons in times of calamity (AŚ.2.3.2).

Kauṭilya was an efficient minister having the potentiality of highly successful in managing the state. The art of controlling the forest and their produce was made by him with sharp attention to the good governance which require amongst others a systematic collection of forest produce and utilization of the tracts of forest-land for various purposes. He was well aware that the existence of living beings is dependent very much on natural surroundings as well their components, such as, flora, fauna, water resources and large forests. To keep the people happy with a healthy environment and with supplies from forest regions, and also for the purpose of enriching the royal treasury, Kauṭilya, led by his empiric knowledge, has given enough concentration on the overall maintenance of all the productive forest of the state.

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[The words and expressions mentioned in this paper are with reference to the *Arthaśāstra* edited by R P Kangle]

Language of Sanskrit Drama

Saroja Bhate

सरोजा भाटे महाभागा संस्कृतरूपकेषु प्राकृतानां प्रयोगवैचित्र्यस्य कारणानि प्रयोजनञ्च अन्विष्यन्ती भरतनाट्यशास्त्रे एतद्विषयकविधीनां विश्लेषणं विधाय, सामाजिक-राजकीय-दृष्ट्या वरत्वावरत्वप्रयुक्ततया प्राकृतभाषाप्रयोगे वैविध्यं नाट्यशास्त्रसम्मतं व्याख्याय, वास्तविकरूपेण मृच्छकटिक-अभिज्ञान-शाकुन्तलादिरूपकेषु प्रयुक्तानां प्राकृतभाषाप्रयोगाणामनुशीलने तु तत्तादृश-नियमानामपरिपालनं विभाव्य महाकाव्येभ्यः वैलक्षण्यसम्पादनं वैचित्र्याधानद्वारा सौन्दर्यपरिपोषणं क्वचित् सामाजिक राजकीयाभिज्ञानपेक्षया अतिरिक्तमेव किञ्चित् असाधारणम् अभिज्ञानदानं प्रयोजनं भवितुमर्हतीति निगमयति।

An attempt is made here to present a brief account of the language of Sanskrit drama particularly with reference to aspects of identity related to them.

Theorists of Sanskrit literature recommend three idioms of poetry: Sanskrit, Prakrit and Apabhramśa. We are, for the present, concerned with the first two since they constitute classical dramatic literature of India. Scholars both, traditional as well as modern, record different opinions about the relationship between these two. I follow the generally accepted view. Sanskrit is the name given to an ancient vernacular, which was "refined", "rendered fit", while the word Prakrit stands for a group of vernaculars initially spoken by different communities settled in different parts of ancient India which were later systematically formalized by grammarians and developed into literary idioms. In the beginning Sanskrit and some Prākṛits were very much similar in form, almost like twin sisters. They deviated from each other in the course of time. Sanskrit was tied down by rules of grammar and became almost a fixed language, while Prākṛits were still freely breathing. India is blessed with a rich collection of literature both in Sanskrit and Prakrit. Drama is the only genre of classical Indian literature which is a multilingual composition. Dr. T.N. Dave refers to the view of A. Weber¹ who accounts for this multilinguality as "due to the existence of high degree of

social stratification existing in Indian society of the time when dramatic literature came into existence in India". Multilinguality is, in fact, not unusual. Woolner tell us that even in western dramatic tradition different dialects are found to be used. However, according to him, unlike in Western drama, in Indian classical drama different dialects are used in the same household and they are perfectly understood by each other.¹ Again, this is not unusual in India. Woolner further quotes Grierson as saying, "In India there is nothing extraordinary in such a polyglot medley. It is paralleled by the conditions of any large house in Bengal at the present day, in which there are people from every part of India each of whom speaks his own language and is understood by others, though none of them attempts to speak what is not his mothertongue."²

Does this hold true of Sanskrit drama throughout its history? Does the existence of almost all texts of Sanskrit drama containing multiplicity of Prākṛits imply multilingual audience? Do these dramatic idioms reflect social history of India particularly with reference to social identities? These are some of the questions which deserve to be addressed. But first, a brief survey of Sanskrit drama, both in theory and practice, as far as its language is concerned.

Nāṭyaśāstra, the foremost treatise on dramaturgy in Sanskrit presents a wide spectrum of dramatic idioms covering the whole world beginning with non-human beings and ending with divine beings. Bharata speaks of *atibhāṣā*- language of gods, *āryabhāṣā*- language of noble beings, *jātibhāṣā*- language of different social strata and *yonyantari bhāṣā*- language of beings belonging to other living species.³ He further describes seven *deśabhāṣās*, regional languages, as Śaurasenī, Māgadhī, Avantikā, Prācyā, Ardhamāgadhī, Bāhikā, and Dākṣiṇātyā.⁴ All these names show the regional basis of this classification. Bharata further distinguishes different phonetic features typical of regions. Here we have, therefore, an instance of linguistic identity based on

1. Woolner : 22

2. Ibid. 88

3. Nāṭyaśāstra, 17.26-29

4. Ibid., 5.17-48

geography as well as features of pronunciation. The dramatic theory recommends the use of those dialects for the persons representing characters belonging to the respective regions. Then there is a list of seven *vibhāṣās* or dialects spoken by persons belonging to low class such as *śābaras* (mountaineers or barbarians), *ābhīras* (milkmen), *caṇḍālas* (outcastes), *vanecaras* (foresters), etc.¹ Bharata describes phonetic features of these dialects.²

The theory of drama as laid down in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* prescribes the use of Sanskrit by characters belonging to noble class (i.e. heroes who, by convention, always belong to high class), learned and educated persons and by females in exceptional circumstances.³ While on the one hand its use is restricted to characters with cultural background, on the other, it is forbidden even to noble characters devoid of education.⁴ Sanskrit is thus obviously a status symbol in the world of drama. Different *Prākṛits* are assigned to different characters. For instance, queens, harlots, heroines and their friends speak *Śaurasenī*, the servants in the harem, eunuchs, chamberlains etc. speak *Māgadhī*, *Vidūṣaka*, the buffoon or jester speaks *Prācyā* or *Avantī*, while *Ardhamāgadhī* is assigned to merchants etc.⁵ After studying this distribution of dialects over dramatic characters Dr. T.N. Dave observes, "The questions of sex, prestige, learning and social status are involved while distributing the dialects for the stage."⁶ Rajendran concludes his observations on sociolinguistic problems in *Nāṭyaśāstra* as follows: "Social hierarchy and power structure are reflected in the elaborate protocols and modes of addresses prescribed in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. We have an elaborately worked out social hierarchy in Sanskrit drama.... the language used by the diverse elements of this vast social hierarchy gives us an idea of their social identity in general manners."⁷

1. Ibid., 17.49-56

2. Ibid., 17.57-61

3. Ibid., 17.31-43

4. Ibid., 17.34, 35

5. Ibid.

6. Dave : 101

7. Rajendran : 133

Although the dramatic dialects and their distribution by Bharata are shown to accord to social reality, reality is denied to the dramatic dialects themselves. Rajendran says, "We have reasons to suspect that none of the language types mentioned in the Nāṭyaśāstra is any of the genuine languages prevalent in different parts of the country".¹ According to him most of these languages may be literary versions of the actual languages. Many other scholars share this view. We will turn to this question at the end.

From theory we turn to practice and here we see that the scenario offered by the classical Indian dramatic literature spread over a period of about 15 centuries presents a variegated picture. Following facts must be noted before we proceed further:

1. Although theorists recognize three idioms for drama, Sanskrit, Prakrit and Apabhraṃśa, in practice, with a singular exception, Sanskrit has been the most preferred idiom.
2. With a very few exceptions Sanskrit drama has always been multilingual.
3. The Prākṛits of Sanskrit drama show, on the one hand, considerable deviations from their theoretical form, while on the other, they evince close relation with the grammarians' Prākṛits.

A brief account of the Prākṛit's appearing in Sanskrit dramatic literature is submitted here with a view to finding out whether in the first place, they elicit any kind of identity and secondly, if yes, what the nature of that identity is.

Though Bharata recommends use of several dialects and sub-dialects in Sanskrit drama, practice is confined to a few of them and a few more, not recommended by Bharata, are added. Among the available Sanskrit dramas the Mṛcchakaṭikam has the maximum number of Prākṛits (about 15) spoken by about 32 characters, while in Abhijñānaśākuntalam 31 out of 48 characters speak Prakrit.² An account of the Prākṛits in different Sanskrit dramas and their ratio with the usage of Sanskrit is presented by

1. Ibid.: 132

2. Dave : 106

scholars like K.R. Chandra and Dr. Dave. Their surveys show that by and large, 50% of the text of Sanskrit dramas appears in different Prākṛits.

Śaurasenī is the most prominent among the Prākṛits. It is originally a vernacular spoken around the region called Sūrasena (Mathura). In Sanskrit drama, both in theory and practice it is spoken by female characters, Vidūṣaka, children, astrologers etc. It occupies the first place among the dialects used in prose passages of Sanskrit plays. According to some scholars the form of classical drama was fixed in Sūrasena country and therefore it appears as a normal prose of Sanskrit drama.¹ The close similarity between Śaurasenī as it appears in its earliest form in the fragments of drama ascribed to Aśvaghoṣa and Sanskrit is due to the fact that Sanskrit evolved out of spoken Śaurasenī.² Here is an illustration of a small dialogue in Prakrit and Sanskrit from the fifth act of Abhijñānaśākuntalam:

गौतमी :- भद्रमुह किंपि वक्तुकामम्।

राजा :- आर्ये कथ्यताम्।

गौतमी :- अहवा ण मे वअणावसरो अत्थि। जदो णावेखिओ गुरुअणो इयाए न तुमेणि पुच्छिआ बंधू एक्कक्कमेला चरिए भणामि किं एक्कमेक्कस्स।।

शकुन्तला :- किं णु खु अज्जौत्तो भणादि।

राजा :- किमिदमुपन्यस्तम्।

Māgadhī is the dialect spoken around the region of Magadha in the East. It was the language of the Magadha Empire. Dramatic theory assigns it to characters belonging to lower class such as servants, fishermen, policemen, barbers and Jain monks. The list of characters supposed to speak in Māgadhī given by Pischel in his Prakrit grammar is reproduced by Woolner.³ It clearly shows that Māgadhī is assigned to low characters. Leuders has, after studying the dialects in Aśvaghoṣa's drama, identified the language of the *duṣṭa* (wicked) as Māgadhī.⁴ Keith's remark in this

1. Keith : 73

2. Woolner : 5

3. Ibid : 87

4. Katre : 25

context, namely, "the fact that the speaker of old Māgadhī is *duṣṭa* (wicked) reminds us of the bad character enjoined by Magadha¹ is worth noting. C. Rajendran also cites the opinion of Madhav Deshpande that assignment of Māgadhī to low class people is "due to the loss of power by Magadha and the rise of other power centres in ancient India after the fall of the Mauryan empire."² Here we have an example of negative identity due to loss of power. Śākārī, one of the *vibhāṣās* assigned to Śākāras (brother-in-law of the king), black-smiths, hunters etc. is traceable to Māgadhī.³ When the character of Śākāra in *Mṛcchakaṭika* recites :

एषा नाणकमूशिकामकशिकामच्छाशिका लाशिका णिण्णाशा कुलनाशिका
अवशिका कामस्स मज्जूशिका..... etc. it appears to some scholars to be a deliberate mockery of the old Māgadhī or Ardhamāgadhī spoken by Jain monks. It is, therefore, not unlikely that language of a particular social group was subjected to travesty in literary compositions like dramas. However, it is difficult then to understand why innocent children like Rohasena and Sarvadamana are made to speak in Māgadhī.

Mahārāṣṭrī is yet another variety of Prakrit employed for songs of female characters. The heroines and their friends, for instance, speak in Śaurasenī and sing in Mahārāṣṭrī. As the name suggests, it was, originally the language spoken by people living in the region around the river Godavari and according to linguists its traces are found in old Marāṭhī. It is not known to Bharata. It makes its first appearance in Kālidāsa's dramas and is regularly used in subsequent dramas for songs. Its entry in Sanskrit drama was due to its established fame as a beautiful language most suited for lyrical songs.⁴ There are literary compositions like the anthology called *Gāhāsattasāī* entirely in Mahārāṣṭrī. Here is the wellknown song sung by Hamsapadikā in the 5th act of *Śākuntalam* :

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1. Keith : 74
 2. Rajendran : 131
 3. Ibid : 132
 4. Keith : 73

अहिणवमहुलोलुवो तुमं तह परिचुम्बिय चूअमज्जरीम्।
कमलवसैमेत्तनिव्वुओ महुअर वीसरियोसि णं कहम्॥

Apart from these three main Prākṛits there are many other Prākṛits found in different dramas. The Mṛcchakaṭikam of Śūdraka composed sometime in the beginning of the C.E. is said to closely follow the line laid down by Bharata and illustrates the use of almost all Prākṛits prescribed by Bharata through its characters. Such dialects which make sporadic appearances deserve closer study with reference to their socio-linguistic aspects. Perhaps, they belong to the category of secondary language described by Sheldon Pollock. Pollock distinguishes between primary and secondary languages of classical Indian literature ; Sanskrit, Prākṛit and Apabhraṃśa are the three primary "cosmopolitan idioms" according to him, while he describes them as secondary languages which were used for mimetic purpose in drama. They appear, says he, "in drama in direct discourse and aside from imitative use of language to provide local colour in drama."¹

Some scholars are of the opinion that Prākṛit utilized by Aśvaghōṣa, Bhāsa, Kālidāsa and Śūdraka must have been drawn from current mediums in those days. Other scholars of Prākṛit languages are of the view that Prākṛits were formalized as literary languages already at the time of Kālidāsa and "the ground for more extended use of dialects may be attributed to literary purpose rather than to any attempt to imitate the speech of the day."²

This brings us to another important issue, raised in the beginning, namely, adaptability of the audience to the multilingual performance involving frequent code switching. To what extent were the Prākṛits understood by the audience in the past who watched the performance of, for instance, Abhijñānaśākuntalam or Mṛcchakaṭikam? A clue to the upper limit is offered by Keith who tells us that as early as in A.D. 900 Rājaśekhara in his Bālarāmāyaṇa alludes to the appearance of Sanskrit Chāyās for Prākṛit texts in mss. of dramas as a normal

1. Pollock : 66

2. Keith : 334

feature. Literary Prākṛits thus, already before the beginning of the second millennium, ceased to exist in the society either as first or second languages. Sheldon Pollock observes that the Sanskrit poets did not speak Prākṛit (as they did not speak Sanskrit either) at least in the form in which we know it in Prākṛit literary texts. He remarks that the word 'Prākṛit' typically connotes a literary language rather than a spoken vernacular.

The language of the drama, be it Sanskrit or Prākṛit, is thus a non living literary language. Neither Śaurasenī nor Mahārāṣṭrī represents in any form the regions after which they are named nor do they offer identity to any specific speech community.

It is believed that literature holds a mirror unto society. The issue of language and identity implies in fact, the existence of language as a social phenomenon, be it a part of the living present or frozen past. It is an accepted fact the creative literature depicts a world mixed with fact and fancy and a historian has to carefully isolate the one from the other. It is difficult to ascertain to what extent we can reconstruct facts of history from the classical Indian literature composed in literary languages far removed from spoken vernaculars. The world of makebelieve of this literature begins, indeed, with the very medium of expression. This reminds me of a very interesting remark by Woolner in connection with the use of Sanskrit throughout the dramatic performance by the hero: "The hero therefore spoke Sanskrit (because he was educated) and by a stage convention spoke it always, just as stage kings almost always, and real kings rarely, wear a crown."¹ However, the place of honour accorded to Sanskrit in Sanskrit drama can have historical implication ; it may suggest that the Nāṭyaśāstra was a part of the movement, which started some time before the beginning of C.E., to restore Sanskrit to its pristine glory which was overshadowed by the dominance of Prākṛits.

Scholars, both of Prākṛit language as well as classical Indian drama, have, time and again, pointed out how the dramatic Prākṛits are far removed from their vernacular counterparts. Keith has, for instance, pointed out that the usage of Prākṛits in drama is motivated by literary purpose rather than an attempt to

1. Woolner : 89

imitate the speech of the day.¹ He says "It cannot be held that..... the usage of the plays could be put down simply to the copying of the actual practice in life."² And therefore, the statement made by C. Rajendran, namely, "the language used by the diverse elements of this vast social hierarchy gives us an idea of their social identity in general manner,"³ has to be taken with a grain of salt.

This reminds me of some interesting statements made by Sheldon Pollock in his recent articles entitled "Sanskrit Literary Culture from inside Out." I quote a few below:

"The theory no less than the practice of Sanskrit Kāvya..... was the single most powerful determinant of vernacular conceptions of literature.... what makes Kāvya different from everything else has essentially to do with the language itself." "Hardly more attention is given to what Kāvya means as a form of moral reasoning, as a way of understanding how life is to be lived." "It is the exclusion of natural language from the realm of literature that, to a significant degree defines Sanskrit literary culture."⁴ He comments on the discovery of the fragments of Aśvaghoṣa's dramas in a far off place in China as follows; "This range of circulation was made possible not so much by the religious universalism of Buddhism as by the literary universalism of Sanskrit and its aesthetic power."⁵

The choice of language in classical Indian literary tradition is, then, as pointed out by Sheldon Pollock, dictated by aesthetic considerations, by its transethnic and global character, rather than by social considerations. He cites examples from ancient history of India, of Buddhist and Jains profusely writing in Sanskrit and, before that, Brahmanic rulers promoting Prākṛit literature.

With this I am forced to arrive at, rather an antithesis, namely, that the choice of language does not necessarily speak of

1. Keith : 74

2. Ibid : 334

3. Rajendran : 131

4. Pollock : 46

5. Ibid.

identities, or, sometimes it speaks of identities which are beyond social and political domains.

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Putrikā Interpretation of the Mahābhārata

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ब्राह्मेक-महाभागः महाभारते “पुत्रिका”-पात्राण्यधिकृत्य विमृशन्, आदौ “पुत्रिका”-शब्दः राजवंशेषु राज्ञः एकमात्रस्त्र्यपत्यस्य वाचकः इति प्रतिपाद्य, पुत्रिकायाः विवाहसमये तस्यां जनिष्यमाणस्य पुत्रस्य आत्मनो वंशस्य समुद्गाररूपेण राजा वरस्य सकाशात् पणं स्वीकरोति इति धर्मशास्त्रसिद्धां व्यवस्थां प्रतिपाद्य, चित्राङ्गदा-ऋष्यशृङ्ग-विश्वामित्र-मनुदक्ष - सावित्री - परीक्षित - द्रौपदीनामाख्यानेषु “पुत्रिका” - प्रसङ्गं स्वकल्पनानुसारं निरूपयति। ब्राह्मेकमहाभागस्य मतेन वशिष्ठस्य गौः तस्य पुत्री एव नान्या। एवमेव मनोः चरित्रे मत्स्यः यः तावत् मनुं जलस्य पारं तारयति, सोऽपि पुत्रिकारूपिणी मत्स्यकन्यैव यस्याः कारणात् पुनः मनुवंशः प्रवर्धितः। दक्षकन्याः अपि पुत्रिकाः। सावित्री न केवलं पुत्रिका अपितु पतिव्रताऽपि यतः पितुः वंशेन सह सत्यवतः वंशमपि वर्धितवती। परीक्षिदुपाख्याने च परीक्षिता मारितो मृगः न मृगः अपि तु शमीकस्य पुत्रिका एव, अतः शमीकस्य पुत्रः शृङ्गी वस्तुतः परीक्षित एव पुत्र इति दिक्।

INTRODUCTION¹

A *putrikā* is a woman whose son is dedicated to his maternal grandfather's patriline in the context of ancestral ritual and inheritance. Such a woman can pose a danger to the patriline into which she marries. This paper introduces the figure of the *putrikā* as described in the Dharmasūtras and Dharmaśāstras and as exemplified by Arjuna's wife Citrāngada in the *Mahābhārata*, and then suggests the idea of the *putrikā* as a tool for the interpretation of several other stories within the *Mahābhārata*:

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Second International Indology Graduate Research Symposium, in Cambridge, on 23 September 2010. Some of the interpretations mentioned here are also suggested in Brodbeck 2009.

the stories of Ṛṣyaśṛṅga, Viśvāmitra, Manu, Dakṣa, Sāvitrī, Parikṣit, and Draupadī. The *Mahābhārata*'s royal-ancestral subject matter provides a fitting context for the exploration of a recurring gendered problematic. In the end, we can begin to understand why so much discursive weight has been mustered to establish and extol a woman's normative duty to be *pativrata* – that is, 'avowed to her husband' and to the prosperity and continuity of his patriline.

ŚRĀDDHA AND PUTRIKĀ IN THE DHARMA TEXTS

The *śrāddha* ceremony is described in old Sanskrit texts as a kind of cult of the ancestors. It is a regular offering to sustain those in the *pitṛloka*, the ancestral heaven. The ritual patron symbolically feeds father, grandfather, and great-grandfather with morsels of food. There are descriptions and discussions of the *śrāddha* in the *Mahābhārata* (13.23–4; 13.87–92; *Harivaṃśa* 11–13), and also in the *Dharmasūtras* and *Dharmaśāstras* (*Āpastamba Dharmasūtra* 2.16–20; *Gautama Dharmasūtra* 15; *Baudhāyana Dharmasūtra* 2.14–15; *Vāsiṣṭha Dharmasūtra* 11:16–44; *Manusmṛti* 3:122–285). The *śrāddha* evokes the idea of a line of fathers stretching off into the distant past and, hopefully, continuing through into the future. It would evoke that idea in a different way for men and for women, since men can be in a line of fathers in a way that women cannot. In each generation a wife is involved, but in subsidiary fashion. Think of the way surnames work when women take their husbands' names in marriage.

If all men did the *śrāddha* and had children, the line would keep forking and form a tree structure, because men often have more than one son. But because of the inheritance of land and the necessity for communal representation, this tree pattern – which has already been stripped of one parent in every generation in order that it can be a pattern – is often seen stripped of its branches, as a sheer trunk; a bamboo, a *vaṃśa*. This is a regal paradigm, a line of singular inheritance and guardianship of an expanding people and place. Where there is no tie between line and land, the idea of a line into the past can come to emphasise biological and property inheritance much less, so that one may think in terms of a line not of fathers and sons, but of teachers and students. But where kingship is

concerned, on whatever scale it may be, one finds lists showing one preeminent male per generation, with younger brothers only occasionally mentioned, as emigrants, assistants, or handy spares.

The ancestral system places a massive existential pressure on any king to have a good son. The texts on *dharma* explain what to do if a man has no son:

*pitotsrjet putrikām anapatyo 'gnim prajāpatiṃ
ceṣṭvāsmadartham apatyam iti saṃvadya ॥*

abhisamdhimātrāt putrikety ekeṣām ॥

tatsaṃśayān nopayacched abhrātrkāṃ ॥

A father who has no son should offer an oblation to Fire and Prajāpati, proclaim 'Your son is for my benefit', and appoint his daughter. According to some, he may appoint the daughter by his mere intention. Because of this uncertainty, a man should not marry a girl who has no brother.

(*Gautama Dharmasūtra* 28:18–20; tr. Olivelle 2000: 187)

yasyās tu na bhaved bhrātā na vijñāyeta vā pitā |

nopayaccheta tāṃ prājñāḥ putrikādharmasaṅkayā ॥

A wise man must not marry a girl who has no brother or whose father is unknown, for fear that the law of 'female-son' may be in force.

(*Manusmṛti* 3:11; tr. Olivelle 2006: 108)

The appointed lineal daughter (Olivelle's 'female-son') is called a *putrikā*.

The point about whom not to marry is crucial; after having a son, a model man must make sure the son marries well, and has a grandson for the line. The daughter-in-law's natal line is a potential nuisance; one wants a girl whose family have been able to give her away properly and fully. In the standard old-fashioned British wedding, the bride is 'given away' by her father on behalf of his family – and so, by implication, is her future son.

The *Gautama Dharmasūtra* quotation suggests that a bride's father might have lineally appointed his daughter without telling

her husband's family. It is important for the two families to understand each other's intentions; but marriage in Indian texts is sometimes contracted by the couple on their own account, before they know much about or have told each other's families, and in situations where one of them is overcome by physical desire. In such situations, the other one may have some political advantage.

ARJUNA AND CITRĀṄGADĀ

In the *Mahābhārata*, Prince Arjuna, great hero of the victorious Pāṇḍava brotherhood in the war of Kurukṣetra and younger brother of King Yudhiṣṭhira, marries a *putrikā*. Citrāṅgadā is Arjuna's third wife, and she is a princess. He meets her when he is visiting the ruling house of Kalinga, on the east coast (*Mahābhārata* 1.207; van Buitenen 1973: 402). He wants her, but when he proposes the marriage to her father, her father explains that she is his only child and that her son must be his own successor as king:

putro mameyam iti me bhāvanā puruṣottama |
putrikā hetuvidhinā saṃjñitā bharatarṣabha ||
etac chulkaṃ bhavatv asyāḥ kulakṛj jāyatām iha |

I think of her as my son, O best of men; she's a *putrikā*, and known as such in customary fashion, Bharata's bull. The price of marrying her must be this: that her child will continue the family line here.

(*Mahābhārata* 1.207:21–22b)

Arjuna marries her anyway, and fathers Babhruvāhana, a good son for her and her father, and then rambles on, and has other sons from other wives.

In the Kurukṣetra war, Babhruvāhana is one of the few sons of the Pāṇḍavas who does not fight; and all of the sons who do fight are killed, so after the war it is not clear that the Pāṇḍavas have anyone to appoint as Yudhiṣṭhira's heir in the next generation. At this tense juncture, in Kalinga, there is a scene between Arjuna – out travelling again in connection with Yudhiṣṭhira's *aśvamedha* – and Babhruvāhana (*Mahābhārata* 14.78–

82; Ganguli 1970: 135–41) is induced to fight against Arjuna; he does so, and fells him for dead. This act of paricide has a clear symbolic meaning in terms of the fact that Babhruvāhana, as the son of a *putrikā*, is necessarily indifferent to his father's line.¹ Arjuna only survives thanks to a miracle cure effected by Ulūpī, one of his other wives (that seems to be her precise significance here); he is revived and returns to Hāstinapura, where it turns out that the widowed wife of his son Abhimanyu has produced a grandson for the Pāṇḍava line. And when he grows up, Parikṣit, that grandson, is king after Yudhiṣṭhira. So in the end it does not matter that one of Arjuna's wives was a *putrikā*.

Arjuna has several wives. But what if a man has only one wife, and she is a *putrikā*? Here we see the story of Ṛśyaśṛṅga (*Mahābhārata* 3.110–13; Smith 2009: 180–87).

ṚŚYAŚṚṅGA

Ṛśyaśṛṅga, a country boy, son of a brahmin and a deer, has a single horn on his head. In a nearby city, King Lomapāda has no sons, only a daughter; and drought sets in across his kingdom. This is a standard motif indicating regal failure of some kind; in this case, there is failure in getting an heir (which is, after all, the primary regal duty). The king consults his advisors, who recommend that Ṛśyaśṛṅga be fetched.

The technique used to procure Ṛśyaśṛṅga is as follows. Ṛśyaśṛṅga is a complete sexual innocent. The king sends an experienced courtesan to his part of the country. She waylays Ṛśyaśṛṅga and, since he has never seen a sexually mature human female before, she bewitches him most effectively. Very soon, despite his father's warnings, he follows her to the city, where he is introduced to Princess Śāntā. He cannot resist her either, and they are married, and soon the king has a grandson and heir from her, and the drought ends.

Then Ṛśyaśṛṅga's father comes looking for his only son, and scolds the king, and says he wants his son back. And so, now that the king's problem is solved, Ṛśyaśṛṅga takes the princess away

1. For a different, psychoanalytic interpretation of the scene, see Goldman 1978: 329–37; Fitzgerald 2007: 194–202.

with him and goes home to his father's house. And presumably the couple also produce a son for R̥śyaśṛṅga's patriline.

And everyone lives happily ever after. This is because one and the same couple, R̥śyaśṛṅga and the princess, with one horn between them, have produced heirs for two different patriline, one in the city and one in the country. That happened because R̥śyaśṛṅga's father insisted that R̥śyaśṛṅga discharge his natal lineal duties, and because the king, once he had got what he needed from his daughter, was willing to dispose of her.

One salient theme in this story is evident elsewhere: a young man who does not have his senses under control and has not mastered his desire can be taken advantage of by a woman, and can make a marriage that is not necessarily beneficial to his own family. No doubt about it, R̥śyaśṛṅga was vulnerable to seduction; and although things worked out for his line in the end, they might not have done.

In this story, Lomapāda's good daughter Śāntā is a separate character from the courtesan. The princess did not seduce R̥śyaśṛṅga; she just gave him what he was already desperate for. But we can imagine that in other stories, the characters of the *putrikā* and the seductress might be combined.

VIŚVĀMITRA

Our next story is a story of Viśvāmitra (*Mahābhārata* 1.165; van Buitenen 1973: 331-3). Viśvāmitra, a prince from a great lineage, is out hunting, and visits Vasiṣṭha, and falls in love with Vasiṣṭha's cow, and tries to take her away with him when he leaves. Vasiṣṭha says he cannot spare her; he needs her, among other things, to assist in the matter of his ancestral offerings. Viśvāmitra says that he and his army are going to take her anyway, and there is nothing Vasiṣṭha can do about it.

But the cow, who knows that Vasiṣṭha needs her, fights back against Viśvāmitra herself, and refuses to leave, and produces jungle armies of various ethnicities, who defeat Viśvāmitra's armies; and Viśvāmitra cannot take the cow home. Viśvāmitra soon decides not to be a *kṣatriya* any more, and to become a brahmin, in which quest he succeeds.

We could say that Viśvāmitra's decision to become a brahmin would coincide with his royal patrilineal failure. In this way, we can interpret the cow as Vasiṣṭha's lineal daughter or niece. This is the description:

*ṣaḍāyatām supārsvorum triprthum pañca saṁvṛtām |
maṇḍūkanetrām svākārām pīnodhasam aninditām ||
suvāladhiṁ śaṅkukarṇām cāruśṛṅgām manoramām |
puṣṭāyataśirogrīvām ...*

She was six units in length, three units across, and five units around. She had nice flanks and thighs, froggy eyes, a lovely figure, perfect swollen udders, a pretty tail, pointy ears, splendid horns, a strong head, and a long neck – the mind's delight!

(Mahābhārata 1.165:13–14c)

The jungle forces repelling Viśvāmitra in his attempt to get a good-heir-producing wife are interesting: Pahlavas, Śabaras, Śakas, Yavanas, Puṇḍras, Kirātas, Dramiḍas, Siṃhalas, Barbaras, Daradas, and *mlecchas* (Mahābhārata 1.165:35–6). There is a discourse of othering here, in connection with peoples who seem to defend the *putrikā* method. Yet they are assisting the cause of Vasiṣṭha, a brahmin of peerless repute!

MANU

Manu is the cosmic king, the son of the sun, and the ancestor of any number of lineages. Manu's most famous royal son was Ikṣvāku, ancestor of Rāma. At the end of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, Ikṣvāku's great solar line in Ayodhyā looks doomed: King Rāma has banished his wife Sītā, never takes another wife, and leads his people to drown in the River Sarayū. Ikṣvāku was ancestor also of the Buddha; but in a slightly similar fashion to Rāma, the Buddha deserts his royal ancestral line and supervises its destruction (Strong in press).


The Rāma finale to the days of the old solar line of Ayodhyā is history at the time of the Pāṇḍavas; and a few generations after the Kurukṣetra war, when Janamejaya, great-grandson of Arjuna, is told his royal line at Mahābhārata 1.70–90, it is told to him as a solar line descended from Manu, as if to replace the old Ayodhyā

line by adapting and solarising the old lunar line told in the *Harivaṃśa* (Brodbeck in press; see Figure 1).

FIGURE 1. THE SOLARISATION OF THE OLD LUNAR LINE

(*Rāmāyaṇa* 1.69; 2.102) (*Mahābhārata* 1.70–90)

(*Harivaṃśa* 20–23)



Rāma

(Yādavas)

(Pauravas)

|

Bharata

|

Kuru

|

Yudhiṣṭhira, Bhīma, and Arjuna Pāṇḍava

|

Abhimanyu

|

Parikṣit

|

Janamejaya

|

In the story of Manu – the story of the great flood, which is told in the *Mahābhārata* by Mārkaṇḍeya (*Mahābhārata* 3.185; van Buitenen 1975: 583–5) – Manu finds and nurtures a little fish, and before it leaves home the fish promises to help him, and then later, when the flood comes, the fish comes and tows Manu across the flood to safety in a more northerly land, and through its assistance Manu has new descendants there.

I suggest that the fish is female: a mermaid, a *putrikā* used by Manu to restart his line after the Ayodhyā disaster. This is suggested by the ancestry presented to Janamejaya at *Mahābhārata* 1.70–90. There are two female names in the list of Janamejaya's direct ancestors. Janamejaya is descended from the sun, through Manu and Manu's son-cum-daughter Ilā. Her son was Purūravas, who elsewhere is, on his father's side, a descendant of the moon (see e.g. *Harivaṃśa* 20:28–21:1). Purūravas's descendant was Yayāti, his anointed son was Pūru, and Arjuna and all the Bhāratas are descendants of Pūru. The top of the line has been changed, to make it a solar line via Manu's retrospective *putrikā* Ilā.

DAKṢA

The other female name in Janamejaya's direct ancestry as told at *Mahābhārata* 1.70–90 is that of Aditi, also called Dākṣāyaṇī, daughter of Dakṣa. In the line, she comes before Ilā. She is the mother of the sun.

In the *Manusmṛti*, Dakṣa is known to have extended his line by the *putrikā* method:

aputro 'nena vidhinā sutāṃ kurvīt putrikāṃ |
yad apatyam bhaved asyāṃ tan mama syāt svadhākaram ||
anena tu vidhānena purā cakre 'tha putrikāḥ |
vivṛddhyartham svavaṃśasya svayaṃ dakṣaḥ prajāpatiḥ ||

A man with no son may make his female child an appointed daughter by means of this formula: 'Whatever children are born in her will offer the refreshment for the dead for me.' In this way in ancient times Dakṣa himself, a Lord of Creatures, created appointed daughters in order to increase his dynastic line.

(*Manusmṛti* 9:127–128; tr. Doniger and Smith 1991: 212–213)

So Dakṣa is the paradigm of the father who uses a *putrikā*.

In the *Mahābhārata* there is a common and famous story of Dakṣa (*Mahābhārata* 7.173; 10.17–18; 12.274; 12.330; 13.76; 13.145). Dakṣa was hosting a great ritual sacrifice, and Śiva was not invited. But Śiva turned up anyway, and wrecked Dakṣa's sacrifice, and the sacrifice fled into the sky in the form of a deer, and never came back. It is now a constellation.

This story of the destruction of Dakṣa's sacrifice is a representation of a story that appears in the *Brāhmaṇas*, whereby Prajāpati, the Lord of Creatures, took a fancy to his own daughter, who was in the form of a deer; Prajāpati became a stag, and was mounting his own daughter. So Śiva, on behalf of the gods, shot him with an arrow, and the gods achieved a great victory (*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* 3.33, amongst other versions; for the development, see Sircar 1973: 5–6, 70–73; Kramrisch 1981: 326–8; Anand 2007: 199–200).

Dakṣa is in the very early generations of Janamejaya's ancestry. It looks like the wrecking of his sacrifice would be a

metaphor for a successful stand against the *putrikā* method, stopping the *putrikā*'s father from using her as if she were his wife, and from taking her son for his line. Śiva would thus represent her inseminator's family. Dakṣa is in the upper reaches of Janamejaya's line, with his daughter; but this is exceptional. In Manu's case the story is told obliquely, with flood and fish, and in the *vaṃśa* at *Mahābhārata* 1.70 Ilā is presented as if she were, in many ways, a son of Manu:

purūravās tato vidvān ilāyāṃ samapadyata |
sā vai tasyābhavan mātā pitā ceti hi naḥ śrutam ||

Purūravas the sapient was born from Ilā; indeed, she was his mother and his father too – or that's what we've heard.

(*Mahābhārata* 1.70:16)

SĀVITRĪ

Sāvitṛī is famous as a paradigm of the *pativratā* wife; she is loyal to her husband Satyavat to a vital degree. In the famous story (*Mahābhārata* 3.277–83; Smith 2009: 215–33), Yama comes for Satyavat, and Sāvitṛī rescues him by not letting Yama take him. She impresses Yama so much with her statements of wifely devotion that he lets her have her husband back.

As the story begins, Sāvitṛī is the only daughter of a sonless man. Seeking a son, he pleases the gods for eighteen years, and after that, they give him a daughter. Her husband's ancestors, whoever they might be, had better watch out. Despite the fact that she is gorgeous, no one wants to marry Sāvitṛī. Though this is not stated explicitly in the story, it seems she is suspected as a *putrikā* (Jamison 1996: 305 n. 96). Eventually she goes off travelling and finds a man, and then her father takes her to that man's parents and arranges the marriage.

Sāvitṛī's husband Satyavat is an only son. His father is blind, and destitute. When, one year later, Yama comes for Satyavat, this can be interpreted as the *putrikā* chicken coming to his home to roost. Sāvitṛī's father wants Sāvitṛī's son for his line, so it looks like it must be the end for Satyavat and his line. But Sāvitṛī saves her husband; by impressing Yama with her dharmic speeches, she frees Satyavat from death, saves his father from ruin, and has

a hundred sons for their line. Thus Sāvitrī seems singlemindedly and singlehandedly to rebel against the *putrikā* method. She crosses the spectrum of motherhood, from *putrikā* to *pativrata*. And she is revered for it.

Among the boons that Sāvitrī wins from Yama is the boon that her father will have a hundred sons. This is an appropriate boon, since if Satyavat's line is to be saved it is not clear what would happen to Sāvitrī's father's line.

This story is not like the story of Ṛśyaśṛṅga, in which one couple produces sons for two different lines. Instead, late in the day, Sāvitrī's mother has a hundred sons. This is the same woman with whom Sāvitrī's father spent more than eighteen years not getting a son. But then we hear that Sāvitrī's new brothers were the Mālavas, named after their mother Mālavī, who was named after her father and his people. So although Sāvitrī's father gets a hundred sons, it seems unlikely that they are his in anything more than a seminal sense.

This makes us wonder if the reason why Sāvitrī's father spent eighteen years not getting a son is because he himself married a *putrikā*; and hence his sons are otherwise engaged, so if he is to service his ancestral line he needs a *putrikā* daughter of his own. Thus *putrikā* usage would be infectious and self-perpetuating unless concertedly challenged. If we imagine Sāvitrī's natal environment, we might try to imagine a context in which the idea of a woman and her people donating her sons to the line of some husband would be locally a new idea, with no immediate role models to demonstrate it; a context in which, from the standpoint of patrilineal family values, there would be no proper male role models for sons. Although in the *dharma* texts the *putrikā* method is presented as something one should only resort to in situations of dire extremity, and is presented in terms of the *putrikā*'s father and his patriline (thus reckoning it as patrilineally as possible), we can try to imagine contexts where the idea of patriliney would be revolutionary. But speaking for myself, given that my surname nominally comprises fifty percent of my personal identity I feel that there is little chance of my reliably imagining what might precede such a revolution.

In the *dharma* texts we read that a girl should be married young (as young as seven or eight; *Mahābhārata* 13.44:13; *Manusmṛti* 9:94), and we can imagine corrective treatment sometimes being given to her in her new home, where her role model is her mother-in-law, who was likewise imported from some other family and then corrected by her own imported mother-in-law. In this system each mother-in-law is a woman whose own daughters have simply been given away, whether she or they like it or not.

PARIKṢIT

Janamejaya's father Parikṣit was cursed, to die, by Śṛṅgin, the son of Śamīka, a *muni* whom Parikṣit had – in Śṛṅgin's opinion, at least – insulted. Parikṣit, out hunting, had shot a deer and was chasing it, but lost it. He asked Śamīka about the deer but Śamīka said nothing, so Parikṣit hung a dead snake around Śamīka's neck, and that was what so angered Śṛṅgin. The curse was for Parikṣit to die by the venom of the snake-king Takṣaka; and Takṣaka was keen to discharge the duty, and did so despite monetary inducements not to, and despite Parikṣit's apparent precautions; and when Janamejaya heard about all this, that was when he decided to kill all snakes (*Mahābhārata* 1.36–40, 45–7; van Buitenen 1973: 97–103, 109–14).

Encouraged by the interpretations presented above, we can read Parikṣit's shot deer as his wife, Śamīka's daughter (Brodbeck 2009b); and we can read Śṛṅgin as Parikṣit's son by her, and Takṣaka as Śamīka's ancestor, the threatened dead snake, and Parikṣit's death by snakebite as his implied lineal death through the *putrikā* operation triggered by Śṛṅgin and Takṣaka, which is solved for both lines at the *sarpasatra*, by Janamejaya, Parikṣit's considerably later son and heir (by a different wife). Janamejaya, as a result of what he is told at that *sarpasatra* (i.e. his solar ancestry and the Pāṇḍava story, including the substories mentioned above, amongst others), decides to let the dharmic snakes, including Takṣaka, stay alive.

CONCLUSION

Most of the stories mentioned in this paper occur in other texts besides the Sanskrit *Mahābhārata*, in different versions, and

sometimes in different versions within the *Mahābhārata*. I have been talking only of the *Mahābhārata* versions, and thinking of them in the context of the *Mahābhārata* as a whole. I have tried not to take liberties with the text; but in reading literature we are empowered to be interpretive, and it seems to me that there is a common theme running through a good deal of the *Mahābhārata*'s discourse. Other stories, in addition to the ones I have discussed here, are susceptible to this kind of interpretation; and its widespread applicability suggests that the *putrikā* problem is a central concern of the text, and provides a rationale for the inclusion within it of many stories which at first glance might seem to be rather tangential.

In a way, the text sketches a continuum of femininity, from *putrikā* to *pativratā*, with the *putrikā* being practically a man in some respects. That continuum would be connected with sexuality in ways that can be caricatured, but which nonetheless are complex and subtle and in many ways ill-served by the crude digital lineal-theoretical perspective I have essayed. If the *Mahābhārata* sketches a continuum of femininity it also has a corresponding continuum of masculinity, from eunuch to *uber-kṣatriya*, with in the latter case a caricatured sexualised masculinity that can sometimes seem parodic. Nonetheless, as I have tried to show, the text does place gender politics at the hub of the wider politics of lineage, kingdom, and the vehicle through time. There is also the distinct possibility of opting out of the whole sick business, forsaking the bondage of action and the way of the fathers. But for *kṣatriya* men at least, and in the *Mahābhārata* at least, such opting out is generally presented as irresponsible.

By concentrating on a reproductive-structural idea in some of the *Mahābhārata*'s apparently incidental stories, in this paper I have held off discussion of the story of the Pāṇḍavas and Draupadī. Their story seems peculiarly complicated because it is overdetermined by the divine Kṛṣṇa-led *avatāra* plan to rescue the earth through them and through the Kurukṣetra war. This plan is announced by a disembodied voice at Kṛṣṇa Draupadī's birth:

sarvayoṣidvarā kṛṣṇā kṣayaṃ kṣatraṃ ninīṣati ||

surakāryam iyaṃ kāle kariṣyati sumadhyamā |
asyā hetoḥ kṣatriyāṇāṃ mahad utpatsyate bhayam ||

Kṛṣṇā, the best of all women, wants to lead the military order to destruction. In time, she of the fine waist will perform this duty for the gods. Because of her, a great danger will arise for the kṣatriyas.

(Mahābhārata 1.155:44c–45)

Draupadī is apparently a *pativrata*, but she is dishonoured in the dicing scene because of her diverse sexuality, and she excoriates her husbands and then goads them to the war; and in it all the men in her natal family are killed, and then so are her own sons, the Draupadeyas (known as such after their maternal grandfather). And so the Pāṇḍava line continues, with Kṛṣṇa's assistance, through Abhimanyu, Arjuna's son by Kṛṣṇa's sister Subhadrā (a one-man wife). Once the divine work is done, Pāṇḍu gets his patrilineal heir; and this happens because Draupadī is replaced by a more conventional woman, in a manner somewhat resembling Sāvitrī's switch-over.

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Passions and Emotions in the Indian Philosophical-Religious Traditions: Some Preliminary Remarks

Raffaele Torella

भारतीयविद्यापरम्परासु मनोविज्ञानं मनश्शास्त्रं वा न विकासं प्राप-इति प्रवादं परीक्षमाणः तोरेल्लामहाभागः कामक्रोधादि-मनोविकाराणां नियमने विजये च भारतीयदार्शनिकचिन्तनधारायाम् उपलभ्यमानं प्रकारद्वयं विश्लेष्यति। प्रथमस्तु प्रकारः-निग्रहणात्मकः अभ्यास-वैराग्याभ्यां साधनीयः वेदान्तिभिः, जैन-बौद्ध-योगिभिश्च प्रतिबोधितः। द्वितीयस्तु अनुगम्यनियमनात्मकः शैवशाक्ततन्त्राभिमतः। दोषदर्शन-वैराग्याभ्यां निग्रह्य प्रकृतिसिद्धबलरूपयोः उपशमनापेक्षया अनुगम्य-नियमनमेव वरं, येन स्वभावसिद्ध ऐहिकानुभवोऽपि न बाध्येत इत्यत्र स्वारस्यम्।

Anyone enquiring into the status of passions and emotions in traditional India is surprised to find that the subcontinent, so avid for analysis in every field of knowledge, has never produced any science similar to western psychology. As a first response, what comes to mind is the gymnosophist's answer to Socrates who was questioning him about man's nature: "But how can we deal with the human before knowing about the divine?" Too busy contemplating the fearful symmetries of the supernatural, were the Indians consequently not particularly interested in untangling the developments of human behaviour? The absence of psychology, as an independent discipline at least, appears all the more surprising if one considers that the Indians have never lacked a capacity either for introspection or for cataloguing. With the former, they have achieved results never surpassed in research on the two realities which, since they naturally coincide with the observer-subject, lend themselves the more readily to eluding observation. I refer to breathing, the breath of life, literally dissected by yoga, and language, the subject of the most discerning analysis that mankind has ever devoted to this

fundamental and pervasive reality. The Indians have never been in short supply with regard to their cataloguing ability and, on the contrary, have raised it to even maniacal levels, so that it is rampant in all scientific, aesthetic, philosophical and religious literature and is often one of the prime reasons making its reading so arduous. The first great philosophical system to develop from Upaniṣadic and epic speculation was given the name Sāṃkhya, meaning 'connected with enumeration, listing'.

It is in fact in philosophical texts, starting precisely from those of the Sāṃkhya school, that we should look for a *thesaurus* of human passions and emotions, analysed and classified with obstinate accuracy and an absolutely neutral and scientific grasp, as in the classical texts of Vaiśeṣika, or else with a mixture of coldness and preoccupation, as often occurs in Buddhist and Jaina texts that describe them, keeping their gaze fixed on the meditating devotee who might be threatened by them. But the researcher into Indian passions and emotions will soon discover with equal surprise that he must delve into treatises on aesthetics and rhetoric perhaps even more than into philosophical and religious texts. Risking here, moreover, losing both the reader and himself in labyrinthine systematics, in his investigation of the essence of poetry and the theatre, the Indian rhetorician must first tackle man's basic passions/emotions (*bhāva*), which the poet or actor must portray so that the reader or spectator can savour their essence, finally liberated from the restrictions of the individual ego.

If, now satiated by descriptions - albeit sometimes of great precision - the researcher of passions wishes to discover how they are assessed in the Indian world, things become even more complicated. They are differently assessed according to the subject's social position, his belonging to one or another of the four basic states of life (*āśrama*), and according to caste. While anger and disdain (*manyu*), as Minoru Hara has demonstrated in one of his seminal lexical analyses, are generally reprehensible in the man of the street, they are even obligatory for those belonging to the *kṣatriya* class of sovereigns and warriors (Hara 2001).

In examining the philosophical-religious texts of Hinduism on such themes, we must first be aware that by far the greater part of them comes from the Brahmanic élite, which thus seeks to envelop the entire Indian reality in its coils. Our first impression after observing the central stream of Brahmanic thought is of a considerable integration – mostly absent in the West¹ – of the individual's physical, psychic-emotive and intellectual dimensions. A single nature runs through them uninterruptedly: it passes fluidly from one level to another, gradually including the animal and vegetal worlds. In the words of Louis Dumont (1975: 30, quoted in Bouillier-Tarabout 2002: Introduction, 18):

Il n'y a pas de coupure entre l'homme et la nature. La chose est sensible dans le vêtement – le corps s'enroule dans une pièce d'étoffe –, dans la simplicité de vie matérielle et la forme des objets d'usage courant. En musique, l'heure de la journée prescrit le ton sentimental de la mélodie: impossible d'être nostalgique le matin et gai le soir...

(There is no hiatus between man and nature. This is appreciable in clothing – the body wraps itself in a piece of cloth – or in the simplicity of material life and the form of objects we use every day. In music, the time of day prescribes the sentimental mode of the melody: impossible to be nostalgic in the morning and gay in the evening...)

Albeit deeply rooted in common opinion, such a view is however substantially a blunder: far from being absent, dualism is merely radicalised to the extreme. In Sāṃkhya for example – and Sāṃkhya with its cosmogenesis remains the model for much of later Brahmanic speculation (cf. Torella 1999) – an apparently unbridgeable abyss separates the world of nature (*prakṛti*) – comprising the body, senses, passions and mental functions forming an integrated whole – from the world of the spirit, alone responsible for striking the spark of consciousness, without which the continual gross activity of the sensorial faculties, of the inner sense, of the I-notion and the intellect could never finally

1. Among the most conspicuous exceptions is Aristotle.

shine as 'knowledge'. An integrated monism of body, senses, emotions and intellectual faculties consequently 'does exist' but leaves out that very principle that alone can give meaning to the whole. The goal is not the final achieving of greater unity, but the recognition of an irremediable otherness, having reached which, the psyche-body-nature complex progressively withdraws from the scene, "...like a dancer", recounts a famous stanza of the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* (v. 59), "having presented her performance to her audience", leaving the spirit to shine in undisturbed solitude. The material, emotional and psychic universe thus comes into existence solely so that the soul can recognise itself as being foreign to it and isolate itself in its own self-identity. Even this recognition is made possible by the action of *prakṛti* itself, which thus finds in its own negation its ultimate reason for existence.

Based on such a premise, two alternatives are possible: to accentuate the integrated and unitary aspect of the body-senses-psyche-intellect complex, or to concentrate on the otherness of the knower principle, the 'spirit'. Brahmanic philosophy – and, *mutatis mutandis*, Jaina and even Buddhist philosophy, despite a programmatic rejection of any substantiality of the subject – decidedly take the second alternative, the option that we might, somewhat roughly, term 'ascetic'. The whole fermenting energy potential of human drives, including the intellectual, which the West would on the other hand place on the other side, is seen as troublesome ballast from which man must free himself. Solely over the desert of body and passions can the moon of the spirit rise. An incurable ontological weakness undermines the roots of whatever is tinted with pleasure or sorrow, or arouses desire or aversion. The whole human adventure may thus take on a fainter outline – or sometimes a more sombre one, as in the scenario depicted by the Vedāntin Sureśvara in its sub-commentary on the *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad*, which explores man's wretchedness right from his mother's uterus, a place of ineffable delights for the West.

anubhūtāḥ purāsaḥyā mayā marmacchido 'sakṛt |
karambhavālukās taptā yā dahanty aśubhāśayān ||

jāṭharānalasaṃtaptāḥ pittākhyarasavipluṣaḥ |
garbhāśaye nimagnāṃ tā dahanty atibhṛśaṃ tu mām ||

*audaryakṛmivaktrāṇi kūṭasālmalikāṇṭakaiḥ |
 tulyāni vitudanty ārtam pārsvāsthikrakacārditam ||
 garbhe durgandhabhūyiṣṭhe jāṭharāgnipradīpate |
 duḥkham mayāptam yat tasmāt kanīyaḥ kumbhipākajam ||*

Having entered this uterus [the foetus is speaking], I am suffering unbearable, devastating pain. Several times in past existences I have fallen into the scorching sands of hell that burn wicked souls, but these drops of bile superheated by the fires of digestion make my tender body suffer much more. Stomach worms with mouths as sharp as thorns torture me, already tortured enough by the bones of my mother's body that cut into me on all sides. The miseries of the hell of Kumbhipāka are nothing compared to the tortures I experience in the uterus, full of the most disgusting miasmas that burn owing to the stomach's digestive fire.¹

Conception was achieved during a rude nocturnal encounter, all heaviness and no grace:

*nijāvidyāmahājālasamvītadhiṣaṇaḥ pumān |
 mohotthānalakāmākhyavaḍiśāpahṛtāśayaḥ ||
 tamasā kāmaśārṅgeṇa samkalpākarṣaṇena saḥ |
 rāgākhyaviṣalepena tāḍito viṣayeṣunā ||
 grahāviṣṭa ivānīśaś codito janyakarmaṇā |
 yoṣidagniṃ pataty āśu jyotirlobhāt pataṅgavat ||*

The mind enveloped in the suffocating coils of innate ignorance, the heart dragged away by the hook of insatiable lust born of obnubilation, the father of the yet unborn is assailed by darkness, pierced by the arrows of the objects of the senses poisoned by passion and shot by the bow of desire drawn by his resolution. Deprived of all control as though a demon possessed him, driven by the karma of the creature yet unborn, [the father to be] plunges rapidly into the woman's fire, like a moth avid for the flame.²

1. *Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttikam*, *Brahmavallī*, *prathamah khaṇḍah*, vv. 191-194 (p. 86).

2. *ibid.* vv. 166-168 (p. 81).

In a manner no less atrocious than life in the uterus is presented the moment of birth and infancy and youth as they come along – tormented by sexual desire, blinded alternately by one passion or other, by love and anger –, up to the rabid impotence of old age. The epilogue that follows is not exactly an apotheosis:

*hā kānte hā dhane putra kranda mānaḥ sudāruṇam |
maṇḍūka iva sarpeṇa gīryate mṛtyunā naraḥ ||*

[...]

viśrāma vrkṣasadrśaḥ khalu jīvalokaḥ ||

sāyaṃ sāyaṃ vāsavrkṣaṃ sametāḥ

prataḥ pratas tena tena prayānti |

tyaktvānyonyam taṃ ca vrkṣaṃ vihaṅgāḥ

yadvat tadvaj jñātayo 'jñātayaś ca ||

mṛtibījaṃ bhavej janma janmabījaṃ tathā mṛtiḥ |

ghaṭīyantravad aśrānto bambhramīty anīśaṃ naraḥ ||

While weeping bitterly over his beloved, his wealth and the son he has to leave, the man is swallowed up by death, like a toad by a serpent. [...] This world of mortals is indeed like a tree used for shelter. One evening birds perch on it in search of a haven for the night and next morning leave it and fly away each wherever he will. Similarly, men encounter, for a brief time, friends or strangers in this world and then disperse. Birth leads to death and death to birth: thus, men ceaselessly circle forever, like the wheel the draws water from the well.¹

The element around which the whole body-senses-emotions constellation seems to turn is attachment, desire. In any final analysis, it is from its grip that man must free himself to rise toward the ātman or nirvāṇa. Even a text certainly not focused on asceticism, like the *Bhagavadgītā*, does not fail to launch a lengthy, venomous attack against desire:

arjuna uvāca:

atha kena prayukto 'yaṃ pāpaṃ carati pūruṣaḥ |

1. *ibid.* vv. 212-221 (pp. 89-90).

anicchann api vārṣṇeya balād iva niyojitaḥ ||

śrībhagavān uvāca:

*kāma eṣa krodha eṣa rajoguṇasamudbhavaḥ |
mahāśāno mahāpāpmā viddhy enam iha vairiṇam ||*

*dhūmenāvriyate vahnir yathādarśo malena ca |
yatholbenāvṛto garbhas tathā tenedam āvṛtam ||*

*āvṛtaṃ jñānam etena jñānino nityavairiṇā |
kāmarūpeṇa kaunteya duṣpūreṇānalena ca ||*

*indriyāṇi mano buddhir asyādhiṣṭhānam ucyate |
etair vimohayaty eṣa jñānam āvṛtya dehinām ||*

*tasmāt tvam indriyāṇy ādau niyamyā bharatarṣabha |
pāpmānaṃ prajahiḥy enaṃ jñānavijñānanāśanam ||*

Arjuna said: Moved by what does man do evil? By what is he driven almost by force, O Kṛṣṇa? The Blessed One replied: It is desire (*kāma*) that drives him, it is anger, arising from the *rajas*¹ component. This is the great devourer, the great Evil One. Recognise in it your enemy. As fire is covered by smoke, as the mirror is covered by a spot and the embryo by the womb, so is our knowledge covered by it [desire]. By this reality that takes the shape of desire, a fire that nothing satiates, eternal enemy of the knower subject, knowledge is covered. Of desire, the senses, the mind and the intellect are the substrate. Through them desire, covering knowledge, beclouds the incarnate soul. Therefore, O Bull among the Bharatas, curb first of all the senses

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1. Desire and anger are deemed strictly as a pair, or rather as two aspects of the same reality. As Śaṅkara says in his commentary on this passage, it is frustrated desire that is transformed into anger. *Rajas*, along with *sattva* and *tamas* (a doctrine belonging to Sāṃkhya, significantly present in the *Bhagavadgītā*) are at the same time psychic states and cosmic forces - an ambiguity that is unresolved in classical Sāṃkhya, which inherits and unites highly differentiated ancient doctrines. *Sattva* is characterized by joy and light: it is gentle and illuminating; *rajas* is characterized by an absence of joy and by dynamism: it is unstable and stimulating; *tamas* is characterized by inertia and restriction: it is heavy and obstructive. Passions and emotions are, of course, expressions of the *rajas* component.

and then abandon this Evil One who destroys knowledge and spiritual science. (III.36-41)

The Kashmiri recension of the *Bhagavadgītā* lays it on thicker, inserting, after the first verses of Kṛṣṇa's reply, five further verses:

arjuna uvāca:

*bhavaty eṣa katham kṛṣṇa katham caiva vivardhate |
kimātmakaḥ kimācāraḥ tan mamācakṣva prcchataḥ ||*

śrībhagavān uvāca:

*eṣa sūkṣmaḥ paraḥ śatruḥ dehinām indriyeṣu ha |
sukhatantra ivāsīno mohayan pārtha tiṣṭhati ||*

*kāmakrodhamayo ghoraḥ stambaharṣasamudbhavaḥ |
ahaṁkāro 'bhimānātmā dustaraḥ pāpakarmabhiḥ ||*

*harṣam asya nivartyaiṣa śokam asya dadāti ca |
bhayaṁ cāsyā karoty eṣa mohayaṁs tu muhur muhuḥ ||*

*sa eṣa kaluṣaḥ kṣudraś cchidraprekṣī dhanañjaya |
rajaḥpravṛtto mohātmā manasyāñām upadravaḥ ||*

Arjuna said: But how is it born, O Kṛṣṇa, and how does it grow? What is its essence, what its operation? Answer, I pray you, this my question. The Blessed One replied: It is the subtle enemy, supreme, of bodily beings and the senses. It appears as an instrument of pleasure, O Pārtha, but in reality it obfuscates. Cruel, its essence being desire and rage, source of the evil pleasure of pride, cause of the ego, by nature presumptuous, only with difficulty can it be overcome by the wicked. First it takes pleasure from man and gives him sorrow and, that done, fills him with terror, obfuscating him increasingly. It is dark, vile, it spies on the weak points, O Arjuna; it is born of rubedo [*rajas*] and its essence is obfuscation: it is the plague of mankind.¹

One of the five major vows absolutely required by the highest Jaina ideal (the other four being non-violence, truthfulness, honesty and absence of greed) is itself continence. It is defined as follows by Hemacandra's : *Yogaśāstra*

1. III.38-42 (cf. Abhinavagupta's *Bhagavadgītārthasaṁgraha* pp. 55-56).

divyaudārikakāmānāṃ kṛtānumatakāritaiḥ |
manovākkāyatas tyāgo brahmāṣṭādasadhā matam ||

The eighteen kinds of continence, in our tradition, consist of abandoning desires (*kāma*) with regard to heavenly, human and animal beings, in mind, word and body, whether one experiences them oneself, or approves their enjoyment, or ensures that others enjoy them. (I.23, p. 200)

Equipped with such readings, the first to filter through systematically in the West and to be firmly fixed in *communis opinio*, how often must the western traveller, landing in India in the expectancy of an ascetic and disincarnate world, have been stunned by the untiring proliferation of colours, odours and sounds of life in all its most splendid and ephemeral forms!

Consequently it seems that something is not right, or that there is at least a hiatus between the theories and prescriptions of traditional philosophical-religious texts and what then occurs in real life. This, however, is only a part of the truth. Indeed, there exists a highly significant sector of Indian thought and religious experience – Tantrism – that became increasingly important until it imbued the whole spiritual life of India starting from the Middle Ages, which literally turns the tables. With regard to Hemacandra's passage on desire, what the greatest master of Tantrism, the śaiva Abhinavagupta, says in one of his most difficult works, the *Mālinīvijayavārttika*, is in total opposition:

kāmaṃ svīkartum icchaiva tadācchādanayogataḥ |
viśvaṃ sādhayet kāmī kāmātattvam idaṃ yataḥ ||

Desire (*kāma*) is the will to take possession [of the other] (to make the other oneself). Veiling everything with his desire, the desirer can accomplish everything, since everything has as its ultimate principle desire itself. (I.281)

And again:

kiṃ nākarṣati kiṃ naiṣa [read: caiṣa] na bhāvayati yogavit |
tata evocyate śāstre nārakto rañjayed iti ||

Whoever knows this path, what may he not draw to himself or realise mentally? For this very reason, traditional texts say, "He who is not impassioned cannot arouse passion [in others]".

(I.279)

The energy of desire, according to Śivaite Tantrism, is what is manifest in the fruition and enjoyment of the senses, that which gives life to the ferment of the emotions, which has one of its peaks in the passion of love. The whole universe is pervaded by this energy, the sole matrix of any form of dynamism and life, whose single thread crosses both the most extreme abstractions of thought and our modest daily round. The first worship that the devotee is bound to render is to the goddesses of his own consciousness (*svaṣaṁvid-devīs*), who are none other than the *kaṛaṇeśvarīs*, the mistresses of his sensorial faculties.¹ The sacrificial offering is thus made of everything within the bounds of ordinary life which, when all is said and done, is not all that ordinary. Neither clarified butter nor flowers are offered to the goddess's icon, but increasingly penetrating and intense enjoyments to those unbridled goddesses that 'are' our senses. As stated in a verse of the *Mālinīvijayottara-tantra*:

bandhamokṣāv ubhāv etāv indriyāṇāṃ jagur budhāḥ |
viḡrhitāni [nigrhitāni?] bandhāya vimuktāni vimuktaye ||

"The cause of both bonds and liberation are the senses: this is what the wise said. Fettered they lead to bonds, freed they lead to liberation." (XV.44)

This is echoed by Abhinavagupta in the *Tantrāloka*:

antarindhanasaṁbhāram anapekṣyaiva nityaśaḥ |
jājvalīty akhilākṣaughaprasṛtograśikhaḥ śikhī ||
bodhāgnau tādrśe bhāvā viśantas tasya sanmahaḥ |
udrecayanto gacchanti homakarmanimittatām ||

Perennially, whatever the fuel provided, burns within us the blazing fire of all our senses. The various knowable things, entering this consensual fire and increasing its radiance, thereby become the cause of oblation. (IV.201-202)

1. See particularly the *Dehasthadevatācakra-stotra* 'Hymn to the wheel of deities residing in the body', edited by Pandey 1963: 952-953.

To yoga, which requires firstly detachment (*vairāgya*) and repetitious and gradual practice (*abhyāsa*), the Śaivaite Tantra responds by opposing to the former attachment and passion (*rāga*), and to the latter the silent vortex of the moment (*kṣaṇa*). But why attachment and passion and, first and foremost, what is in this word *rāga* whose semantic area is so evasive? *Rāga* 'attachment, affection', but also 'colour' or 'the fact of being coloured by emotions' in Śaivaite theology and psychology constitutes one of the individual's three innermost 'cuirasses', the concept of 'cuirass' being complex and many-faceted, irresistibly recalling Wilhelm Reich's similar motif.¹ It is a fact accepted by all, say the Śaivaite masters, that there is no action in ordinary life that does not proceed from an idea or expectation of pleasure. Furthermore, the most disparate philosophical schools and prescriptive texts coincide in considering *rāga* as the root of all feelings, emotions and mental activities. The universe – here the great Abhinavagupta is again speaking (*Tantrāloka* IX.62) – was created in order to satisfy souls, in which a frenzy (*lolikā*), a feverish craving for enjoyment had been roused. This subtle frenzy has neither outline nor horizon: it may be said to be a 'desiring condition' without an object (Jayaratha: *niṣkarma abhilāṣitā*), a state of undefined expectation (Jayaratha: *lolikā svātmani sākāmṣateva*). Tantrism is aware that it must take this into account first of all.

In order to act on these profound structures, traditional yoga seems like a blunted weapon.

vastuto 'sti na kasyāpi yogāṅgasyābhyupāyatā |
svarūpaḥ hy asya nīrūpam avacchedavivarjanāt ||

upāyo 'py anupāyo 'syāyāgavṛttinirodhataḥ |
recanāpūraṇair eṣā rahitā tanuvātanaūḥ ||

tārayaty evaṁ ātmānaḥ bhedasāgaragocarāt |
nimañjamānam apy etan mano vaiṣayike rase ||

nāntarārdratvam abhyeti niścchidraḥ tumbakaḥ yathā |
svapanthānaḥ hayasyeva manaso ye nirundhate ||

1. Reich 1973. On the doctrine of the 'cuirasses' in Tantrism, see Torella 1998.

*teṣāṃ tatkhāṇḍanāyogād dhāvaty unmārgakoṭibhiḥ /
kiṃsvid etad iti prāyo duḥkhe 'py utkaṇṭhate manaḥ ||*

*sukhād api virājyeta jñānād etad idaḥ [tv iti ?] /
tathāhi gurur ādikṣad bahudhā svakaśāsane ||*

*anādāraviraktyaiva galantīndriyavṛttayaḥ /
yāvat tu viniyamyante tāvat tāvad vikurvate ||*

In actual fact, no member of Yoga can really serve as a means of achieving the condition of *anuttara* 'that which nothing transcends'. The means to it is, in fact, a non-means, since it comprises neither ritual practices nor suppression of the mental functions. It is a boat designed for a light breeze, without exhalation or inhalation¹, which thereby carries itself beyond the ocean of duality, albeit in the meantime the mind is immersed in the fluid of the objective world. We must bear in mind that the husk cannot be separated from the grain unless it is soaked. We consider what we are headed for when we decide to place the natural course of the mind under control, as when we wish to put a bridle on a wild horse. As a result of the violence of the procedures, the mind – like the horse – starts running here and there, taking innumerable wrong directions. Why does this occur? We all know well that the mind can take pleasure even in pain and, vice-versa, withdraw disgusted from pleasure and knowledge. This is what the master demonstrates in various forms in his treatise:² the impulses of the senses can only be thrown off thanks to a highly special kind of detachment, a detachment practiced in elegant *souplesse*. On the contrary, if we try to subdue them, they end up becoming ungovernable. (*Mālinīvijayavārttika* II.106-112)

Passions and emotions are consequently allowed to flow freely without attempting to safeguard the mind from their impact. Not only: "Passion should not be extinguished by reason, but reason converted into passion" (except that here it is not a

1. This is a clear allusion to yoga practices focused on breathing.

2. Here Abhinavagupta is possibly referring to Vāmanadatta and his *Svabodhodayamañjarī*; on this interesting, and very peculiar, text see Torella 2000.

Tantric master speaking, but the early XIX c. Italian poet and philosopher Giacomo Leopardi in his *Zibaldone*).¹

1. It is worth presenting the full passage in which the sentence quoted above is contained. "Ma la ragione non è mai efficace come la passione. Sentite i filosofi. Bisogna fare che l'uomo si muova per la ragione come, anzi più assai che per la passione, anzi si muova per la sola ragione e dovere. Bubbolo. La natura degli uomini e delle cose, può ben esser corrotta, ma non corretta. E se lasciassimo fare alla natura, le cose andrebbero benissimo, non ostante la detta superiorità della passione sulla ragione. Non bisogna estinguer la passione colla ragione, ma convertir la ragione in passione; fare che il dovere la virtù l'eroismo ec. diventino passioni. Tali sono per natura. Tali erano presso gli antichi, e le cose andavano molto meglio. Ma quando la sola passione del mondo è l'egoismo, allora si ha ben ragione di gridar contro la passione. Ma come spegner l'egoismo colla ragione che n'è la nutrice, dissipando le illusioni? E senza ciò, l'uomo privo di passioni, non si muoverebbe per loro, ma neanche per la ragione, perchè le cose son fatte così, e non si possono cambiare, chè la ragione non è forza viva nè motrice, e l'uomo non farà altro che divenirne indolente, inattivo, immobile, indifferente, infingardo, com'è divenuto in grandissima parte. (22 ottobre 1820)" (G. Leopardi, *Zibaldone di pensieri*, a cura di F. Flora, vol. I, Milano, Mondadori, 1937, pp. 173-174). [But reason is never as effective as passion. Listen to the philosophers. Men should be led to act in accordance with reason as much as, indeed much more than, out of passion; in fact their actions should be determined solely by reason and duty. Nonsense. The nature of human beings and other things can easily be corrupted but not corrected. And if we let nature take its course, things would run very smoothly, despite the said dominance of passion over reason. Rather than extinguish passion with reason, it would be better to turn reason into passion: to make duty, virtue, heroism etc. become passions. So they are in nature. So they were among the ancients, and things were much better. But when the only passion in the world is egoism then it is right to cry out against passion. But how can selfishness be eliminated by reason, which fosters it by destroying illusions? And without it, a man deprived of passions would not be motivated by them, or by reason, either, because things are like that, and cannot change, reason is neither a living nor a motive force, and man will do nothing but become lazy, inactive, immobile, indifferent, uncaring, as in large parte he has become. (22 Oct. 1820).] I wish to heartily thank Michael Caesar and Franco D'Intino

Indeed, Tantrism, especially in its most extreme forms, goes far beyond any instrumental acceptance of the emotive dimension (for the purpose of neutralising it). If the divine is first and foremost energy that unites and overwhelms all provisional levels of being, it is in the tumult of the passions that we best meet it face to face. Emotional states, whether sexual excitement or fright, joy or terror, not only should not be obliterated, any more than they should be merely accepted. They should be cultivated, skilfully intensified and then exploded and spread in order to create subtle rents in the veil of ordinary existence, through which we can contact the magma of universal consciousness/energy. Liberation does not occur therefore in spite of human passions, but precisely by virtue of them. By way of a provisional conclusion, we may use a passage from the *Kiraṇa-tantra* (IV.29a), which ventures, if possible, even farther: "Without the body, there can be no liberation (*na dehena vinā muktiḥ*)".

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Kālidāsa and Āhārya Abhinaya

Vijay Pandya

विजयपण्ड्यामहाभागः नाट्यप्रयोगे आहार्याभिनयस्य महत्त्वम्
आवश्यकताञ्च निरूपयन् तत्तदाचार्यैः प्रतिपादितानि आहार्याभिनय-
सम्बन्धीनि लक्षणानि परिशील्य कालिदासीये नाटकत्रये तस्याभिनयस्य
प्रधान्यं, तदभिनयसम्बद्धान् विविधान् प्रकारान् विशदीकृत्य संस्कृत-
नाटकप्रयोगे प्रयोक्तृभ्यो दीयमानं स्वातन्त्र्यमपि स्पष्टयति।

What is Āhārya Abhinaya? The benediction stanza of the Abhinaya-darpaṇa (AD.) most gloriously and lucidly crystallizes the essence of the Abhinaya of which āhārya is one of the four types. The verse runs as follows:

आङ्गिकं भुवनं यस्य वाचिकं सर्ववाङ्मयम्।

आहार्यं चन्द्रतारादि तं नुमः सात्त्विकं शिवम्॥¹

We bow to the Sāttvika Śiva whose āṅgika is the whole universe, whose vācika is the entire language and whose āhārya is the moon and the stars and so on.

So āhārya includes objects of the world like the moon and the stars and in the theatre world also, the āhārya is the stage-property. Further AD. explains the āhārya

आहार्यो हारकेयूरवेषादिभिरलंकृतिः। (AD, 40a)²

Āhārya is the decoration of the body with necklace and armlet etc.

It is called āhārya because 'It is external to the actor, to be put on and taken off.'³ Nāṭyaśāstra (NS.) first calls āhārya as *nepathyam* and then *nepthyam* is further divided into four types:

1. Abhinaya-darpaṇa Gujarati Translation by Dr. Panubhai Bhatt, pub. by Gujarat Vidhyapitha, Ahmedabad, First Edn. 1967.
2. Ibid AD 40a.
3. V. Raghavan, p-22 in Sanskrit Drama in performance, ed. by Rachael Van in Baumer and James R. Brandon, pub. by the University Press & Hawaii Honolulu, (date not available).

चतुर्विधं तु नेपथ्यं पुस्तोऽलङ्कार एव च।
तथाङ्गरचना चैव ज्ञेयं सजीवमेव च॥ (NS. 21-4)¹

This āhārya comprises not only the personal make-up of a character, but also four-fold external techniques viz. the use of colour, costume and ornaments, masks and properties.

The whole of the 21st chapter of the NS. expounds the āhārya-abhinaya. The various characters in their different states are best introduced by revealing the traits of the character through the other aspects of acting techniques. An actor, elucidates Bharatamuni, has to give up or cover up his personal identity and become a new and different person. Bharatamuni sets forth in detail the differences and details to be followed in facial complexion, hair-style and dress according to a character's sex, age, country, religion, profession and status and whether he is god, man, sage or demon. Even in the same person, particular activities and emotional states like separation or sorrow will make difference in dress and decor. Ācārya Bharata says that ornaments, crowns and armour must be of a very light material, so that actors do not get tired by their weight or hampered in their movements in abhinaya.

Ācārya Bharata also describes mountains, vehicles, chariots, shields, armour and banners. These also should be made of light material viz. fibre, bamboo, hide or wax. Animals, birds and reptiles are also made from similar light materials and used on the stage.

These all form the material of the āhārya abhinaya, as these are described by the ācārya in great detail. Obviously this must form the part of the scenery and properties of the stage, if the script of the drama so demands. Ācārya Bharata says that

नास्त्यन्तः पुरुषाणां हि नाट्योपकरणाश्रये। (NS. 21-1936)²

प्रासादगृहयानानि नानाप्रहरणानि च।

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1. Nāṭya Śāstra, 21-4, ed. by Ācārya Revaprasāda Dwivedi, First Edn. 2005, Pub. by Bharatiya Uchcha Adhyayana Sansthan, Shimla.
 2. Ibid.

न शक्यं तानि वै कर्तुं यथोक्तानीह लक्षणैः॥ (NS. 21-197)¹

There is no end to the things required in this world, but it is not possible to bring them all in their proper form on the stage.

So, while considering the āhārya abhinaya in the Kālidāsa's plays, we have to keep in mind this theoretical aspect of it, which has been described at length in the NS. of Bharata.

Now to illustrate, if the fourth act of the Vikramorvaśīyam is to be staged then, how to go about it? We may consider the staging of this act from the āhārya abhinaya point of view.

We know that the hero of the play Purūravas is in a disturbed state of mind due to his separation from his beloved Urvaśī and searching for her in the forest where she was lost. Purūravas is asking animate and inanimate objects such as a peacock, a cuckoo, an elephant, a swan, a bee, a mountain, a river, a cloud, an antelope, saṅgamanīya jewel so called because it is to bring about a union of the hero-heroine and a creeper about his lost beloved Urvaśī. These objects cannot be presented on the stage in their original forms, though they are described by the poet Kālidāsa in that vein and there are no dramatic directions-raṅgasūcanā in the text itself about its performance on the stage. Here, I think, we can take a cue from the theoretical discussion in the NS. about āhārya abhinaya and produce a play, here the fourth act of the Vikramorvaśīyam. So the āhārya abhinaya will be the mainstay of the fourth act of the Vikramorvaśīyam. Out of all these objects described in the play, it may be pointed out here that, Saṅgamanīya jewel also is a part of the material of the āhārya abhinaya. Now considering the important part played by the jewel, the jewel cannot be dispensed with and it must form an important segment of the stage-property of the Vikramorvaśīyam. The Jewel brings about the union of the hero and heroine in the fourth act and further in the fifth act too, it becomes an instrument to bring about the family reunion, so to say. To wit, the son Āyus who was weaned away from his mother Urvaśī, as soon as he was born, again gets united with his parents due to his Saṅgamanīya jewel, indirectly if not directly. We need not go into the details of the story as that it well-known to all of

1. Ibid.

us. Again we may say that the jewel indirectly almost becomes as instrument to bring about the separation also of Urvaśī from Purūravas. So the importance of the Sangamanīya jewel cannot be overemphasized. This jewel has to be somehow shown on the stage in an effective manner in order to reveal the important role assigned to it by the playwright in the drama. So, the jewel has to be a part of the āhārya abhinaya.

Similar remarks may also be made regarding the ring in the Śākuntalam play. Ring also plays a very significant part in the development of the story of the Śākuntalam, and obviously the ring also should be a part of the stage property of the Śākuntalam. Performance of Sanskrit drama in any language on the stage is highly creative thing and hence, no straitjacket rules can be laid down about the employment of the stage-property on the stage. Yet a producer or a director or a sūtradhāra of a Sanskrit play has to interpret the text of the play, take into account the convention of the Sanskrit theatre, feasibility of performing a particular scene on the stage from the point of view of effective representation and convenience and so on. All this, nitty-gritty of the stage has to be mastered and then a Sanskrit play or any other play is to be performed on the stage. So, regarding the object, a ring in the Śākuntalam, is a very small thing and even the highly limited audience of the Sanskrit theatre, would not be able to see the small thing like a ring from even a little distance. Then what is to be done? I may venture to say that, whenever there is a reference and a role of the ring in the Śākuntalam in any act or acts, a symbol or a big image of a ring or a façade of the ring may be constantly kept on the stage, say for example in the first act, or the forth act and the seventh act also. Creativity reinforced by the knowledge and experience of the stage can take any shape. One cannot make any watertight rules and regulations about the performance. On the stage of any play in any language less of a Sanskrit play on the stage. So the objects, animate and inanimate as well, say of the fourth act of the Vikramoraśīyam may be presented by their images on the stage.

In Kālidāsa's theatre-world, a ring occupies a very prominent place as we saw with reference to the Śākuntalam and

we may find similar importance attached to the ring in the development of the play *Mālavikāgnimitram*.¹ Kālidāsa is a dramatist of the highest order and so, in the *Mālavikāgnimitram* the ring with the seal of a snake-impression, worn by the queen Dhārīnī is mentioned. And this ring with a snake-impression is a part of an āhārya abhinaya in the *Mālavikāgnimitram*. Kālidāsa very ingeniously utilizes this ring with a snake impression during the course of the events in the drama. So by the āhārya abhinaya, a director or a producer has to reveal the dramatic genius of our great poet Kālidāsa. Vīdūṣaka, in the act four to procure release of Mālavikā from a cellar, pretends that he is bitten by a snake. And when Vīdūṣaka makes an entry on the stage, he is shown as entering on the stage with his thumb tied up with his sacred thread. *yajñyopavītabaddhāṅguṣṭhaḥ vīdūṣakaḥ* enters. *Yajñopavīta* also should be a part of the āhārya abhinaya. And the physician Dhruvasiddhi required a ring with a serpent-image on it to cure Vīdūṣaka of a snake-bite. It is all so dramatically delightful. So in the play *Mālavikāgnimitram* also, the ring plays a very significant role and without any doubt, the ring should be a part and parcel of the stage-property.

Now this āhārya abhinaya and the entire dramatic representation on the stage can be discussed and analysed from another point of view also; i.e. from the dharmī point of view. This dharmī is divided with two kinds : loka-dharmī and nāṭya-dharmī. These terms mean the qualities pertaining to loka-world or nature and the stage. In modern theatre terminology, loka-dharmī means Idealistic Theatre. Again, there can never be watertight compartments between these two kinds of theatre. No stage-production of any Sanskrit or any other play can either be totally loka-dharmī or nāṭya-dharmī, exclusive of each other. That is impossible in the very nature of things. In a Sanskrit play, dialogues in prose can only be loka-dharmī and the verses should be regarded as nāṭya-dharmī. Nāṭya-dharmī is anything peculiar to drama and not found in exactly the same manner in the world. Loka-dharmī is the natural condition of things in the world. But overall, the performance of a Sanskrit play can be more of a nāṭyadharmī rather than of a Loka-dharmī.

1. *Mālavikāgnimitram*, ed. by M.R. Kale, Ed. 1960, P. 120.

From the style of the performance of a Sanskrit play on the stage, a Bhāṇa type of rūpaka which has a single character in the play is nāṭya-dharmī while from the theme point of view, the Bhāṇa type of rūpaka may be regarded as a loka-dharmī drama being closer to the reality of the world. Nāṭaka type of rūpaka is nāṭyadharmī and Prakaraṇa type of rūpaka from the theme point of view, being more realistic is lokadharmī play.

In the Sanskrit theatre tradition, it can be safely stated that, prakaraṇa type of rūpaka is the ideal loka-dharmī play while nāṭaka type of rūpaka is a perfect nāṭya-dharmī play. Again in the nāṭya-dharmī rūpaka like nāṭya form, the dialogues may be loka-dharmī and even the poetic description may be nāṭya-dharmī, though they may have a basis of loka-dharmī. So exclusive division of nāṭya-dharmī and loka-dharmī is not possible.

Hence, the fourth act of the Vikramoraśīyam, may be performed on the stage in such a way, which may be closer to the loka-dharmī type of play. In this style, as in the fourth act of the Vikramoraśīyam, a mountain, a river, a peacock, an elephant can be represented on the stage by their small replicas made of lighter material as the Ācārya Bharata envisages. These small replicas, it is obvious should be closer to the realistic world and nobody can gainsay that fact. So in this respect, the production of the fourth act of the Vikramoraśīyam can be loka-dharmī as it is mainly based upon the āhārya abhinaya. On the other hand, the performance of the fourth act of the Vikramoraśīyam can be done in an opera style i.e. dance style, and happily the version of this style is available today. The entire fourth act of the Vikramoraśīyam can be represented on the stage in a dance or an opera style.

Now this opera style production will be of course, nāṭya-dharmī and the production which gives importance to the āhārya abhinaya is loka-dharmī. So, the fourth act of the Vikramoraśīyam can be regarded both as nāṭya-dharmī as well as loka-dharmī, depending upon the style adopted to produce the act on the stage.

Thus, it is an eternal credit to our śāstrakāra's (especially to NS.) to grant and acknowledge the artistic freedom so intensely required in staging a play and that is why, it is not surprising that

the Sanskrit theatre has the richest and longest tradition in the entire world.¹

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1. A.L. Kroeber quoted by V. Raghavan in his article in the volume Sanskrit Drama in performance ed. by Rachael Van M. Baumer and James R. Brandon, The University Press of Hawaii, Honolulu.

Intellectual Freedom in Ancient India : Some Random Thoughts

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रुक्मिणीमहाभागा अत्यन्तसरलया प्रवहन्त्या च शैल्या निबन्धेऽस्मिन् निरूपयति यत् विश्वस्य प्राचीनतमे वेदोपरिषद्-वाङ्मये प्रतिबिम्बितं वैचारिकं स्वातन्त्र्यम् अद्यतमविज्ञानिनां विशेषतः समाजशास्त्रिणां मनस्सु आश्चर्यमुपजनयति। अत्यन्तसुदूरे प्राचीनकाले एव ऋत-सत्ययोः, धर्मस्य, वर्णाश्रमव्यवस्थायाः, कर्मणः, पुनर्जन्मनः, पुरुषार्थचतुष्टयस्य, विशिष्य च मोक्षरूपपरमपुरुषार्थस्य, अभ्युदय-निःश्रेयसयोः च सङ्कल्पनं, तेषां निर्वचनं विश्लेषणं च ऋषिभिरधिष्ठितायाः अत्यन्तोनततमप्रज्ञाभूमिकायाः परिचायकं सत् अद्यतनवैचारिकाणाम् आदर्शरूपं चकास्ति। सूक्ष्माति-सूक्ष्मशरीरस्य परममहच्छरीरेण सह सावयवसारूप्यस्य प्रत्यक्षीकरणम् मानवीयेतिहासे अनितरसाधारणं सत् जीवब्रह्मैक्यरूपदुरुहसिद्धान्तस्य उन्नायकं वर्तते इति च सविस्तरं प्रतिपादयति।

Intellectual freedom is the right to freedom of thought and of expression of thought. As defined by Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it is a human right. Article 19 states:

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Introduction,

In today's world, intellectual freedom as defined above in the Human Rights Charter has been accorded primary importance and is enshrined in one form or another in the constitutions of many countries including that of India. But what is noteworthy is that while most of the western world was still living in uncivilized conditions, these ideas of freedom of

expression and thought were already present in Vedic society. The famous verse *saṃgacchadhvam, saṃvadadhvam* etc., in the *ṛgveda*, calls for people to come together and exchange views freely and harmoniously. The rise of dissenting schools of thought like Jainism, Buddhism, Pāñcarātra, Kāpālika, Cārvaka etc., in the post-Vedic period and their coexistence with Vedic schools points to a society that allowed freethinking and intellectual freedom. When one is reminded of Socrates being accused of corrupting the minds of youth in Greece or of Galileo being denounced and incarcerated by the Church for going against the cosmological theories of the Bible, one realizes that this respect for divergent views in ancient Vedic society was indeed a great achievement. Since the topic is wide, my attempt in this paper is to focus on the ancient period in general, wherein the patterns of intellectual freedom were in the making and which left traces or set the tone for future developments as well. I would like to argue that India opting to be a secular, democratic republic after Independence even when more than 80% of the population at that time was Hindu, may in some small measure be due to this early foundation of intellectual freedom laid in the Vedic period.

Going back to the ancient Vedic world view one witnesses this freedom especially in the approach to religion and philosophy. Knowing as we all do today the potential that conflicting religious views have for fermenting trouble and chaos in society, this is an amazing accomplishment of the Vedic ṛṣis. In the field of religion and philosophy the following stand out as unique expressions of the Vedic intellectual freedom: (1) the freedom to hold many views on the concept of ultimate reality, (2) a holistic vision wherein all that exists in the universe command equal consideration and (3) a willingness to admit that one cannot know for certain some of the higher metaphysical principles and the ultimate meaning of life. The first avoided religious conflicts and created an atmosphere for later religions like Buddhism and Jainism to appear on the scene which questioned the very authenticity of the Vedas. The second holistic vision was at the basis of the environmental and ecological ethics which in my view also led to rethink the act of animal sacrifice and also paved the way for the introduction of

vegetarianism. These are all ideas which the world has started to recognize in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. And the third which acknowledged the inability to know for certain the larger meaning of life and its metaphysical foundations enabled different schools of philosophy to exist side by side each propounding its own version of the meaning of life. It is amazing to see that what is taken for granted today and achieved after hundreds of years of struggle in many parts of the world and is still a dream in some other parts of the world was taken for granted in the Vedic worldview.

Intellectual freedom implies an exercise of the intellect or reason. It assumes that things or ideas are not accepted on blind faith and there is a tendency to arrive at conclusions after due reflection. In India the period starting from ancient Vedic times to the Upaniṣadic and *Dharmasūtra* period is important, as many of the foundations of intellectual development were laid at this time. One is not arguing that this period is characterized solely by intellectual freedom and harmonious coexistence as opposed to other human tendencies as well. But the thrust of the paper is to point out that there was a strong inclination towards reasoning and reflection in early times as evidenced in available texts of the period. This is particularly visible in the domain of religion in ancient India, wherein one finds the tendency to question and critique many views on the nature of reality and which also advocates different cosmological theories.

It is important to note that the foundations of Indian culture were arrived at not blindly, but by a combination of faith and reason and perhaps intuition born out of continuous reflection on the mysteries of life and one's place in it. The ultimate intuitive insight expressed in the Upaniṣadic verse *pūrṇamadaḥ pūrṇamidam pūrṇādpūrṇamudacyate, pūrṇasya pūrṇamādāya pūrṇamevāvaśiṣyate* did not happen all of a sudden and must have started very early in the Vedic period of thought.

I would like to draw a distinction between the date of the *ṛgveda* (RV) for instance and the thought process which must have antedated the codification of those *mantras* by a long time. Even by the most conservative reckoning the RV can be dated to by about 2500 BCE. So the thought process that led to the

contents of the RV were there for a long time in the making. It appears that the families of sages who composed the *mantras* of the *Samhitas* engaged sincerely and intensely to understand the riddle of the universe. Their thoughts as seen in the RV, which is the oldest extant literature in the world, gives us a glimpse of how their minds worked. What strikes one in the RV is the absence of a tacit acceptance of a religious or philosophical idea, based purely on blind faith. There is a sustained effort to arrive at foundations after exploring the many dimensions of a problem. It is this fact, perhaps, that led E.W.F. Tomlin to say that "Indian thought arrives at subtleties of distinction so varied and acute that the uninitiated and unprepared reader may well receive the impression that Indian philosophers enjoy the use of half a dozen intellects instead of one." (Tomlin, 1968:152)

Let us look at the question of the Vedic deities themselves. They are called *devas*, a Sanskrit word derived from the root *div* which means to shine. Thus the *devas* were not gods in the way that god or gods are understood in the Abrahamic religions or in the Greek religion i.e. they are not totally anthropomorphic. Hirianna used the word 'arrested anthropomorphism' for this phenomenon. The word Advaitist Theism was coined by A.C. Bose to describe this approach to the divine. Man is not the measure of the *devas* here and they are not measured in terms of what it takes to be a human being. Early orientalist scholars like Max Müller have also tried to describe this phenomenon, in keeping with their own understanding, by using words like Henotheism or Kathenotheism. Polymorphism is doing the rounds these days. Not used to this kind of a unique approach to the divine, the West has invariably described the *devas* as many gods and the general perception is that Hinduism is a polytheistic religion. The Vedic *ṛṣis* were conscious of the divine essence present in all the *devas*, some of whom were imagined as natural phenomena and others were not. What is important to bear in mind is that each of the *devas* is also the Supreme Being and therefore the Vedic religion contemplates the One in the Many and the Many in One. In fact there are hymns addressed sometimes not just to one *deva* like Agni or Indra but to a duality like *Dyāvāpṛthivī*, or even to a collective group like the Maruts.

We find the same deity is addressed as Agni, Āditya, Vāyu etc., i.e. the one as the many, and sometimes we find all *devas* identified with one divine essence as *ekam* (the One) in the neuter gender or *tat sat* (that reality). We have the famous oft-quoted statement *ekam sat viprāḥ bahudhā vadanti* in the first *maṇḍala*; the same sentiment being repeated in the 3rd *maṇḍala* and also in the refrain of the 55th hymn in the 3rd *maṇḍala* i.e. *mahad devānām asuratvam ekam* (great and single is the divinity of the gods) (A.C.Bose, 1966:19-20). Thus the habit of thought that identifies the same Supreme being or essence in the one or in the many, was developed very early in the Vedic period. Surely this profound observation could only have come about by deep thought and reflection. What the ṛṣis were striving at was to arrive at a perfect concept of the divine essence or in other words, to free the idea of divinity from all error.

Parallel with this unique concept of *ekam sat* or one reality, we find two more concepts that play a large part in the religion and philosophy of the Vedas. While *Sat* in a metaphysical sense denotes Existence, Truth, or Reality, in a moral sense it denotes truthfulness and integrity (ibid:7-8). Not only was there one single truth but there was also one single *ṛta* which governed the physical and moral order of the universe. In fact the words *sat*, *satya* and *ṛta* were interchangeable. The ṛṣis developed a holistic vision wherein adherence to *ṛta* or *satya* contributed to the orderliness seen in the universe. We will follow the path of *ṛta* like the sun and the moon says a Vedic ṛṣi and Indra is mentioned as destroying Vṛtra who obstructs the working of *ṛta*. So also the *devas* were very often called *ṛtavān*, *ṛtāvare*, *gopā-ṛtasya* and *ṛtāyu*. The ṛṣis were also confident that it was possible to realize *ṛta* by the performance of *yajña* with devotion. It is not the mere utterance of the *mantras* that matter. The *mantras* were to be recited with the necessary devotion and used in the act of *yajña* to achieve perfection says RV 1.164.39. The *yajña* conforms to the laws of order i.e. they are part of *ṛta*. Thus if performed according to the moral law of *ṛta* it had to yield a glimpse of the eternal *ṛta* (Pandey, Vol.I 1990:24-26). This elaborate structure and attention to the various religious, moral and spiritual dimensions could not have been possible without engaging in an intellectual exercise of the highest order.

An intellectual engagement is possible if there is an atmosphere that encourages contemplation and freethinking. We get ample evidence in the RV for the presence of a tradition of free thinking and questioning as well as an adaptability to changing social conditions. After all it is the courage to think freely and to question existing beliefs that is the basis or is the beginning of philosophy. As examples of free thinking and questioning we can cite the famous hymn which ends with the refrain 'which *deva* shall we adore with our oblation' (*kasmai devāya haviṣā vidhema*). (RV.X.121). (To my mind "ka" is not a *deva* as some argue, and "*kasmai*" is the dative of "*kaḥ*"). Our mind boggles to think of the courage of the *ṛṣi* who is willing to question the very concept of *deva* that must have been widely accepted in society. So also the *nāsadīya-sūkta* (RV.X. 129) crosses all boundaries in asking the most difficult questions regarding the ultimate truth. Is it existence or non-existence asks the seer and of course ends by stating "Who verily knows and who can here declare it, whence it was born and whence comes this creation.". The next line is even more bold when the *ṛṣi* continues "No *devas* had then been born- who then can ever the truth disclose" (cited in Hiriyanna 1951:42). Thus even the *devas* are not the ultimate beings but are considered to be later. The *ṛṣi* continues on the same lines and ends the hymn by doubting whether even the first one knows the secret of the coming into being of the universe.

The Vedic *ṛṣis* have speculated on different models of the ultimate truth. Thus we find examples of pantheism, monotheism, monism and sometimes the *ṛṣi* lapses into even skepticism in the RV. Similarly the origin of the universe has also found many models. If the *nāsadīya-sūkta* gives rise to both the ideas of creation of the universe from nothing or from some real entity, the *puruṣa-sūkta* introduces a model wherein the ultimate divides itself into all that inhabits the world (RV.X.90). While some might identify that with pantheism, the statement that *puruṣa* manifested all this with one fourth of himself and the other three fourths transcend that, makes us wonder whether it can fit the model of pantheism. Thus the beginnings of the idea that the ultimate being is both a transcendent and an immanent truth is expressed in the *puruṣa-sūkta*. We have another model of

creation in the Yama/Yamī *sūkta* which speculates on the origin of the world in terms of the worldly model (RV. X.10).

The importance of these intellectual speculations in the early period is the many sided development of these different ideas into a rich tapestry of religious, moral and philosophical schools in later times. We see the changes happening almost soon after when we read the Brāhmaṇas. The theory of *bandhutā* or relating the microcosm with the macrocosm in its various permutations and combinations was also carried to perfection at the time of the Brāhmaṇas. In the *puruṣa-sūkta* of the RV, one can find an attempt at this micro/macro relationship or holistic vision. Thus we see that the *puruṣa* when sacrificed is the material from which the entire universe comes into being. The moon was born from his mind, from his eye the sun; from his mouth Indra and Agni and from his breath Vāyu, etc, etc. Bandhutā is the "belief in the presence of some subtle, secret and mystic bond connecting a thing and its *bandhus* and the *bandhus* amongst themselves." (Belvalkar & Ranade, Vol.2, 1927:62-67). The funeral hymn of the RV also brings in this micro/macro connection when it says that the eye of the dead man goes to the sun, the breath to vāyu and so on (RV. X.16). This micro/macro paradigm will also be developed further in later times and we see the micro/macro resemblance further unfolding in the Kuṇḍalinī Śakti.

One has also to note that of the three principles of *satya*, *ṛta* and *yajña* the Brahmanas developed the *yajña* aspect in all its dimensions. Thus it was the instrumental value of *yajña* which received highest importance in the Brāhmaṇas. However, the reward sought through correct performance of *yajña* was not the vision of the unitive principle of *ṛta* but the continuation of a life in *svarga* in order to reap the benefits of the *yajña* performed. This dilution of both the exalted nature of *yajña* as well as the displacement of *ṛta* from its paramount position gets rectified in the Upaniṣads which carried some of the nuclear ideas, in particular the philosophical ones, given in the RV to their logical conclusion.

The Upaniṣads, in Hiriyanna's words represent "the earliest efforts of man at giving a philosophic explanation of the world

and are as such invaluable in the history of human thought” (1951:52). In the Upaniṣads we find the Vedic idea that the one divine essence is spoken of variously by the wise gradually giving rise to the doctrine of the ultimate reality being one called Brahman, and to the corollary that everything else including one’s self called *ātman* is identical with Brahman. Briefly one could say that a subjective search to unravel the mystery of the inner self got identified with the objective search for the true nature of the world by a leap in thought and thus ended the ṛṣis’ constant effort to reach a satisfactory end to the search for unity started in the RV. The *mahāvākya tat tvamasi* in the Chāndogya Up (Chānd.Up) expressed this profound truth.

The formulation of the theory of *karma* is perhaps one of the great achievements of the ancient Indian mind. Though one does not find specifically the theory of the *ātman* being eternal and subject to many births and deaths in the RV there is mention in it of a person after death going to a different realm in accordance with his *iṣṭāpūrta* (Hiriyanna, 1951:80). This is expanded further into one facing repeated deaths in an after world like *svarga* in the Brāhmaṇas which implies that there was an idea of the permanence of whatever constituted the person. Since the notion of reaching *svarga* or otherwise depended on one’s own action, there was already the theory of *karma* in a nascent form in this early literature. It was however left to the Upaniṣads to develop the permanent nature of *ātman* and the *karma* theory into their full-fledged forms as we know today.

The concept of *ātman* as a permanent entity helped in the formulation of the *karma* theory in all its dimensions. Since not all *karma* was seen to lead to its result in one life it was also perhaps at the basis of assuming the permanent nature of the *ātman* transmigrating through many lives, reaping its just fruit in many births till such time as the effects of *karma* had been exhausted and *mokṣa* achieved.. More than anything else the *karma* theory shifted the responsibility for moral behaviour solely on the individual himself/herself. By the time of the Upaniṣads the ‘telos’ has changed from *ṛta* to *dharma*, and the theory of *karma* in the moral context, transferred the result of good moral conduct in one life to be rewarded in future lives and thus the freedom to choose between what is ‘good’ and ‘not good’ now

devolves on the individual himself. I would argue that the concepts of *dharma* and the theory of *karma* are unique intellectual contributions in the field of social civic sense and moral responsibility. Never mind the misuse of these concepts and the rigidity that it acquired in the later *dharmaśāstra* texts. One is witness to this happening to any innovative idea in the long run in the world. But what is important is that such an idea was even possible during the time that it was formulated. It is in the formulation of ideas such as *dharma* and *karma* that one realizes the importance accorded to individual decision making and intellectual freedom in society. *Dharma* is an improvement on the earlier *ṛta* concept where *ṛta* was an external metaphysical entity. By making *dharma* as the overall principle of how one leads life in all spheres of activity both secular and religious, *dharma* was lifted to a level wherein the individual takes care of life in the world keeping the ultimate spiritual goal in mind. One need not sacrifice the one for the other.

The Upaniṣads also affirm that one can realize the identity of the *ātman* and Brahman in a state known as *mokṣa* which can be achieved through right knowledge. Instead of treating philosophy as merely a theoretical exercise the *ṛsis* linked philosophical inquiry to the achievement of the highest value of *mokṣa* i.e. to realize the identity between *ātman* and Brahman. *ekameva advitīyam* is the clarion call of the Upaniṣads and can be interpreted to mean that narrow self interest known as *ahamkāra* or ego, is the basis of all conflict. In order therefore to get rid of this ego and behaviour based on that, the Upaniṣads advocate cultivation of *vairāgya* or detachment/dispassion. The world currently is experiencing the evils of gross egocentric behaviour and crass materialism which is a byproduct of selfishness. In recognizing this human weakness and to warn society against this natural tendency and to advocate the cultivation of *vairāgya* as an antidote to it, is indeed remarkable.

One other important development in the Brāhmaṇas is to question the morality of animal sacrifice in a *yajña*. This led to the introduction of rice cakes (*purodāśa*) as substitutes for animals as mentioned in the Brāhmaṇas. Even though there is no discussion on the evil of meat eating in the Brāhmaṇas it is reasonable to speculate that a consideration of the harm caused to animals in

sacrifice must, in turn, have led to a reflection on the evil of consuming flesh. Texts belonging to the classical period (500BCE-500 CE) which followed soon after like the Mahābhārata is replete with statements on the evils of flesh eating and on the paramount importance of *ahiṃsā* (MHb.XIII.114, 8-19; 115. 10, 14,16,19, 22, 29, 34). It declares *ahiṃsā* itself as the highest *dharma* (MHb.XIII. 115. 23,69; 116. 38-39).

Values such as *mokṣa* and depiction of sages who dedicated their lives solely in pursuit of *mokṣa* are the ideals that the Upaniṣads represent. But it is good to remember, in this context, that texts very often present an idealistic picture of society, which need not necessarily correspond to reality. There is bound to be a disjunction between theory and practice when dealing with actualities on the ground. But as Tucker and Grim remark "such disjunction cannot be used to invalidate the rich perspectives that these conceptual resources provide" (2000: xx). While *mokṣa* was the highest value in the Upaniṣads, by its very nature, it can only be aspired for by a small minority. Thus the Kāthopaniṣad and the Bhagavad-Gītā (Gītā) point out that such persons are very rare indeed (Kāth. Up I.2.7; Gītā II.29). One has to believe that the general population was more in tune with living within *dharma* which is the 'telos' guiding their lives. This is still true for an average Hindu who while following *dharma* in daily life also aspires for *mokṣa* in whatever way he/she internalizes it. Support for this approach is found when Saṅkarācārya mentions in his Introduction to the Gītā that *dharma* is of both kinds – one leading to *abhyudaya* and the other leading to *niḥśreyas* (liberation) (*dvividho hi vedokto dharmah pravṛttilakṣaṇo nivṛttilakṣaṇaḥ ca*). The only difference is that while on the one hand one can achieve *mokṣa* gradually by leading a *dhārmic* life within the world, adopting *sannyāsa* or total renunciation of worldly goods is the special path to *mokṣa*.

The sages continued to exercise their intellectual freedom and tried their hand at the classification of society by dividing the stages of life of an individual into the four *āśramas* as well as laying down the goals of life as the four *puruṣārthas*.

From the point of view of society the ṛṣis who can be called social scientists in modern terminology, classified society based

on *varṇa* (*brāhmaṇa*, *kṣatriya*, *vaiśya* and *śūdra*) and *āśramas* (*brahmacarya*, *gṛhastha*, *vānaprastha* and *sannyāsa*) which took care of the specific *dharma* of each individual within a *varṇa* as well as within society. The *āśramas* that are directly concerned with those following *dharma* as the highest value are those of the *brahmacarya* (student) and *gṛhastha* (householder); the *vānaprastha* (forest dweller) can be clubbed with the *sannyāsin* (renouncer) aiming at *mokṣa* as the highest value. One should not lose sight of the fact that the formulation of the human goals as the pursuit of *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa* and enclosing *artha* and *kāma* within a general regulation of *dharma* gave some meaning and guidance for living in the world. That along with the structuring of society in terms of *āśramas* in such an early period, is worthy of praise.

While these are achievements of a very high order, since these classifications were applied mainly to men in society and also only to the three groups of *brāhmaṇa*, *kṣatriya* and *vaiśya* one may question how far the society was fair towards those who were left out in the system. It further raises the question as to whether this discrimination can be justified as an act of intellectual freedom. This is specially true when *dharma* is depicted as a mental attitude of fairness and consideration towards all that exists if we look at the way the origin of *dharma* is described in the following episode of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (Br.Up):

Brahman after creating all the four *varṇas*, says the *Upaniṣad*, was still not happy and then fulfilled itself by projecting *dharma* (Br. Up. I.4.14). The *Upaniṣad* then identifies *dharma* with *satya* (truth) thus emphasizing the moral virtue of truth embedded in *dharma*. This is mentioned specifically within the context of a *ksatriya* who represents the ruler, and points to a higher principle or *dharma* by which the king rules i.e., *rājadharmā*. Śaṅkara tellingly comments that *dharma* rules even the ruler. (*dharmam tadetat śreyorūpam sṛṣṭam kṣatrasya kṣatram kṣatrasyāpi niyantr, ugrādapyugram (bhāṣya on Br.Up. I.4.14)*).

It is thus something right, implanted internally, which guides human conduct, to do the right thing. And in the very next passage the Br. Up. extends the notion of *dharma* to the

fulfillment of one's obligation to one's cultural heritage (*brahmayajña*), to the *devas* (*deva-yajña*) to one's ancestors (*pitṛ-yajña*), to one's fellow beings (*manuṣya-yajña*) and to all living beings (*bhūta-yajña*), which is called the *pañcayajñas*. (Br. Up. I.4.16). The Upaniṣad thus makes the point that one's behavior is to be correct not only towards other fellow beings but has to extend to animals, beasts, birds and ants. Built into this is the ethics of compassion and sympathy for all that inhabits the world. By leading a life of *dharma*, we are told that one attains well being (*abhyudaya*) in this world as well as after death. So behavior in accordance with *dharma* has an end value as well.

Given this background of the origin of *dharma* and its definition in the MBh as 'conduct that sustains oneself' or 'conduct that behooves a human being' (*dhāryate iti dharmah*), questions as to whether the sages exercised their intellectual freedom in a fair and equitable manner to all members in society is bound to arise. Much like the Greeks who came up with grand philosophical ideas and moral philosophy in spite of the presence of slaves in society, the Vedic ṛṣis also came up with grand concepts notwithstanding certain social and historical pressures. It is here that one realizes that great ideas and concepts can still arise in spite of ground conditions not being ideal. In a patriarchal atmosphere even intellectual freedom is exercised to benefit men. Even though ṛgvedic society was comparatively an egalitarian society and women enjoyed relative freedom, this was not because of the men supporting it but in spite of patriarchy itself. This is clear when one sees the preference for male offspring. However it is in the post-Vedic period that a downgrading of women became the norm and in the period of the epics and later, intellectual freedom will be serviced to keep the women down completely. While *dharma* was one of the unique contributions of the freedom to think, it fell a prey to prevailing social norms. For instance in the case of women *dharma* was degraded from the concept of ideal human conduct to just serving the husband (*pativratā-dharma*). This is a travesty of the highest order. We as yet do not understand the circumstances of why this happened.

One wonders whether one should condemn the intellectual freedom which resulted in many a grand idea in different fields

because of succumbing to social pressures or should we credit the ṛṣis for their contributions while acknowledging their shortcomings. When we recall that Indian civilization has had a continuity of over five thousand years when other civilizations have melted away, maybe we need to pause and perhaps give some credit to the ancient ṛṣis who laid the foundation of that civilization. It is especially in the family values that one particularly witnesses these contributions of the ṛṣis. When parents, teachers and elders in society are being neglected due to the growth of selfishness and greed in today's world, it is appropriate to recall the wisdom of the Upaniṣadic sages who rated these individuals as worthy of the highest respect in society. The respect shown to elders and to teachers/*ācārya* in Indian culture even today, is an echo of the instruction given as early as in the Vedic period and expressed eloquently in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad (Taitt.Up).

One is used to convocation addresses at Universities these days. But to find a *brahmacārin* being told how he has to conduct himself when he goes out into the outer world in the Taitt.Up is truly amazing. The teaching in the Taitt.Up is still relevant and as a student of Delhi University (DU) I remember it being part of the convocation address at DU in my student days. I do hope it is still continuing. The duty to continue the race, respect for elders and the teacher, charity along with the right attitude of humility without any arrogance, the modesty on the part of the teacher to admit that even the teacher need not be followed blindly but only his good deeds are to be emulated, and of course the advice to be guided by wise men in society whenever one is in doubt, are all virtues which are relevant for all times.

The Taitt.Up. is also an unique text to point out that it is not possible to measure human happiness. While the passage in question i.e., II .8. 1 – 4 is intended to glorify the bliss of the knower of *brahman*, the message it conveys is that there is no end to the concept of happiness as it is a relative concept.

While presenting many ideas on religion, philosophy and moral virtues the ṛṣis were also aware of the difficulty of comprehending spiritual messages like the identity of *ātman* and Brahman for one immersed in the world. They therefore tried to

guide the individual gradually towards the highest goal. The Taitt.Up is seized of this problem and guides the spiritual aspirant gradually to ascend from one level to another by classifying the human being as having gross, subtle and subtler levels of existence called *kośas* or coverings (Taitt.II.1-5). The lowest of the levels is the sheath of matter (*annamayakośa*), higher than that is the *prāṇamayakośa* (life sheath), next is the *manomayakośa* (mind sheath), succeeded by the *vijñānamayakośa* (intelligence sheath) leading to *ānandamayakośa* (sheath of bliss). Spelt out in such clarity, the aspirant is enthused to reach the higher levels of existence. He is familiar with matter, life, mind and intelligence and is assured that it is possible to reach beyond to a state of *ānanda* and then to self realization. This can be described as progressive self enlargement that the Upaniṣadic sages present before us.

In the above description I have tried to present some examples of what the Vedic ṛṣis accomplished particularly in the fields of religion and philosophy and to a small degree in the organization of society. I have tried to demonstrate the tendency of the Vedic ṛṣis to pursue a question rationally and without error as far as possible by which they arrived at some of the most astounding ideas on the concept of divinity, on the idea of an after life, the belief in a moral and physical order (*ṛta*) and the interdependence of all that inhabits the world, a holistic vision of the universe and a micro/macro relationship between the individual and the cosmic forces. They also related one's deeds with an after life and suggested the eternal nature of the self. Each one of these ideas became enriched and enlarged by the time of the Upaniṣads and continue to be relevant to the present day. Thus one can assert that the foundations of intellectual freedom in India had its beginnings in the remote past in the time of the Vedas and it continued to have its impact in the subsequent periods of Indian religious and philosophical development.

** I have used some material from my earlier publications in this paper.

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A Critique to Prof. Murti's Attempt of Equation
between
Buddhist Yogācāra Theory of Advaya and that of Hindu
Advaita Theory

Shohei Ichimura

बौद्धदर्शने विज्ञानवादिनां नागार्जुनप्रभृतीनां शून्यवादः क्वचिद् वेदान्तस्य
अद्वैतमतेन संवदति। क्वचित् एतत् परिलक्ष्य केचन आद्यशङ्कराचार्यः
प्रच्छन्नबौद्ध इति प्रायोवादं प्रचारयामासुः। अद्वैततत्त्वमुभयत्र समानमिति
कृत्वा आधुनिकदार्शनिकः श्रीमन्मूर्तिमहाशयो अद्वैतवेदान्तस्य शून्यवादेन
समन्वयं प्रत्यपादयत्। शोहोइ-इचिमुरामहोदयो मूर्तिमहोदयानां मतमिह
दृढं प्रत्याचष्ट। वेदान्त आस्तिकदर्शनं शून्यवादश्च नास्तिकदर्शनं
श्रयतीत्युभयोर्भिन्नैव भूमिः। उभयोः सामञ्जस्यकरणप्रयासाः
आस्तिकमतावलम्बिनामेकाधिपत्यं पोषयेयुरित्याशङ्कते इचिमुरावर्यः।
वेदान्ते तावद् अद्वैततत्त्वं निरपेक्षमैकान्तिकं च। शून्यवादे तु - न
सन्नासन्न सदसन्नोभयात्मकमिति चतुष्कोटिविनिर्मुक्तं शून्यतत्त्वं भाषाया
अभिव्यक्तेर्वा अनैकान्तिकतां द्वन्द्वात्मकतां च गाहत इति अनयोः
सामञ्जस्यवादोनुत्थानोपहत एवेति दिक्।

1. Introduction

Buddhism and Pre-Hindu Brahmanism held the view of humanity fundamentally of non-theistic origin. Though a form of theism developed within the history of Hinduism in later periods, the fundamental view of human nature has not been changed. Moreover, Buddhism and Hinduism both shared cognate languages, such as Vedic and Pālī, Classical and Hybrid Sanskrit, and yet both parties neither made compromise nor any point of alliance prior to the history of Muslim domination and British Colonialism. Under the Islamic rule, Buddhism quickly disappeared, while Hinduism survived through tightening the Caste system.

I am concerned with a possibility of cooperation between Hindu and Buddhist thoughts *vis-à-vis* the contemporary hypersensitive fundamentalism arising from the mono-theistic religious and cultural movements. As an example, the paper partially refers to an attempt of speculation by the distinguished Indian philosopher, Prof. T.R.V. Murti, who spoke of a possibility of reconciliation between the Hindu theory of Advaita Vedantism and the Buddhist Yōgācāra theory of Advaya in his well known book *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (1955). Despite the authenticity of his distinguished career as philosopher, and despite the idea of his advocacy on to the two traditions, since his study comprises some flaw, I am respectfully refute his idea on the ground that an equation between the two is immatured, because his attempt to reconcile epistemologically oriented Advaya philosophy of Yōgācāra Buddhist school and the ontologically oriented Advaita Vedanta of Hindu school is imbalanced. He did not present the Yōgācāra system of philosophy in its entirety. He attempted to visualize the infinite approaches of the two traditions in terms of equation, i.e., toward the coalescence of the ultimate perception and the ultimate reality into One. His presented equation omitted an important serious ingredient for the Yōgācāra system of philosophy, namely, omitting the theory of Niḥtrīsvabhāvatā that is inseparable from that of Trīsvabhāvas.

Calling the reader's attention to the Buddhist and Vedānta philosophical Absolutism, he asserts that "Only mystical religion, which eminently combined the unity of Ultimate Being with the freedom of different paths for realizing it, can hope to unite the world." And in this connection, he also asserts that "the Mādhyamika Absolutism can serve as the basis for a possible world-culture." At the times of 1960's and 70's, I was impressed by his candid referencing to the Madhyamaka Buddhism, but I could not help feeling some degree of skepticism on his proposition. After half a century, as global situations changed and my intellectual capacity strengthened, I am compelled to challenge his proposition as inadequate in addressing to his call of Buddhist-Hindu coordination.¹

1. Harold Coward: T.R.V. Murti, *The Builders of Indian Philosophy*

In 2002, I participated in the Centenary Commemoration for the Birth of Prof. Murti in Vanarasi and presented a paper entitled "Culture-Free Transmission of the Buddha's Spirituality from the Asiatic (South and East Asia) to the Global Stage." The purpose of my paper of the decade ago was a critical examination of his work, by which it was attempted to clarify due justification for stating my skepticism. Although the Mādhyamika dialectic became the pan-Indian cultural form through religious and philosophical polemics later on, I pointed out that the basic distinction between the two traditions continued, because human thought ultimately relies on culture either in terms of reason or that of religious belief for its ultimate value.

If it is possible to apply the Kantian categories of "*thing-in-itself*" and "a-priori forms of human intellect," as done by Prof. Murti for his interpretation of Mādhyamika Buddhism, and if the thing-in-itself is never revealed to empirical cognition beyond the modes of human intellect, we may have to say that it would be the religious prerogative to project the non-theistic natural principle like Buddhist causality or theistic principle like anthropomorphic supreme being in the place of that transcendent. The question is: What is the limit and the criterion of it for the sake of ultimate fulfilment of humanity? The Yogācāra Buddhist asserts only the Advaya demarcation at the ultimate point of the empirical and phenomenal world in terms of *Anātman* or *Paramārtha* or *Śūnyatā*. This demarcation was meant to represent the safeguard against all philosophical extremism and religious fundamentalism.

The paper is to propose the Yogācāra Buddhist Philosophy of Language as currently fit to the global context and call the cooperation by Indian colleagues irrespective of whether they advocate Hindu tradition or rational humanism. Since the Murti Centennial Commemoration did not publish the proceedings, I have freely availed the contents of my previous paper presented in that conference for this opportunity.

2. *Necessity of Change from Metaphysical Interpretation to that of Logical and Linguistic Philosophy on Buddhist Studies.*

Prof. Murti's philosophical insight into Buddhist spirituality is remarkable in two points of his interpretation: (1) that the Mādhyamika dialectic had its fundamental origin in the Buddha's silence against the metaphysical questions that cannot be answered either in terms of affirmation or negation. The Buddha thus opened the new way of transcendence toward the higher plain of the Middle; (2) that the Buddhist philosophical orientation was epistemological, whereas the Upaniṣadic orientation was ontological. Prof. Murti upheld that this difference continued between Buddhist and Hindu schools throughout history down to the times of the confrontation between the schools of Vijñānavāda and Advaita Vedānta.

He failed, however, in two accounts; (1) that he sought the theoretical basis of Nāgārjuna's method of *reductio-ad-absurdum* argument in the *Prajñāpāramitā* scripture instead of seeking it in the Ābhidharmika problem of logical deadlock, because the scriptures of *Prajñāpāramitā* philosophy simply does not exemplify the method of *Reductio-ad-absurdum* argument; (2) Most importantly, he failed to give due importance to the theory of *Niḥ-trisvabhāva* that is inseparable from the theory of Three Self-natures (*Trisvabhāva*), and omitted it from his thought of equation between the Yogācāra system of philosophy and that of the Advaita Vedānta philosophy.

Initially I thought that this significant omission is academically infeasible. In the second thought, however, if he knowingly omitted it in order to stress his cherished idea of the equation, I thought that the matter may have to be re-examined more carefully. It is because of this background of my thought that the present paper partially addresses later on to the reason why the theory of *Niḥ-trisvabhāva* is the necessary part of the Yogācāra theory of *Trisvabhāva*, and why it should be included in the Yogācāra system on the table of equation between the two rival thoughts of Indian civilization.

In the late 1970's when I was engaged in post doctoral research on the Abhidharmist controversy recorded in the *Kathāvatthu*, the text was scarcely paid attention by scholars of

Buddhist Studies as a likely source of Nāgārjuna's innovation of the Madhyamaka method of negation. I recollect that those scholars of the earlier 20th century who tried to decipher the Mahāyāna Buddhist concept of *Śūnyatā* were attracted, like Prof. Murti, toward the textual sources of *Prajñāpāramitā* inculcation on the insight of *Śūnyatā*. But because of this, they were likely misled to think that the subject matter of the *Prajñāpāramitā* is metaphysical, and that Nāgārjuna's dialectical method of argument and negation embodies something that indicates the way to deal with the metaphysical problem. As a result, the scholars were swerved away from the subject matter of logical and linguistic nature of the ultimate insight.

My dissertational title presented to the University of Chicago was "Nāgārjuna's philosophy and his Dialectic." My interest was more concerned with the tangible methodological feature, rather than something intangible subject of *Śūnyatā*. For dissertational research, I focused my attention to the nature and forms of Buddhist logic, especially in relation to the metaphorical examples of *māyā*, *dream*, etc., which appear in similar form of logical exemplification (*dṛṣṭānta*) to conclude each of narrative inculcations of *Śūnyatā* in all *Prajñāpāramitā* scriptures. My dissertational research was essentially directed to the propositional linkage, Apoha theory, fourfold logic, and affirmative and negative corroborations (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*) of syllogism, as related to Nāgārjuna's dialectical negation of names, meanings, sentential linkages, causal and grammatical linkages, and so on.

With such an interest to look at the Mādhyamika dialectic from the logical and linguistic point of view, when I investigated the consistent format of the logical deadlock recorded in the *Kathāvatthu*, I came almost immediately to grasp why it was the important source of Nāgārjuna's innovation of his dialectical method (*prasaṅgavākya*). Despite the fact that those textual specialists, like Mrs. Rhys Davids along with her Burmese co-translator, Shwe Zan Aung, remarked that the logical method of argument was regrettably not totally deciphered,¹ I have

1. *Kathāvatthu*: Pālī Text Society Series Nos. 48, 49; edited by Arnold C. Taylor, published by Pālī Text Society, London, 1979. English

successfully understood the meaning of the mutual invalidation on account of failure of the dual logical corroborations (*anvaya-vyatireka*). Ever since it has been a solid addition to my doctoral dissertation completed in 1972.¹ I introduced what I found on the logical deadlock of the *Kathāvatthu* by publishing an article initially in the second IABS conference,² as well as in a few other journals within a decade.

3. Prof. Murti's Hypothetical Flaw: Nāgārjuna's Source of his Dialectic As the Philosophy of *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra*

Prof. Murti ascertained that the Mādhyamika dialectic can be traced in the Buddha's critical spirituality of the Middle. It is commonly known that the Buddha shunned both of the opposing positions, such as, the Eternalist (*Śāśvata-vāda*) and the Nihilist (*Uccheda-vāda*). His critical dealing with the sixty-two prevalent schools of views of his days is known to have embodied his transcendence to the Middle. Prof. Murti examines in detail the dialectical meaning of the Buddha's silence with respect to the fourteen metaphysical questions (*avyākṛtavastūni*), which he compares with the Kantian philosophical problem of antinomy. He asserts that facing such metaphysical questions like,

translation: *Points of Controversy or Subjects of Discourse* by Shwe Zan Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids, Pāli text Society, 1960. Especially refer to the latter's Prefatory Notes by Rhys Davids, pp. xxix - liv.

1. *Nāgārjuna's Philosophy of Śūnyatā and his Dialectic*, Department of South Asian Languages and Civilizations, University of Chicago.
2. Ichimura: (1) "A Study of the Mādhyamika Method of Refutation, Especially of its Affinity to that of *Kathāvatthu*," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, pp. 7-16. 1980. (2) *Buddhist Critical Spirituality: Śūnyatā and Prajñāpāramitā*, Chap. 5: "Ābhīdharmika Logical Crisis and Mādhyamika Dialectical Solution," (3) "Ābhīdharmika Logical Deadlock in the *Kathāvatthu* and Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika Dialectic," *Japanese Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*, vol. 39, No. 2 (1991) 20-24. (4) "Mādhyamika and The Future," presented at the International Conference for Studies in Buddhology in 1990, included in *Buddhism into the Year 2000*, Dhammakaya Foundation, 1994, pp. 67-85; (5) "On the Relationship between Nāgārjuna's Dialectic and Buddhist Logic (III), Esp. Similar and Disimilar *Drṣṭānta*," *Japanese Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*, No. 49, 1998.

“Whether the world is eternal, or not, or both, or neither,” and so forth, the Buddha was conscious of the indeterminable nature of the conflict in reason, and resolved it by rising to the higher standpoint of criticism. He claims: “Thus was born the Buddhist Dialectic.”

Secondly, Prof. Murti modified his thought on antinomical conflict of reason in reference to historical changes, because the Buddha’s silence was still in suggestive form. Hence, before the rise of the Mādhyamika dialectic, he asserted that there was a period of accentuated situation in which human consciousness was further pressed by the two opposite maturing traditions, namely the Upaniṣadic Ātma-tradition evolved to be the schools of Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, etc. and the Buddhist Anātma tradition evolved to be the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, etc. on the other hand. The rise of the Mādhyamika critical consciousness is therefore explained in reference to these radically different and rival systems reaching their full systematization as thesis and antithesis. Prof. Murti contends that the Mādhyamika had dual tasks: (1) one to express the Buddha’s ascension to the middle, and (2) another to demonstrate the real’s transcendence to thought.

Although I accept the above two points of philosophical attitude of the Buddha, I cannot accept Prof. Murti’s reference to Nāgārjuna’s contemporary history. It is true that Nāgārjuna was engaged in dispute not only with Naiyāyika Hindu logicians notably as a singular school of the Hindu camp but also more clearly challenged some Abhidharmist school by his major work *Mādhyamakakārikā-śāstra*. But it is not precise to say that his dialectical method was a necessary consequence resulting from the metaphysical antithesis between the Upaniṣadic Ātmavāda and the Buddhist Anātmavāda.

I am also refusing to accept his theory that the Mādhyamika system is the systematised form of the *Śūnyatā* doctrine of the *Prajñāpāramitā Treatises* regarding its metaphysics, the six-fold path (*ṣaṭ-pāramitā-naya*) of practice and its spiritual ideal.¹ I should conditionally agree with his view here on the ground that Nāgārjuna as author of the *Upadeśa Śāstra*, Voluminous

1. *Ibidem*, p. 83

Commentary on the 25,000 Verse *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*, was identical with that dialectician, called Nāgārjuna, who wrote the Treatise of the Middle (*Mūlamadhyamakakārikā-śāstra*). The reason I make it conditional is that the *Upadeśa Śāstra* does not apply the Mādhyamika dialectical method of *reductio-ad-absurdum* argument at all. Surely the text comprises innumerable passages that explain the concept of *Śūnyatā* and the ideals of Mahāyāna Bodhisattvas, especially Kuan-shih-yin-pu-sa (Avalokitasvara) endowed with activist love and compassion, but it does not comprise a theoretical exposition of the Mādhyamika method of argument and negation.

I have no objection in assuming that Nāgārjuna was the author of the *Upadeśa Śāstra*. But, since the text is not the source of the Mādhyamika dialectic, I cannot satisfactorily agree with Prof. Murti's assumption that the *Prajñāpāramitā* treatises are the source of Nāgārjuna's dialectic, nor that the *Śūnyatā* which the *Prajñāpāramitāstras* inculcate is anything related to metaphysical. I am therefore compelled to propose that Nāgārjuna's source of dialectical method ought to be looked for somewhere else, namely, in the Ābhidharmika doctrinal disputes recorded in the *Kathāvatthu*.

4. The *Kathāvatthu*'s Mutual Invalidation and Necessity of Breaking Categorical Forces of Signification

Candidly speaking, the Buddha's teaching of *Anātman* (non-self) meant to be the critical and skeptical insight toward the nature of cognition based on linguistic convention (*sāṃvṛti* or *vyavahāra*). Prof. Murti paralleled the concept of *Ātman* that is central to the Upaniṣadic literature and that of *Ātman* which the Buddha rejected in his teaching in terms of *Anātman*. His parallelism to show the Buddhist and the Upaniṣad in conflict is not exactly right, because the concept of *Anātman* the Buddha taught was not an exactly opposite entity to that of Upaniṣadic entity. His teaching was rather linguistic in that an empirical consciousness is cognized only through linguistic and logical forms, and that whatever arises from the pre-linguistic subliminal causal configuration of five Skandhas (psycho-physical elements), which is named as *Dependent Origination* (*pratītyasamutpāda*), has no linkage to the Upaniṣad metaphysics.

It is my contention that the theory of *Anātman* or that of *Śūnyatā*, which are interchangeable in Mahāyāna Buddhist thought, is essentially linguistic rather than metaphysical. This is clearly indicated by the logical controversy recorded in the *Kathāvatthu*. If my hypothesis is correct in that Nāgārjuna's dialectic was an innovation by which he tried to show solution to the problem of *Kathāvatthu* controversy, it is possible to alter the course of hitherto metaphysically treated philosophy of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra toward the logical and linguistic treatment of these philosophies. The *Kathāvatthu* treatise is based on a well organized logical formula of demonstration in terms of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, i.e., affirmative and negative corroborations based on the principle of instantiation (*drṣṭānta*). The contents of the text does not show any clear marks of *Anvaya* and *Vyatireka*, even making the textual experts, such as Rhys Davids and Burmese co-translator, astrayed and express their regret that an ultimate decipherment was not accomplished.¹ The difficulty was due to the subject matter of the controversy, because the logical corroborations crisscrossed the boundary of *Paramārtha* and *Vyavahāra*.

The pattern of mutual invalidation reflects the failure of syllogistic demonstration. Take an example of a universal statement that "if there is a smoke, there is fire." In order to convince people that the yonder hill is on fire by perceiving a rising smoke there, the speaker is required to make an inductive assertion by presenting an example in which smoke and fire are likely observed to be together. So the speaker shows a similar example (*sapakṣa*) such as kitchen hearth where both are likely co-present, and simultaneously, he must show an example of its contraposition by citing an irrigation pond where the listeners agree "neither fire nor smoke" to be observed. This is a dissimilar example (*vipakṣa*). Once this is done, it is justified for the speaker to claim deductively that the yonder hill is on fire because of the sight of a rising smoke.

What is crucial to logical argument is to provide affirmative

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1. Shwe zan Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids: *Points of Controversy or Subject of Discourse*, translation of *Katāvatthu*, Pāli Text Society, 1960; Prefatory Notes, pp.xlvii-lvi.

(*Anvaya*) and negative corroborations (*Vyatireka*) by presenting similar and dissimilar examples. It follows that success and failure of an inference depends on the effectiveness of similar and dissimilar examples. Historically, Buddhist logicians were consistent in holding that the essential nature of logical method is that the subject (i.e., a hill) of inference ought to be a member of the group of similar examples (i.e., a hearth), but contrarily, not to be a member of the group of dissimilar examples (i.e., a irrigation pond). In short, in logical context, it is utmost important to keep the logical categories of affirmative and negative examples separate.

In Buddhist thought, human life is always known to be in between two different dimensions, i.e., transcendent (*Paramārtha*) and phenomenal (*Vyavahāra*), on account of which an individual's life is accounted either as spiritually oriented or as secularly oriented. The heart of Theravāda practice was set as analytical introspection (*vipassyanā*) in accordance with what Śākyamuni taught at his initial sermon. Human spirituality means to become aware of the three aspects of transcendent elements as *anitya*, *duḥkha*, and *anātman* through the practice of analytical introspection. It is to raise the right insight (*samyak-prajñā* or *sammā-paññā*) by seeing the nature of the five Skandhas (*pañca-skandha*: *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *saṃskāras*, *vijñāna*) as they really are (*yathābhūta-darśanam*). The same introspection ought to be directed to the categories of twelve Āyatanas, eighteen Dhātus, and so forth, up to the laws of the four holy Truths. In short, analytical introspection points to the fact that whatever we cognize through linguistic forms is neither certain nor reliable in their depiction of the world we experience.

The Abhidharmist goal of religious emancipation was to identify through introspection the nature of psycho-physical elements of the Skandhas as well as all other categories of ultimate facts as impermanent, suffering, and non-self (*anātman* or *anattā*) i.e., having no reality of its own. It is the practice of penetrating from the empirical and linguistic forms of consciousness to the depth of pre-linguistic processes of an individual mind. The practitioners thus become aware of the boundary of the transcendent and empirical. What the *Kathāvatthu* controversy was concerned was the linkage of these

two dimensions. It was not anything metaphysical but essentially logical and linguistic in the sense that the Theravādin orthodoxy and Pudgalavādin heterodoxy contested to prove their respective interpretations. They, however, equally failed to prove either view as valid. They mutually crisscrossed the logical boundary between the transcendent and the empirical categories. Because of this, their arguments did not reveal the standard formula of *Anvaya* and *Vyatireka*, but the complicated formula of mutual invalidation expressible as “smoke but no fire” and “fire but no smoke.”

I am obliged to make their mutual invalidation to be intelligible for the sake of subsequent chapters, and prepare a chart which explains how and why the two sectarian debaters ended up to be logically invalid. Before introducing the chart, let me explain what they respectively asserted to. First, the Theravādin held that “the factual elements of the Skandhas are known to be real,” but “not an individual person (*Pudgala*) or self,” because the latter is an empirical subject with a bundle of logical and linguistic forms. The Pudgalavādin, however, attempted to assert that an individual person (*Pudgala*) too should be known as real like those Skandha elements, because a person is taught to be identical with the whole of Skandha constituents. The Pudgalavādin relied on scriptural evidence, saying:

The world honored One said: “there is the person (*puggala*) that goes along (with an aggregation of five Khandhas) for the sake of an individual’s self (*atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno*), and the *rūpa dhamma* (and so forth) are known in the sense of a genuinely real thing.¹

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1. The following disputes on Pudgala comes some later proceeding on the relationship between a Pudgala and its constituent Skandha facts;

Puggalavādin: Is the person not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact? Theravādin: No.

Puggalavādin: Did the Exalted One say: ‘There is the person who works for his own good? and is material quality (*rūpa*) known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact? Theravādin: Yes.

The Theravādins prepared their thesis by setting up the first proposition as (1) 'x' (a subject term) is known as a genuinely real thing "P";¹ which can be transcribed as "(x)P"; and the second proposition as (2) 'x' is known in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known, which also can be transcribed as "(x)Q." In this way, the two propositions are linked to represent the formula of affirmative verification (*Anvaya*) as "(x)P \supset (x)Q." Setting up these two propositions as a universal statement, the Theravādin questioned Pudgalavādin, saying "Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?" The Pudgalavādin answers "Yes." Next, the former questions again, saying: "Is the person known in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known?" The Pudgalavādin cannot answer with similar confidence,

Puggavādin: Is material quality one thing and the person another?
Theravādin: Nay, that cannot be truly said.

Ref.: (Pālī text: *Kathāvatthu*, *ibidem*, p. 13: Theravādin: *Puggalo n'upalabbhati saccikaṭṭha-paramatthenāti?* Theravādin: *Āmantā.*
Pudgalavādin: *Vuttaṃ Bhagavatā: Atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno, rūpaṃ ca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti?* *Āmantā.*
Pudgalavādin: *Aññaṃ rūpaṃ añño puggalo ti?*

Pudgalavādin censured Theravādin: "Acknowledge this rejoinder: If the Exalted One said: 'There is the person who works for his own good, and if material quality be known in the sense of real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should also have admitted that material quality and the person are two distinct things. You are wrong in admitting the truth of the former statement while you deny that of the latter. If material quality (*rūpa-dhamma*) and person (*pudgala*) are not two distinct facts, then neither can you also say that the Exalted One predicated anything concerning a 'person'. Your position is false."

1. These two rules are a paraphrasing of the valid syllogistic principles of '*anvaya* and *vyatireka*,' or 'similar and dissimilar instantiation' or 'method of agreement and that of difference.' Cf. Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, Vol I, pp. 283-287. Śaṅkarasvāmin [probably Dīnnāga's disciple] defined these two rules in his concise *Nyāyapraveśaka-sūtram* as / *sapakṣe sattvaṃ vipakṣe'sattvaṃ* / "two concomitant propositions ought to be jointly verified by the class of similar instances" and "the same propositions equally falsified by the class of dissimilar instances." [Gaekwad Oriental Series vol. 33, 1930, p.1]

because Pudgala is a person empirically known. Hence answered "No." By symbolizing 'pudgala' as 'y,' we have the Pudgalavādin's position by the two propositions which are expressible in notation as " $(y)P \supset - (y)Q$." The Theravādin announces that they won:

Oh, Pugalavādin. You are wrong, because if you affirm the first proposition as " $(y)P$," you ought to also affirm the second one as " $(y)Q$," but you instead affirmed the former while negated the latter, i.e., " $(y)P \cdot -(y)Q$." If you are to negate the latter, you ought also to negate the former, i.e., " $-(y)Q \cdot -(y)P$," but you instead affirmed the former and negated the latter as " $P(y) \cdot -Q(y)$." You are lost. ¹

In the second round, i.e., rejoinder (*patikamma*), the Puggalavādin ingeniously rebutted by questioning the Theravādin with negative implication through similar tactics, asking: (1) "Is 'puggala' not known as a genuinely real transcendent facts?" The Theravādin replied, "No, it is not so known," [$-(y)P$]. The former again questions the latter, asking: "Is 'pudgala' not known in the same way as a real thing is known?" Here the Theravādin could not give a similar confident reply, because the unreality of empirical self is known only through the same trans-empirical insight in which *rūpa-dharma*, etc. are known as genuinely real and ultimate facts. Hence the Theravādin was forced to reply affirmatively through double negation: "Yes, it is not to say that it is not known in the same way [$- \{-(y)Q\}$]." Thus, it is the Pudgalavādin's turn to

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1. In Indian logic, in general, logical relation was not conceived in terms of comprehension of the minor term or proposition by the major, but in terms of concomitance, concurrence, or accompaniment of two terms or propositions, although the latter relation can be translated into the former—comprehension of a minor universal by a larger one. Hence, a conditional statement: "if 'p,' then 'q'", was not conceived in terms of comprehension expressible by the 'containment of symbol " \supset ", but, strictly speaking, in terms of conjunction expressible by symbol ' \cdot '. When even a containment symbol " \supset " is used here, it should be understood to imply an intention of conjunction with the conditional force of the logical rule.

announce that the Theravādin's assertion as $\{-(y)P \cdot (y)Q\}$ is logically wrong and censured the Theravādin, saying:

If you, Theravādin, negate the first proposition [that is our thesis], you ought also to negate the second one as " $\neg p(y) \supset \neg q(y)$," but you instead, while negating the first, affirmed the second as " $\neg p(y) \cdot q(y)$." If, on the other hand, you wish to affirm the second proposition, you ought also to affirm the first one, as " $q(y) \supset p(y)$," but you instead, while negating the first, affirmed the second as " $\neg p(y) \cdot q(y)$." Since you affirmed the second while negating the first, you failed to accomplish your thesis.

The foregoing exchange of arguments between the Theravādin and Puggalavādin, though only the initial session of their confrontation, shows how and why they end up to their mutual invalidation in which they nullify their claims each other and resulting in a draw. The chart I referred to the exchange of argument is placed as a subnote here, so as to reduce a space of the main section.¹ The *Kathāvatthu* controversy was the type of intra-Buddhist disputes, and shows why the text continued to be upheld as the third book of *Abhidharmapiṭaka*. The subject matter is by no means a metaphysical problem against the Upaniśadic

1. "Whether *Puggala* is Empirical or Transcendent"

- | | |
|--|---|
| <p>1. Theravādin Refutation
Puggalavādin thesis '$p \cdot q$'
is false, because '$p \supset q$';
'$p \cdot q$' is false, because '$\neg q \supset \neg p$';
Hence, the thesis '$p \cdot q$' is false.</p> | <p>2. Puggalavādin Rejoinder
Theravādin refutation '$\neg p \cdot q$'
is false, because '$\neg p \supset \neg q$';
'$\neg p \cdot q$' is false, because '$q \supset p$';
Hence, the refutation '$\neg p \cdot q$' is false.</p> |
| <p>3. Puggalavādin Refutation
Theravādin's refutation '$\neg p \cdot q$'
can be refuted, because '$\neg p \supset \neg q$.'
Theravādin's refutation '$\neg p \cdot q$'
is false, because '$q \supset p$.'
Hence, '$\neg p \cdot q$' can be refuted.</p> | <p>4. Puggalavādin Application
Our thesis '$p \cdot q$' is not falsified;
Your refutation '$\neg(p \cdot q)$' is
not acceptable, because '$p \supset q$'
and also because '$\neg q \supset \neg p$';
Hence, '$\neg(p \cdot q)$' is not acceptable.</p> |

5. Puggalavādin's Conclusion

Our thesis ' $p \cdot q$ ' is not refuted, because ' $p \cdot q$ ' is not compelled;
Your refutation $\neg(p \cdot q)$ is not convincing,
because ' $\neg p \cdot q$ ' is not compelled;
Hence your Theravādin's contention: ' $p \cdot q$ ' and ' $\neg q \cdot p$ ' are not convincing.

Ātman, because the problem is the issue of two different interpretations as to how the transcendent Skandha elements are linked to an empirical self in which the phenomenal world is experienced. It is a linguistic problem how to explain the transcendent process of multiple elements of senses and intellect guided by *Dependent Origination* to manifest into an empirical consciousness constructed by logical and linguistic forms at each moment of existence.

5. The Kathavatthu Controversy and the Madhyamaka Method of Dialectic as Solution

The Madhyamaka's *reductio ad absurdum* method which Nāgārjuna introduced was to break down "thought categories" which are inseparably constricting human mind by the force of linguistic signification. In his initial verse of dedication, Nāgārjuna specified eight categories by dual negation of the four sets of paradoxical terms:

Neither perishing (*anirodham*) nor arising" (*anutpādam*);
 Neither ceasing (*anucchedam*) nor lasting (*aśāśvatam*);
 Neither identical (*anekārtham*) nor different (*anānārtham*);
 Neither coming (*anāgamam*) nor going (*anirgamam*).¹

These categories of thought are fixed in the mind to dualize conceptual processes in reference to whatever is cognized as phenomenal events. Since Buddhist does not accept the referential objects of linguistic signification in the external world, all referential phenomena ought to be looked into paradoxical inner meanings as "arising and perishing" as resulted from the configuration of transcendent elements of the five Skandhas. Thus, Nāgārjuna dedicated his salutation to the Tathāgata's Supreme Enlightenment and subsequently attempted to reveal his insight of transcendent *Dependent Origination* by way of negating all mental categories. This was precisely what Nāgārjuna attempted to theorize as Buddha's thought in the 24th chapter of the *Madhyamakakārkā-śāstra*, saying:

Whatever arises by depending on the configuration (of

1. *Mādhyamakakārika*, the verse for dedication::
anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvatam/
anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anirgamam//

five Skandha, etc.), we call it “Śūnyatā” (an empty phenomenon without its own identity), because it is a product of linguistic convention (*prajñapti*), having depended (*upādāya*) (on multiple causes and conditions). This is the way to see phenomenon in terms of Middle Way.¹

In the following, I summarily itemize Prof. Murti's views of the Mādhyamika dialectic and evaluate his views with my critical observation. First, he defines the dialectic to be the negation of all empirical notions and speculative theories and thereby replaces Ābhidharmika pluralism and dogmatism of the earlier Buddhism. I can agree with the first half of his statement as adequate, but the latter half is questionable, because as it is clear in the above quotation cited from the *Mādhyamikakārikā*, Nāgārjuna accepts the plural causality beneath every empirical phenomenon experienced in consciousness. Second, I am compelled to disagree with his second view that *Prajñāpāramitā* revolutionized Buddhism in all aspects of its thought and religion by the basic concept of Śūnyatā.² My disagreement here is corollary to my objection against his theory that the source of the Mādhyamaka method of dialectic was the *Upadeśa Śāstra* (only extant in Chinese translation *Ta-chih-tu-lun*) or any or all of the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras*.³ Thirdly, Prof. Murti viewed that the Madhyamaka dialectic originated in the Buddha's consciousness as its principal theme, and that his avoidance of two extremes and ascension to the

1. *Madhyamakakarika* XXIV, verse 18:

*yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatām tām pracakṣmahe/
sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā//*

2. *Ibidem*, p. 82

3. *Ta-chih-tu-lun* (『大智度論』 100 fasc.): A commentary to the 25,000 Verse *Prajñāpāramitā-śāstra*, known as *Ta-p'in-pan-jo-ching* (『大品般若經』). This voluminous commentary, with its encyclopedic contents divided into 100 chapters, is generally known as ascribed to Nāgārjuna. It was translated by Kumārajīva during 402- 405 [*Taishō*. 25 (No. 1509); Cf. Étienne Lamotte (1981): *Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgārjuna*, Tome 1-5, Université de Louvain, Institut Orientaliste, Louvain

middle, embodies the real's transcendence to thought.¹ This feature of the Buddha's critical spirituality is said to have reached the highest in Mādhyamika philosophy, because the Buddha's dialectical thought, originally expressed in silence, was magnified utmost in the form of active repudiation. My question, however, is: Whether was the Buddha's transcendence from linguistic forms of assertion was the Upaniṣadic metaphysical ground or the Buddha's own pluralistic causal ground?

In the following I am closely following Prof. Murti's analyses of the formal aspect of Mādhyamika dialectic. (1) He emphasized that the *reduction-ad-absurdum* argument of the Mādhyamika does not establish any thesis. Though accepting a particular thesis hypothetically, it is designed to elicit its implication to expose the inner contradiction which has escaped the notice of the opponent.² I asserted that the Mādhyamika dialectic is directed toward the breakdown of the categorial borders of signification. In order to accomplish this goal, the primary expression Nāgārjuna undertook was to create the context in which contradictory concepts are compelled to their juxtaposition without mitigation as contents of the Buddha's insight. I consider that this was the thesis of the Mādhyamika, namely, the breakdown of the categorial demarcation, only expressible by contradictory juxtaposition.

Secondly, (2) Prof. Murti analyzes that since the Mādhyamika does not have a thesis of his own, he does not construct syllogisms with arguments and examples of his own. I must say categorically that this is an inadequate analysis, because in his great commentary *Mahāprajñāpāramitotpāda-śāstra*, Nāgārjuna offers nine metaphorical examples as appropriate to the Mādhyamika dialectical negation and elucidates that these examples help regular humans to understand the concept of *Śūnyatā*.³ One of the Mādhyamika subsect Svātantrika

1. *Ibidem*, p. 83

2. *Ibidem*, p. 132

3. *Ta-chih-tu-lun* (Taishō, 25(No. 1506), fasc. 6; nine metaphorical examples which can be quoted for understanding *Śūnyatā*: an illusion (*māyā*), a moon reflected in the water (*dakacandrā*), empty space (*ākāśa*), an echo (*pratiśruthā*), an imaginary town in the sky

Mādhyamika emphasized the use of syllogistic formula instead of *reductio-ad-absurdum* method. According to their formula, the subject term, irrespective of whether it designates a transcendent or an empirical entity, the thesis statement is equally and invariably required negation to express the principle of *Śūnyatā*. This negation implies a juxtaposition of two paradoxical concepts, i.e., one subject term is affirmed as existent empirically and simultaneously negated as non-existent. The Mādhyamika example ought to be invariably dual natured as created by paradoxical or contradictory juxtaposition.¹

Thirdly, (3) Prof. Murti holds that the principle of the Mādhyamika dialectic is "Nothing in itself and all is relative (*pratītyasamutpāda*)," which means that nothing exists in its own nature. He elaborated this by saying, because any fact of experience, when analyzed, reveals the inner rift present in its constitution. It means that everything is composite. I can agree with this definition. For instance, when Nāgārjuna refutes the Naiyāyika logicians in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, he repudiates their

(*gandharvanagara*), an image in dream (*svapnacgāyā*), an image in mirror (*pratibimbānirmāṇa*), a pseudo highest achievement (*upamadharmā-adhimukutir*).

1. The syllogistic formula of Bhāvaviveka of Svātantrika Madhyamika directly contradicts to Murti's assertion, and demonstrates that the Madhyamika dialectic can be expressed in syllogistic formulas by the means of *drṣṭānta*. Cf. The Sanskritized text *Mahāyāna-karatāla-ratna* or *On the Mahāyāna Treasure within the hand (Palm)*, one of Arya Bhāvaviveka, which was retranslated into Sanskrit by N. Aiyaswami Sastri from the Zuanzang's Chinese translation [『大乘掌珍論』 (2 Fascicles, 『大正』 30, (No.1578), *Chang-chen lun* (*Karatalaratna* or *the Jewel in Hand*); Visva-Bharati Annals, vol II, 1949

- (1) Transcendently (*paramārthatas*) whatever empirically existent is devoid of reality (*śūnyatā*) 「真性有為空」
Because it arises from depending on causes and conditions. 「緣生故」
Like a "magical apparition" (*māyāvat*)..... - 「如幻」
- (2) Transcendently, whatever does not arise from the causality is devoid of reality 「無無有實」
Because it is without empirical origination 「不起」
Like a "sky-flower" (*kha-puṣpavat*)..... 「似空華」

presupposition that perception arises from the contact of visual organ (*pramāṇa*) and object (*prameya*) of perception. Nāgārjuna refutes this primary condition to repudiate self-existent perception by using metaphorical examples. Accepting the Naiyāyika theory that a perception arises from the contact of a visual faculty (i.e., eyes) and an object of perception, Nāgārjuna makes the opponent agree that the phenomenon of illumination requires the contact of an agent of lighting, i.e., a candle light, and the object of illumination, i.e., nightly darkness. Then, he questions whether the candle light and the darkness of the night can be met together in contact.¹ Convention accepts their contact to explain the fact of illumination. Nāgārjuna's question is why such an illumination ought to be self-existent.

This is the most standard formula of *reductio-ad-absurdum* method to negate independent nature of the subject matter of argument. Here Prof. Murti correctly defined the form of dialectic, but I must emphasize that the origin of the dialectical arguments of this type must have come from the type of the *Kathāvatthu* controversy, and not from that of *Prajñāpāramitā* narrative inculcation. What I am further pointing out is that the fact of illumination cannot be an independent existent, precisely because it arises out of two interdependent entities (i.e., agent of light and its recipient), and linguistically explains the fact of illumination as drawn from the juxtaposition of light and darkness, despite their contradictory nature. This applies to all kinds of relationship conceptualized in convention in which logical contradiction is never questioned despite the logical laws.²

It is my contention that the Mādhyamika dialectic does not

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1. *Vigrahavyāvartanī: Kārikās 36-39: (『廻諍論』第 36-39 頌)* The Treatise on Turning Around (Doctrinal) Disputes : Kunst and Johnston : A Sanskrit edition of the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques* (1948-1951);

Ref. Ichimura: "Zen Master Dōgen's View of Language in his *Shōbō Genzō*," *The Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies* No. 11, 2010, p. 65.

Another applicable metaphor is the grammatical structure of *Kāraṇas* which make up an independent sentential meaning.

repudiate the empirical world, and that what it repudiates is the underlying mental force of linguistic behavior, namely, the referential force of the mind directed to its objective referent and the tendentious or purposive force of the mind which links one sentential symbol with another. The Ābhidharmika debaters of the *Kathāvatthu* were invariably affected by these dual forces of the mind in disputing on their different theses and referents, exactly in the way the Naiyāyika and the Mīmāṃsaka disputed on the nature of *śabda* during Medieval India.¹ The Mādhyamika dialectic can be defended for two accounts: (1) By disclosing the hidden contradiction in an imbalanced assertion of a thesis, the dialectic is designed to annihilate the sharpened discrepancy between two different assertions and to bring about a more conciliatory state of the mind in both parties of disputes. (2) It

1. The Naiyāyika empiricist held a presupposition that *śabda* (vocal word) is impermanent because it is human made like a pot is, while the Mīmāṃsaka transcendentalist held an exactly opposite presupposition that *śabda* is permanent because a command of *retualism* should be understood exactly same way at any time or any place. The two schools contested their different interpretations on the nature of *śabda*, The both parties presented their theses by perfect syllogism:

Naiyāyika Thesis: 'Vocal word' (*śabda*) is impermanent.....*śabdo 'nityaḥ*

Reason: because it is a product.....*kṛtakatvāt*

Example: just as a pot is (or anything molded)

....*ghaṭatvavat*

The Mīmāṃsā linguist would arrange his syllogistic argument against the former as follows:

Thesis: 'Vocal word' [*śabda*] is permanent.....*śabdo nityaḥ*

Reason: because it is audible (or communicable)

Example: just as any other vocal word.....*śabdatvavat*

The Mīmāṃsā schoolmen, along with the Vaiyākaraṇas, postulated the transcendent existence of ideas and concepts in a similar manner as Plato's postulation of the world of eternal ideas. These examples are given in the *Nyāyapraveśakasāstram*: *Gaekwad Oriental Series*, 38 (1930), pp.3-4. Although strictly speaking, '*śabdo anityaḥ kṛtakatvāt ghaṭavat*,' is a Vaiśeṣika presupposition [*siddhānta*], since the Naiyāyika accepted the metaphysical system in *toto*, it is presented as the Naiyāyika view of language. Cf. A. Kunst: "The Concept of the Principle of Excluded Middle in Buddhism," *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* XXI, (1957), p. 146.

should also be additionally noted that Nāgārjuna's dialectical critique is not to abandon the orthodox analytical introspection into *Skandhas*, *Āyatanas*, and so forth, but to restore the status of real *dharma*s to the trans-empirical and non-linguistic domain where alone the Ābhidharmika elders exercised transcendent introspection. Nāgārjuna's dialectic demonstrates that no sooner than these *dharma*s are subjected to empirical and linguistic domain along with *pudgalas*, they become empirical and linguistic subject to be negated as *Śūnyatā*.

6. **Vijñānavādin-Yogacāra Theory of Language and Grammarian's Ultimate Source of Signification pertained to Śabda-Brahman**

Assuming that Nāgārjuna was man of A.D. 50 through 150,¹ the subsequent history of Indian philosophy, already out of the mythological era, began to develop the most vibrant and complex period of intellectual activities, ushering the so-called classical period in India. It would be almost impossible therefore for any individual scholar to follow up the vast and multifarious philosophical and religious developments of the following millennium. Prof. Murti, however, traced the Buddhist and the Upaniṣadic traditions very skillfully by distinguishing their philosophical orientation respectively as epistemological and ontological. He follows down the Mādhyamika influence on the Vijñānavādin philosophy on the one hand and on the Advaita Vedāntin philosophy on the other by these criteria. Although I am skeptical whether or not the Buddha's philosophy of *Anātman* was directly counters the Upaniṣadic concept of *Ātman*, his critical attitude toward the convention and his epistemological

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1. Ichimura: "Re-Examining the Period of Nāgārjuna: Western India, A.D. 50-150" (「龍樹の年代論再考」), *JIBS*, vol. 40, No. 2, March 1992 (pp. 8-14); "The Period of Nāgārjuna and the *Fang-pien-hsin-lun* or *Upāyahṛdayasāstra* (龍樹の年代と「方便心論」), *JIBS*, Vol. 43, No. 2, 1995, pp. 2033-2028; also Re.: *Buddhist Critical Spirituality: Prajñā and Śūnyatā*, Chap. 2: Nāgārjuna's Historicity on the Basis of *Suḥrillekha* and *Ratnāvalī* Presented at the International Seminar on Contribution of Andhra Desa to Buddhism under the title: "Nāgārjuna as author of *Suḥrillekha* and *Ratnāvalī* and his Eventual Center of Activity as Southern Kosala," Hyderabad, Dec. 26-28, 1997.

orientation were always consistent with the subsequent characteristics of Buddhist history. The Vijñānavāda adopted the meaning of Madhyamaka dialectic, developed its logical system of Dignāga, on the one hand and formulated the Consciousness-only system of Vasubandhu of which Three Self-natures (*Tri-svabhāva*) is a part, through all of which they disproved the ontological reality of the external world. Thus asserts Prof. Murti that the Vijñānavādin thereby indirectly established the sole reality of consciousness (*Vijñaptimātratā*).¹

As to the history that the Mādhyamika influenced on the philosophy of the Advaita Vedānta which belonged to the Upaniṣadic tradition, Prof. Murti pointed out that the Advaita Vedānta adopted a dialectical method to demolish multifarious phenomenal dimensions, but by so doing, they indirectly established the sole reality of the Upaniṣadic Pure Being as changeless, universal, and self-evident. I was attracted to Prof. Murti's attempt to equate the two different orientations at some point between the Vijñānavāda and the Advaita Vedānta systems. From the ontological standpoint, the Advaita Vedānta emphasized that what matters to them is the thing known in the objective world, whereas the Vijñānavāda emphasized that whatever known externally is non-existent. Although Prof. Murti did not go into the linguistic and Grammarian's philosophy that arose prior to the Advaita-Vedānta, I think that a comparison between Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language with that of the Vijñānavāda can provide an additional aid to assess the difference of the foregoing major philosophical orientations. Therefore I shall briefly examine the essential characteristics which are also shared by the Vedānta system of philosophy.

Hindu grammarians theorized that the linguistic force of the mind, namely, significative power (*śakti*) shapes individual's experience and the world by calling it the power of convention (*vyavahāra*). Accepting to the presence of such a force of language, Buddhist and Hindu thinkers established totally different theories. Bhartṛhari of the 5th century, for instance, theorized human (empirical) cognition as a phenomenalization of the ultimate principle *Śabda-brahman*, of which each linguistic

1. Murti: *op.cit.*, p. 218

proposition (i.e., subject-predicate linkage) has its sentential referent (*sphoṭa*) as *Śabda-Brahman*'s partial manifestation. His theory of *Sphoṭa* defines the three categories of propositional components as follows:

- (1) *Sphoṭa* is the *Śabda-Brahman* that is the unifying principle establishing the linkage of subject and predicate of a proposition; (2) *Artha* is the objectified word that is to be linked as the signified, and (3) *Śabda* is the subjective word (the signifying) that links itself with the signified.¹

It is evident that Hindu thinkers as a whole postulated realistic correspondence between language and things of the external world. Buddhist thinkers, on the other hand, invariably refuted their theory of reality on the ground that human thought and perception rely on the force of duality in the subjective consciousness, say, cognizing agent and cognized object bifurcated within the mind, and hence whatever is constructed by linguistic convention is *ipso-facto* without referential reality externally; it is nothing but subjective illusion or imagination. In attempting to refute the Grammarian's theory of word-object relationship, Buddhist philosophers proposed their own theory that consists of three categories. The theory was called "Three self-Natures" (*Tri-svabhāva*) as referred to before. The theory was originally presented in the *Sandhinirmocana-sūtra* of the third century. The theory of the Three self-Natures is given as follows:

- (1) The imaginary nature (*parikalpita*) depends on names associated with notions. (2) The dependent nature (*paratantra*) depends on attribution of the imaginary nature to the dependent nature. (3) The absolute nature (*pariniṣpanna*) depends on non-attribution of the imaginary nature to the dependent nature.²

1. Re.: *Vākyapadīya*, Kaṇḍa III: *Sambandha-samudeśa*.

2. Étienne Lamotte: "Les trois 'caracteres' et les trois 'absences de nature propre' dans le *Samdhinirmocana*" (Chap. 6 with a sanskritization from the Tibetan version), *Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences Morales et Politiques*, Louvain, 1935, p. 298; also, his *Sandhinirmocana-sūtra*, *L'explication des mystères* (Texte tibétain edite et traduit) (Louovain, 1935), 63; *Chieh-shenmi-*

Vasubandhu of the fifth century simplified their definitions for more easy understanding in linguistic terms:

The imaginary nature of the empirical world (*parikalpita*) is the *Vyavahāra*, namely, (externalized) linguistic operations; the dependent nature (*paratantra*) is the *Vyavahārī*, namely, the subjective author of linguistic usage; and the absolute nature (*pariniṣpanna*) is the Cessation of the *Vyavahāra*, namely, cessation of linguistic usage.

In the system of the Grammarians, phenomenalization occurs ultimately from the principle of *Śabda-brahman*, of which an individual sentential *Sphoṭa* is its partial manifestation. On the other hand, in the Buddhist system of *Tri-svabhāva*, such entities (*sphoṭa*) are significantly absent, because the first (*parikalpita*) and third (*pariniṣpanna*) categories are only so differentiated over and above the same substratum, namely, plural causal configuration of the *Skandha* elements. Simply speaking, external phenomena are illusory projection of a subjective inner imagery which arises into the dependent nature from the multiple causal configuration of the *Skandhas*. When such an imaginary nature (*parikalpita*) ceases to be, the subjective imagery also drops from the second dependent nature where the consciousness freed from all linguistic significations manifests itself upon the same plural causal configuration.

Bhartrhari claimed that the *Śabda-brahman* manifests as a physical replica (referent) of the mental object (signified) in outer world, and as a verbal expression of a mental word (signifying) and object (signified) in inner world. The Buddhist philosopher asserts that the external world (*parikalpita*) is empirically existent but does not really exist in the absolute sense (*paramārthataḥ*). It is the subjective imagery, and hence exists only as illusory, not in the manner it appears. The Grammarians postulated *Śabda-brahman* or an individual *Sphoṭa* as a mediating principle of the necessary linkage between word and meaning, but the Buddhist accepted no reality of whatsoever and

rejected the *Sphoṭa* of necessary linkage. The reason is that the word-object linkage is a product of mental dualization (*dvaya*). In short, the grammarians postulated a singular principle beyond empirical duality of inner and outer worlds, whereas the Buddhist accepted cessation of this duality of word and meaning itself in inner world as the ultimate. The history of Indian philosophy as represented by Buddhist and Hindu traditions increasingly evolved in the bipolar directions.

6. The Yogācāra-Viñānavādin Philosophy as Successor of the Mādhyamaka and Prof. Murti's View of Equation

Like the Mādhyamikas, the Yogācāra theoreticians differentiated two dimensions of Transcendent (*paramārtha*) as free of mental duality (*advaya*) and Secular Convention (*vyavahāra*) based on mental duality. After the Mādhyamikas successfully broke down the categorial constrictions by dialectical method, demolishing the paradoxical sets of existential concepts associated with the use of language. The Yogācāra, followed the suite, but modified the duality of the mind in terms of linguistic categories of names and meanings as ultimate force of signification.¹ In the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra-śāstra* Asaṅga introduced the following chart of paradoxical sets of linguistic signification.

- (1) Non-existent (*abhāva*) and (2) existent (*bhāva*), (3) excess attribution (*samāropa*,) and (4) harmful attribution (*apavāda*); (5) identity (*ekatā*) and (6) difference (*anekatā*), (7) Universal (*sāmānya*) and (8) Particular (*viśeṣa*); (9) analyzing Meaning from Name (如名起義分別) and (10) analyzing Name from Meaning (如義起名分別)²

1. If. Bid., fast. 40, p. 393b.:復次、「衆生中行忍辱慈悲等福功德無量、功德無量故故心柔軟、心柔軟故疾得禪定、修禪定故心如意調柔、心如意調柔故、破世間長短男女白黑等。入一相法所謂無相、得是法等已、令一切衆生得是法等。」

2. 無著菩薩造『大乘莊嚴經論第五卷 (*Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra-śāstra*) (述求品第十二之二)「無體體增減、一異自別相、如名如義者分別有十種」釋曰。有十種分別。一者無體分別。二者有體分別。三者增益分別。四者損減分別。五者一相分別。六者異相分別。七者自相分別。八者別相分別。九者如名起義分別。

The last two categories of names and meanings explain, for instance, on the one hand, "adhering to the name of a thing, for instance, a pot, we analyze the actual form of a pot (*yathānāmārthābhīniveśa-vikalpa*), and on the other hand, adhering to the meaning of a pot, we identify its name as a pot (*yathārthanāmābhīniveśa-vikalpa*). The Mādhyamika dialectic demolished the existential categories as forces of signification (*vyavahāra*) in order to nullify the duality of the mind, and thereby directly face the transcending causal configuration of the Skandha elements (*paramārtha*). This radical approach flattened the structural system of the empirical world. On account of this, some Vedānta philosophers criticized the Mādhyamika and Vijñānavāda in philosophical polemics by accusing that Buddhist denied of the (external) real altogether and admits a theory of appearance without any reality as its ground. Prof. Murti defended the Buddhist position by saying:

In fact the Mādhyamika does not deny the real; he only denies doctrines about the real. For him, the real as transcendent to thought can be reached only by the denial of the determinations which systems of philosophy ascribe to it. When the entire conceptual activity of Reason is dissolved by criticism, there is *Prajñā Pāramitā*.¹

Prof. Murti's defense for Buddhist position in this passage is adequate, because according to Nāgārjuna, when one is freed from the significative forces of language, one directly faces the underlying Skandhas and causal configuration as real. Prof. Murti rightly pointed to it as "*Prajñāpāramitā*" instead of Upaniṣadic *Ātman*.² His use of *Prajñā Pāramitā* was correct and

十者如義起名分別。般若波羅蜜經中為令諸菩薩遠離此十種分別故說十種對治」[大正 Vol. 31, No. 1603]. Asaṅga's *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra-śāstra* in S. Lévi's Sanskrit edition and translation: *Exposé de la doctrine du Grand Véhicule selon le Système Yogācāra*, 2 tomes, Paris: Librairie Honoré Champion, 1907.

1. *Ibidem*, p. 218

Placing *Prajñāpāramitā* instead of Brahmanic metaphysical principle shows the fact that Prof. Murti differentiated the two different reality respectively for Buddhist and Brahmanic system of philosophy.

evidenced that he correctly understood the Buddhist concept of reality. The Buddhist *Paramārtha* is "plural inter-dependent causality" (*pratītyasamutpāda*) which is identical as *Śūnyatā*. This is what Nāgārjuna called '*tattvasya lakṣaṇa*' "the characteristic of the real" in his terminology. The Yogācāra theorists ought to rebuild a viable system of practice toward the realization of Enlightenment, and it was the task of the Vijñānavādins to introduce the structural linkage between the *Paramārtha* and *Vyavahāra* by their innovative system to open the way from the empirical to the transcendent. This is called the System of Subjective Consciousness.

The Vijñānavādin (Yogācāra) introduced the theory of the phenomenal world by systematizing the eight kinds of consciousness, i.e., the primary one as *Ālaya-vijñāna*; the second one as *Mano*-(or *Ādāna*)-*vijñāna*; and thirdly, the group of six cognitive consciousnesses including mental. In part, this system replied well to the Hindu criticism by demonstrating that Buddhist theory does not ignore human individual self. The beginning-less and endless evolvement of interaction between names and meanings depends on the linguistic dispositions (*jalpa-bija* or *karma-bija*) produced by the use of language (*yatthājalpārtha-saṁbandhāyā nimittam*) and accumulated within a semi-subjective agent (*Ālayavijñāna*) as forces of signification from the time of immemorial. Vasubandhu theorized *Ālayavijñāna* as consisting of innumerable seed-like residues of disposition (*bījaśaṅgrhītam ālayavijñānam*). This pseudo-subjective agent acts as the user of language (*Vyavahārī*). The question is: How can we modify the undesirable linguistic and Karmic dispositions which activate unfavorable dualities of categories as names and meanings? How can we reduce affectation of negative linguistic dispositions and how can we create new incentives toward the religious goal as well as for the betterment of humanity? The answer is the Yogācāra's theory of Three Self-natures (*Trisvabhāva*) and Three Non-self-natures (*Niḥtrisvabhāvatā*) which are briefly referred to above.

The Buddhist theory of "Three Self-Nature" (*Traya-svabhāva*) was originally introduced in the *Sandhinirmocana-sūtra* as said before. According to Xuan-zang's translation, the fourth chapter of the text dealt with the Three Self-natures under the

heading of “Characteristics of Entire Dharmas” (*Sarvadharmalakṣaṇa* 「一切法相品」) and the fifth Chapter dealt with “Three Non-self-natures” under the heading of “Characteristics of Non-self-natures for Textual Meaning” (*Sandhinirmocana-niḥsvabhāvalakṣaṇā* 「解深密經無自性相品」). The following are the definitions of the Three Self-Nature (*Trisvabhva*) given in Xuan-zang's translation:

- (1) The imaginary self-nature (*parikalpita-svabhāva*) which depends on names associated with own self-notions. It means that the empirical world is set up temporarily by names associated with distinctions of self-nature.
『謂一切法名假安立自性差別』.¹
- (2) The dependent self-nature (*paratantra*) for the world of phenomenal appearance, which is explained as “Because of this, that is,” and “Because of this rising, that arises,” and so forth, “Depending on delusion (*avidyā*), activation of co-efficients,” and so on, up to “Accumulation of a great mass of suffering.”²
- (3) The absolute self-nature (*pariniṣpanna*) in which entire dharmas are free from distinction, and in the context of this truth an indomitable Bodhisattva practices based on given causal context, exercising due will and minding without up-side-down thought, being aware of co-efficient context, gradually accumulating practices towards the supreme enlightenment and perfect realization.³

The *Vijñānavādin-Yogācāra* asserted that the external

1. 『謂一切法名假安立自性差別』

2. 『謂一切法緣生自性、則此有故彼有、乃至此生故彼生、謂無明緣行、乃至招集純大苦蘊。』

3. 「謂一作法平等真如、於此真如，諸菩薩衆勇猛精進為因緣故、如理作意無倒思惟，為因緣故之能通達漸漸修集、乃至無上正等菩提方証圓滿、

Étienne Lamotte: op.cit, Note 25.

world (*parikalpita*) appears to be empirically existent but does not really exist in the absolute sense (*paramāthatas*), and that subjective cognition refers to the objective appearance which is illusory and non-existent. Xuanzang's translation gives it as translating: "The entire phenomenal world appears temporarily, as it were, by names according to the nature of individual distinctions."¹

Accordingly, when an inner cognition (*vyavahartr*) perceives an external world [by linguistic forms], this external referent is an imaginary nature (*parikalpita*, *vyavahāra*); when this imaginary nature ceases to be upon cessation of the duality (*advaya*), the absolute nature automatically manifests (*pariniṣpanna*). "Advaya" in Mādhyamika Buddhism refers to the state or knowledge that is free from the duality of the two extremes as "is" and "is not," subjective cognitive faculty (*pramāṇa*) and object to be cognized (*prameya*), and so forth. It is the knowledge free from conceptual bifurcation essential to linguistic force of signification.²

7. Prof. Murti's formula of Equation and the Omitted Yogācāra's Theory of Three Non-self-nature

"Advaita" of the Vedānta usage, as given by Prof. Murti, is the knowledge of differenceless entity – *Brahman* (Pure Being), and he equates the meaning with that of *Vijñānamātra* (Pure Consciousness). He seems to have proposed here that when Brahman shines forth as universal, totally devoid of difference, the knowing faculty too gets concentrated and lost (*brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati*),³ and that in theory, the ultimate objective principle that is freed from all phenomenal differences can be identified with the Vijñānavāda's epistemic subject purified to its perfection. He says:

While the Buddhist Advaya system represented epistemic and the Hindu Advaita system of philosophy represented ontological, the primary aim of the Vedānta and the Vijñānavāda is to seek the truly real and suffuse the mind exclusively with it to the extent that the mind becomes

1. 「一切法名假安立自性差別」

2. Murti: *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism.*, p. 118

3. *Ibidem.*

one with the real.¹

In short, Prof. Murti places his idea of reconciliation on this equation between the Vijñānavāda's Pure Consciousness (*āśrayapravṛiti ālayavijāna*) and the term "advaita" (free from duality) that refers to the knowledge of differenceless entity – Brahman (Pure Being). At this juncture, however, I am obliged to challenge Prof. Murti from the Buddhist point of view that the Advaita Vedānta's call for reconciliation is premature once again.

In my reading of Prof. Murti's passages, he appears to have been sincerely convinced of the possibility of reconciling the Advaita Vedānta advocacy of ontological non-duality (*advaita*) and the Vijñānavāda advocacy of epistemic non-duality (*advaya*). I quoted one of his words above. In addition, he further says:

Advaya is knowledge free from the duality of the extremes (*antas* or *dṛṣṭi* of 'Is' and 'Is not,' Being and Becoming, etc. It is knowledge free of conceptual distinctions. Advaita is knowledge of differenceless entity – Brahman (Pure Being) or Vijñāna (Pure Consciousness). The Vijñānavāda, although it uses the term Advaya for its absolute, is really an Advaita system.

The reason why I said that his proposal of reconciliation is premature was initially my concern of his sincerity, because while writing on the *Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, why should he risk of his scholarly reputation? While he is talking about reconcilability of the two traditions, he drops the theory of Śūnyatā corollary to that of Three self-Natures entirely from the Yogācāra system of philosophy. Especially, when his view is that the source of Nāgārjuna's dialectic was the *Prajñāpāramitā* textual sources of which *Niḥsvabhāva* or Śūnyatā is central. As second thought, if he deliberately and knowingly omitted it, I thought it would be necessary to investigate the matter more carefully whether it was thought to be advantageous to him for his presentation or it is unnecessary to him for his presentation. With this thought behind, I am introducing the theory of Three Non-self Natures from Xuan-zang's translation of the *Sandhinirmocana-sūtra*.

1. *Ibidem*, p. 217

(1) All *dharmas* are without self-nature for their characteristic (諸法相無自性性): Whatever fact of phenomenon has no self-nature for its own characteristic. For instance, it has no characteristic of imaginary existence. Why? It is because the characteristic of imaginary appearance happens to be due to linguistic phenomenon, and not due to its own nature. Therefore, no imaginary appearance has its own nature. ¹

(2) All *dharmas* are without self-nature for their arising (諸法生無自性性):

Whatever fact of phenomenal occurrence has no self-nature. For instance, it has the nature of inter-dependence with other co-efficient causes for occurrence. Why? It is because its occurrence is due to depending on causally efficient others, hence it is not arising due to its own self-nature. Hence, no fact of occurrence has its own nature ²

(3) All *dharmas* are without self-nature for ultimate transcendence (諸法勝義無自性性) whatever fact of the transcendent state has no self-nature. For instance, it has the nature of arising without its own nature. Hence it has no own self-nature. It arises upon depending on the presence of coefficients. Hence, it is called no self-nature for ultimate transcendence. Why? It is because this is the genuinely free and no self-orientation. Therefore, such a state ought to be known as no self-nature. This genuine state is for all facts and elements without exception. Hence this is revealed to be with no-self-nature. On account of this, it is called the no self-nature of the transcendent state. ³

1. 「如何諸法相無自性性，謂諸法遍計所執相，如何故，此由假名安立為相非由自相安立為相，是故說無自性相。

2. 「如何諸法生無自性性，謂諸法依他起相、如何故，此由依他緣力故有，非自然有，是故說名生無自性性、

3. 『如何諸法勝義無自性性，謂諸法由生無自性性故，說名無

Although the Buddhist assertion of the theory of Three Self-natures (*trayasvabhāva*) itself clearly differentiates the theory of reality from the Vedānta positive assertion of external reality. The theory of Three Self-nature, however, may have created an impression that it advocates an underlying reality in terms of "self-natured distinction" (自性差別). It is obvious that the textual author must have thought the theory of Three Self-Natures ought to be accompanied by the corollary theory of Three Non-self-Natures, but why? It is clear to me that the two theories together confirm that theoretical bases are negation of reality in terms of *Niḥsvabhāva* or *Śūnyatā*. Prof. Murti's popularity was due to his intermediate position between Buddhism and Vedānta Hinduism. Some scholars comment on his philosophy in reference to the Brāhmanical cultural context. His approach dissociated from the pro-Brahmanism scholars like Radhakrishnan, his own teacher, according to whom Buddhism was a form of Brāhmanism as originating from the Upaniṣads. Prof. Murti's approach, however, is also different from those orthodox Buddhist scholars who regard Buddhism a radically new tradition having no connection with Vedic thought. Where do we find him between the two different philosophical traditions? We are compelled to go back to the case of his omission of the Three Non-self-nature from the Yogācāra system of philosophy.

I have focused my research to the nature of the *Kathāvatthu* controversy and that of Nāgārjuna's *reductio-ad-absurdum* argument. Although this method became a pan-Indian cultural form in later period of polemics, it is generally known to have been the Buddhist origin, of which I challenged Prof. Murti's view by demonstrating the *Kathāvatthu* controversy and the contribution of the Mādhyamika type of treatment to deal with the problem that arises from the problem of discrepancy of

自性性，即緣生法，亦名勝義無自性性，如何故，於諸法中
是清淨所緣境界、我顯示彼以為勝義無自性性，依他起相非
是清淨所緣境界，此故亦說名為勝義無自性性、復有諸法円
成実相、亦名勝義無自性性、是一切法勝義諦故，無自性性
之所顯故，由此因緣，名為勝義無自性性。

signification in logic. I did not go into the method of the *Prajñāpāramitā* method of narrative inculcation of *Śūnyatā* although I challenged against Prof. Murti's view that it was the source of Nāgārjuna's dialectic. I think that the *Prajñāpāramitā* textual tradition had an important educational role in Buddhist history in India as well as outside India. Besides, logical and dialectical method did not create as much enthusiasm outside India as in India.

The reality underlying linguistic usage is another subject. The grammarians,, like Bhartṛhari asserted the metaphysical system of *Śabda Brahman* to explain linguistic phenomena of signification. The Buddhist view is centered to the individual transcendent skandha elements harmoniously configured by dependent origination throughout history since the Buddha. Prof. Murti himself asserted the direction of new research in linguistics as early as 1963 when he spoke in his presidential speech for Indian linguistic Society. It is my hope that the linguistic research may be more successful to deal with the problem of antithesis between the two major traditions.

8. Epilogue

As it is with the world of globalization, the trend is proceeding toward a period when one system of philosophy or religion would no longer be linked with a particular cultural, historical and racial context. Buddhist Studies today is no longer confined to Indian cultural context, even though its study still requires the knowledge of Sanskrit and Pāli. Chinese and Tibetan languages have already been important disciplines of Buddhist Studies. This trend would advances as times go on, especially because we are more and more pressed to focus attention on to individual persons irrespective whether one is in whatever religion, culture, business, and so on.

My first visit to India, especially, Buddhist historical sites, goes back to 1952-53. In 2009, I happened to write an article for the felicitation volume for Prof. N.H. Samtani who served as chair of the Buddhist and Pāli Studies at the Banaras Hindu University after Ven. Bhikkhu Kāśyapa. I had a chance to refresh my observation of Buddhist sites in Bodhagayā and Lumbinī, etc. Also I had chances of studying the status of Ambedkar Buddhist

Movement in Nagpur and Mumbai. In short I spent my adult life observing India's development and the revival movement of Indian Buddhism for over half a century. It has been often difficult for me to face such a slow history of recovery tasks of the Buddhist sites and revival movement of Buddhist affairs. Some theorists say that the majority of Hindu society has kept it down. I do hope that there will be some change with these affairs.

I have been concerned with the depth of religious and cultural conflicts between the monotheistic religions and cultures themselves which cannot be ended smoothly, unless both parties become capable of controlling and modifying the mental force of signification. The significative force of language is so strong in all human cultures, like in ethnic, tribal, racial, social groups, and strongest of all, in religious groups. When two parties collide, it is always the case that the force of signification is emphasized in both parties rather than reduced. New education is necessary in terms of globally balanced degrees as many localities as possible for reduction of verbal and linguistic forces of signification. I do hope that Sanskritists keep this matter in mind and contribute to this global goal while promoting their cause.

Vyakti and the History of Rasa

Sheldon Pollock

शेल्डन् पोलक् महाभागः भट्टनायकाभिमतयोः भोग-भोगकृत्वयोः अभिनवगुप्ताद्यङ्गीकृत-व्यक्तिव्यञ्जनाभ्याम् अभिन्नत्वं ब्रुवतो जगन्नाथ-पण्डितराजस्य पक्षमसमीचीनं प्रतिज्ञाय, अलङ्कारशास्त्रेतिहासे आदित एव रसविषयकशब्दबोधात्मकज्ञानस्य रसविषयकस्यानुभवात्मकस्य च ज्ञानस्य विषये पारस्परिकभेदाग्रहवशात्, रसाश्रयविषये भिन्नभिन्नपक्षाणा-माश्रयणेन च सञ्जातं वैचारिक-व्यामिश्रणं विशदयता सप्रमाणमुपपाद्य धनिक-धनञ्जय-महिमभट्ट-रुय्यक-विश्वनाथादीनां ग्रन्थावलम्बनेन पूर्वोक्तज्ञानयोः पारस्परिकभेदं सम्यक् प्रत्यपादयत्। आनन्दवर्धनेन तु व्यक्तेः शब्दवृत्तित्वं रसाश्रयत्वं चोरीकृतम्, तत्परवर्तिभिस्तु तस्याश्चित्तवृत्तित्वं सहृदयाश्रयत्वं च निरूपितमिति विशेषः। भट्टनायक एव अस्य प्रस्थानभेदस्य वस्तुतो नायक इति पोलकवर्यस्यात्र स्वारस्यम्।

A small but significant chapter in the intellectual history of rasa is opened by the philological history of the word *vyakti* (and its virtual synonyms *vyañjanā* and *abhivyakti*). The fact that this term underwent fundamental redefinition after Ānandavardhana's time, for whose new linguistics of literature it was a keyword, seems to have been as invisible to the premodern Indian thinkers who wrote on aesthetic theory as it has been to the modern scholars who have studied them. And while Indian thinkers may actually have been more aware of some crucial components of the intellectual history of rasa than most modern scholars of the subject, their awareness was incomplete without a sense of the historically contingent semantics of *vyakti*.

A case in point is Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja. In an earlier publication I argued that when, in reviewing the history of rasa theory in his *Rasagaṅgādhara*, Jagannātha claims Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's notion of "experience" (*bhoga*) to be no different from Abhinavagupta's idea of *vyakti*, and his "experientialization"

(*bhogakṛttva* [sic]) no different from Abhinava's *vyañjanā*,¹ the great seventeenth-century poetician was seriously mistaken. My reasoning was that, from the moment Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka redirected attention away from the internal production of emotion in the text to the external reception of *rasa* in the reader, Ānandavardhana's conception of *vyakti/vyañjanā* was rendered irrelevant for the understanding of *rasa* and hence ceased to have the pivotal role in literariness that had been claimed for it. As Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka famously put it, "As for the other process called 'implicature' (*dhvani*), which is essentially the process of manifestation (*vyañjanātmakaḥ*), even were it proven to be different from the other two [verbal modalities, i.e., literal and figurative meaning (*abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā*)], it would only be a component of literature, not its essential form."²

My account was correct, I believe, but only up to a point, for I failed to make clear the radical difference between what Jagannātha meant by *vyakti/vyañjanā* and what Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka himself meant (though Jagannātha should of course have registered it himself, in view of the citation I gave above). It is this difference, its origins, and its significance for the history of *rasa*—which I think can be considered (and which at all events I will consider) separately from the history of the term in broader philosophical and linguistic thought—that I want to try to delineate here.

I

To the degree that we can reconstruct his views from the pitifully few fragments surviving from his masterpiece, the *Hṛdayadarpaṇa*, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka was concerned to rethink the notion of *rasa* in part by refuting the doctrine propounded by Ānandavardhana. In fact, Ruyyaka in the mid-twelfth century

1. *matasyaitasya pūrvasmān* [sc., *abhinavaguptasya*] *matād bhāvakatvavyāpārāntarasvīkāra eva viśeṣaḥ. bhogas tu vyaktiḥ. bhogakṛttvaṃ tu vyañjanād aviśiṣṭam* (*Rasagaṅgādhara* p. 30 l. 2).
2. See Pollock 2010: 147, the note there, and appendix #9. See also the fragment of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka cited in *Dhvanyālokalocana* p. 88: "[Since implicature is supposed to be found everywhere in discourse] we would be forced to say that all discourse can be called literature," and his downgrading of *dhvani*, *ibid.* pp. 171-172.

called the *Hṛdayadarpaṇa* “a book meant to overthrow the concept of implicature” (*dhvanidhvaṃsagranthaḥ*), though it was undoubtedly far more than a mere polemic.¹ As we can see from the fragment quoted above, in Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s usage *vyañjanā* was synonymous with *dhvani*. And, unsurprisingly, that is precisely how Ānandavardhana himself uses the term throughout the *Dhvanyāloka*. There, the verbal root *vyañj* and its derivatives *vyakti*, *abhivyakti*, *vyañjakatva* (curiously he nowhere employs the term *vyañjanā* itself) refers exclusively to a *śabdavṛtti*, the new verbal modality Ānanda postulates and designates *dhvani*.² It represents exclusively a *linguistic*, specifically a semantic, dimension of the literary text; what is *vyakta* is an *artha*, a layer of textual signification.³ As in narrative or rhetorical implicature (*vastudhvani*, *alaṅkāradhvani*) and no doubt analogized from those cases, *rasa* is held to be communicated by implicature as well (*rasadhvani*): the emotional content of a literary work is something that cannot be signified by metaphor or metonymy let alone directly expressed; it can only be implied (*dhvanyate*), that is, “manifested” (*[abhi]vyajyate*).⁴

All of this is in complete harmony with Ānandavardhana’s overall aesthetic theory. His striking critical innovation in the area of literary meaning notwithstanding, Ānanda belonged to the traditional school of *rasa* analysis, which was entirely formalistic. His attention is directed almost exclusively to the text-centric problems of *rasa*: how it is related to “language qualities” or figures of sound or sense (chapter 2), or to “texture” (e.g., degree of compounding) (chapter 3.5); by what processes it

1. Ruyyaka’s comment on *Vyaktiviveka* p. 5.
2. *vyañjakatvasāmyād dhvanir ity uктаḥ (Dhvanyāloka p. 135); śabdo vyañjakatām bibhrad dhvanyukter viśayībhavet (1.15), etc.*
3. *so ’rthas tadvyaktisāmarthyayogī śabdaś ca kaścana ... (Dhvanyāloka 1.8).*
4. *trṭīyas tu rasādīlakṣaṇaḥ prabhedo vācyasāmarthyākṣiptaḥ prakāśate, na tu sāksāc chabdavyāpāraviśaya iti vācyād vibhinna eva (Dhvanyāloka pp. 78-80). The terms *vyakti* and *abhivyakti* are used synonymously: *upanibadhyamāno ’laṅkāro rasābhivyakti- hetuḥ (p. 233); rasavyaktinimittam idaṃ cāparam ... (p. 342); rasavyaktyanugūṇatayaiva ... (p. 354); gītādīśabdebhyo ’pi rasābhivyaktir asti (p. 405), etc.* So too in *Vyaktiviveka*, e.g., *vyaktīlakṣaṇa- ... abhivyaktir iti tal lakṣaṇam (p. 80).**

is produced at the level of the literary work as a whole (3.10-14); what obstructs or contradicts it (3.18-20), and so on. In short, what Ānandavardhana wants to understand is the basic mechanism immanent in the text by which rasa is made manifest in the character, and why this mechanism cannot be comprised under the normal verbal modalities of literal or figurative signification (*abhidhā*, *lakṣaṇā*). Like all his predecessors he shows no interest whatever in rasa as an epistemological problem let alone in the subjective aspect of rasa, that is, the question of how the viewer/reader experiences it, though of course it is the viewer/reader who is always the one making the judgments about the successful or unsuccessful manifestation of rasa on the basis of his antecedent reactions.

It is this *vyakti* (*vyañjanā/abhivyakti*), in the technical sense of the verbal modality thought to explain how rasa can be communicated, that in the following generation formed the principal target of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's critique of Ānanda's theory in general. We shall see that it may well have been Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka himself who already recoded the sense of *vyakti*, but, as the citations adduced above suffice to show, the principal sense of the term for him was undoubtedly the linguistic.¹

We are able to get a firmer grasp of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's actual critique thanks to the *Avaloka* of Dhanika (c. 975), which offers the fullest exposition available of the ideas of the *Hṛdayadarpaṇa*.² That critique was partly derived from a reassertion (against *dhvani*) of the older theory of the process by which the final purport of a sentence is produced (*tātparya*), to which Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka as a Mīmāṃsaka was committed (I cannot detail the

1. In a brief excursus at the end of this article I consider one complex passage that has confused scholars on this point. I am not entirely sure what to make of the few earlier uses of (*abhi*-)*vyañj* in rasa discourse, namely in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (the *sthāyibhāvas* are *nānābhāvābhīnayavyaṇjita*-, NŚ 6.31+, GOS 4th ed. p. 283; the *bhāvas* are *kāvyaśābhīvyakti*hetavaḥ, NŚ 7.6+, GOS 4th ed. p. 342). Assuming these passages are old (which is not a given), it is most unlikely they are referencing the *śabdavṛtti*; perhaps they are simply playing on the metaphor of the *nānāvyañjanasamskṛtam annam* (p. 282).
2. As argued in Pollock 2010 *passim*.

complexities of that discussion here). But it certainly also seems to have been partly tied up with the hermeneutical shift itself that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka effected, from his redirecting the analytical focus of aesthetics away from its long-standing concern with the textuality of the production of *rasa* to the psychology of its reception. That the theory of implicature was rendered irrelevant by this new hermeneutics is indicated by Dhanika:

All this being the case, the view that *rasa* can be “manifested” (*rasādīnāṃ vyaṅgyatvam*) stands refuted. For an entity can only be manifested by something after it has been brought into being by something else: a pot, for example, can only be manifested by a light when it has already been produced by the clay.¹ It is certainly not possible for an entity to be brought into existence by the very things that are supposed to manifest it, and this at one and the same moment. But that *rasa* can be “reproduced” (*bhāvyante*) by means of the factors and the rest in the spectators is something that has already been cogently argued.²

To understand this passage we must first understand what “All this being the case” (*evam ca sati*) refers to. It would seem to signal the conclusion of Dhanañjaya’s core argument on which Dhanika is commenting, that is, the argument concerning the location of *rasa* (and hence its real nature). To quote the *kārikās* of the *Daśarūpaka* at issue:

Rasa belongs to the spectator experiencing the *rasa*, and to him alone, because he is alive and present. It does not belong to the character, because (1) he is no longer alive and present; (2) the ultimate aim of literature cannot pertain to the character; (3) we would otherwise have the absurd situation of the spectator being overcome with shame, jealousy, passion, or hatred—just as if he had seen a man in

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1. One of four types of manifestation, see *Vyaktiviveka* p. 80; and compare *Pramāṇavarttika* below, p. 250 n 3 (cited by Ruyyaka and Viśvanātha).
 2. *Daśarūpaka* p. 217.

everyday life in the embrace of his beloved—or else having a merely indifferent apprehension.¹

First, and generally, what Dhanika's comment suggests is that any given theoretical position on the location (or, generally, ontology) of *rasa*—whether it exists in the text or in the receiver—was intimately connected with a particular modality of its cognitive genesis (or, generally, epistemology)—such as here whether “manifestation” or “reproduction” (*bhāvakatva*) is the more appropriate explanation. If *rasa* is not something located in the text it cannot be “manifested”; if it is something in the mind of the viewer/reader it must be experienced (or, rather, re-experienced) in the way peculiar to aesthetic objects. Second and more specifically, this is the argument that Dhanika seems to be presenting, however elusively, in his comment just cited. If *rasa* is thought to be something “manifested,” it can only be manifested in the character, where it already exists, having attained its existence from something else—that is, presumably, from the real events recounted in the narrative—like a pot from clay, and is only being brought to light, like a pot by a lamp, by the language or representations of the literary text or drama. But since it makes no sense for *rasa* to exist in the character, as Dhanañjaya (following Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka) so cogently argues, some other epistemological/causal process must be involved, such as *bhāvanā*, where *rasa* is actually brought into existence—in the viewer/reader—by the words of the author.²

II

It was this powerful critique, or something close to it, from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka that would seem to have prompted the recoding of *vyakti* into the new meaning—indeed, into something on the order of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's *bhoga*—that would become so blindingly present to Jagannātha's eyes seven centuries later. The term in

1. *Daśarūpaka* 4.38-39.

2. In the *Vyaktiviveka* (pp. 80-83) it is the causal relationship of the aesthetic elements and *rasa* that is adduced to refute the simultaneity presupposed by Ānanda in his theory of the “manifestation” (*Dhvanyāloka* p. 404, sequentiality [cause and effect]; p. 424, simultaneity [lamp and jar]). Contrast the critique of the *Sāhityadarpaṇa* (see below).

the context of rasa theory would no longer refer to the manifestation of rasa through the text—the character's stable emotion enhanced by the aesthetic elements (*vibhāvādi*)—but rather to the “manifestation” of the viewer/reader's own stable emotion; *vyakti* in this context would no longer refer to a linguistic process, a *śabdavṛtti*, concerning the text's production of meaning, especially affective meaning, but instead to a psychological process, a *cittavṛtti*, concerning the viewer/reader's experience of rasa. As Jagannātha himself puts it, “In the statement ‘The stable emotion, manifested by the aesthetic elements, is known as rasa’ [*Kāvyaprakāśa* 4 *kārikā* 28], the word ‘manifested’ (*vyakta*), or being made an object of ‘manifestation’ (*vyakti*), refers to the consciousness [of the viewer/reader] from which obscurity has been removed (*bhagnāvaraṇā cit*).”¹ And this of course was the sense he had in mind when he equated Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's *bhoga* with Abhinavagupta's *vyakti*.

What can we say, however, about the actual history of this recoding prior to Jagannātha? If we trace our steps back from the mid-seventeenth-century, we find the new sense of the term in the *Kāvyapradīpa* (c. 1475), where Govinda in glossing *vyakta* in the same Mammaṭa passage declares that “‘manifestation’ is synonymous with aesthetic relishing” (*vyaktiś carvaṇeti paryāyaḥ*), that is, with the experience of the viewer/reader.² Some three centuries before Govinda, Hemacandra (d. 1172) defines rasa as the stable emotion existing in the form of the predispositions of the spectators when manifested (*abhivyakta*) by the aesthetic elements (*vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicāribhir abhivyaktaḥ sthāyī bhāvo rasaḥ*, which he glosses: *abhivyaktaḥ sāmājīkānām vāsanārūpeṇa sthitaḥ sthāyī ratyādiko bhāvaḥ*).³ Hemacandra's definition, however, has been borrowed from the summary of Abhinavagupta's aesthetic doctrine in Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa* (c. 1050).⁴

1. *Rasagaṅgādhara* p. 26.

2. *Kāvyapradīpa* p. 116. “That is to say, rasa is the stable emotion [that exists in the form of the viewer/reader's latent predisposition, p. 117] when it is qualified by *vyakti*, or relishing” (p. 118).

3. *Kāvyānuśāsana* p. 88.

4. *Kāvyaprakāśa* p. 92.

The text that would seem to establish something of a baseline in our semantic reconstruction is Mahima Bhaṭṭa's *Vyaktiviveka*, which highlights our keyword in its very title. This work must have been composed sometime in the first quarter of the eleventh century, since it cites the *Dhvanyāloka* (c. 1000) at least once and was itself cited by Mammaṭa. There is no hint in the *Vyaktiviveka* that by *vyakti* Mahima Bhaṭṭa understood anything but Ānandavardhana's *dhvani*, the "manifestation" of linguistic meaning; it is certainly never used in the sense of the revelation of a subjective response to the aesthetic object. In fact, like Ānanda himself Mahima Bhaṭṭa is largely indifferent to the reception theory of *rasa*—as he puts it explicitly, "We hold *rasa* to be an imitation of a stable emotion" (*sthāyīyanukarāṇātmano hi rasā iṣyante*)—and, like his fellow logician Śrī Śaṅkuka from whom he borrowed this view, he was concerned with the cognitive process by which we infer the presence of *rasa* in the literary text.¹ Of course, Mahima, writing in the wake of Abhinavagupta's reconceptualization (he had no direct knowledge of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's work), agrees that in the final analysis *rasa* is an "experience of rapture on the part of the responsive viewer/reader" (*sacetanacamatkāritvam*),² but the only possible application of the term "manifestation" to that process can be a figurative one (*vyāṅgyatvopacāra*). We actually infer *rasa* from the aesthetic elements—these elements do not "manifest" *rasa*—but the use of "manifestation" in a metaphorical sense, he suggests, may be allowed as pointing toward the uniqueness of the final experience.

We are finally, and not unexpectedly, brought to Abhinavagupta, where we encounter a commentator forced to transfigure the very meaning of the work he is commenting on to

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1. *Vyaktiviveka* p. 73. When Mahima Bhaṭṭa refers to "apprehending desire or any other stable emotion at the same time as [we apprehend] the meaning of the sentences [that convey] the foundational factor and the other aesthetic elements" (p. 62), he is talking about the stable emotion of the character in the work, not the stable emotion of the apprehending subject, the viewer/reader.
 2. *Vyaktiviveka* p. 59. Note that the term *camatkṛ* is found only once in the *Dhvanyāloka*, in what is almost certainly a gloss that has crept into the text (p. 549).

save it; but also, and unexpectedly, perhaps to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka himself, where we may be finding a critic turning his opponent's weapons directly against him.

What is striking about the Abhinavagupta material is that, *pace* Mammaṭa, there seems to be no explicit reformulation of *vyakti* as the revelation of the viewer/reader's *sthāyibhāva*. Of course, it is everywhere clear in Abhinava that *rasa* is an experience of the reader and an experience brought about by *vyakti*; indeed, the equivalence of his categories with Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's was drawn by Abhinava himself:

*bhogīkaraṇavyāpāraś ca kāvyasya rasaviśayo dhvananātmaiva, nānyat kiñcit.*¹

(The process of "experientialization" in literature is nothing other than implicature with *rasa* as its object.)

But while all the components of the theory are present here and elsewhere—the idea that *rasa* is an apprehension in the subject having the *rasa* experience; that the subject's latent predispositions are stimulated by the experience; that the language of *vyakti* can continue to be used—I have been unable to locate anywhere in the *Locana* or the *Abhinavabhāratī* a passage where Abhinava says directly that it is the latent emotion of the viewer/reader that is "manifested"; the phraseology that will become so common later (*abhivyaktaḥ sāmājīkānām vāsanārūpeṇa sthitaḥ sthāyī* and the like) is not found in Abhinava, so far as I can see, and while Abhinava is committed to the view that the viewer/reader's predispositions are activated in the aesthetic process, he does not seem to say that they are "manifested."² The closest we come are in the following two passages from the *Locana* (I find nothing quite comparable in the *Abhinavabhāratī*):

tasmāt sthitam etad abhivyajyante rasāḥ pratītyaiva ca rasyanta iti. (p. 190)

1. *Dhvanyālokalocana* p. 188.

2. E.g., *Abhinavabhāratī* p. 279, *tadvibhāvādisādhāraṇyavaśaṣaṃprabuddhocitanijaratyādivāsanāveśa-*, etc.

(Hence it is settled that the rasas are “manifested,” and are tasted in the form of an apprehension [thereby attained].)

vyaṅgyasya ca cārutvaṃ rasābhivyaktiyogyatātmakam, rasasya svātmanaiva viśrāntidhāmna ānandātmakatvam.... (p. 473)

(“The beauty of a suggested meaning is no more than its ability to manifest *rasa*, and ... *rasa*, as the end product of the aesthetic process, is itself bliss....”)¹

The semantic transformation, whereby what is “manifested” or revealed is a new form of consciousness in the viewing/ reading subject, which is implicit throughout Abhinava’s work, may in fact have begun before him, just possibly with Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka himself. Given how little we know about the great critic, however, it is not entirely surprising that making this determination comes down to how we understand a single, intrinsically and contextually complex verse found in the *Abhinavabhārati* and the *Vyaktiviveka*, and what sense we are to make of its history. Here is the verse in question:

saṃvedanākhyayā vyaṅgyaparasaṃvittigocaraḥ /
*āsvādanātmānubhavo rasaḥ kāvyārtha ucyate //*²

(The purpose of literature is *rasa*, which is an experience consisting of savoring; it may be said to be “manifested” only by way of a manifestation called awareness, and its domain is the highest consciousness.)

The reading in *pāda* a is that given in the second edition of the Gaekwad Oriental Series edition of the *Abhinavabhārati*,³ which the editor of the fourth edition imprudently emended to accord with the version transmitted by Mahima Bhaṭṭa: *bhāvasaṃyojanāvyaṅgya*-.⁴ In addition to the problematic variant, we are confronted with several complications in understanding

1. Trans. Ingalls et al. 1990: 611.

2. *Abhinavabhārati* p. 271.

3. *Abhinavabhārati* p. 277 (*saṃvedanākhyayā*, sc., *vyañjanayā/ vyaktyā*). The *sāpekṣasamāsa* is difficult. Kangle conjectures *saṃvedanākhyavyaṅgyas tu* (1973: 150); *vyaṅgyaḥ* would be easier. See also below p. 247 n 2.

4. *Vyaktiviveka* p. 70 (“Revealed by the conjuncture of aesthetic elements”).

the verse. First, while in the *Abhinavabhārati* it is found at the end of Abhinava's review of the ideas of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, it is not self-evident that the verse is to be attributed to him. A second, closely related question is posed by the context of Abhinava's quotation of the verse and his comment on it. And a third is how to explain the fact that the verse is absent from the parallel passage in Hemacandra's *Kāvyaṇuśāsana*: where Abhinava gives *yat tūktam saṃvedanākhyayā*, etc., Hemacandra (and the *Kalpalatāviveka* following him) offer another verse undoubtedly to be attributed to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka but one with entirely different concerns.

Whether or not the verse is to be attributed to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is complicated by the fact that Mahima Bhaṭṭa confesses never to have had the chance to read the *Hṛdayadarpaṇa* (*adrṣṭadarpaṇa*-, v. 4). It is of course entirely possible that a verse from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's work could have been circulating anonymously and found its way into the *Vyaktiviveka* (indeed, he may have taken it from the *Abhinavabhārati* itself, though I know of no evidence that he had access to this work). More tellingly, we might wonder why Abhinava should quote the verse immediately after citing two other verses from the work of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka if it were not by the same author.¹ The context of his citation is somewhat confusing, however, and one is easily misled into supposing that the point of Abhinava's quotation is the same in all three instances, i.e., to reject his *pūrvapakṣin*. Here is how Abhinava introduces and explains the verse:²

[H: *bhāvanābhāvya eṣo 'pi śṛṅgārādigaṇo hi yat*] iti tu yat kāvyena bhāvante rasāḥ ity ucyate, tatra vibhāvādijanita-carvaṇātma-kāśvādarūpapratyayagocaratāpādanam eva yadi [H: *bhaved*] bhāvanam [sic] tad abhyupagamyata eva. yat tūktam saṃvedanākhyayā [etc.] tatra vyajyamānatayā vyaṅgyo lakṣyate. anubhavaṇa tadviśaya iti mantavyam.³

(If in saying that "Reproduction" brings into being the things we categorize as *rasas* ..." [Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka] means that "Rasas

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1. A simple point I overlooked until C. Rajendran called it to my attention.
 2. "H" indicates additions or variants from Hemacandra's *Kāvyaṇuśāsana*.
 3. *Abhinavabhārati* p. 371.

are caused to come into being by a literary work”—that is, if he means thereby, “bringing rasa within the scope of an apprehension [on the part of the viewer/reader] in the form of a savoring (i.e., relishing) produced by the aesthetic elements,” then that sort of “bringing into being” is something we fully accept. As for what is said in the following, “The purpose of literature is rasa ...,” here rasa itself is figuratively being referred to as “manifested” as [the reader’s awareness itself] that is being manifested;¹ while by the use of the word “experience” what is meant is that rasa is the *object* of an experience.”²

The introductory phrase *yat tūktam* normally prompts us to expect a refutation—but no refutation ever in fact arrives; on the contrary, rather than introducing yet another *pūrvapakṣa* the verse is clearly adduced to *corroborate* Abhinava’s interpretation of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s *bhāvanā*. This strongly suggests that original reading was not *yat tūktam* but *yathoktam*, “as indeed he has said.” True, this still leaves open the question of who said it—and of course the possibility that it was Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka himself.

In interpreting the verse I am inclined to believe that Mahima Bhaṭṭa preserved its principal thrust of emphasizing the experiential as opposed to the linguistic idea of *vyakti* and hence its figurative and not literal meaning here (as Ruyyaka clearly indicates in his commentary). Mahima’s reading of *pāda a*, on the other hand, may be a later revision, perhaps by Mahima himself, to make the quotation fit better with his concerns in the *Vyaktiviveka* passage regarding the normal production of rasa.

1. Translation uncertain.

2. So Ruyyaka (on *Vyaktiviveka* p. 71): “*vyaṅgyo*” *vyaktivādinā tathātvenābhipreta iha darśane tūpacaritavyaṅgyabhāvaḥ ... “anubhavo” yady api tasya [sc., rasasya] grāhakaḥ tathāpy abhedopacārād iyam uktiḥ*. I do not think it makes much difference to the historical argument I am offering whether *-vyaṅgya* in *pāda a* is read as *-vyaṅgyaḥ* or as the first member of an *ubhayapadaviśeṣaṇasamāsa*, both construed as referring to *rasaḥ* in *pāda d* (so Ruyyaka), or as modifying *-saṃvitti-* in *pāda b* (which would be somewhat redundant in the presence of *saṃvedanākhyayā*).

That the *Kāvyaṇuśāsana* fails to transmit the verse is less problematical than what it substitutes. Hemacandra does not hesitate elsewhere to emend the original *Abhinavabhāratī* for one reason or another (such as the Vedic citations *rātrim āsata*, etc. on the page following the verse in question). The substitute verse that he offers here, however, while it undoubtedly belongs to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, is entirely out of place in the current context, and someone, if not Hemacandra himself, understood it in a way that, given what we know of Nāyaka and Abhinava both, seems to me simply impossible.¹

Regardless of whether or not we ascribe the verse to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (though I think we should), or accept as genuine the reading *saṃvedanākhyayā* given in the manuscripts of the *Abhinavabhāratī* (though I think we must), the verse would still appear to be the first instance of the migration of the idea of *vyakti* from its linguistic sense of manifestation of a latent meaning in the text, to its psychological sense, the revelation of a new consciousness in the viewer/reader. Were the transvaluation in fact owing to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, it would be a clever move. “*Vyakti* does not work the way you think it works,” he would be telling Ānanda, “because *rasa* does not work the way you think it works, from within the text. I am prepared to accept *vyakti* only in a figurative sense, in connection with the real nature of *rasa*, which is a process unfolding in the mind of the witnessing subject.”

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1. The complete verse is: *saṃsargādir yathā śāstra ekatvāt phalayogataḥ / vākyārthas tadvad evātra śṛṅgārādī raso mataḥ //* (Just as in the Veda, where syntactic construal and the other linguistic operations constitute sentence meaning—since sentence meaning is a unity given that it must bear a relation to a single outcome of action—so here in literature does the erotic and every other *rasa* constitute a kind of sentence meaning). This is authenticated, by my lights, as the work of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka by the arguments provided by Dhanika (*Avaloka* on *Daśarūpaka* 4.37, p. 211; see Pollock 2010: 152-153). In the *Kāvyaṇuśāsana*, however, the following citation is added: *tad asmākam abhimatam eva*, which makes no sense. Abhinavagupta should not be shown accepting a view of *rasa* as constituting a sentence meaning (*vākyārtha*) when that was precisely what Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka used to refute Ānanda’s doctrine of *dhvani/vyañjanā*.

III

What remains troubling in this tentative reconstruction of mine is that the Indian tradition seems to have only rarely gestured toward, and never fully acknowledged, the transmutation of *vyakti* from a linguistic into a psychological phenomenon. The most telling case, I believe, is that of Ruyyaka (c. 1150). In his commentary on the *Vyaktiviveka* he sets out to justify precisely what Mahima Bhaṭṭa had sought to refute, namely, the applicability of *vyakti* to the notion of *rasa*. What he has to say is valuable, and merits citing at length:

The reasoning of the advocate of manifestation¹ for his acceptance of that explanation is as follows.... It would be incorrect to attempt to vindicate inference instead of manifestation, or to claim that “manifestation” can only have a figurative sense [see above, p. 243], by resorting to the idea that the aesthetic factors and the stable emotions are actually factitious.² It is relishing that actually animates (*anuprāṇa*) *rasa* and it is the sensitive viewer/reader alone who relishes *rasa*; hence, when we characterize *rasa*’s essence, it must be as something that exists in the viewer/reader. *Rasa* does not exist in the character or the actor, because we can only apprehend *rasa* through “commonization” (*sādhāranya*), which requires eliminating (*avatoṭana*) all the character’s (or actor’s) particularities, those of space, time, social status, and literary type. It is not, of course, entirely incoherent to ascribe *rasa* to a character such as Rāma or the actor portraying him, since they participate (*anupraveśa*) in *rasa*. But it is altogether incorrect to classify (*vyavasthāna*) *rasa* as *existing* in them, given the authoritative statement of the Sage himself, that “The stable emotion itself is *rasa*.”³

Since, accordingly, it is the stable emotion that is *rasa*, and since those who lack *rasa* (*nīrasa*) themselves cannot relish it,

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1. This is actually the position of Ruyyaka himself.
 2. The theory of Śrī Śāṅkuka, with which Mahima Bhaṭṭa in fact agrees.
 3. This makes sense only if Ruyyaka takes “stable emotion” as referring to the actual feelings of the viewer/reader.

the stable emotions really and truly exist in the form of our predispositions, and they become *rasa* when they are made accessible to the act of relishing. Such is our position. There is nothing factitious here about the *rasas*, desire and the rest, nor indeed, even about the causes, effects, and ancillary causes that come to be designated 'factors' ('foundational' and 'stimulant'), 'reactions,' and 'transitory emotions' when apprehended by the viewer/reader as common to him, because these actually do exist: they are called 'foundational factors' and so on in the primary sense of the terms only when apprehended by a sensitive viewer/reader; otherwise they remain 'causes' and the like. (This was intention of the Sage in giving these things their supermundane designations in the *rasasūtra*.) Therefore, the truly existing stable emotion in the form of a predisposition is manifested by the aesthetic factors without the interposition of any recollection of some connection among them.¹ Given this, *rasa* is "manifested" in a quite literal and not figurative sense, while its being something that must be inferred is refuted. The same holds for the emotions.

As for the four different kinds of manifestation that have been recognized,² depending on whether the object of manifestation is real or not, that subject is quite irrelevant here, because we accept for our theory of manifestation the model of the lamp and the pot. It is also false to raise the specter of the absurdity that, if the manifestation were real, the *rasa* would have to become visible. We do not refute our opponent's view by way of his own definition as "coming to visibility"; and in fact no one has defined manifestation this way. The term can be defined generally (according to the statement, "Manifestation produces a cognition of something else—if that something is an already existing entity—by the cognition of itself, as in the case of a lamp")³

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1. Such as would support Mahima Bhaṭṭa's rival doctrine of inference.
 2. *Vyaktiviveka* p. 80.
 3. *Pramāṇavārttika* of Dharmakīrti, *kārikā* 262 (p. 137).

as “coming to awareness.” There is accordingly no objection whatever to the application of “manifestation” to rasa.¹

There are several key moves we should notice in Ruyyaka’s argument. The first is to assert that the “stable emotion” at issue in rasa theory has, *from the beginning*, been the stable emotion of the viewer/reader, in the form of his latent predispositions: rasa only lives when it is experienced, and it is only the viewer/reader who does experience it (precisely the axiom, we will recall, that led Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Dhanika to *reject vyakti*). The character may “participate” in the actual events of rasa but rasa as such cannot exist in him, since (aside from the fact that only the *sahṛdaya* can savor rasa) we must in effect erase the specific character if commonization is to take place. In the same way, the *vibhāvas* and the rest actually do exist insofar as they are real apprehensions of the viewer/reader. And it is these that manifest the predispositions, in the primary sense of the term “manifest”: “bring into the domain of aesthetic experience.” In short, according to Ruyyaka, since the theory of rasa was never about the rasa of the character, and “manifestation” can never have meant anything other than simply “bringing to awareness,” there can never have been a transformation of the term *vyakti* in the first place.

This is quite an astonishing reassessment, and we might expect to have encountered somewhere some criticism of it, a demurral, or at least an acknowledgement. But in fact, the only slight hesitation that is registered, so far as I have been able to discover, is in the *Sāhityadarpaṇa* (late fourteenth century). When Viśvanātha uses the language of *vyakti/vyañjanā*, we find someone for the first time confronting, or so it seems to me, the difficulties inherent in the term’s redirection from the semantics of rasa to its phenomenology. He starts with the imagined objector arguing that, since what exists in the case of rasa is only a process of tasting—of aesthetic consciousness—and not some actual object, how can the language of “manifestation” (*vyañjanā*) continue to be applied to it? The author’s answer is to concede the point, and to defend himself by saying that the use of “manifestation” is borrowed from the language of *dhvani*:

1. *Vyaktiviveka* pp. 62-63.

Objection: If it is indeed the case that *rasa* is not some *thing* different from the experience of it, then one winds up arguing that *rasa* is not an object of knowledge. And since manifestation, which you accept as the mechanism for knowing *rasa*, is the making known of some particular object, *rasa* and manifestation would wind up being one and the same thing (since both are *forms* of knowledge and not *objects* of knowledge). And how then could *rasa* possibly be something that is manifested, as you claim [at the beginning of the chapter: *vibhāvenānubhāvena vyaktaḥ ...* (2.1)], when the source of manifestation and the thing manifested must be absolutely separate entities, like a lamp and a pot. To quote: “Manifestation produces a cognition of something else....”

Answer: This objection is entirely valid. And for this reason it has been argued that “*Rasa* must be completely distinguished from all acts of making and knowing. It is a unique function, something we can call ‘savoring.’”¹ And that is why scholars use distinctive terms for it: tasting, savoring, rapture (*camatkāra*), and so on.² It is only because we are keen to establish the process as such and as different from all other language functions, that we have said that *rasa* is something “manifested.”³

The best commentary on this passage is the vacillation expressed by Viśvanātha himself later, in chapter 5, where he vindicates the verbal function of *vyañjanā* in general but demurs

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1. Source unknown.
 2. Commentators and manuscripts are in disagreement on this passage. Anantadāsa construes the whole passage from *vilakṣaṇa-* to *bhavatīti* (which he reads thusly) as the direct discourse introduced by *āhus* (whom he calls the ancient authorities). I read *iti* after *vyāpāraḥ* and omit it after *vyapadeśāḥ*. The last line seems to me Viśvanātha’s defense (*asmābhiḥ*) of *vyañjanā* despite its logical irrelevance to a theory based on a hermeneutical *vyāpāra*.
 3. *Sāhityadarpaṇa* pp. 79-81 (NSP). As Andrew Ollett has pointed out to me, it is possible that Viśvanātha is responding directly to Dhanika; at the same time, his strategy—insisting on a metaphorical use of *vyakti* in order to accommodate the doctrine of subjective appreciation of *rasa* (*rasacarvaṇā*)—seems very similar to Mahima Bhaṭṭa’s.

when applying it to rasa: “This linguistic function [“a fourth function above and beyond *abhidhā*, *lakṣaṇā*, and *tātparya*”] is called ‘manifestation’ by scholars. But when it comes to the ‘manifestation’ of rasas, others”—that is, Viśvanātha himself—“say that the function should be called ‘tasting.’”¹

* * *

I have tried to show that we must distinguish both conceptually and historically between two kinds of *vyakti*, one a *śabdavṛtti*, a linguistic phenomenon and an objective process, the other a *cittavṛtti* (or *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*), a psychological phenomenon and a subjective process. (While a linguistic fact is of course at one and the same time a cognitive fact, the two can be analytically separated and were actually separated in India.) When Ānandavardhana and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka were employing the language of *vyakti* they were doing so in the former sense. The latter sense arose only after Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s hermeneutical transformation of the idea of rasa—and possibly thanks to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s own ironical usage—when rasa was no longer held to be the stable emotion manifested (rather than directly or figuratively expressed) in the character but rather (according to Abhinavagupta’s reformulation of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka) the stable emotion manifested in the viewer/reader, that is to say, the revelation to himself of his own *vāsanās*.

Why later discussions fuse (or confuse) these two senses, why, that is, the language of linguistics was retained for the language of psychology, is a question we can definitively answer only when we have a fuller understanding of when and where the transformation took place. If we conclude, on the basis of the little evidence I could find, that it started with Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, the purpose would appear to have been to turn Ānandavardhana on his head, and demonstrate that the terminology he uses properly applies to something he never considered. If it begins with Abhinavagupta or in his lineage, the purpose might be the desire—and the sheer intellectual bravado in the face of so arduous a task—to vindicate the *dhvani/vyakti* concept that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka had sought to refute even while deploying the

1. *Sāhityadarpaṇa* 5.5., p. 271 (NSP): *sā ceyam vyañjanā nāma vṛttir ity ucyate budhaiḥ / rasavyaktau punar vṛttiṃ rasanākhyāṃ pare viduḥ //*

new hermeneutics that made this refutation essential. In the same way, when seven centuries later Jagannātha asserted Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's *bhoga* to be identical with *vyakti*, he was eliding the critique that led to the terminological redefinition—a critique, he thereby implied, that the term had anticipated from the start.

Equally striking, if my analysis here is even remotely correct, is the internal intellectual history of the transformation: first, the very fact that the transformation was so rarely thematized by the tradition itself, and second, when it was thematized, as by Ruyyaka, the move made to defend the new theory by locating its justification in the founding doctrine of the aesthetic system. While the latter phenomenon is hardly novel—the growth of knowledge in the Sanskrit world often has the *satkāryavāda* (or Platonic) character of discovery of something there all along rather than invention of something entirely new—the former merits careful scholarly attention: clearly what traditions fail to see (if this was failure) must be as much a part of our concern as what they do see. Let me also highlight in closing the small but consequential methodological point illustrated by the foregoing exercise and which I will characterize by way of another old Sāṃkhya figure: intellectual history without philology will be as blind as philology without intellectual history will be lame.

Excursus

Whether or not it was Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka who first (and if then, ironically) redeployed the term *vyakti* in the psychological sense it was to have for writers from Mammaṭa onward, elsewhere in the fragments it is clear he had only the linguistic meaning in mind. That some scholars have thought otherwise is due to a suspect passage in the *Locana* in the course of Abhinavagupta's restatement of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's critique. We may compare the *Locana* version with the *Abhinavabhāratī* rendering and Ruyyaka's later summary from his *Samketa* commentary on the *Kāvyaprakāśa*:

- (a) *Dhvanyālokalocana*: śaktirūpasya hi śṛṅgārasyābhivyaaktau viṣayārjanatāratamyapraṇṛtīḥ
- (b) *Abhinavabhāratī*: śaktirūpatvena pūrvam sthitasya [sc. *rasasya*] paścād abhivyaaktau viṣayārjanatāratamyāpattiḥ

(c) *Samketa: viṣayārjanatāratamyād api rasanīyatvābhāvaḥ*.¹

As I understand it, the idea being attributed to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka here is that if Ānanda's "manifestation" were to be accepted as the mechanism behind rasa, it could come about that, "since rasa exists only in potential form² and has to be 'manifested,' there would be 'gradations' (*tāratamya*) in the acquisition of all the pertinent objects" (i.e., the aesthetic elements, *vibhāvādi*), so much so that (as Ruyyaka concludes) one might never have a full experience of the rasa.

On this interpretation the reading *-pravṛtti* in the *Locana* passage would be a corruption for *-āpatti*. And indeed, the received reading makes little sense, as the recent translation of Ingalls et al. shows: "If the erotic rasa were a power [located within him] that is manifested, the spectator would make even greater efforts to obtain those objects [which bring about the manifestation]" (1990: 221). They also seem to be in error when they say, with reference to the use of *abhivyajyate* in the *Locana* passage that follows, "It seems unlikely ... that [Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka] is using *abhivyakti* in Abhinava's more restricted sense, namely the manifestation of a suggestion by verbal means" (1990: 227). In fact, it is Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka who has the more restricted understanding of the term here. The theory of *abhivyakti*, says Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, is subject to the same criticism as the theory of *utpatti*, since rasa can be "manifested" neither internally, in the perceiving subject, nor externally, in the actor or the characters (*tatrāpi kiṃ svagato 'bhivyajyate rasaḥ paragato vā*). On the first option, the viewer/spectator would be having the exact same experience as the character (and so recoil from tragedy, and so on); on the second, he would have no experience at all. This dilemma would make no sense if it were the later, non-

1. *Dhvanyālokalocana* p. 182; *Abhinavabhāratī* p. 270; *Kāvyaaprakāśa* p. 563.

2. One of the four varieties of *abhivyakti* reviewed by Mahima Bhaṭṭa; an example is the curd existing in *potentia* in milk (*Vyaktiviveka* p. 80).

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“restricted,” psychological meaning of (*abhi*)vyakti that were in play.

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Changing Paradigms in Performance : Kūṭiyāṭṭam in Historical Perspective

C.Rajendran

राजेन्द्रन्महाभागः केरलेषु उपलभ्यमानां संस्कृतनाट्यपरम्परां
“कूटियाट्टम्” नाम्नीमधिकृत्य ऐतिहासिकदृष्ट्या विवेचयन्
शङ्कराचार्यसमकालिकस्य शक्तिभद्रस्य आश्चर्यचूडामणेः प्रयोग एव
प्राचीनतमः प्रयोगः ऐतिहासिकप्रमाणसिद्धः इति प्रतिपाद्य
मन्दिरकलारूपेण प्रायः विंशतिशताब्दिपर्यन्तं प्रवृत्तः एषः प्रयोगः
रामचक्यार्-द्वारा मन्दिरेभ्यः बहिरानीतः इदानीं विश्वस्तरे प्रसिद्धो जात
इति विशदयति।

As the only surviving traditional Sanskrit theatre in India, Kūṭiyāṭṭam has recently attracted a lot of international attention, especially after UNESCO recognized the art form as one among the “Masterpieces of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity” in 2001. This unique temple theatre of Kerala has an attested history of at least a thousand years. Unfortunately, even though there is no dearth of books and studies outlining the technical aspects of the performance as such, not much has been written about the history and evolution of this art form. The present paper is an attempt to historicize the performance tradition of Sanskrit drama as manifested in Kūṭiyāṭṭam. It is my belief that such an exercise will go a long way in correcting the stereotyped view of performance, related with classical theatre as a monolith having neither inner strands nor subtle and manifest changes down the ages. It will also enable us to appreciate the socio-cultural and historical background which stimulated the evolution of Kūṭiyāṭṭam to the present state, even while Sanskrit drama became extinct in other parts of India.

We know practically nothing about the performance of Sanskrit drama during the hey day of it, when great plays Like *Abhijñānaśākuntala* were written. However, the dramas of

playwrights like Aśvaghoṣa, Kālidāsa and Sūdraka themselves are replete with copious information regarding stage techniques. Luders' identification of the fragments of the manuscript of Aśvaghoṣa's *Śarīputraprakaraṇa* from Turfan in Central Asia shows that during the heyday of Buddhism, drama was used to propagate religious ideals¹. In fact, Fahien, the ancient Chinese traveler refers to the performance of a play depicting the conversion of Śarīputra to Buddhism in Buddhist monasteries in the rainy season. Itsing, another Chinese traveler refers to the play *Nāgānanda* being popularized by King Harṣavardhana.² The only copious reference to actual performance in ancient Sanskrit literature is in Dāmodaragupta's *Kuṭṭanīmata*, written in 9th Century A.D. Here the author describes in detail the enactment of the first act of *Ratnāvalī*, the *Nāṭikā* composed by King Harṣavardhana which was played at the court of Prince Samarabhaṭa at Kaśī. The troupe consisted of women only, and the male roles were also enacted by women. This would be a total reversal of the ancient Indian theatre tradition wherein males were the sole actors, donning even female roles, as suggested by the term *Bhrūkumsa*, appearing in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, which stands for a man playing a woman's role³. The *Ratnāvalī* troupe is in diametrically opposite position with regard to art forms like Kathakali also which did not have female actors. Instruments like the flute were used for the opening ceremony culminating in the entrance of the Sūtradhāra. Dhruvā songs were improvised and sung at the entrance and the exit of the Sūtradhāra. Also, there was elaboration of the idea contained in the text, probably an indication of the freedom given to the stage director for improvisation of the script in actual performance.⁴

When did the Sanskrit drama migrate to the South? We know very little about the process. Śaktibhadra, the Keralite playwright roughly contemporaneous with Śankarācārya, in the prologue of the play *Āścaryacūḍāmaṇi*, makes the naṭī remark that

1. Luder, *Bruchstuecke Buddhistischer Dramen*, Berlin, 1911
2. A record of Buddhist Religion, p.163. Cited by Dr.K.Kunjunni Raja, *Sanskrit Drama on the Stage*, p.7
3. *Mahābhāṣya*, iv.1.3 See also, B.N.Puri, *India in the times of Patanjali*, p.200
4. *Kuttanīmata* Ed.Jagannatha Pathaka, p.p.579-682

dramas are indeed very rarely written in the South. It will, however, be wrong to suppose that Sanskrit drama migrated to the South into a cultural void. On one hand, we have *Nāṭyaśāstra* itself mentioning that the people of the South are 'proficient in many types of dance and music, prone to *Kaiśikīvr̥tti* and adepts in dexterous, sweet and graceful acting'¹. We have also numerous references to various stage performances and discourses called *Kūttu* in ancient Tamil literature. It is significant that the term *Kūttu* is still used in the sense of *Kūṭiyāṭṭam* as well as the solo discourse of the actor, as vouchsafed by the expressions *Kūṭiyāṭṭamkūttu* and *Prabandhakkūttu* respectively. From these we can surmise that a fusion of tradition might have taken place in the South sometime, amalgamating the Sanskrit performance tradition and the local *Kūttu* tradition. This might have taken place in the eight century, may be before Śaktibhadra's play was written. Śaktibhadra is one of the earliest authors whose plays feature in *Kūṭiyāṭṭam* tradition and in all probability, he must have written his play for an already existent stage.

There are two other important plays to be considered in this connection which may throw some light to the evolution and status of the classical Sanskrit theatre in the South, especially in Kerala. One is *Nāgānanda*, already referred to, written by Harṣavardhana, who ruled over Thaneshwar in AD 606-648. It is significant that this play has been a part of the repertoire of *Kūṭiyāṭṭam* from ancient times onwards. Two reasons are likely for the popularity of the drama in Kerala. One is it that it celebrates, as the title suggests, the joy of snakes and must have won special admiration in Kerala which is famous for snake worship. A more plausible explanation will be that it was a repertoire of the small Buddhist community which seems to have existed in Kerala in certain pockets. The second supposition looks much probable if we consider the view, held by some, that the term *Cākyār*, used to denote the actor, could be traced to the word *Śākya* meaning a member of the Buddhist clan. The earliest reference to the acting community of *Cākyār* is traced by some to

1. *Tatra dākṣiṇātyāstāvād bahunṛttaḡītavādyāḥ kaiśikīprāyāḥ caturamadhura lalitāṅgābhinayāśca. Nāṭyaśāstra XIV, p.165*

Śilappadikāram, wherein there is a mention of the actor called Paravūr Kuṭṭacākyaṛ .

The second drama to be considered here is *Mattavilāsaprahasana* written by Mahendravikrama the great Pallava King who reigned in Kāñcī in 600-630 AD. This remarkable farce, which is a satire on the decadence of religious practices, especially those of Buddhism and Śaiva sects, prevailing in the contemporary society has been a part of Kūṭiyāṭṭam repertoire for centuries and it is quite possible that Mahendravikrama had written the play to be staged in his court. It is also probable that his play, which was staged in Kāñcī came to be adapted to the Kerala stage roughly at the time of the emergence of the Kulaśekhara empire at Mahodayapuram in central Kerala .

There seems to have a lot of indigenization when Sanskrit drama came to be grafted to the Kerala soil through Kūṭiyāṭṭam. One major change is related to bodily acting; Kūṭiyāṭṭam, like all the other Kerala classical arts coming afterwards, makes use of the gestures outlined in *Hastalakṣaṇadīpikā* and not *Nāṭyaśāstra* or *Abhinayadarpaṇa*. Evidently, *Hastalakṣaṇadīpikā* represents a later dialect of the gesture language in comparison with that seen in *Nāṭyaśāstra* . Another noteworthy feature of Kūṭiyāṭṭam is the total disappearance of old musical instruments like *Vīṇa* and *Veṇu* mentioned in *Nāṭyaśāstra* and the appearance and prominence of percussion instruments like the *Miḷāvu*. The costume also seems to have undergone radical transformation; as in Kathakali, of the later era, and obviously as a prototype of it, Kūṭiyāṭṭam makes use of stereotypes like *Pacca*, *Katti* and *Tāṭi* for costume in *āhāryābhinaya* .

We have some interesting pieces of information regarding the evolution of the Sanskrit drama at the time of Kulaśekhara who ruled from Mahodayapuram in central Kerala around 900A.D¹. Kulaśekhara had enriched Kerala theatre with two of his plays, viz. *Subhadrādhanañjaya* and *Tapatīsamvaraṇa*, which are till date staged in Kūṭiyāṭṭam tradition. The *Vyaṅgyavyākhyā* commentaries on these two plays, written by an anonymous commentator are very important documents in the performance history. The commentator narrates how he was invited to the

1. K.Kunjunni Raja, *Contribution of Kerala to Sanskrit Literature*, p. 15

royal court and how the king himself demonstrated the performance of the plays following which he wrote the commentaries. In the commentary to *Tapatīsamvaraṇa*, he clearly mentions that the king donned the costume for each character and represented them for the latter's benefit ; all the stage directions contained in the commentary seem to have been done on the basis of this interaction. According to popular tradition, King Kulaśekhara reformed the Kerala stage with the assistance of Tolan, who is identified with this commentator.

The reforms brought about by Kulaśekhara seem to have drastically changed the nature of Sanskrit drama in Kūṭiyāṭṭam tradition from what it was in the pan Indian tradition. The main innovation seems to be the introduction of the local language as a medium for the Vidūṣaka and the provision given to him to parody the verses sung by the hero with Malayalam *Pratiśloka*s. Structurally, the plays seem to have been fragmented to autonomous units with each segment having its own Nāndī verse. Probably, this was necessitated due to the accumulation of diverse material in the enactment. On one hand, there was sophistication the bodily acting underwent with the dramatic potentiality of each word exploited to the hilt.¹ On the other, the discourse element in the presentation also seems to have gained an upper hand with increased prominence being given to the Vidūṣaka.

The plays presented in Kūṭiyāṭṭam make an intriguing list. The most conspicuous omissions are plays of celebrities like Kālidāsa, Śūdraka, Bhavabhūti and Viśākhadatta. The reasons are obscure. But fortunately we have most of the plays ascribed to Bhāsa, though now the staging of plays except portions from *Pratijñāyugandharāyaṇa* and *Abhiṣeka* has become practically extinct. Harṣavardhana's *Nāgānanda* was popular though *Ratnāvalī* and *Priyadarśikā* were not staged. Another hot favorite was Mahendravikrama's *Mattavilāsaprahasana*. An early and frequently staged play is the *Āścaryacūḍāmaṇi* of the Keralite author Śaktibhadra of the 8th century. The *Kalyāṇasaugandhika-vyāyoga* of Nīlakaṇṭha and *Bhagavadajjuka* of Bodhāyana are also some old

1. Ammavan Thampuran, *Kuttum Kutiyattavum*, p.25. See also, C.Rajendran *The Traditional Sanskrit Theatre of Kerala*, p.13

interesting plays. But the most frequently staged plays were of King Kulaśekhara himself, whose *Subhadrādhanañjaya* and *Tapatīsamvaraṇa* were very popular on the stage probably because of their authorship by the King, who was a great patron of Sanskrit learning.

There is no evidence to suggest that even during Kulaśekhara's time, Sanskrit drama was performed only in temples, and there is every likelihood that the Sanskrit drama was performed in royal courts in Kerala as elsewhere in the beginnings. Probably the early Buddhist settlers also might have used it for religious propaganda as evidenced by the popularity of *Nāgānanda* here. Gradually, it must have been grafted to the temple ritual when the Kerala agrarian societies were organized in Brahmin settlements with temples as their nucleus. The Kūṭiyāṭṭam came to be performed by the acting community consisting of Cākyār, Nambiār and Naññyār. The male characters are enacted by the Cākyār and the female characters by Naññyārs. The Nambiārs, the male counterparts of the latter are the professional drummers who play the instrument *Miḷāvu*. Of all, there were eighteen families belonging to the Cākyār community, the mainstay of the art, but now it has been reduced to three. These families were assigned the performance of the enactment of the ritual at various temples all over Kerala and various entitlements fixed to them, which ensured the continuity of the ritual across centuries.

Kūṭiyāṭṭam was conventionally staged in specially constructed temple theaters called *Kūttampalam*. Many important temples of Central and South Kerala like those at Trichur, Irinjalakkuda, Kidangoor, Harippad, Guruvayur, Peruvanam, Muzhikkulam, Tirunakkara and Chengannur have their own *Kūttampalams* which used to stage the Sanskrit drama regularly as a structured ritual. Most of the *Kūttampalams* are rectangular in shape as mentioned in texts like the *Nāṭyaśāstra* even though they do not possess characteristics like *Mattavāriṇī*. One half of the structure is earmarked for the audience. The other half consists of the stage and the green room, which is connected with the former through two doors. The stage is usually one feet raised from the level ground and its area ranges from 21'4"X21'4" square feet and 9'4"X9'4" square feet. The stage is demarcated by

four to twelve decorated pillars, which support a roof having architectural decorations. The low roof of the stage creates a bigger than life image for the actors dressed up in their costumes. The *Kūttampalams* have excellent auditory properties and good ventilation. The biggest theatre as in the *Vadakkumnāthan* temple of Trichur can accommodate two to five hundred spectators at a time. A big oil lamp placed in front of the stage serves as the focal point of the stage wherein the actors face the main audience sitting in front of them.

The pre-modern history of *Kūṭiyāṭṭam* is the story of the remarkable transformation of a relatively secular art like the Sanskrit play into a temple art. The manner in which this transformation took place in the medieval times is very fascinating. Even in the case of relatively secular plays like the *Pratijñāyugandharāyaṇa*, ritual came to be integrated to the enactment and the play production became more or less an annual ritual with fixed entitlements (*avakāśa*) prescribed to the actors and drummers in temples like the *Vadakkumnāthan* Temple of Trichur. In the case of plays like *Mattavilāsaprahasana*, there is even the articulation of the fruit (*phalaśruti*) like the begetting of a son as in a ritual like the sacrifice or an offering. This must have ensured the preservation of enactment tradition of the play in the temple with the sponsorship of believers. Kings and chieftains of medieval Kerala entrusted various *Cākyār* and *Nambiār* families with the performance of *Kūṭiyāṭṭam* in designated temples and gave property grant to them for livelihood apart from the prescribed entitlements. The acting communities have till date followed these conventions and discharged the duties assigned to them with religious fervor, thus preserving *Kūṭiyāṭṭam* for posterity. But the fact remains that later, due to the evolution of other 'parallel' art forms like *Kṛṣṇanāṭṭam*, *Kathakali* and *Tullal*, the appeal and reach of *Kūṭiyāṭṭam* seem to have suffered considerably since these later art forms had greater mass appeal.

If, thus it was the ritualisation and accommodation to the temple precincts which ensured some sort of survival for *Kūṭiyāṭṭam*, in the Post-independence era, its progress was made possible when the practitioners of the art found it necessary to bring it to the outside world. *Kūṭiyāṭṭam* had become somewhat

visible to the world of scholars even earlier, with the discovery of the thirteen Trivandrum plays ascribed to Bhāsa, as the authorship question became complicated when it was pointed out that many of these plays were presented through Kūṭiyāṭṭam for centuries. But it was the late Paimkulam Rāma Cākyār, a great traditional artist of foresight who dared to take the art to the outside world weathering stiff resistance of die hard traditionalists. He created history of a sort by presenting a *Prabandha* discourse (*Cākyārkkūttu*) outside temple precincts in September, 1949¹. Incidentally, this art form is a solo discourse of a Cākyār who dons the costume which more or less resembles that of the Vidūṣaka in Kūṭiyāṭṭam and accompanied by *Miḷāvu* recites portions from Sanskrit Campū texts and explains them in a humorous vein. Finally, in 1956, Kūṭiyāṭṭam was staged in open when Rāma Cākyār himself took the initiative to present it in the palace of the Zamorin at Calicut.² Other maestros also started following the example of Rāma Cākyār. He also accepted the invitation of Kerala Kalamandalam to start a Kūṭiyāṭṭam department which was opened in 1965 under his stewardship.³ One corollary of this bold venture was that Kūṭiyāṭṭam became available to the artists who did not belong to the traditional acting castes of Cākyār and Nambiār. Further, the Gurukula system was replaced by an Institutional training mode which ingeniously adapted the time tested traditional methods to the modern institutional framework. Rāma Cākyār relentlessly tried to graft more and more plays to the repertoire of the art. Of course, all this has created a cleavage between traditional temple performance which remained more or less stagnant and the modern 'secular' performance which has been showing phenomenal growth and to which non conventional spectators came to be attracted. In fact, with its emancipation from the rigid temple rituals, Kūṭiyāṭṭam started moving outside, attracting an international audience in places like France and Poland. Of course, there has been concern about Kūṭiyāṭṭam losing its original purity when transplanted from its organic surroundings.

1. Dr.K.T.Ramavarma, *Ammannur Cāccu Cākyār*, 1981, p.49.

2. *Ibid*, p.50

3. Killimangalam Vasudevan Namboodiripad, 'Kutiyattam:10 years after the UNESCO declaration' in *Indian Folklife* No.38,p16

Interestingly, there has also been an awareness of the “over-ritualisation” of Kūṭiyāṭṭam in contemporary discourses on Kūṭiyāṭṭam¹.

The latest development in the chequered history of Kūṭiyāṭṭam is, of course the UNESCO proclamation of it as a “Masterpiece of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity” in May, 2001. There has been a resurgence of the traditional art ever since this, with more and more institutions being established for the propagation of the art, in addition to Keralakalamandalam, Mārgi and Ammannūr Gurukulam, which have been in the forefront for a long time. Sudha Gopalakrishnan, reviewing the fall out of the UNESCO declaration brings forth the positive and negative aspects. On one hand, there has been an increased interest in Kūṭiyāṭṭam among the theatre lovers across the world, and positive benefits like more performance opportunities, a rise in the number of students, and institutions, more documentation and more media exposure. On the other, there is the perceived threat of decrease of high quality training and proliferation of new low quality choreographies of plays².

A critical overview of the history of performance tradition in Kerala as reflected in Kūṭiyāṭṭam, thus leads us to the inevitable conclusion that the tradition has been anything but stagnant and it was the survival techniques adapted by Sanskrit drama which ensured its continuity here even as it had become extinct elsewhere. Probably, Kūṭiyāṭṭam requires its temple precincts also for its continued growth and vitality, even when it has been emancipated from its narrow surroundings. As Virginie Johan puts it, ‘the flower needs its root to continue to grow’.³

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1. See Mundoli Narayanan ‘Over- Ritualisation of Performance: Western Discourses on Kutiyattam’, *The Drama Review* 50-2 pp.136-153
 2. ‘Kutiyattam :UNESCO proclamation and the Change in Institutional Model and Patronage’, in *Indian Folklife* No.38.p.4
 3. Virginie Johan, ‘The Flower Needs its Roots to Continue to Grow’ ,*Indian Folklife* No.38. p.20

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Tantric Thought of Kashmir : A Framework of Humanistic Culture

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नवजीवनरस्तोगीमहाभागः काश्मीरीयतान्त्रिकपरम्परायाः मानवीय-सांस्कृतिकमूलकत्वं विशदयति। पुरुषार्थचतुष्टये चतुर्थस्य मोक्षस्य वैयक्तिकसाधनामात्रप्राप्यत्वकथनमेव आस्तिकदर्शनानां प्रमाद इति, तेन च कारणेन मानवजीवनस्य विषये विपरीतभावना प्रादुर्भूतेति, बौद्धजैनतन्त्राद्यवैदिकदर्शनानि मनुष्यकेन्द्रितानीति, एतानि च अवैदिकदर्शनानि विशिष्य तन्त्राणि मानवानां मध्ये उच्चावचभावं दूरीकृत्य सर्वमानवसमभावनायाः उत्पत्तौ उपकुर्वन्तीति, मनुष्यकेन्द्रितदार्शनिकसिद्धान्तव्यवस्थापनकारणात् तन्त्राणि मानवजीवनस्य मूल्यं परिरक्षन्ति इति व्यवस्थापयति।

In every sociological analysis of a philosophical system two imperatives are invariably to be taken into account. One is the supreme cultural value of the community and the other is the social order or the structure of that community. On these criteria, growth of Indian philosophy has essentially been conditioned by the idea of liberation, i.e. mokṣa, and the structural order adopted by the Indian society is the one that is basically conceived by Manu. While the scheme of society as conceived by Manu reflects the life-affirming and hence a society-centric attitude, the concept of Mokṣa has evolved, at least at the level of psycho-spiritual pursuit (*sādhana*), as a purely personal and asocial process culminating into a sort of life-negation. Several variants of the theory of the two-fold truths (without any real nexus between them) only go to substantiate the view further. As a natural corollary the mokṣa which actually grew in the wake

of a fully structured life-affirming process began to lose its social relevance.

This social context was restored by the non-orthodox systems by realigning liberation with life, i.e. liberation, as marking the apex of the process of life. The apparent paradox was sought to be eliminated in a variety of ways by the Buddhists, Jainas and Tāntrikas as well as by the Bhāgavata, Sant (Saints) and Bhakti movements. But all these movements could not get rid of one fundamental shortcoming that they failed to provide a new social order, other than the Manu's, bringing about only supra-structural changes. The Tantra philosophy of Kashmir however contains in a very large measure the potential and possibility on which the foundations of a new equalitarian and humanistic society may be laid.

The traditional difference as obtaining between the Vedic and non-Vedic lines of thought is basically cultural. Vedic culture is *varṇāśrama*-centric and male-dominated culture while the Tantric culture ignores *varṇa*, *āśrama* and gender. Equality, for Tantras, is not the absence of inequality but the structural qualitative ordering of the things marking the basic underlying unity. It is not the negation of duality or inequality but the sublimation of it. In order to achieve this integration Tantras have advocated several elaborate courses at the level of thought and practice both.

Thus in Tantras we find a genuine effort to establish a real nexus between the two truths - *paramārtha* and *vyavahāra*. A five-point eligibility scale has been used to precisely determine the Tantric potentialities of a new social order.

The paper closes with a warning against treating equality as an exclusive value in isolation. It has to be an organic part of an integrated value system governing the society. Tantras, by propounding several such values forming a consistently ordered whole, show us the way.

We have to acknowledge frankly that the growth of humanistic principles in the Indian philosophy has not taken the

path which Western philosophy or a keen student of social philosophy would normally expect it to take. Perhaps the reason is that philosophy happens to be a part of broader cultural activity of a society, it is not synonymous with it and in this role it has been reflecting the highest value latent in the subconscious of that culture. The notion of freedom, despite the tug of war we have been indulging in about its precise nature, has been the pivot of the Indian philosophy and at the level of spiritual pursuit (*sādhana*) it has continued to remain a purely individualistic, a-social, trans-Āśramic (*atyāśramin*) process. While the society has been the end point of all the values claiming total attention of the Dharma-śāstras, the value called freedom (*mokṣa*) has been delinked from society and shifted onto the individual, howsoever integral, comprehensive and all-inclusive that emancipated personality might be deemed to be. It appears that if philosophy be considered to the utter exclusion of the Dharma-śāstras for getting an insight into the humanistic undertones, the precise context of the problem would fail to acquire logical coherence. A simple analysis would reveal that whenever humanistic issues cropped up, they did so by remaining in the background playing second fiddle –there too the metaphysical, not the social, got the upper hand.

It is always difficult to theorize in a fractured context and perhaps it has no meaning either. In order to have a whole context it is necessary that the problem be viewed in its total cultural perspective. It would, therefore, be advisable to approach philosophy from the point of view of its historico-cultural dynamics. The problem of humanism is invariably linked with the structural order of society and, more than that, with our cultural subconscious. The degree of spontaneity in reciprocity between the social order and the cultural subconscious determines the pace of humanistic progression.

The world history shall always remain indebted to Manu, the Man of Culture, ("culture embodied", *saṃskṛti-puruṣa*) for endowing Indian society with a system, i.e. an order, as perfectly structured as could be practically sustainable, wherein synthesis between the society, an individual and the values determining

their mutual relation was wrought in such a way as to allow continual elimination of distortions brought about by historical process and to ensure uninterrupted flow of the natural social momentum and cultural milieu. Its genesis lay in the habitual tendency of the Indian mind to accept life in its manifold variety and entire diversity. This we may designate as life-affirming attitude. Nevertheless, it appears paradoxical that freedom (*mokṣa*), which was conceived by the authors of *varṇāśrama* system as culmination of the ultimate and perfect blooming of a living personality, came to be regarded not as a spontaneous outcome of the dynamics of life but rather as an anachronism at the cost of fullness of life owing to its trans-social and apparently individualistic emphases and, as a consequence, the orthodox (*āstika*) systems were led to embrace the life-negating or life-devaluing side of freedom. Since life loses its meaning, its relevance in the absence of a social context, the social context itself started withering out gradually.

The social context was restored by the heterodox¹ philosophies by re-linking freedom to life, that is to say, by regarding freedom as final phase or ultimate stage of the pervasive process of life. The intervening life-negating attitude was transformed in certain areas as life-affirming one. This fresh march towards life-affirmation connected us with societal identity and, in consequence, the humanistic issue regained a context. The process of alignment with societal value system mushroomed in several forms and was confronted with various challenges. Among Śramaṇa and Jaina traditions the paradox between life-negation and life-affirmation became very evident. In spite of the ideals, not only professed but practised also, of equality at social level, great compassion and monastic (*saṃghīya*) life, the concept of freedom retained its basically life-negating stance and the schism between the two *nirvāṇas*, one in the

1. The word heterodox is an English equivalent of the term *nāstika* and has been used in a wider sense not only to denote Śramaṇa and Jaina traditions alone, but also all non-orthodox (*non-āstika* i.e., not subscribing to the final authority of the Veda or Śruti) systems.

'nirvāṇa' ("blowing out") of highly compassionate Buddha and other in 'netranirvāṇa' ("extreme felicity of eyes") of the *Abhijñāna-śākuntala* continued to deepen. In a way it was an endorsement of the ultimate value of the Varṇāśrama system, substantive Hindu tradition in other words, together with an implicit denial of its very basic or inalienable total approach. In the Tantra tradition affirmation of life took place at a more meaningful level. By rejecting the so called duality between life and freedom, a patently conscious effort was undertaken to project freedom as a final culmination -natural and spontaneous- of life. But emergence of this tide occasionally took retrograde swings which quite often obstructed its large-scale social acceptance. Among the mosaic traditions of the Bhāgavata, Bhakti and Sant (Saint) movements an attempt was made to devise a hope-dispensing self-sustained Divine support (*ālam̐bana*) for human urges and faith and as a result the notion of freedom emerged as a condensed form of supreme bliss of life. But, whereas the present movement gave rise to various expectations and possibilities in the realm of social commitment and human good, the tendency of self-centricism kept it centripetal and self-contented affair. All these thought-currents and efforts suffered from a basic drawback that not a single one of them could posit a substitutive social order or an alternative map for social re-structuring. That is, the opposition to life-negation grew in the form of such a circle in which centre and circumference both were new, but the content remained unchanged. In other words, subscription to original basic structure of society only signified that the change in the form of structural diversions, seemingly distortions and historical character of transgressive social identity was superficial rather than fundamental. No doubt, there was, thus slight advance towards humanistic goals, but there was no real transformation. However, we need not jump at the conclusion that these changes were totally inconsequential. They did make deep inroads into the 'whole' of body social of India with the net result that a background was laid for disintegration of the Varṇāśrama order.

This lengthy introduction is driven by a purpose. We will approach the Tantra tradition from this point of view and see how far the social implications of their professions carry us and even if these implications suffer from some inherent limitations, does their potential pose a pointer to a new humanistic ethos ?

So far as the question of humanistic terminology is concerned, Tantra literature is no exception to the fact that it does not pinpoint a putatively structured form of social order grounded in humanistic ideals. But there was some fundamental difference between the Tantric and Vedic world-views, and it may be noted that the codifiers of the Nigama tradition as well as the those of the Āgama tradition were quite conscious of this difference. Kullūka Bhaṭṭa, the celebrated commentator of the *Manusmṛti*, talks of two types of revealed scriptures – Vedic and Tāntric : द्विधा च श्रुतिः वैदिकी तान्त्रिकी च। In a similar strain Śrīkaṇṭha in his *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* (2.2.37) refers to the two divisions of the Śaiva scriptures – Vedas which directly relate to the three *varṇas* and others that are open for all *varṇas* : अतः शैवागमो द्विविधः, त्रैवर्णिकविषयस्सर्वविषयश्चेति। वेदः त्रैवर्णिकविषयः। सर्वविषयकश्चान्यः। उभयोरेक एव शिवः कर्ता। Jayaratha, the illustrious commentator of Abhinavagupta's *Tantrāloka*, also dwells on the distinctions between the two classes of scriptures in a slightly different formulation : तत्र भेदप्रधानानि वेदादीनि शास्त्राणि, अभेदप्रधानानि च शैवादीनि। (*Viveka* on *Tantrāloka* 4/252). Similarly Sadāśivendra Sarasvatī, the famous author of *Yoga-sudhākara* (on Y.S. 2/32), draws our attention to two types of mantras : तेन मन्त्राः द्विविधाः, वैदिकास्तान्त्रिकाश्च। वैदिकाः प्रगीतागीतभेदेन द्विविधाः। तान्त्रिकाः स्त्रीपुंनपुंसकभेदेन त्रिविधाः। (p.43)

Really speaking the fundamental line of demarcation between the Vedic and Tantric currents begins right here. The gap between the two as traditionally understood is primarily cultural. Vedic culture is *varṇāśrama*-centric and male-oriented culture, while Tantric culture ignores *varṇa*, *āśrama* and *liṅga* (gender). Says the *Kulārṇava Tantra* :

गतं शूद्रस्य शूद्रत्वं विप्रस्यापि विप्रता।

दीक्षासंस्कारसंपन्ने जातिभेदो न विद्यते॥ (p.183)

The equation of the melting away of caste and inculcation of divine culture takes place both at the highest and lowest levels in a person specially endowed with spiritual refinement. Abhinavagupta once again highlights this characteristic in the *Gītārthasaṁgraha* : शूद्राः कात्स्न्येन वैदिकक्रियानधिकृताः परतन्त्रवृत्तयश्च, तेऽपि मदाश्रिता मामेव यजन्ते। (on *Gita* 9.35) Abhinava emphatically does away with the gender-distinction just as he does with the *Varṇa*-distinction. In so doing Abhinava has a very cogent argument. Degrading somebody on the basis of *varṇa* and gender amounts to demeaning the omnipotence of the Divine and His infinite capacity for compassionate grace : केचिदाचक्षते—द्विजराजन्यप्रशंसापरमेतद्वाक्यं, न तु स्यादिष्वपवर्गप्राप्तितात्पर्येण इति। ते हि भगवतः सर्वानुग्राहिकां शक्तिं मितविषयतया खण्डयन्तः तथा परमेश्वरस्य परमकृपालुत्व-मसहमानाः,निरतिशययुक्तिप्रपञ्चसाधिताद्वैतभगवत्तत्त्वे भेदलिङ्गं बलादेवानयन्तो, अन्यांश्चागमविरोधानचेतयमानाः..... परमन्तर्गर्भीकृतजात्यादिमहाग्रहाविष्टान्तःकरणाः मात्सर्यावहित्थलज्जाजिह्वीकृतावाङ्मुखदृष्टय इति हास्यरसविषयभावम् आत्मनि आरोपयन्ति इति। (*loc. cit*)

A twofold method has been adopted to ignore the *varṇa*-, *āśrama*- and gender-distinctions – sometimes by total negation, rejection or transgression and sometimes by synthesis and reconciliation. The former approach has found expression in the Left Path (*vāma mārga*) while the latter in the Right Path (*dakṣiṇa mārga*). But the basic undercurrent has remained the same all along. Thus, embracing life in its totality is the primary tenet of the Tantric culture.

Time and again, the idea has been continually hammered in the Tantras that the individual (*āśrama*), social (*varṇa*) and spiritual (*niḥśreyas*) identities of a human being are not mutually antithetical, but mark a gradual evolution of a unitary consciousness and that the difference among the various stages of each aspect is that of degree and not of essence. Kṣemarāja has

given vent to this fact in the *Pratyabhijñā-hṛdaya* in his famous aphorism by enunciating the thesis that "all the view-points are but the various roles assumed by Him": तद्भूमिकाः सर्वदर्शनस्थितयः। (Sūtra 8) The following saying of the mystic saint Lallā is a further elaboration of the subtle theme developed by Kṣemarāja :

शिवो वा केशवो वापि जिनो वा द्रुहिणोऽपि वा।

संसाररोगेणाक्रान्तामबलां मां चिकित्सतु॥

(*Lalleśvarīvākyaṇi*, verse 8)

Abhinava is visibly very angry with those who fail to perceive this self-revealing Godly immanence and therefore stand deserted by the Godhead : परमात्मनः सर्वगतं रूपं यो न पश्यति, तस्य परमात्मा पलायितः, स्वरूपप्रकटीकाराभावात्। (*Gītārthasaṁgraha* on *Gīta* 6.31)

Really speaking this thematicisation of human equality as an expression of all pervasive divine essence sows the seeds of a humanistic society. Tantras, on their part, are univocal in their declaration that equality does not mean absolute negation of inequality but devising of a harmonious and inter-nourishing space for difference under a system so that the apparent diversity may emerge as a rich symbol of a deeper fundamental unity. Nor could humansim ever mean that one should bid good bye to the notion of individuality and the unique personal excellence. Humanism is a two-tier appreciation of an individual – first, in the context of his exclusive individuality and then, in apprehending that individuality as a spontaneous transformation of a more fundamental and meaningful essence. While explaining *Gītā* 5.19 Abhinavagupta shows a deep insight into the humanistic ideals. The perception of equality according to him does not amount to indiscriminate levelling up or delevelling, but treating even a so called lowly individual with equanimity, respect and understanding : तथा च तेषां योगिनां ब्राह्मणे नेदृशी बुद्धिः – अस्य शुश्रूषादिनाऽहं पुण्यवान् भविष्यामि इत्यादि। गवि न पावनीयमित्यादि। हस्तिनि

नार्थादिधीः। शुनि नापवित्रापकारितादिनिश्चयः। श्वपाके च न पापापवित्रादिधिषणा। अत एव समं पश्यन्ति इति, न तु व्यवहरन्ति। (Gītārthasaṁgraha on Gīta 5.19)¹

If we look at the last sentence of the above noted pithy remark, Abhinava seems to warn against the confusion of categories between "seeing" and "treating" and thus against a mechanical interpretation of his thesis. There is no dearth of efforts in the Tantras to realise and substantiate this integral vision at every stage of our being and understanding. By mounting a multi-pronged assault on the intra-objective anomalies and subjective-objective dichotomies, recourse to the inculcation of a synthetic and integral perception of life has been sought to be achieved by resorting to the following multilateral mechanism of :

- 1) Sublimation, and consequent universalization, of the human consciousness²,
- 2) Unification of material and efficient forms of the creative consciousness³,
- 3) Organic growth of objective world from the supreme consciousness⁴,
- 4) Equation of microcosm with macrocosm⁵,
- 5) Synthesis between knowledge and devotion as a part of integral spiritual pursuit (sādhana)¹,

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1. विद्याविनयसंपन्ने ब्राह्मणे गवि हस्तिनि।
शुनि चैव श्वपाके च पंडिताः समदर्शिनः॥
 2. सर्वो ममायं विभव इत्येवं परिजानतः।— *ĪPK* 4.3.12
 3. चिदात्मैव हि देवोऽन्तःस्थितमिच्छावशाद्बहिः।
योगीव निरुपादानमर्थजातं प्रकाशयेत्॥ — *ibid.*, 1.5.7
 4. विमतिपदमङ्गं सर्वं मम चैतन्यात्मनः शरीरमिदम्।
शून्यपदादीलावधि दृश्यत्वात् पिण्डवत् सिद्धम्॥— *Virāpākṣa-pañcāśikā*, verse 2
 5. अण्डपिण्डरुभयोरेकरूप्यमाम्नायेषु प्रसिद्धम्। — *Mahārthamañjarī- parimala* (*mmp*), p.8

- 6) Homologizing metaphysics, religion, ethics and *sādhana* through four limbs (segments) – *jñāna*, *yoga*, *kriyā* and *caryā* – of the *āgamas*,
- 7) Notion of *vimarśa* or *spanda* as reflecting a synthesis between the two conceptual polarities represented by statism (*kūtaśthatā*) and dynamism (*pariṇāmitā*),
- 8) Harmonious reciprocity between the two channels of cosmogonical evolution consisting of word and meaning,
- 9) The concept of unity as being involved in the notion of multiplicity², and
- 10) Equation of Yogin with Parama Śiva.

The natural upshot of all this comes handy to strengthen our firm belief that the transcendence and the mundane life, instead of symbolizing freedom and bondage, respectively stand for perfect and imperfect nurturing of spiritual consciousness of an empirical being; merit and demerit signify the revaluation of perspectives only : यः पापपुण्यहेतुत्वेन मम पूर्वं प्रसिद्धः नीलसुखादिभावः स एव मोक्षसाधनमिति। (*Bhāskari* on *IPV.*, I, p.40) Worldly enjoyment and Yogic intuition turn out to be mutually complementary after giving up their anomalous character³ : भोगमोक्षसामरस्यचमत्कारलक्षणो जीवन्मोक्षः। (*MMP*, p.132)

The brand of intellectual thinking that visualizes qualitative schism between the two may be termed as discerning and analytic view of knowledge (*vivekamula*) and the other as synthetic one (*sāmarasyamūla*). In the field of epistemology its impact is progressively felt in the respective processes of determinate judgement (*adhyavasāna*), i.e. knowing by selection,

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1. समावेशपल्लवा एव च प्रसिद्धदेहादिप्रमातृभागप्रह्वीभावभावाननुप्राणिताः परमेश्वरस्तुतिप्रणामपूजाध्यानसमाधिप्रभृतयः।— *IPV*(*Bhās.*), II, p. 258
 2. वस्तुभेदस्वभावत्वादभेद एव प्रतितिष्ठति।— *MMP*, p.46
 3. Abhinava is very very emphatic about it. Asserts he : “एवं व्याख्यानं त्यक्त्वा ये – परस्परानुपघातकं त्रिवर्गं सेवेत – इत्याशयेन व्याचक्षते, ते संप्रदाय-क्रममजानाना भगवद्रहस्यं च व्याचक्षाणा नमस्कार्या एव”। – *BGS* on *Gītā* 7.11

that is, knowing by excluding (others) and synthetic judgement (*anusandhāna*), i.e. knowing by including (others)¹.

From such an angle the development of the concept of divine essence in the *Śivadr̥ṣṭi* as constitutive of the individual being offers an adequate basis for its innate congeniality towards boundless potential for humanistic and social transformation. What we decry as lowly, according to the *Śivadr̥ṣṭi*, is essentially a self-ramification of the Absolutic being and as such its denigration is out of tune with the reality :

कुत्सितेऽकुत्सितस्य स्यात्कथमुन्खतेति चेत्॥

रूपप्रसाररसतो गर्हितत्वमयुक्तिमत्॥ – (Ś.Dr. 1/11-12)

Not only this, the individual being embodies all the powers of the Absolute ensuring thereby the integral unity of all individuals :

यदेकतरनिर्याणे कार्यं जातु न जायते।

तस्मात्सर्वपदार्थानां सामरस्यमवस्थितम्॥ – (Ś.Dr. 1/23)

In substantive Hindu tradition, it may be noted, the principle of self-analogizing (*ātmaupamya*) is reckoned as a significant ingredient for inculcation of the humanistic outlook :

आत्मनः प्रतिकूलानि परेषां न समाचरेत्।

The *Gītā* firmly supports

आत्मौपम्येन सर्वत्र समं पश्यति योऽर्जुन।

सुखं वा यदि वा दुःखं स योगी परमो मतः॥ – (*Gītā* 6/33)

But the tantras go even a step ahead and propound the theory of self-unity or self-identity (*ātmaikya*). Needless to say that the unifying process does not negate duality outright, rather it seeks culmination of duality into unity. It is not an action in denial, rather it is a process of sublimation :

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1. For further discussion see author's article "तांत्रिक दर्शन : प्रकृति और सांस्कृतिक संदर्भ" – *Pariṣad-patrikā*, Bihar Rashtra Bhasha Parishad, XVIII-2, p. 38

तथा नाना शरीराणि भुवनानि तथा तथा।
 विसृज्य रूपं गृह्णाति प्रोत्कृष्टाधममध्यमम्॥
 एवं सर्वपदार्थानां समैव शिवता स्थिता।
 परापरादिभेदोऽत्र श्रद्धधानैरुदाहृतः॥
 एवं भेदात्मकं नित्यं शिवतत्त्वमनन्तकम्।
 तथा तस्य व्यवस्थानान्नानारूपेऽपि सत्यता॥

— (Ś.Dr. 1/34, 48, 49.)

Maheśvarānanda, the author of *Mahārthamañjarī*, has passionately pleaded the cause of the 'self is the essence of all'-thesis (*sārvātmya-bhāva*) by taking recourse to eight type of equality in a quote from the *Trika-śāstra* —

समता सर्वभावानां वृत्तीनां चैव सर्वशः।
 समता सर्वदृष्टीनां द्रव्याणां चैव सर्वशः॥
 भूमिकानां च सर्वासामोवल्लीनां च सर्वशः।
 समता सर्वदेवानां वर्णानां चैव सर्वशः॥ — (MMP, p.168)

The way the Absolute and salvation are conceptualized in terms of harmonious synthesis of 'I' and 'this' is nothing but reconciling the two polarities into one another from which automatically flows the above idea of oneness and equality. Similarly, projecting the immanent aspect of the Divine as consisting of pure awareness and its self-presentative activity (*prakāśa-vimarśamaya*) precisely has the same implication, where ontological synthesis has been assigned to *prakāśa* and epistemic unification/de-unification to *vimarśa*. Interactive reciprocity and harmonization between the two orders is what is conveyed by the term Godly perfection. Reality is not only pure consciousness, but integrally perfect also. The ultimate unity, which has been so often adored, is not an abstraction, but a concrete unity. In the words of Pandey "It is not only the unity of opposites, as Hegel maintains his Absolute to be, but also the unity of distincts as

Croce, maintains".¹ Reality, therefore, is necessarily unity-multiplicity. The concept of integral perfection of reality cannot be understood without an insight into the inherent autonomy or spontaneous overflow of consciousness. All causal explanations, therefore, turn out to be half-baked and incomplete².

From the point of view of the historical endorsement of the Tantric approach we would notice that the Tantras inspired rise of a humanistic movement albeit unconsciously, in the vally of Kashmir. The undercurrent of *bhakti*, as formulated by Tantras, that flooded the valley scaled its peak in the pithy sayings of Lalla De by the time we approach fourteenth century :

यथा शिलेकैव स्वजातिभेदात् पीठादिनानाविधरूपभागिनी।
तथैव योऽनन्ततया विभाति कष्टेन लभ्यंशृणु तं गुरोः शिवम्॥

(L.V., Verse 52)

Nilla Cram Cook, in her *The Way of Swan*, an anthology dedicated to the mystical poetry of Kashmir, encounters a close parallelism between the Sufi poet philosophers of Irfan in Central Asia and the Śaiva thinkers of Kashmir³. The two movements e.g. of Irfan and the valley that came in contact with one and other as a result of the alleged meeting of Lalla De (1335 AD) and Shah-i-Hamdan spontaneously overflowed into the fusion of the Irfan tradition of the Sufism and the monistic Śaivism of Kashmir. Lalla came to be hailed by all sections of society as the prophet of the new movement preaching social equality of mankind and inner unity of all creeds. The process of trans-cultural synthesis engineered by and emanating from the *bhakti* movement, climbed its summit at the hands of the King Zain-ul-ābidin. He was committed by conviction to religious tolerance, inter-faith catholicity and equal respect for all faiths. He was the first

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1. *Comparative Aesthetics*, Vol-1: Indian, K.C. Pandey, 2nd edition, p.101
 2. For futher treatment see author's "Contribution of Kashmir to Philosophy, Thought and Culture", ABORI, Vol.56, pp. 32-33
 3. Vide, *Kashmir Biannual*, ed. P N Pushp, Vol 1-No. 1, Srinagar, 1960, p.90

Muslim ruler who prohibited cow-slaughter and encouraged learning and dissemination of Sanskrit language. Cook goes that far to say "Had the example of Kashmir been followed (by Akbar) a secular India might have come into being then and there."¹ This cult was continued by Shaikh Noor-ud-din (1438 AD), a Hindu Saint converted to Islam, who founded the indigenous Sufi order of Kashmir called Reshi Order and stood by the essential unity and fraternity of humanity through out his life.²

The only purpose behind all this running about is to rummage through the plenty of evidence in the Tantras which could form the basis on which concrete possibilities of a humanistic ideology may be envisaged. As has happened elsewhere in the several schools of Indian Philosophy, here also two orders of reality – absolutic and empirical are postulated. But, unlike these systems, there has been a serious effort to integrate, not to admix or confuse (*saṁkara*), the two by unearthing the underlying reality of both. The Tantric emphasis on derecognizing any fundamental gap between profession and practice amply substantiates our contention. We do not intend to unduly glorify or defend the Tantras, instead what we aim at is to bring out the inherent possibilities towards establishment of a humanistic, egalitarian and democratic social order. The five point eligibility-scale³, suggested by Harsh Narain for devising

1. *ibid.*

2. Vide, *Doctrine of Recognition*, R K Kaw, Hoshiarpur, 1967, p.366

3. Vide "भारतीय धर्मदर्शन का स्वर, सामाजिक समता अथवा विषमता", Harsh Narain, *Parisaṁvāda* (II) *Bhāratīya Cintana kī Pramparā meṁ Navīna Sambhāvanāye*, ed. R.S. Dwivedi, S.S. University, Varanasi, 1981, pp. 261-62

The five eligibilities are as under :

1. वह दर्शन यह मानकर चले कि सभी सत्य मानव सत्य हैं और अंतिम सत्य का दावा दम्भमात्र है।
2. वह हममें सार्वभौम सत्तों-मूल्यों की चेतना जगाता रहे और तदर्थ अन्यो की सत्य चेतना, मूल्य चेतना से भी लाभान्वित होने की प्रवृत्ति का पोषण करता रहे।
3. व्यक्ति को साधन न मानकर साध्य माने।

and mapping out the humanistic content of a system, is our guiding principle and it is really quite an achievement for the Tantras that they harbour and cherish all these criteria in a sizable measure, in one form or the other, to qualify as a potentially humanistic thought current. Let us now sample them in brief :

1. Notwithstanding its Absolutistic disposition the Tantra regards all truths as human truths :

तद्भूमिकाः सर्वदर्शनस्थितयः। (P.Hr. Sūtra 8)

No doubt there is an air of final superiority about its own life- and worldview, but that does not exhaust the infinite possibilities of the Absolutistic expression.

2. The immanence of the aggregate in its constituent unit means that every idea contains in it the seed of the universal and the ultimate value and the function of philosophy is to nurture and enrich that value-consciousness.
3. The equation between macrocosm and microcosm, yogin and Parama Śiva and identity of the individual and universal consciousness points out to only one thing, i.e. to regard an individual as an end by himself and to discover, accordingly, the ultimate possibilities of his progression.
4. The notions of individual freedom and permanence (imperishability) derive strength from the admission of subject as commanding more lasting existence than the objective world he is supposed to interact with at the empirical stage.
5. There has been repetition ad nauseam that the constitutional instinct of the Tantric philosophy is to unearth some deep interdependence among the objects and, in a way, this instinct is nothing but a discovery of the

4. व्यक्ति की स्वतन्त्र तथा स्थायी सत्ता माने।

5. व्यक्तियों, आत्माओं का किसी स्तर पर अन्योन्याश्रयत्व स्वीकार करे।

intrinsic unity inherent in plurality. Tantras are never tired of reiterating the idea that it is the unity-multiplicity perspective, in the worldly context, that facilitates our grasp of the Absolutic truth and inculcates an insight into the ultimate values.¹

In sum, we may logically conclude that the essentials of a true humanistic order find a strong metaphysical foundation in the Tantric culture. We envision a striking similarity between modern democratic ideals and the Tantric view of man. There must be three basic assumptions of a democracy of any substance as well as of any genuine humanistic concept of man :

- i. To grant element of divinity in man;
- ii. To hold firmly that man is absolute i.e., every man is equal to another man; and
- iii. To regard man as a 'whole' i.e., an end by himself.

The tantras offer them in abundance.

1. सर्वथा तावदत्र प्रमेये भगवत एव भेदने च अभेदने च स्वातन्त्र्यं घटगताभास-
भेदाभेददृष्टिरेव परमार्थाद्वयदृष्टिप्रवेशे उपायः समवलम्बनीयः, न तु व्यवहारोऽपि अयं
परमेश्वरस्वरूपानुप्रवेशविरोधी। - I.P.V. (Bh.), II, p. 129

A Review of
"Jaina Background of Dvaita Vedānta"
by Robert Zydenbos

Veeranarayana Pandurangi

जैडेनबोसमहाभागेन निबूद्धस्य "द्वैतवेदान्तसिद्धान्तानां जैनदर्शनपीठिका"
इत्याख्यस्य शोधनिबन्धस्य परिशीलनात्मकेऽस्मिन् शोधनिबन्धे
वीरनारायणपाण्डुरङ्गी-महाभागः नवसु विषयेषु जैडेनबोसपक्षमनूद्य
एकैकस्मिन्नपि विषये विशदप्रमाणां विस्तृतटिप्पण्या सह प्रदर्शनं विधाय
तस्य पक्षस्य अप्रामाणिकतां ऊहापोहजनितत्वं च प्रतिष्ठापयति। ते च
विषयाः-तारतम्यम्, अनुप्रमाण-करणप्रमाणे, केवलत्वं, साक्षी, स्मृतिः,
मुक्तिः, विशेषः, मध्वाचार्यस्य देशकालादिकृत दार्शनिकपरिवेषविचारः,
जयतीर्थस्य कृतीनामुपरि अन्येषां प्रभावः इत्यादयो भवन्ति।

Robert Zydenbos claims that the theories of Dvaita Vedānta are influenced by Jainism. This he does in his paper "On the Jaina background of Dvaita Vedānta" published in the Journal of Indian Philosophy (pp. 249-271), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands, 1991. While he starts his write up claiming the well-deserved yet neglected attention towards Dvaita Vedānta as a philosophical school, he furthers the hypothesis of Jaina influence on this system of thought taking support from the historical and geographical proximity of Jaina theories being available to the propounder and promoters of Dvaita Vedānta. In this article I wish to analyze the arguments furthered by Zydenbos in support of his theory and try to prove that the conclusions of Zydenbos are fit contestants for hypothesis only.

1. Tāratamya and Bhavyābhavyatva

Zydenbos starts his paper by drawing our attention on similarity of classification of souls in Dvaita and Jaina systems as we see in his own words—

"[In dvaita]...not all souls are destined to attain *mokṣa*. In the *Tattvaviveka*, one of the Madhva's shortest writings, we read that there are two *nityamuktas* or eternally liberated souls in this universe: the Lord Viṣṇu and his consort Śrī or Lakṣmī and all other souls are *sṛṣṭiyuj* or associated with Viṣṇu's creation. These other souls are again either *muktas* or *amuktas*, liberated and not liberated; and the not liberated souls are again of three kinds:

high, middle and low, or *muktiyogyāḥ*, *nityāvartāḥ*, and *tamoyogyāḥ* [eligible for liberation, ever returnee, eligible for eternal hell]¹.....

What seems highly significant here is that Dvaita was not the first school of thought in India to hold that the final state is not the same for all souls. Jainism expressed such a doctrine from its very beginning, in its own terminology. Here the *Tattvārthasūtra*, the foremost Jaina doctrinal text, mentions the three characteristics of the soul in II.7 *jīvabhavyābhavyatvāni ca*.According to the *sukhabodha*, a digambara commentary of the *Tattvārthasūtra* by Bhāskaranandi, *jīvatva* is consciousness. ‘He [i.e. the soul] who possesses the ability to manifest characteristics of *samyadarśana* etc. is a *bhavya*.’ Bhāskaranandi says as an explanation of *bhavyatva*, and ‘a soul that does not show that ability is an *abhavya*’.... The three modifications of nature called *jīvatva*, *bhavyatva* and *abhavyatva* are the natures of the soul. (Zydenbos pp. 251-253)

Some points are to be noted in refutation of the claim Zydenbos makes.

Firstly, the purpose of the concept of *tāratamya* goes beyond mere classification of the nature of souls. Zydenbos is aware of this purpose, for his words go as follows -

“Dvaita.... puts forward its concept of *pañcabheda* or fivefold difference... between the souls among themselves...” and “According to Dvaita, souls are inherently different from each other... also in *mokṣa* differences remain. The amount of bliss experienced in *mokṣa* varies according to the soul's natural capacity for experiencing bliss, and thus *mokṣa* does not mean the same for all souls...” (pp. 250-251)

The analysis of Zydenbos on this issue clearly shows the conceptual diversity of difference (*bheda*) between the Dvaita and Jaina schools. While Jainas and Dvaitins classify the nature of souls based on their innate capacity/eligibility to attain *mokṣa*, Mādhvas go ahead and emphasize the concept of *bheda* to belong to souls in *mokṣa* also. The gradation of bliss they enjoy in *mokṣa* is an important factor of *tāratamya* which ought not to be overlooked. Hence, this concept goes beyond taxonomy in the

1. Square bracketed translations mine.

Dvaita School. However, Zydenbos does not seem to take this important issue seriously. There is no reference that he gives related to the most essential issue of *tāratamya*, viz., *bheda* in the Jaina school.

Difference among souls based on their eligibility to attain *mokṣa* merely results from the taxonomy regarding nature of souls. Their essential difference from each other between themselves is not referred, which actually is the crux of *tāratamya* accepted by Dvaita. We can see that the whole perspective in which the concept of *tāratamya* has been advocated by Dvaita is different and hence not influenced by Jaina thought.

In this context it is very important to see what is the context of *Tattvārthasūtra*. *Tattvārthasūtra* "jīvabhavyābhavyatvāni ca" (2.7) quoted by Zydenbose in support of his claim that *tāratamya* is accepted in Jainism. But it seems highly doubtful since this *sūtra* of *Tattvārthasūtra* has nothing to do with the classification of souls, as it only enumerates the *pāriṇāmikabhāvas* of a soul. And more interestingly qualities like *cetanatva* and *acetanatva* are also to be added to this list of *pāriṇāmikabhāvas* as indicated by the word "ca" in that *sūtra*.¹ Souls can not be classified as *cetanas* and *acetanas*. Hence this classification, if accepted, will lead us into more troubles.

Further, it is very important to note that in *mukti* the soul gets rid of even *bhavyatva* as explained in *Tattvārthasūtra* (10.3) *aupaśamikādibhavyatvānām ca*.

Instead *Tattvārthasūtra* defines and classifies souls as follows-- *upayoga* is the definition of souls. They are twofold: *saṃsārīn* and *mukta*. *Trasa* and *sthāvara* are *saṃsārīn*s. Those who possess more than two sense organs are *sthāvara*s. (*Tattvārthasūtra* II. 8,10,12,14).²

1. Śrutasāgara clearly states *atha pāriṇāmikabhāvasya bhedatraya-mucyate-- jīvabhavyābhavyatvāni ca. cakārāt astitvaṃ, vastutvaṃ, dravyatvaṃ, prameyatvaṃ, agurulaghutvaṃ, nityapradeśatvaṃ, mūrtatvaṃ, amūrtatvaṃ, cetanatvaṃ, acetanatvaṃ ca*.

2. *kiṃ tallakṣaṇaṃ jīvasya iti praśne jīvasvarūpanirūpaṇārthaṃ sūtramida māhuḥ umāśvāmināḥ (tattvārthavṛtti) "upayogo lakṣaṇam" (2.8.) evaṃvidha upayogo vidyate yeṣāṃ te upayogināḥ. te ca katiprakārā*

Thus it seems highly doubtful that Jainas hold this theory at all.

Moreover, secondly, going by the availability of literature available on this issue in the history of Indian philosophy, it would be inadequate to claim that Dvaita was influenced by Jaina theories!!

Parthasārathi Miśra's *Śāstradīpikā*¹, the prominent pre-Madhva Mīmāṃsaka text explicitly states – “This *mukṭiśāstra* is not for those who see and desire the worldly happiness in this *saṃsāra* which is (actually) full of sorrow. It is only for those who want to liberate themselves from this *saṃsāra*.”

In *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, Bhāsarvajña² states – “this *śāstra* is not meant for those who are interested in violas (worldly objects), but for those who want liberation from this worldly sorrow”.

Vallabha's *Nyāyalīlāvatī*³ says – “there is no liberation for all the souls, since there are some souls who ever desire this *saṃsāra*”.

While commenting upon the *Sāṅkhyasūtra* 4.25 Vācaspatimiśra⁴ states – “this aphorism describes the eligible, who is different from the ineligible”.

bhavantīti praśne sūtramidamāhurācāryāḥ saṃsāriṇo mukṭāśca (2.10.)
saṃsāriṇasstrasasthāvarāḥ (2.12.) *dvīndriyādayassthāvarāḥ* (2.14.)
Tattvārthasūtra.

1. *evambhūte'pi saṃsāre ye raktāḥ sukhatrṣṇayā.*
na teṣāmadhikāro'sti mukṭiśāstre kathañcana..
saṃsārādudvijante ye dṛṣṭalokaparāvarāḥ.
ta eva khalu mucyante, na tu yaḥ prākṛto janaḥ..
teṣāmevāpavargākhyāḥ puruṣārtho mahātmanām. – *Śāstradīpikā*,
Tarkapāda, Ātmavāda, p. 129.
2. *naitacchāstram viśayaṇaḥ pratyārabdham ... kintu ye'tyantam*
duḥkhanirvinṇaḥ tān prati duḥkhocchedārtham... – (*Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*
p. 594)
3. *na ca krameṇa sarvamukṭiḥ, keṣāñcidātmanām saṃsāryaikasva-*
bhāvatvāt – *Nyāyalīlāvatī*, p. 598.
tadupadeśādhikṛtaṃ puruṣam anadhikṛtapuruṣāntarāt vyāvṛttam
āha - viśeṣadarśina ātmabhāvabhāvanāvinivṛttiḥ. – *Tattvavaiśārādī*
on *Yogasūtra*, 4.25, p. 441.

This makes it clear that several schools of thought uphold that there are some souls who are not eligible for liberation. It is also to be noted that this concept is found in the very sources of Vedānta, viz., *Upaniṣads* and *Bhagavadgītā*. *Bṛhadāraṇya-kopaniṣad*¹ states - "Those who know this (Brahman) will become immortal and those who do not only attain sorrow".

*Bhagavadgītā*² is far more clear in this regard. While describing the demoniac nature, Kṛṣṇa says - "I shall throw those evil-minded people only into evil births (*āsurayoni*). Having got such births they shall attain meanest positions (*adhama gati*) and shall never be able to attain me".

Both Śāṅkara and Rāmānuja confirm the concept of the eternally bound (*nityabaddha*) while commenting on this portion of the *Gītā*. Other commentators also acknowledge this with slight variations in their comments.

According to some early preceptors of the Rāmānuja system, viz., Rāmamiśra and Meghanādārisūri, almost contemporaries of Rāmānuja, there are people always bound to the world (*nityabaddha*). Though Rāmamiśra's work is not available now, this view is found in the *Nayaprakāśikā* (1.1.1.) of Meghanādārisūri.

Some early followers of Rāmānuja apprehended a problem that if we accept such a category of "eternally bound souls" a genuine follower/devotee may confuse himself that he will not be liberated in case he, actually, happens to be an eternally bound one. Hence they desired to get rid of the theory of "eternally bound" itself. Allaying such a fear, Vedāntadeśika³ says

-
1. ya etadviduramṛtāste bhavantyathetare duḥkhamevāpiyanti. Bṛ. Upa. 4.4.4.
 2. āsuram pārtha me śruṇu.
tānaḥ dviṣataḥ krūrān saṁsāreṣu narādhamān.
kṣipāmyajasramaśubhānāsuriṣveva yoniṣu..
āsurīm yonimāpannā mūḍhā janmani janmani.
māmaprāpyaiva kaunteya tato yāntyaḍhamāṁ gatim.. - *Gītā*, 16.19-20.
 3. kaściccenityabaddhaḥ kimayamahamiti syānmumukṣorupekṣā,
maivaṁ yuktasya muktirbhavati dṛḍhamiti pratyayāt
tatpravṛtṭeḥ// (*Tattvamuktākālāpa* 2.27).

"there is no need to get rid of such a theory simply in order not to get oneself confused. The deep belief (in God) helps one to get over such confusion."

This is enough to prove that the concept of “ever bound” is not alien to Rāmānuja system.

This is what Dr. S. Radhakrishnan has to say about the Rāmānuja system (I.P. II, p. 695, fn. 2) - “There are some Viśiṣṭādvaitins who believe in those who are for ever bound to the wheel of *saṃsāra* (*nityabaddha*). See *Tattvamuktākālāpa* ii.27-28”.

This is same in Roman Catholic and Islamic systems also¹.

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1. In the Roman Catholic system we find the concept of 'Limbo' - a place where non-believers of Christ stay eternally without reaching God ["Limbo" the word used frequently to describe the situation where a certain thing is neither dead nor alive (usage-- Until we have got official permission to go ahead with the plans we are in limbo.) is derived from the church concept of Limbo. [However it is totally another matter that there were some news reports some years back indicating that The Church wants to get rid of the concept of “Limbo” which it sees as an embarrassment. Simply google it to get splendid results such as “Catholic Church Puts Limbo In Limbo” etc.].

Catholic Encyclopedia on CD ROM describes the Limbo as follows-

LIMBUS INFANTUM

The New Testament contains no definite statement of a positive kind regarding the lot of those who die in original sin without being burdened with grievous personal guilt. But, by insisting on the absolute necessity of being "born again of water and the Holy Ghost" (John 3:50) for entry into the kingdom of Heaven (see "Baptism", subtitle Necessity of Baptism), Christ clearly enough implies that men are born into this world in a state of sin, and St. Paul's teaching to the same effect is quite explicit (Rom.5:12 sqq). On the other hand, it is clear from Scripture and Catholic tradition that the means of regeneration provided for this life do not remain available after death, so that those dying unregenerate are eternally excluded from the supernatural happiness of the beatific

All these statements of different faiths clearly indicate that the concept of *nityabaddha* is not only uninfluenced by Jainism, but show that this concept is an important theory of all the mainstream philosophies across the globe irrespective of race and religion, caste and creed, the only exception being the Sāṅkhya system which holds that all the souls will attain liberation one day or the other. See *Sāṅkhyasāra* (*Uttarabhāga*, V. 24-43) of Vijñānabhikṣu and *Sāṅkhyasūtra* (II.4).

All this go to prove the suggestion of Zydenbos that "this theory is adopted from Jainism where the *Tattvārthasūtra* (2.7) *jīvabhavyābhavyatvāni* narrates the three characteristics of *jīva* i.e. *jīvatva*, *bhavyatva* and *abhavyatva* -- the *bhavyatva* and *abhavyatva* being the good and bad qualities of *jīvas*" lacks clear evidence and seems illogical.

2. Jayatīrtha's familiarity with Jainism?

"What is very striking, however, is the amount of space that Jayatīrtha devotes to the discussion of Jainism... in his description of Jaina teachings, he reveals a genuine familiarity with them and presents a more detailed and truthful picture of Jainism than most Vedānta authors do." (Zydenbos p. 254) "Here Jayatīrtha shows an independent spirit and greater fairness towards the Jains when he describes their view of *mukti* as *mokṣaḥ svābhāvīkātmasvarūpāvirbhāvaḥ*" (Zydenbos p. 259)

The above claim of Zydenbos in his paper is baseless since the description of Jaina teachings and *mokṣa* in the *Nyāyasudhā* (Nyāyasudhā 2.2.10.33, pp. 3989-1990) is verbatim quotation of what is available in the Rāmānuja's *Bhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtras* in the

vision (John 9:4, Luke 12:40, 16:19 sqq, II Cor. 5:10; see also "Apocatastasis")

It is the same in Islam too. "Those who prove unfortunate shall be in the fire, given to sighing and sobbing, abiding therein so long as heavens and earth endure, excepting that which thy Lord may will. Thy Lord does whatever He pleases." – Koran 11.108. There are so many other references of ever-hell in Koran. [See 3.113-117, 5.35-37, 13.5 etc.]

same *adhikaraṇa* (*Rāmānujabhāṣya* 2.2.6.31, Vol. II, pp. 308-309). Even the three fold classification of souls, quoted by Jayatīrtha, as (1)bound, (2)have achieved yoga, and (3)are liberated, which Zydenbos thinks do not occur in Jainism, --(“To my knowledge this threefold classification does not occur in Jaina texts” Zydenbos p. 260)-- is found verbatim therein. The same is the case with the description of Śaiva teachings and description of Jaina's *mukti* as *mokṣaḥ svābhāvikātmavarūpāvirbhāvaḥ*. Hence the familiarity with Jainism claimed by Zydenbos actually goes to Viśiṣṭādvaita and not Dvaita!!

3. *Anupramāṇa* and *Karaṇapramāṇa*

“We may look at what is said about *prama* and *pramāṇa* and (sic) the *Pramāprameya* of Bhāvasena, a Jaina author who was a contemporary of Madhva, Manuscripts of his works are found in the Jaina maṭha of Hombuja, which is situated just outside Madhva's native district of South Kanara. ‘What is *pramāṇa*? *Pramāṇa* is the determining of the true nature of a thing and it is twofold: *bhāvaprmāṇa* and *karaṇa pramāṇa*. *Pramiti* is *pramāṇa*, and by the qualification *bhāva*, *pramāṇa* is correct knowledge. By the qualification *karaṇa*, *pramāṇa* is the instrument [for attaining] correct knowledge’. In other words *pramāṇa* can be either a means for attaining knowledge or knowledge itself.

“In his *Pramāṇalakṣaṇa*, Madhva briefly states *yathārtham pramāṇam*, i.e. *pramāṇa* [is] true to its object. Madhva then continues by saying that *pramāṇa* is twofold *kevala* and *anupramāṇa*. *Kevala* is further defined as *yathārthajñāna*, and *anupramāṇa* is the means by which it is attained. In this later context, Jayatīrtha adds that *yathārthajñāna*, i.e. *kevala* is *pramā*. In other words, here *kevala*, which was first defined as one of the two basic kinds of *pramāṇa*, finally is considered as *pramā* as well, as has traditionally been the case in Jainism. Dvaitin authors were either classical or modern, have never noticed or acknowledged this obvious similarity between the two systems.” (Zydenbos p. 256)

Thus Zydenbos refers to the classification of *pramāṇas* according to *Pramāprameya* of Bhāvasena to show the similarity in this issue with the concept of *pramāṇa* in Dvaita Vedānta. However, the way it goes in *Pramāprameya* only adds to the

dissimilarity of the views of Jainas and Dvaita Vedāntins on this issue.

Unlike Dvaita Vedānta where *pramāṇa* is spoken of in purely epistemological terms, some extension of it related to measurements is found in the Jaina view. The section of *Pramāṇaprameya*¹ related to this issue goes as follows -

“*Pramāṇa* is the determining of the true nature of a thing. And that is twofold: *bhāvapramāṇa* and *karaṇapramāṇa*. *Pramiti* is *pramāṇa*, and (sic) by the qualification ‘*bhāva*’, *pramāṇa* is correct knowledge. By the qualification ‘*karaṇa*’, *pramāṇa* is the instrument [for attaining] correct knowledge, by which the truth of a thing is concluded or determined, through the excellence by which it discriminates [correct knowledge] from doubt and contrariety.” (Translation by Zydenbos, p. 255-6).

1. *padārthayāthātmyaniścayaḥ pramāṇam. tacca bhāvapramāṇam karaṇapramāṇamiti dvividham. pramitiḥ pramāṇam iti bhāvavyutpattyā samyak jñānameva pramāṇam. prakarṣeṇa saṁśayaviparyāsānadhyaavasāyavyavacchedena mīyate niścīyate vastutattvaṃ yena tat pramāṇamiti karaṇavyutpattyā samyak jñānasādhanaṃ pramāṇam. tat pratyakṣaṃ parokṣamiti dvividham. tatra padārthānāṃ sāksāt pratīyantarāvyavadhānena vedanaṃ pratyakṣaṃ, tatsādhanaṃ ca. tacca indriyapratyakṣaṃ mānasapratyakṣaṃ yogipratyakṣaṃ svasaṃvedanapratyakṣamiti caturdhā. (Pra.Pra. p.1-2). parokṣaṃ ca ātmānvadhānapratyakṣādikaraṇakaṃ smṛtipratyabhijñohāpoha-tarkānumānāgamabhedam. (Pra.Pra. p.8). samyaksāadhanāt sādhyavijñānam anumānam. ... tadvacanamapi taddhetutvāt parārthānumānameva. (Pra.pra. p. 12). āptavacanādi janitapadārthavijñānam āgamaḥ. ... tadvacanamapi jñānahetutvādāgama eva. (Pra.Pra. p.117). karaṇapramāṇam dravya-kāla-kṣetrabhedena trividham. tatra dravyapramāṇam indriyārthatatsambandha hetuḥ śāntavyāptiśabdārthasaṅketādayḥ mānonmānāvamāna-pratimānatatpratimānagaṇanāmānāni. tatra mānaṃ ṣoḍaśikā-ardhamānaprasthādi. unmānaṃ trāsucchinnavartikātulādi. avamānaṃ caturaṅgaculukapāṇipuṭaprabhṛti ... (Pra.Pra. p.119). kṣetrapramāṇam uttamamadhyamajaghandyabhogabhṛkarmabhūjaśīroruha-lakṣatīlayavāṅgulanyaṣṭāṣṭagaṇitāni. (Pra.Pra. p.120). kālapramāṇam asaṅghyātasamayaḥ āvaliḥ. asaṅkhyātāvalisamūhairucchvāsaḥ. (Pra.Pra. p.121).*

The *Bhāvapramāṇa* is twofold: *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*. The cognition which objectifies things directly [without interruption of any other cognition] is *pratyakṣa*, and its instrument also [is *pratyakṣa*]. That is fourfold: *indriyapratyakṣa*, *mānasapratyakṣa*, *yogipratyakṣa*, and *svaśamvedanapratyakṣa*.” (Pra.Pra. p.1-2).

“*Parokṣa* is the cognition which results through the concentration of soul and *pratyakṣa* etc. is sevenfold: *smṛti*, *pratyabhijñā*, *ūha*, *apoha*, *tarka*, *anumāna*, and *āgama*.” (Pra.Pra. p.8).

“The cognition of *sādhya* through the correct *sādhana* is *anumāna*. The sentence (for that purpose) is also *parārthānumāna*” (Pra.Pra. p. 12).

“Cognition of a thing caused by the sentence of an *āpta* is *āgama*. That sentence is also *āgama* since it causes the cognition.” (Pra.Pra. p.117)

“*Karaṇapramāṇa* is threefold: *dravya*, *kāla*, and *kṣetra*. Senses, objects, relations between them, *hetu*, *drṣṭānta*, *vyāpti*, *śabdārthasaṅketa* etc., *māna*, *unmāna*, *avamāna*, *pratimāna*, *tatpratimāna*, and *gaṇanāmāna* etc. are the *dravyapramāṇa*. *Ṣoḍaśikā-ardhamāna*, *prastha* etc. is the *māna*. *Trāsu*, *chinna*, *vartikā*, *tulā* etc is *unmāna*. *caturaṅga*, *culuka*, *pāṇipuṭa* etc. is *avamāna*.” (Pra.Pra. p.119)

“*Kṣetrapramāṇa* is *uttama*, *madhyama*, *jaghanya*, *bhoga*, *bhṛkarma*, *bhūja*, *śīroruha*, *lakṣa*, *tila*, *yava*, *aṅgula* etc. which are multiplied by eight each.” (Pra.Pra. p.120)

Kālapramāṇa: *āvali* consists of innumerable *samayas*, innumerable *āvalis* constitute *ucchvāsa* (Pra.Pra. p.121)

According to this text, sense and knowledge produced by the sense are both called *pratyakṣa*. Similarly, inference (*parārthānumāna*) and inferential knowledge produced by it are both called *pratyakṣa*. Likewise sentence and knowledge produced by it (*śābdabodha*) are both called *āgama*. Since Bhāvasena's description and definition of *bhāvapramāṇa* continues up to page 119 of *Pramāṇaprāmāṇya*, it seems appropriate to think that the instruments or means of knowledge such as *pratyakṣa* (senses), *anumāna* (probans) and *āgama* (sentence) which are defined under the heading “*bhāvapramāṇa*” constitute only the consequential knowledge (*bhāvapramāṇa*) and not the means

(*karaṇapramāṇa*) *per se* as accepted in Dvaita Vedānta. For here, it is clearly stated "Here ends the description of *bhāvapramāṇa*" (Pra. pra. p. 117).

Karaṇapramāṇa, on the other hand, Bhāvasena chooses to describe as various weights and measures of space and time based on the colloquial usage of *pramāṇa* meaning weights and measures, instead of its epistemological usage meaning instruments of cognition such as senses, objects, their relation, probans etc. Bhāvasena classifies *karaṇapramāṇa* further as *dravyapramāṇa*, *kṣetrapramāṇa* and *kālapramāṇa*. And according to him, *dravyapramāṇa*, apart from senses, objects etc., include word meanings (*artha*), example (*dṛṣṭānta*) etc., which epistemologically cannot be thought as contestants of *dravyapramāṇa*.

In essence, it emerges from the above considerations that in the *karaṇapramāṇa* section Bhāvasena describes weights and measures and not just epistemological *pramāṇas*, to which the editor of *Pramāprameya* corroborates in his foreword as -

"*pariccheda 125-128 taka karaṇapramāṇa arthāt nāpataula kī paddhatiyoṃ kā varṇana hai.*" [author has described *karaṇapramāṇa* i.e. measurements up to chapters 125-128] (*Prastāvanā* - p.4)

The description of *dravyapramāṇa*, *kṣetrapramāṇa* etc. can be found in *Anuyogadvārasūtra* (132) as stated in the comparative study (*tulanātmakasamīkṣā*) by the editor (see *Samīkṣā* p.154).

It is also important to note the Hindi translation of the relevant text by the editor¹

"*Karaṇapramāṇa* is threefold -- *dravyapramāṇa*, *kṣetrapramāṇa* and *kālapramāṇa*. Senses, objects and their relations, words, meanings and their relations which are dependent upon the probans and examples of senses, objects and their relations etc. are *dravyapramāṇa*. It (*dravyapramāṇa*) is classified as *māna*, *unmāna*, *avamāna* etc."

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1. *karaṇapramāṇa tīna prakāra haiṃ. dravyapramāṇa, kṣetrapramāṇa tathā kālapramāṇa. indriya aura padārtha tathā unake sambandha ke hetu aura dṛṣṭāntoṃ para ādhārīta śabda aura artha saṅketa ādi ko dravyapramāṇa kahate haiṃ. usake bheda isa prakāra haiṃ - māna, unmāna, avamāna ...*" (Translation of *Pramāprameya* by the editor, p.119).

Further, if we consider the early Jaina literature, it will be clear that Bhāvasena's description of *bhāvapramāṇa* is not at all new. Here the *anuyogadvārasūtra*¹ and *maladhārīyavṛtti* on it, describe *bhāvapramāṇa* as follows--

“*Bhāvapramāṇa* is threefold as - *guṇapramāṇa*, *nayapramāṇa*, and *saṅkhyāpramāṇa*. *Guṇapramāṇa* is fourfold as *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *āgama*. The *pratyakṣa*, here, is defined as Knowledge (*jīvasyārthasākṣātkāritvena yat jñānam vartate tatpratyakṣam* - *Maladhārīyavṛtti*). *Pratyakṣa* is twofold as *indriyapratyakṣa* and *noindriyapratyakṣa*. *Indriyapratyakṣa* is the knowledge caused by nose, eye etc. *noindriyapratyakṣa* is identical with *jīva* i.e. *avadhi*, *manahparyaya* and *kevala*.”

It follows from above that Bhāvasena's *karaṇapramāṇa* is definitely not epistemological in the strict sense. Hence we need not subscribe to the theory of Jaina influence on Dvaita Vedānta in this account claimed by Zydenbos (p.255).

Moreover, it is true that Bhāvasena accepts knowledge and its instrument both as *pramāṇa*, and it is so in Dvaita Vedānta. However, not only Dvaita Vedānta but all other schools of Indian philosophy also subscribe to this notion.

For instance, Uddyotakara discusses this in *Nyāyavārtika*² (contents within flower brackets mine) --

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1. *se kiṃ taṃ bhāvappamāṇe ?*, 2 *tivihe paṇṇatte, tañjahā guṇappamāṇe nayappamāṇe saṅkhappamāṇe* (sū.143). *se ki taṃ guṇappamāṇe?*, 2 *duvihe paṇṇatte, tañjahā jīvagūṇappamāṇe ajīvagūṇappamāṇe* a. *se kiṃ taṃ jīvagūṇappamāṇe?*, 2 *tivihe paṇṇatte, nāṇagūṇappamāṇe daṃsaṇagūṇappamāṇe carittagūṇappamāṇe*. *se kiṃ taṃ nāṇagūṇappamāṇe*, 2 *cauvvihe paṇṇatte, tañjahā paccakkhe anumāṇe ovamme āgame*. (*Anuyogadvārasūtra* quoted in *Jaināgamanyāyasaṅgraha* p. 1, 3.).
 2. *nanu phalābhāvo doṣa uktaḥ. na doṣaḥ. hānopādānopekṣābuddhīnām phalavattvāt. sarvaṃ ca pramāṇaṃ svaviśayaṃ prati bhāvasādhanam, pramitiḥ pramāṇamiti. viśayāntaraṃ prati karaṇasādhanam, pramīyate'neneti pramāṇam. yadi bhāvasādhanam pramāṇasābdah, kiṃ phalaṃ, viśayasyādhigatatvāt? uktaṃ phalaṃ hānādibuddhaya iti. jñāte tadbhāvāt. jñāte khalvarthe tridhā buddhirbhavati heyo vā upādeyo vā upekṣāṇīyo vā iti. kecittu sannikarṣameva pratyakṣaṃ varṇayanti, na*

“All the *pramāṇas* are *bhāvasādhanas* with regard to their own objects by the *bhāvavyutpatti*, that is ‘*pramiti* is *pramāṇa*’. But the same are (also) *karaṇapramāṇas* with regard to another thing by the *karaṇavyutpatti*, that is ‘*pramāṇa* is the means by which objects are known.’ {This will be clarified in the following paragraphs}

Then there arises a question as to ‘If knowledge is *pramāṇa*, then what is the result of this *pramāṇa*; for, the object of this *pramāṇa* is already known {when the desired result i.e. knowledge is already achieved}?’

The answer is ‘No problem. The cognition of abandoning (*hānabuddhi*) or utilisation (*upādānabuddhi*) is the result of this knowledge {of *pramāṇa* which is of the form of an ‘effect’}, since the cognitions for abandoning etc. arise only after the rise of knowledge’.

Some others hold that only contact between senses and objects (*sannikarṣa*) is *pramāṇa* {and not the knowledge}. That is not right as there is no proof to conclude that only contact (*sannikarṣa*) is *pramāṇa*. {Hence} both *sannikarṣa* and the knowledge have to be accepted as *pramāṇas*”.

We find the same verbatim in the *Sarvārthasiddhi* (1.10, p. 97), an important commentary of *Tattvārthasūtra*, also.

*Praśastapāda*¹ very clearly says so -

“The knowledge which is produced by *sannikarṣa* is the *pratyakṣapramāṇa*..... cognition of abandoning etc. is *pramiti*.”

It is acceptable to all philosophical schools to use the word *pramāṇa* to mean both instrument and its end result, for, the suffix *lyuṭ* used to generate this word *pramāṇa* is grammatically

tannyāyyaṃ, pramāṇābhāvāt. sannikarṣa eva pramāṇamiti na pramāṇamasti. ubhayaṃ tu yuktaṃ, paricchedakatvāt, ubhayaṃ paricchedakaṃ sannikarṣaḥ jñānaṃ ceti. ekānatavādinastu doṣa iti.] (*Nyāyavārtika* 1.1.3, p. 89-90).

1. *athavā sarveṣu padārtheṣu catuṣṭayasannikarṣādavitathamavya-padeśyaṃ yajjñānamutpadyate tatpratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam..... pramitirguṇadoṣamādhyasthyadarśanamiti. (Prašastapādabhāṣya, p. 192)*

capable of giving rise to both of the meanings based on the *Pāṇinisūtras* - *lyuṭ ca [bhāve napuṃsake]* (3.3.115) and *karaṇādhikaraṇayośca [lyuṭ]* (3.3.117). Hence, Madhva introduced this new terminology of *Kevalapramāṇa* and *Anupramāṇa* for the first time to distinguish between *pramāṇa* in its pure and in the instrumental senses.

It is also very important to note that in this context Bhāvasena offers nothing new in his work, a fact which is acknowledged even by the translator, who says - "The author has tried to synthesize the traditional Jaina theories with then available Bauddha and Nyāya doctrines" (English introduction by Editor V. Johrapurkar, p. III).

This is sufficient to conclude that the theory of veridicality of both knowledge and its instrument was not a new theory introduced by Bhāvasena, but a well-established theory of almost all branches of Indian philosophy well before his time.

4. *Kevala* similar in Jaina and Dvaita?

"His statement that *pratyakṣa* is of four kinds has no foundation in Madhva's text; worse still, it is a flat contradiction. Also it seems that he has made a logical error..... Thus the problem of the seven kinds of *pratyakṣa* which are four kinds remains unsolved..... it may be not wrong to assume that Jayatīrtha was aware of how kindred certain concepts in Jainism and in the teachings of Madhva were, and that he either innocently read further Jaina terminology into Dvaita or actually deliberately attempted to achieve a further synthesis." (Zydenbos p. 258-259).

The article clearly states that according to *Tattvārthasūtra* *kevala* is a *pramāṇa* falling under the category of *pratyakṣa* only. Bhāvasena's classification of *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* does not contain the word *kevala* in it. The classifications of *Tattvārthasūtra* and Bhāvasena are as follows :-

Tattvārthasūtra classification

(*matīśrutāvadhimanaḥparyayakevalāni jñānam* 1.9)

1. *matī* - recollection, recognition, guessing, inference etc.
2. *śruta* - almost equal to *śābdabodha*.
3. *avadhi* - cognition of pud-

galas etc. which have some kind of forms. 4. *manahparyaya* - the knowledge of other's thought. 5. *kevala* - the omniscience only possible in enlightened souls. Bhavasena's classification (Pra. pra. pp. 1-2, already quoted in section 3.)

Bhāvapramāṇa is of two types- *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*. *Parokṣa* includes recollection, inference, verbal cognition etc. *Pratyakṣa* is divided into four types as 1. *indriyapratyakṣa*, 2. *mānasapratyakṣa*, 3. *yogipratyakṣa*, 4. *svasamvedana-pratyakṣa*.

The Dvaita classification of *pramāṇa*¹ however is as follows :-

"One which is true is *pramāṇa*. It is twofold - *kevala* and *anupramāṇa*. The knowledge itself is the *kevalapramāṇa* and the instrument (means that causes the knowledge) is *anupramāṇa*".

From this one can clearly see that apart from the fact that *kevala* is a jargon related to cognition and the name itself there is nothing conceptually similar in the Jaina and Dvaita schools related to this epistemological element.

As far as the logical error that Zydenbos sees in the classification of *pratyakṣa* the simple fact is that categorisation of *pramāṇas* by two different functions is undertaken by the Dvaitins. From the point of view of the means of cognition, *pratyakṣa* is divided into seven as *sākṣī-manas-ghrāṇa-rasana-cakṣus-tvak-śrotra*. From the perceiver's point of view *pratyakṣa* is fourfold as *īśvarapratyakṣa-lakṣmīpratyakṣa-yogipratyakṣa* and *ayogipratyakṣa*. The functional domain of the classification being entirely different as mentioned above, we can see that there is no contradiction or confusion created by the Dvaita epistemologists. With this classification clearly chalked out, Dvaitins specify that the perceivers *Īśvara* and *Lakṣmī* are independent of *prākṛtendriyas* since they are spiritual beings who perceive only through the *svarūpendriya*, which is listed among the classification of *pramāṇas* as means of cognition. With this "the problem of seven kinds of *pratyakṣa* which are four kinds {which} remains unsolved" (p. 259) (flower bracketed word mine) to Zydenbos is solved.

1. *yathārthaṃ pramāṇaṃ, kevalaṃ anupramāṇaṃ ceti. yathārthajñānaṃ kevalapramāṇaṃ, tatsādhanamanupramāṇaṃ. (Pramāṇalakṣaṇa. p. 65)*

As for the foundation of four kinds of *pratyakṣa* in Madhva's texts, we can refer to *Anuvyākhyāna*¹ (2.1.4) -

“*Pratyakṣa* is twofold: *prākṛta* and *śuddhacaitanya*. *Śuddhacaitanya* is found only in the Lord, *Ramā* and other liberated souls. *Prākṛta* is sixfold: five *indriyas* and *manas*”.

As far as the *yogijñāna* is concerned, this concept is found even in *Nyāya*, *Yoga* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems as well.

“*Īśvara* is a special soul. He has got special powers of *aṇimā* etc. because of *dharmasamādhi* etc. He is proved as omniscient by *āgamas*”. (*Nyāyabhāṣya*²)

“It is said to distinguish the two, without contradiction to *sūtra*. *Pratyakṣa* is of two types- *yogipratyakṣa* and *ayogipratyakṣa*” (*Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*³)

“The *Yogins*, who are special among all of us, get the veridical cognition of souls (self and others), space, *dik*, time, atoms, wind, mind etc. because of the *yogajadharma*” (*Praśastapādabhāṣya*⁴)

*sattvapuruṣānyatākhyātīmātrasya sarvabhāvādhiṣṭhātṛtvaṃ
sarvajñātṛtvaṃ ca.*

(*Yogasūtra* 3.49).

This means Dvaita need not look at Jainism to adopt these theories. It is also to be noted that Dvaita's *kevala* is merely knowledge that can be caused by *pratyakṣa* or *anumāna* etc. and not necessarily be a 'manifestation of the soul' (sic) as claimed by

1. *prākṛtaṃ śuddhacaitanyamakṣaṃ tu dvividhaṃ matam.
śuddhamīśaramāmukteṣvanyatra prākṛtairiyutam.
pañcendriyamanobhedāt prākṛtaṃ ṣaḍvidhaṃ smṛtam.* (*Anuvyākhyāna*. 2.1.4)
2. *viśiṣṭātmāntaram īśvaraḥ. tasya ca dharmasamādhīphalam
aṇimādyastavidham aiśvaryaṃ..... āgamācca draṣṭā boddhā sarvajñātā
īśvara iti* (*Nyāyabhāṣya* 4.1.21, pp. 943-944).
3. *sūtrāvirodhena bheda jñāpanārtham idamucyate - taddvidhaṃ
yogipratyakṣam ayogipratyakṣam ca* (*Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* pp. 100-101).
4. *asmadvīṣiṣṭānāṃ tu yogināṃ yuktānāṃ yogajadharmaṇuḡrhitena
manasā svātmāntarākāśadikkālaparamāṇuvāyumanassu..... avitatham
jñānamutpadyate.* (*Praśastapādabhāṣya* p.189).

Zydenbos in his article (p.258). It may also be *svarūpajñāna* or simply a *manovṛttijñāna* caused by any of the senses etc. *Pramāṇapaddhati*¹ is very clear in describing this fact as one can see – “The Yogins like Gods etc., who different from the above said (i.e. *tāttvikayogins*), are *atāttvikayogins* (not the mentors of *tattvas*)Their cognition... it is of two types as said above (internal and external or *svarūpajñāna* or *manovṛttijñāna*)”.

Thus, I feel, the similarity claimed by Zydenbos not only lacks proof but also contradicts all available proofs shown above.

Moreover the *svasaṃvedanapratyakṣa* of Bhāvasena corresponds to none of the Dvaita's *pratyakṣas*. Though *sākṣipratyakṣa* is accepted to be self-revealed, we cannot equate *sākṣin* to *svasaṃvedanapratyakṣa*, for, *svasaṃvedanapratyakṣa* is described as the 'self manifestation of all the cognitions'². This seems to be an adoption of Prābhākara's *tripuṭipratyakṣa*.

And Bhāvasena's theory of *mānasapratyakṣatva* of souls, which itself is a copy of Nyāya theory, is also rejected in *Pramāṇapaddhati*³ which says “Soul and its qualities can not be cognized by *manas* since they are the objects of *sākṣin*”.

Hence it will be wrong to assume that Jayatīrtha was aware of certain kindred concepts in Jainism and teachings of Madhva; and that he either innocently read further Jaina terminology into Dvaita or actually deliberately attempted to achieve a further synthesis.

5. Dvaita Sākṣin and Jaina Manas

“This brings us to crucial question of our means of knowing the truth. In Dvaita this means has been termed as the *sākṣin* or 'witness', the ultimate *upajīvyapramāṇa*... For the Dvaitins, on the other hand, it is the source of the intuitive (sic) knowledge of, among the other things, the reality of phenomenal world, i.e. the

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1. *tadvyatiriktā devādayo yogina atāttvikāḥ.tajñānam. tadapi purvavad dvividham. Pra.Pa. p. 97.*
 2. *sarvajñānānam svasvarūpasamvedanam svasamvedanapratyakṣam. (Pramāṇaprameya p.6).*
 3. *ātmanastaddharmānām ca sākṣiṣayatvena manoviṣayatvābhāvāt. (Pra.Pa. p.145).*

reality of difference between things, and the term plays an immensely important role in Dvaitin epistemology. It is considered one of the important original contributions of Dvaita to Indian thought... *Sākṣin* is *jñānarūpa* ‘has the form of knowledge’ and is *pramāṭṛsvarūpa* ‘is the nature of the experiencer of truth’.... As Bhāvasena explains in connection with the *manas*: ‘The form of the *manas* as that of an eight-petalled lotus situated in the heart is the *dravyendriya*. The *Bhāvendriya* is *labdhi* and *upayoga*. Here the partial destruction and neutralization of the karma which obscures the knowledge is *labdhi*. The action of grasping by soul is *upayoga*. *Upayoga* is the term for the two types of knowledge which are distinguished by the terms *jñāna* and *darśana*, and it is the characteristic of the soul’. This explains how Jaina *mānasapratyakṣa* covers both the *sākṣin* and *mānasapratyakṣa* of Dvaita, for the Jaina *manas* in its subjective aspect is the soul (sic), as is the Dvaitin *sākṣin*... Thus the Dvaitin concept of the *sākṣin* appears to be one aspect of Jaina theory of the soul, which has been made more explicit through the use of a new term.” (Zydenbos p. 263-265).

This construction of parallelism is based on the misunderstanding of the *Tattvārthasūtra*. It is very clear that Jainism does not consider the *manas* in its subjective aspect as soul. *Tattvārthasūtra* enumerates “senses are five” (2.15) “They are twofold” (2.16) “*nirvṛtti* and *upakaraṇa* are *dravyendriyas*” (2.17) “*labdhi* and *upayoga* are the *bhāvendriyas*” (2.18) sequentially. *Nirvṛtti* and *upayoga* are defined as external and internal parts of each sense organ already enumerated in 2.15. *Labdhi* is explained as the “capacity to grasp objects” by Śrutasāgara in his *Tattvārthavṛtti* (p.97). *Upayoga* is already mentioned as a definition of soul in *Tattvārthasūtra* (*upayogo lakṣaṇam* 2.8) It is explained generally as *jñāna* and *darśana* by Śrutasāgara.

Here arises the question as “*upayoga* can not be treated as sense organ as it is the effect of the senses. How can the effect of *indriya* be *indriya* itself?” Having raised this question, Śrutasāgara¹

1. *pañcendriyāṇi* (2.15), *dvividhāṇi* (2.15), *nirvṛttypakaraṇe dravyendriyam* (2.17), *labdhyupayogau bhāvendriyam* (2.18), *Tattvārthasūtra*.
jñānāvaraṇakṣayopasame sati ātmano'rthagrahaṇe śaktirupayogaḥ.

answers that "here effect is figuratively treated as effecter (cause)". Here the term "figurative treatment" (*upacāra*) employed by Śrutasāgara clearly shows that *upayoga* is actually knowledge itself literally and sense organ only figuratively.

It is also significant that this *bhāvendriya* has no epistemological application and hence it is suitably named *bhāvendriya* which is quite opposed to the other, namely, *dravyendriya* that is an actual epistemological *indriya*.

Further it is very clear from the sequence of *Tattvārthasūtra*¹ and *Pramāprameya* that *labdhi* and *upayoga* are not related to *manas* only, but to all the other five *indriyas*.

Hence it will be wrong to assume that "Bhāvasena explains in connection with the *manas*...." (Zydenbos. 264).

It is also very important that in *Pramāprameya* and *Tattvārthasūtra*, *upayoga* is held to be a definition (*lakṣaṇa*) of soul and it is not identical with soul unlike in Dvaita Vedānta where specifically internal knowledge is held to be identical with soul i.e. *sākṣin*.

On Dvaita *sākṣin* Madhva says in his *Anuvyākhyāna*² - "pratyakṣa is two-fold, pure (*śuddha*) and worldly or material (*prākṛta*). Pure is found only in Īśa and Lakṣmī and liberated souls. The sense organs of the *pratyakṣa* are present in other worldly souls. *Śuddhapratyakṣa* perceives happiness, sorrow etc. in the worldly souls. It is, in case of contradiction, powerful enough to nullify all other types of cognitions as it is ever error-free."

ātmano'rthagraha udyamaḥ arthagrahaṇe pravartanam arthagrahaṇe vyāparanamupayogaḥ. nanu indriyaphalamu- payogaḥ. tasya indriyaphalabhūtasya indriyatvaṃ katham. satyaṃ kāryasya kāraṇopacārāt. ... indriyārthagrahaka upayogo'pi indriyamucyate. Śrutasāgara in his *Tattvārthavṛtti* (p.97).

1. pañcendriyāṇi (2.15), dvividhāni (2.15), nirvṛtтыupakarāṇe dravyendriyam (2.17), labdhyupayogau bhāvendriyam (2.18), *Tattvārthasūtra*.
2. prākṛtaṃ śuddhacaitanyamakṣaṃ tu dvividhaṃ matam. pañcendriyamanobhedāt prākṛtaṃ śaḍvidhaṃ smṛtam. nirdoṣatvātiniyamāt tadbaliṣṭhatamaṃ matam. (*Anuvyākhyāna* 2.1.4).

Pramāṇapaddhati describes the scope of knowledge of *sākṣin* as follows - "...the soul, its qualities (such as sorrow, happiness etc.), nescience, mind (*manas*), its manifestations such as cognitions, sorrow, happiness which are caused by external sense organs, time, eternal space (different from the *bhūtākāśa*) etc."¹ (Pra.pa. p. 126).

According to Dvaita, happiness etc. are of two types - manifestations of the soul and manifestations of mind. The mind cannot perceive the qualities that are the manifestations of soul, hence the need of a sense that is identical with the soul. The mind cannot be held to be the perceiver of these qualities of soul, for it has proved to be erroneous in some other cases, whereas we find the cognitions of sorrow, happiness etc. always error-free, and hence they cannot be handled by *manas*. I have dealt elsewhere (Pandurangi 2004) the theory of *sākṣin* in detail.

Thus it is clear that there is a big conceptual gap among the Dvaita, Jainism and Nyāya on this issue. The theory of mental cognition (*mānasapratyakṣatva*) of sorrow etc. which is basically found in Nyāya should prompt one to look into the similarities between Dvaita and Nyāya and not between Dvaita and Jainism, unlike Zydenbos does.

In this context it is very interesting to note that Jainism does not consider the *manas* as a sense organ at all,² though Bhāvasena accepts *manas* as an instrument of *pratyakṣa*.

It is to be noted that the *sākṣin* theory of Dvaita stands very different from that of other schools, for no other school, except Advaita, accepts *sākṣin* as a sense organ that always cognizes knowledge of self etc., even though its role being actually different in Advaita.

Hence it is astonishing and baseless that Zydenbos thinks that "*manas* in its subjective aspect is the soul.... Thus the Dvaitin concept of the *sākṣin* appears to be one aspect of Jaina theory of

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1. *tasya viṣayāḥ ātmasvarūpaṃ taddharmā avidyā manastadvṛttayaḥ bāhyendriyajñānasukhādyāḥ kālo'vyākṛtākāśaścetyādayaḥ*. (Pra.pa.)
 2. *Sarvārthasiddhi on Tattvārthasūtra - mano'nava-sthānāt indriyaṃ na bhavatīti pratyākhyātam* (p. 79), *Tattvārthasūtra - spārsana-rāsana-ghrāṇa-cakṣuḥ-śrotrāṇi* -2.19, *śrutamanindriyasya* (2.21).

the soul, which has been made more explicit through the use of a new term." (Zydenbos, p. 264).

6 Smṛti as *pramāṇa*

"In his discussion of the position of memory in Indian theories of *pramāṇa* B.K. Matilal remarks that memory-experience was never regarded by any of non-Jaina philosopher (a Naiyāyika or Buddhist) to constitute a piece of knowledge a *pramā*, a cognitive awareness which amounts to truth. The qualification a Naiyāyika or Buddhist is necessary here, for we see that Madhva and his followers very explicitly do so" (Zydenbos, p.255).

Madhva accepts recollection as a kind of knowledge and places it on the same line as *pratyakṣa*, *anumiti* and *sābdabodha*. The reason behind this is - nobody can say that all the perceptions are true, nevertheless the *pratyakṣa* which is caused by error-free sense is accepted to be true. Likewise recollection caused by true impression is also accepted as true. Some recollections however proved to be faulty as experienced by all.

The fact that some recollections are true is accepted in almost all schools of Indian Philosophy, notwithstanding the debate whether a true recollection is *pramā* or not. For this, it is necessary to detail on what constitutes *pramā*? How it is defined? We find early descriptions of recollection in the *Nyāyasūtra*¹- "recollection occurs in the soul as soul is of the nature of cognition". And the next *sūtra*² describes the causes of recollection. *Nyāyabhāṣya*³ is clear on how recollection occurs.

Vaiśeṣikas are much more clear on this issue. *Praśastapāda*⁴ says that *vidyā* (knowledge) is fourfold - perception, inference,

1. *smaraṇam tvātmano jñāsvābhāvīyāt* (N.S.3.2.40).

2. *prañidhānanibandhanābhyāsa-liṅga...* (N.S.3.2.41).

3. *buddhijo hi saṃskāro guṇāntaram smṛtihetuḥ* (*Nyāyabhāṣya* 3.2.42, p.882).

4. *vidyāpi caturvidhā pratyakṣa-laiṅika-smṛtyārśalakṣaṇā* (*Praśastapādabhāṣya* p.183).

recollection, and intuition. Here *vidyā* is defined by Udayana¹ as true cognition. The term *vidyā* is used against the word *avidyā*, which is understood to mean erroneous cognition.²

Praśastapāda describes the occurrence of recollection (p. 242) the same way as Naiyāyikas do. Udayana, while commenting upon the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, asserts that recollection is not *pramā*, though it is true (*vidyā*), since it grasps the things as to be (being) in the past. (*atītaviṣayā smṛtiḥ*)

He ends by saying that "recollection is not a *pramā*, for it is not awareness (*anubhava*), and since all the authorities such as Gotama, Kaṇāda and Jaimini etc. say that only awareness is *pramā* and not *smṛti*" (*Kiraṇāvalī*, p.244). In Vaiśeṣika philosophy only awareness conforms to *pramā*, according to Udayana.

*Taittirīyāranyaka*³ which enumerates *pramāṇas* as follows "smṛti, *pratyakṣa*, *aitihya* (synonym for *āgama*), and *anumāna* are the four *pramāṇas* to be used for purpose of dharma etc." also supports the veridicality of recollection.

Thus it is clear that *smṛti* is not accepted as *pramā*, not because it is erroneous or false, but because it is not awareness.

This view of Udayana lacks proofs as Praśastapāda nowhere mentions that recollection is not *pramā*. Instead, he counts the recollection on par with other kinds of knowledge such as perception or inference that are accepted unanimously as *pramā*.

Furthermore Udayana's view of recollection not being *pramā* in *Kiraṇāvalī* is heavily influenced by his inclination towards the Nyāya view that recollection is not *pramā*, as we see in the following-

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1. *yathārthā pratipattirvidyeti sāmānyalakṣaṇamuktam* (*Kiraṇāvalī* p. 183).
 2. c.f. *avidyā caturvidhā saṁśayaviparyayānāḍhyavasāya-svapnalakṣaṇā* (*Praśastapādabhāṣya* p. 171).
 3. *smṛtiḥ pratyakṣamaitihyamanumānaścatuṣṭam. pramāṇamiti vijñeyam dharmādyarthe bubhūṣubhiḥ.*
It is quoted by Madhva in *Pramāṇalakṣaṇa* p. 233, by *Vedāntadeśika* in *Nyāyapariśuddhi* p. 67.

Nyāyavārtika¹ defines *pramāṇa* as a means that causes cognition. Vācaspati commenting upon the said *vārtika* clarifies-- "Here, the term 'cognition' should be taken to mean true awareness, not just cognition, nor a true cognition. For that will lead (respectively) to the overextension of this definition in the case of means of erroneous cognition and in the case of means of recollection. A means of recollection cannot be accepted as *pramāṇa* since, recollection is not accepted as *pramā*, the case being only true awareness is accepted as *pramā*".

It is also noteworthy that while discussing this point in his commentary *Parīśuddhi* on *Tātparyatīkā*, Udayana attempts to prove the faultiness of all the recollections. His arguments are as follows--

"Recollection, caused by an impression that occurred long ago, objectifies a red jar as "this is a red jar", at a time when the jar is no more red, being grey when the recollection actually occurs. Whereas, awareness objectifies a red jar as "this is a red jar" and hence true, because it is occurring at the actual time when the jar is still red. In spite of its erroneous reporting pertaining to real time, a recollection is accepted as true, if and only if, the awareness which causes the impression, and through it, the recollection, is true".

Jayatīrtha rejects Udayana's views. His arguments are as follows---

Mind plays a big role in the production of recollection by transforming the time objectified by the impression from the present to past and hence the actual form of recollection is that "this jar was red" and not as "this is a red jar". Mind converts the awareness (& impression) of "this is a red jar" to "this was a red jar" recollection, since it is aware of the change of time in between awareness and recollection. The mind has the capacity to introduce the past time - the time which was absent in awareness, in recollection. This can be likened to an eye which causes the recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) of a present thing relating it with past, a process readily acceptable for Naiyāyikas. Recollection has a very important role in all walks of life, being a

1. *upalabdhihetuḥ pramāṇam*, (Nyāyavārtika 1.1. p.15).

lone proof of crime etc., when no other material evidence of that crime is available. Thus one should accept recollection as true, willing or unwilling. (Free rendering of *Nyāyasudhā*, 2.1.2.4, pp. 2533-2553, 2818-2832, 3.2.1. pp. 4551, Pra.Pa. pp. 134-135)

Praśastapāda is highly clear in admitting recollection as *vidyā* on par with the other true cognitions such as perception and inference. While the early *nyāya* writers up to Uddyotakara are conspicuous by their silence, the latter writers do not admit recollection as *pramā* though they accept it as true. (See Gaṅgeśa on *savikalpaka* section p. 844).

Jayanta approves the view of Udayana that recollection is not true. Bhāsarvajña rejects Jayanta and re-establishes the trueness of recollection. Vallabha¹, in the line of Praśastapāda accepts recollection as *pramā*.

Both Bhāṭṭa² and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas opine that though recollection is true, it cannot be held as a *pramāṇa* because it naturally occurs only with regard to a thing that is already known, and not because it is false.

Śālikanātha³ says "what is *pramāṇa*? if it is held that true cognition is *pramāṇa*, then, recollection would have to be accepted as *pramāṇa*".

However Vedāntadeśika⁴ in agreement with Vaiśeṣikas, says "we cannot say that all the recollections are untrue, for we see in world that there are many recollections which are accepted by common men as *pramāṇa*."

This leads us to conclude that recollection is accepted as true by most Indian philosophies, though some of them may not term it as *pramā*, owing only to technical reasons. Thus it appears

1. *smṛtirapi mānāntarameva*. (*Nyāyalīlāvātī* pp. 620-624).

2. *smṛtirhi grhītagrāhitvamātreṇa apramāṇamityucyate, na tu ayathārthatayā*. (*Nyāyaratnākara* on *Ślokavārtika*. Anu.158, p. 281), also c.f. *Ślokavārtika* - *pramite ca pravṛttatvāt smṛternāsti pramāṇatā*" (*Śabda*. 104 ab. p. 306).

3. *kiṃ punaridaṃ pramāṇaṃ nāma? na tāvadavisamvādijñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ, smṛterapi tathābhāvaprasakteḥ*. (*Prakaraṇapañcikā* p.113). *smṛtimātrāpramāṇatvaṃ na yuktamiti vakṣyate*. *Abādhitā-smṛterloke pramāṇatvapariagrahāt..* (*Nyāyapariśuddhi*. 1.1. p. 45)

that even Matilal (255; 1985) seems to have misunderstood in describing "memory experience was never regarded by any non-Jaina philosopher (a Naiyāyika or a Bauddha) to constitute a piece of knowledge a *pramā*".

Thus we can conclude that the theory of holding *smṛti* as *pramāṇa* is not an original theory of Jainism as claimed by Zydenbos (p. 255).

7. *Nityordhvagamaṇaṃ muktiḥ*

"Madhva criticises the Jaina view that *Mukti* consists in the everlasting upward movement of the soul (which the Jainas have never said, and which is a misrepresentation of how the Jainas conceive the condition of soul in the few moments immediately following death in the final incarnation)" (Zydenbos p. 251).

Zydenbos' assertion that "Madhva's description of Jaina's *mukti* being a misrepresentation" is baseless. Madhva is well aware of the Jaina stand on Liberation, since he states that, according to Jainas, soul reaches the *alokākāśa* through upward movement and that is liberation. Here the everlasting upward movement becomes illogical if one accepts that soul reaches *alokākāśa*. Soul can not reach the *alokākāśa* if he (it) has to take everlasting upward movement.

Madhva quotes the Jain view twice in his *Anuvyākhyāna*.

In the first occurrence he asks Jainas as to "Is liberation not a bad effect (*vikṛti*) for soul who attains the *alokākāśa*, if the liberation is held to be *nityordhvagati*?"¹

Jayatīrtha² explains this as follows "Liberated soul who resides in *lokākāśa* (before liberation) reaches the *alokākāśa* through the uninterrupted upward movement or *nirantarordhvagati*. This journey is a kind of undesired

1. *nityordhvagatirapyeṣā yā muktiriti kathyate. alokākāśamāptasya kathaṃ na vikṛtiśca sā.. (Anuvyākhyāna 2.2.10, p. 4017).*
2. *prāk lokākāśastho hyayamātmā nirantarordhvagatyā alokākāśamāpnoti. tathā cānyathābhāvādātmano'nityatvāpattiriti bhāvaḥ. anenāntyā yā avasthitiḥ santatordhvagatilakṣaṇā tataścātmano'nityatvāpattiriti sūtrakhaṇārtha ukto bhavati. (Nyāyasudhā p. 4017)*

transformation. Hence soul would have to be momentary or *anitya*”.

In the second instance Madhva¹ refutes the Jaina view of liberation.

“Jina (which is a synonym for Jaina masters) due to his very high *tāmasī pratibhā* defines liberation as follows-After the termination of *karmans*, due to knowledge, soul, like a bird, gets liberated from this cage-like body. This liberated soul having hands, feet etc. goes always upwards. This description of liberation is not acceptable since this is confronted by an *anumāna* (which alone Jainas hold as *pramāṇa*) ‘This upward journey is full of sorrow, because it is journey, like an empirical journey’ ”.

In the second instance he questions the Jaina view only with regard to upward movement and not “everlasting upward movement”. He would have certainly pointed out possible defects in Jaina view of everlasting upward movement if it was really held by Jainas.

On both the occasions it is very much clear that he is aware of the Jainas’ view that the liberated soul reaches *alokākāśa* where he (it) resides and gets eternal bliss etc. Hence it can be concluded that Madhva never misunderstood this Jaina theory of liberation.

Thus we can conclude that the word *nityordhvagati* means only uninterrupted upward movement as Jayatīrtha puts it, contrary to the “everlasting upward movement” claimed by Zydenbos. The word *nitya* has many a meanings. For example a sentence “fire always flows upward” (*nityordhvagatimān agniḥ*) means that fire does not flow backward, and never means that fire will be on an everlasting upward flow. Hence *nitya* here

1. *āśritya pratibhāmāha jinastatrātītāmasīm.
jñānātkarmakṣayānmokṣo bhaveddehākhyapañjarāt.
nityamūrdhvaṃ vrajatyeva pudgalo hastapādavān.
iti tatkena mārgeṇa mokṣarūpaṃ pradarśyate..
gatiṃrūrdhvā ca duḥkhetā gatiṃvāllaukikī yathā.
ityukte cānumānaikaśaraṇasya kimuttaram.. (Anuvyākhyāna 4.2.1.
5469-5472]*

means uninterrupted and not everlasting.¹

1. One more possible way to interpret Madhva's quotation of *nityordhvagati*, although unlikely since Madhva is very clear about what he wants to say, may be constructed as follows —

It seems there are two views among Jainas regarding liberation. The first one propounded in *Tattvārthasūtra* etc. being that Soul will get a form full of bliss, and knowledge etc. while liberated. And the second one is that Soul moves upward eternally and that is liberation. It is evident from abundant quotations available in works of different systems of Indian philosophy that some Jainas held such a (second) view. A third view also seems to be held by some as to reaching the Arhat is liberation. This third view is quoted in one commentary of *Brahmasūtraśaṅkarabhāṣya*.

For the first time we find description of two types of Jain liberation in *Bhāmatī*. *Bhāmatī* commentary on *Brahmasūtraśaṅkarabhāṣya* narrates the two views of Jainas on *mukti* as follows — “Having got rid of all difficulties and their effects, soul without any *āvaraṇa* and being full of bliss resides upwards. That is liberation, so say some. Others say that soul being innately capable of going upwards, goes upwards always, after getting rid of *dharma* and *adharmāstikāyas*, that is liberation” [*vigalitasamastakleśatadvāsanasya anāvaraṇajñānasya sukhaikatānasya ātmanaḥ uparideśāvasthānaṃ mokṣa ityeke. anye tu -- ūrdhvagamanaśīlo hi dharmādharmāstikāyena baddhaḥ tadvimokādyadūrdhvaṃ gacchatyeva, sa mokṣa iti. (Bhāmatī.2.2.33, p. 560)*].

Vedāntadeśika quotes the two views of Jainas as follows-- *tatra bhūbhūyāṃ nityapatanavannityordhvagamanaṃ ityeke. anye tu lokākāśamatikramya sakalalokamastakasthāyinyalokākāśe dehamekamanekaṃ vā parigrhya vasanta iti.. (Sarvārthasiddhi 2.75).*

Vārtika commentary on *Brahmasūtraśaṅkarabhāṣya* follows *Bhāmatī* verbatim as follows-- *santatordhvagamanaśīlo hi jīvaḥ (Vārtika p. 594). atha mokṣaḥ- nigatanikhilakleśatadvāsanasya anāvaraṇajñānasya sukhaikatānasya ātmano'lokākāśa-deśāvasthānaṃ ityeke. apare tu -- ūrdhvagamanaśīlo hi dharmādharmāstikāyena baddhaḥ tadvimokāt ūrdhvaṃ gacchatyeva. sa mokṣa ityūcire (p.595).*

Ānandapūrṇa quotes only the second view of Jainas as *nāpi santatordhvagamanaṃ mokṣaḥ. vikalpāsahatvāt. (Nyāyacandrikā p. 536).*

8. Viśeṣa and Anekāntavāda

“Śaṅkara conveniently overlooked that the *syādvāda* does not say that opposing predications may be made about the same object from the same point of view in the selfsame temporal and spatial circumstances, so his criticism on this point does not reach far beyond a mere sarcastic stating that *tertium non datur*. ... Madhva does the same in his *Anuvyākhyāna*, his fourth (sic) commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*,... (Zydenbos. 254). Furthermore we may doubt whether the Dvaitins have much right to ridicule the Jaina *anekāntavāda* if we have a close look at their doctrine of *viśeṣa*..... Elsewhere Jayatīrtha calls *viśeṣa* the *padārthaśakti* (power of the object) which acts as the representative or

Ānandānubhava too quotes only one view of Jainas as *santatordhvagatiṃ kecit* (p.374). *santatordhvagatipakṣe tu* (Nyāyaratnadīpāvaliḥ p. 377).

Appayyadīkṣita even quotes a Jaina verse to support his quotation of *santatordhvagamana*.

“*tadāhuḥ—*

gatvā gatvā nivartante candrasūryādayo grahāḥ.

adyāpi na nivartante hyalokākāśagocarāḥ..” (Śivārkamaṇidīpikā . 2.2.33)

Kamalākarabhaṭṭa quotes the two views of Jainas as follows--
*dehādibhinno dehaparimāṇa evātmā. tasya puryaṣṭakaveṣṭitasya
 svaśāstroktena keśolluñchanataptaśilārohaṇādītapasā sukhātmakasya
 nirāvaraṇajñānasya ātmākārasamādhiparipākāt santatordhvagamanam
 alokākāśagamanam vā mokṣaḥ. tadeva svātantryam
 pañjarasthakhagasyeva tadbhaṅge ityārhatāḥ. nāpyārhatapanthāḥ.
 santatordhvagamanasya alokākāśāvasthānasya vā kriyātvena mokṣasya
 vināśāpatteḥ.* (Mīmāṃsākutūhala p. 46).

Sarvadarśanaśaṅgraha quotes this type of *mukti* twice. “*tathā
 karmarahita ātmā asaṅgatvāt ūrdhvaṃ gacchati*” (p. 33),
*pañjarāṇmuktasya śukasyeva ātmanaḥ santatordhvagamanam muktiriti
 cet tadā vaktavyam* (p. 95).

Hence, we can guess that though this kind of *mukti* may not be that of mainstream Jainism, it is a view held by some people (not unanimously approved). There is no conclusive evidence as to which sect of Jainism held such a view. But it is unlikely that such a big number of Indian Philosophers quote a view not at all held by Jainas. This view might have been lost long ago hence not available in any of Jaina texts available now.

substitute of difference in a relation of *saviśeṣābheda*, "in the sense that it produces the effects of difference where there is no difference" as Siauve puts it. In this arguing in favor of the notion of the one which at the same time is many, of the substance which is one with its qualities and yet different, of differences which exist only in a certain qualified sense, one hears something that sounds suspectly similar to *syādvāda*..... Thus he actually adopts the paradoxical style of writing which Jaina authors before him have cultivated for centuries, by implicitly applying the third predication of *saptabhaṅgī*: *syāt asti nāsti*." (Zydenbos. 262-3).

There is a basic and great difference between the Jaina *saptabhaṅgī* and Dvaitin *viśeṣa*. The *saptabhaṅgī* postulates seven different varieties of aspects and characteristics of a given thing which are quite conflicting to each other. Hence it is rejected by all non-Jaina authors. First two predications of *saptabhaṅgī*, i.e. *asti* and *nāsti*, are quite possible and acceptable (from different points of view) and even accepted in Dvaita since it is true that one thing can be existent in its own time/space and the same thing can be non-existent in other time/space. But a given thing certainly can not be more than that unlike Jaina thinkers have held it sevenfold. This seven-folded-ness is contradicted by our experience. This is the ground based on which Madhva and Jayatīrtha¹ reject the Jaina view.

Even If somebody persists on more aspects of a given thing i.e. *saptabhaṅgī*, despite these difficulties, then a commonsense question arises as to why to accept only seven varieties? Why not hundred or thousand or even more? This will lead us nowhere.

Further, so to speak, the first, second, and third predications of *saptabhaṅgī* i.e. *sat*, *asat*, and *sadasat*, were readily available for Madhva in Advaita which he inherited from his teacher Acyutaprajña. Hence mere employment of such terms,

1. *etat saptaprakāratvaṃ kutaḥ?. asambhavāt. so'pi katham. dṛṣṭivirodhataḥ. sarvaṃ hi svopādhau sat, paropādhāvasat. ato vyavasthayā niyamagrāhakapratyakṣādivirodhena asambhavāt ayuktameva anekāntimatamiti.* (Nyāyasudhā 2.2.10, p. 3996).
mayā hyekasyaiva sadasattvamaṅgīkṛtam, svopādhau pratiśedhāpratiyogitvāt anyopādhau tatpratiyogitvāt (Nyāyasudhā p. 464).

although in different contexts, should not lead one to a wrong conclusion that Dvaitins accept Jaina theory of *saptabhaṅgī*.

Moreover this *saptabhaṅgī* or *anekāntavāda* has nothing to do with identity and difference (*bhedābheda*) between substance and qualities that Dvaitins hold, and for which they employ the service of *viśeṣa*. *Saptabhaṅgī*'s postulations are more concerned with a given thing's seven aspects in its own existential realm rather than that of substance and qualities.

Further the concept of *bhedābheda* is not new to Indian mainstream philosophies. It is a well established theory of Bhāṭṭas. *Ślokaṁvārtika*¹ clearly rejects the only difference (*atyantabheda*) between *jāti* and *vyakti*, *guṇa* and *guṇin* etc. This theory is well steeped in Śābara and it is one of the main issues of debate between Bhāṭṭas and Naiyāyikas. The whole *Samavāya* chapter of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* is devoted to the rejection of *bhedābheda* vehemently put forth by Bhāṭṭas. I have elsewhere² detailed it. All the Vedāntins, in line with Bhāṭṭas, accept both *bheda* and *abheda* between substance and qualities, the only exception being Rāmānuja system which owing to some technical difficulties, hold substance and qualities different from each other.

Thus it is clear that this theory of *bheda* and *abheda* is a well established theory, which is not only adopted by Dvaita but also further improved and strengthened by introducing the concept of *viśeṣa*. This *viśeṣa* is not a separate entity, as commonly misunderstood, but the innate natural capacity of managing the usages of both *bheda* and *abheda*. This concept is dealt primarily and extensively in *Vaiśeṣikādhikaraṇa* of *Anuvyākhyāna* and *Nyāyasudhā* there upon (2.2.6, pp. 3572-3772), where great stress is laid on the perceptibility of *viśeṣa* beyond any doubt.

1. *tena nātyantabhedo'pi syātsāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ. (Ākṛtivāda 11.)
sthitaṁ naiva hi jātyādeḥ paratvaṁ vyaktito na hi.
yadi hyekāntato bhinnaṁ viśeṣyātsyādviśeṣaṇam.
svānurūpāṁ sadā buddhiṁ viśeṣye janayatkatham.. (Pratyakṣasūtra 141-142).*

2. See Pandurangi 2005. *Samavāyavimarśaḥ*.

9. Madhva, his lineage of Ācāryas, Divinity and geography

Madhva was born in a small village called Pājaka, which is very near to the famous Vaiṣṇava pilgrimage city of Udupi. His birth date is fixed variably either at 1238 or 1197 CE. Any way, by that time Jainism was in decline all over Karnataka, due to either, Rāmānuja's influence on Hoysaḷa kings or more probably destructive Islamic campaigns. Though it is doubtful whether Hoysaḷa and Cālukya dynasties which ruled Karnataka at the time of Madhva were still following Jainism or not, some Jaina feudatories ruled some pockets, though small, in the district where Madhva was born. But neither they were influential nor dominating as claimed by Zydenbos (p. 267). Interestingly this region, particularly, is still dominated culturally and religiously, by Brahmins (both mādhas and smārtas) and their temples, whereas the other parts of Karnataka are dominated either by Lingayat or Vokkaliga castes.

In Madhva's bibliography by Nārāyaṇapaṇḍita, a junior contemporary of Madhva, not a single instance of interaction with jainas is mentioned, and quite contrarily, King Jayasiṃha of Kumble, which is in the southern corner of Tuḷu country, is said to have welcomed Madhva into his capital and greatly facilitated him in his efforts to recover books stolen by some miscreants. Jayasiṃha was evidently a Hindu king who ruled the whole of Tuḷu country stretching from present day Kasargod to Udupi or probably more.

Madhva laid great emphasis on supreme lordship of Viṣṇu, and dealt a heavy blow to Advaita using each and every opportunity to refute it in his works. His major teachings have nothing to do with Jainism, even distantly, unlike the Advaita philosophy which, theoretically, is much similar to Śūnyavāda. Madhva was the first one to notice this which he pointed out in his *Tattvodyota* and *Anuvyākhyāna*.

Madhva's lineage of dualist Ācāryas has been described to be heavily tortured by early Advaitins, as narrated by Narayanapandita in *Maṇimañjarī*, so these Ācāryas were made to follow Advaita.

Hailing from such a lineage, Madhva declared loud enough, very much himself, and not early Dvaitins, as claimed by

Zydenbos (p. 250), that he is an incarnation of Vāyu and his teacher is Vedavyāsa and Nārāyaṇa¹ who lived in Badarī in Himalayas.

Neither was he uneasy in declaring himself as an incarnation (which was the first in Indian philosophical arena, nobody seen following), nor were his early followers in declaring him so, as claimed by Zydenbos (p. 250). He could also defend his divine nature amid his formidable rivals. Even Trivikrama, one of the formidable ex-advaitin and new recruit to Madhva's system, also Madhva's direct disciple, praised Madhva's divinity in his commentary on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* of Madhva. Thus Zydenbos' claim that “it seems not unlikely that in ascribing a divine nature to Madhva the early Dvaitins evinced an uneasy awareness that their creation of a new Vedāntic tradition could be frowned upon within the brahminical community” (Zydenbos p. 250) lacks evidences.

10. Conclusion

Thus it is very much clear that in Dvaita nothing is borrowed from Jainism. Hence none of the six topics i.e. (1) *Tāratamya* and *Bhavyābhavyatva*, (2) *Anupramāṇa* and *Karaṇapramāṇa*, (3) *Kevala*'s similarity in Jaina and Dvaita, (4) Similarity of Dvaita *Sākṣin* and Jaina *Manas*, (5) *Smṛti* as *pramāṇa*, (6) *Viśeṣa* and *Anekāntavāda*, where the Jaina background was suspected by Zydenbos proves to be so.

None of the three grounds i.e. (I) Clear similarities shared only between Dvaita and Jaina, (II) Greater antiquity of Jaina theories, (III) Geographical, religious, and historical proximity, are sufficient to prove this suspected background, for it is proved that there is no similarity between them. Hence, ground no. I stands insufficient. As shown above with all quotations, the theories that Madhva preached are available in most other

1. *tameva śāstraprabhavaṃ praṇamya jagadgurūṇāṃ gurumañjasaiva viśeṣato me* (*Anuvyākhyāna* 1.1.1), *nārāyaṇenābhīhito badaryāṃ tasyaiva śiṣyo jagadekabhartuḥ*. (*Mahābhāratatātparyanirṇaya* 32.157), *tanuṣṭṛīyā pavanasya seyam* (*Mahābhāratatātparyanirṇaya* 32.162), *yasya trīṇyuditāni vedavacane rūpāṇi divyānyalam* (found in the end of many works of Madhva)

schools of Indian philosophy. Hence the ground nos. I and II also stand anything but useful.

As for as the ground no. III is concerned, it is true that there is such a geographical and historical proximity, but it is common to all the schools of Indian philosophy. Was not Jainism prevalent when Śaṅkara or Rāmānuja wrote their *bhāṣyas*? Kāñcī was a famous Buddhist as well as Jaina center for many years.

What Madhva had to do with this obscure copycat¹ Bhāvasena's work when vast Vedic and allied literature, and other kinds of mainstream philosophical works (including all the important Jaina and Bauddha works) were readily available for him.

Even if we assume, for arguments' sake, that Madhva borrowed something from some work, how can one think that Madhva copied something from his own region when he is described to have traveled length & breadth of India not only once or twice but thrice?

Was Madhva a kūpamaṇḍūka not to see what was available in the wider Indian philosophical arena? Madhva spent most of his time in traveling the whole of India as evident from his biography.

What is the evidence for his passing remarks on Dasgupta's refutation of Christian influence on Dvaita ("Dasgupta's argumentation against it is hardly convincing" p. 251)? Does Zydenbos see any similarity between Christianity and Dvaita?

Writing anything about the quotations of Madhva is well beyond the scope of this paper.

Hence I conclude this paper saying "Jaina Background of Dvaita Vedānta" is clearly a case of misunderstanding, misinterpretation and finally mistranslation, not to forget some

1. See what editor of Bhāvasena has to say: "The author has tried to synthesize the traditional Jaina theories with then available Buddha and Nyāya doctrines" (English introduction by Editor V. Johrapurkar, p. III).

misquotations, especially, that of B.N.K. Sharma on similarity which Zydenbos uses to support his theory.¹

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1. I am grateful to Prof. Dayananda Bhargava, the renowned Jainologist, JRRSU, Jaipur, for his kind and critical comments which proved to be very useful and Dr. Vaishnavi Nishankar, Mumbai, who took pains to revise the whole paper and made it more understandable. I express my thanks to the following for the comments and reviews of earlier versions of this paper: Dr. Shrinivasa Varakhedi, Director, Karnataka Sanskrit University; Dr. Tirumala Kulakarni, Poornaprajnya Vidyapeetha, Bengalooru; Shri Kadri Krishna and Shri Shrisha Rao, Bengalooru; Shri Umesh Nepal, JRRSU, Jaipur; and finally my wife Archana Pandurangi. I am also very much thankful to Shri R. Narendran, Librarian, IFP, Pondicherry; Shri Sohanlal Yadav, Librarian, JRRSU, Jaipur for their help.

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COMMENTS

जैदेन्बोसमहाभागः पाण्डुरङ्गविर्येण विहितानाक्षेपान् प्रत्याक्षिपन्
मध्वाचार्ये जैनदर्शनपीठिकाऽन्तर्निहितेति स्वपक्षं पुनरुपोद्धलयति।

It is gratifying for a scholar to see that his twenty-one-year-old research article is still considered important enough to inspire further investigation. Today I would write the article differently, but my main conclusion would remain largely the same.

Because I have been given only one single day to respond to Veerananarayana Pandurangi's complex critique, that clearly is the result of considerably more time and occupies far more space than what has been allotted for this response, I request the readers' forgiveness that I cannot do justice to a task that deserves more attention.

It seems that at times Pandurangi has not read me very precisely. For instance, toward the end of his critique he is disturbed by a side remark of mine, and he asks: "Does Zydenbos see any similarity between Christianity and Dvaita?" Similarity is one thing; direct influence is something else. Pandurangi omits that I have stated: "from a philosophical point of view, Christian influence in Dvaita seems not likely" (Zydenbos 1991:250-1). That S.N. Dasgupta's *argumentation* in this matter, to which I refer, is unconvincing, is something quite different.

Perhaps Pandurangi also failed to understand my objective. My basic question was: Madhva is the creator of a new branch of

Vedānta; it differs from the previous two main currents of Vedānta in a few respects; how did it originate, and why did it originate in this particular manner?

I am not a Vaiṣṇava theologian; my objective was a purely historical one. Pandurangi is of course free to believe the *Madhvavijaya* of the early Dvaitin Nārāyaṇapaṇḍitācārya (Madhva was the first and earliest Dvaitin); but it is a hagiography, not a “biography”, and an impartial historical researcher is not allowed to accept the fanciful stories about Madhva in that text as historical facts. As soon as one accepts the unprovable statements about Madhva in the *Madhvavijaya*, or Madhva’s own claim to *avatāra*-hood (see my “Madhva and the Reform of Vaiṣṇavism in Karnataka” in *The Oxford India Hinduism Reader*, ed. V. Dalmia and H. von Stietencron (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 151-168) as ‘truths’, one is not a historian, but a theologian.

It is irrelevant that Pandurangi gives many quotes from a variety of unconnected philosophical texts that happen to be older than Madhva. The question should be: why did Madhva pick up precisely that coherent, meaningful combination of older ideas which I have highlighted in my 1991 article? Why did neither Śaṅkara nor Rāmānuja do that? Because those ideas are a meaningful combination, just as they are in Jainism, for philosophically establishing a non-monistic ontology. It seems obvious that Madhva (not a *kūpamaṇḍūka*, but already familiar with Jainism near to his home before he went on his grand tours) saw it was useful for *viṣṇuhakti*, and he used it. And it is unnecessary to point out numerous differences between Dvaita and Jainism: I have never claimed that Dvaita is a Jaina sect.

Pandurangi’s partisan theological approach is also seen where he defends the views of Dvaitin authors about Jainism. Jayatīrtha was relatively well-read in Jainism, but not completely fair, and Rāmānuja made the same mistakes earlier (just as Śaṅkara did, by the way). And why should we accept Rāmānuja as a spokesperson for Jainism? Should we read (for instance) Christian or Islamic theological sources to learn what Vedānta is? If Jaina sources say something different about Jainism, then Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Jayatīrtha are simply wrong. Further discussion is meaningless.

A historian should also strive to be impartial in his evaluations. If Pandurangi deprecates the Jaina author Bhāvasena is an “obscure copycat” because he synthesized some older ideas, then what to say of Madhva, irrespective of the sources from which he drew his basic ideas?...

The Dvaita-Vedānta tradition of Madhvācārya is an area of Indian intellectual history that has been sadly neglected in modern scholarship, and also therefore traditional scholars are unfamiliar with the methods of modern research. They should realize that historical research poses no threat to theological meaningfulness. The lack of this realization also lies at the basis of recent, purely theological attacks from Mādhva circles on the impressive philological work by the Austrian researcher R. Mesquita about Madhva’s writings. What a traditionally trained theologian says is not the only or final word about the historical truth of his tradition, and sometimes one needs a scholar outside that tradition to point out its meaning and value for the wider world.

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The Dhruvabhrama-Yantra of Padmanābha

Sreeramula Rajeswara Sarma

श्रीरामुलराजेश्वरशर्ममहाभागः मध्यभारतस्य नर्मदानदीतीरवासिना पद्मनाभेन पञ्चदशशताब्दस्य प्रथमपादे आविष्कृतस्य ध्रुवभ्रमनामकस्य दिने रात्रौ च काल-राशि-दशमभावादिगणनानुकूलस्य यन्त्रस्य साङ्गोपाङ्गविवरणम् अप्रकाशितमातृकानां साहाय्येन स्पष्टयति। पुण्यपत्तने, जयपुरनगरे पारिसनगरे च पुरावस्तुसङ्ग्रहालयेषु विद्यमानध्रुवभ्रमयन्त्राणां चित्राणि प्रदर्श्य तन्निर्माणप्रकारं वैविध्यञ्च निरूपयति। प्रायः विंशत्यधिकानि ध्रुवभ्रमयन्त्राणि विश्वस्मिन् विविधसङ्ग्रहालयेषु सन्ति इत्यपि प्रकटयति।

1.1 Introduction

Diksāmya, the agreement between the computed and observed positions of the astral bodies, has always been the ideal of the Indian astronomer. Nīlakaṇṭha Somayājīn enjoins that only such astronomical treatises should be followed which agree with actual observations.¹ While astronomical texts of different *genres* like the *Siddhāntas*, *Karaṇas* and *Koṣṭhakas* help the astronomer to mathematically compute the planetary positions, he has to verify them through direct observation with astronomical instruments (*yantras*). Therefore Sanskrit astronomical texts describe the method of construction and use of several astronomical instruments. Brahmagupta devoted the twenty-second chapter of his *Brāhmasphuṭa-siddhānta* (composed in AD 628) to instruments and named it appropriately as *Yantrādhyāya*.²

The following abbreviations are used in this paper.

CESS = *Census of the Exact Sciences in Sanskrit* by David Pingree

DBA = *Dhruvabhramādhikāra* by Padmanābha

DBAC = Padmanābha's auto-commentary on *Dhruvabhramādhikāra*.

1. Nīlakaṇṭha Somayājīn, *Jyotirmīmāṃsā*, p. 6: *yaḥ siddhāntaḥ darśanāvisaṃvādī bhavati so 'nveṣaṇīyaḥ*, quoted in: Subbarayappa & Sarma, *Indian Astronomy: A Source-Book*, p. 7; for similar statements by other astronomers, see *ibid*, pp. 5-8.
2. Sarma, "Astronomical Instruments in Brahmagupta's *Brāhmasphuṭasiddhānta*."

Subsequently several other *Siddhāntas* emulated this practice. There are also texts that deal exclusively with astronomical instruments. These can be divided into two categories, viz. those which describe several instruments, like the *Yantraprakāśa* (AD 1428) by Rāmacandra Vājapeyin of Naimiṣāranya¹ or the *Yantraśiromaṇi* (AD 1615) by Viśrāma of Jambūsara,² and those which discuss a single instrument, like the *Yantrarāja* or *Yantrarājāgama* (AD 1370) on the astrolabe by the Jaina monk Mahendra Sūri,³ or the *Turya-yantra-prakāśa* (AD 1572) on the sine quadrant by Bhūdhara of Kampilya.⁴

Among the various astronomical instruments described in these Sanskrit texts, the *Dhruvabhtama-yantra* is an interesting multi-purpose instrument. While it is generally difficult to say which instrument was invented by whom, we know fortunately that this instrument was invented by Padmanābha in the first quarter of the fifteenth century.

1.1 Padmanābha

Padmanābha wrote three small tracts on the construction and use of three different instruments, viz. the *Yantrarājādhikāra*⁵ on the southern astrolabe, the *Diksādhana-yantra* on an instrument of the same name and the *Dhruvabhramādhikāra* on the *Dhruvabharma-yantra*.⁶ While the southern astrolabe is an

1. Sarma, "On the Life and Works of Rāmacandra Vājapeyin."

2. See the note below.

3. Mahendra Sūri, *Yantrarāja*, with the commentary of Malayendu Sūri, together with the *Yantra-śiromaṇi* of Viśrāma, ed. Kṛṣṇaśaṅkara Keśavarāma Raikva, NSP, Bombay 1936.

4. Available in just two manuscripts, viz. 35097 of the Varanasi Sanskrit University and 12828 of the Oriental Institute of Vadodara. The latter is incomplete.

5. For an excellent critical edition, English translation and mathematical commentary of this work, see Ohashi, "The Early History of the Astrolabe in India."

6. About the mutual relationship of these tracts, the manuscript tradition is rather confusing. It is not clear whether these are independent works or chapters of one or more treatises. While the *Yantrarājādhikāra* is described in the colophons as the second chapter of the *Yantrakiraṇāvalī*, the *Dhruvabhramādhikāra*, (also

unusual variety of astrolabe and the *Diksādhana-yantra* is a simple instrument to determine the cardinal directions, the *Dhruvabhrama-yantra* is a multi-purpose instrument that can be used both in the day and at night to measure various parameters. Padmanābha wrote commentaries on his *Yantrarājādhikāra* and *Dhruvabhramādhikāra*, and also on the *Karaṇakutūhala* (AD 1183) of Bhāskara II.

We know very little about Padmanābha's personal life save that his father was born by the grace of the river goddess Narmadā and was therefore named Nārmada.¹ This Nārmada was himself an astronomer and composed the *Nabhogasiddhi* following the Brāhmapakṣa.² Padmanābha acknowledges him as his teacher. Padmanābha's son Dāmodara too was an astronomer. He is known by three works: a *Karaṇa* work called *Bhaṭatulya* based on the *Āryabhaṭīya* of Āryabhaṭa, another *Karaṇa* by name *Sūryatulya* based on the *Sūryasiddhānta*, and a commentary on the *Karaṇaprakāśa* of Brahmadeva.³

In his *Dhruvabhramādhikāra* (verses 21-26), Padmanābha gives the meridian altitudes (*madhyonnatāmśas*) of the lunar mansions (*nakṣatras*) for the terrestrial latitude of 24 degrees. He must, therefore, belong to some place in Central India, close to the river Narmadā. Again, in his *Yantrarājādhikāra*, he gives the precession (*ayanāmśa*) for the Śaka year 1345 (= AD 1423), which may be the

known as *Dhruvabhramādhikāra*), is styled the second chapter of the *Yantraratnāvalī*. It is not clear if these *Yantrakiraṇāvalī* and *Yantraratnāvalī* are one and the same book or two different works. Nor do we know whether the third work *Diksādhana-yantra* is an independent work or a chapter of the *Yantrakiraṇāvalī* or of the *Yantraratnāvalī*. If these are two different texts, the *Yantrakiraṇāvalī* must surely have other chapters besides the first *Yantrarājādhikāra*, and the *Yantraratnāvalī* should contain at least a first chapter besides the second *Dhruvabhramādhikāra*; cf. Ohashi, "The Early History of the Astrolabe in India," p. 217.

1. DBA 1: *śrīnarmadānugrahalabdhanmanah padāravindaṃ janakasya sadguroḥ |
natvā triyāmāsamayādibodhakam dhruvabhramaṃ yantravaram
bravīmy aṭha ||*
2. CESS, A-3, 171b; A-5, 183a.
3. CESS, A-3, 100b-101a; A-4, 108a; A-5, 137a.

year of composition of this work.¹ Padmanābha's son Dāmodara composed his *Sūryatulya* in Śaka 1339 (= AD 1417). Thus both Padmanābha and his son must have flourished in the first quarter of the fifteenth century somewhere in Central India.

1.3 The Dhruvabhramādhikāra

The *Dhruvabhramādhikāra* is a small tract of 31 verses in different metres, accompanied by an auto-commentary. Because this text has not been published so far and is available only in manuscript form² and because the instrument is rather unknown but important for the history of astronomical instrumentation,³ we introduce the instrument and its function in the following pages largely through select extracts from the *Dhruvabhramādhikāra* and its commentary. Since this is a technical subject, whenever a technical term is used for the first time, its Sanskrit equivalent will be given in parenthesis.

2.0 The Dhruvabhrama-Yantra

The *Dhruvabhrama-yantra* is an oblong (*āyata-caturasra*) metal plate one side of which is designed as the *Dhruvabhrama-yantra* and the reverse side as a sine quadrant (*Turya-* or *Turiya-yanta*). The *Dhruvabhrama-yantra* proper is a kind of nocturnal, i.e. an instrument to be employed at night. Its construction is based on the apparent diurnal rotation of the stellar sphere around the celestial poles. In his commentary, Padmanābha explains the diurnal rotation thus:

“At the beginning of the creation, the resplendent
Brahmā arranged two stars as the celestial poles at

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1. Ohashi, “The Early History of the Astrolabe in India,” p. 217, 249.
 2. David Pingree's *Census of the Exact Sciences in Sanskrit* lists some seventy manuscripts; cf. CESS, A-4, 170a-172a; A-5, 205b. I have prepared a working edition of the *Dhruvabhramādhikāra* together with Padmanābha's own commentary on the basis of eight manuscripts. The citations in this paper are from this edition.
 3. For a description of the instrument, see Garrett & Guleri, *The Jaipur Observatory and its Builder*, pp. 62-64, pl. X; Ohashi, “History of Astronomical Instruments of Delhi Sultanate and Mughal India,” p. 167; Sarma, “Indian Astronomical and Time-Measuring Instruments : A Catalogue in Preparation,” pp. 517-518.

the end of the southern and northern directions so that the stellar sphere (*bhacakra*) can properly revolve in the sky towards the west, without any support but impelled by the *Pravaha* wind. These two stars were designated as the celestial poles. That which is the southern [Pole] Star is situated below the horizon at the degrees of the local latitude (*palāṁśa*). The northern Pole Star lies above the horizon at the degrees of the local latitude. Around the latter is seen a fish-shaped constellation consisting of twelve stars. This is designated as the Polar Fish (*dhruva-matsya*). Two bright stars are visible at its mouth and tail. Of these, the one at the mouth lies at an interval of three degrees (*bhāga*) from the [actual] Pole Star and the one at the tail lies at thirteen degrees. The two are separated from one another by sixteen degrees.”¹

The star at the mouth of the fish is Polaris (α Ursae Minoris) and the one at the tail end is called *Markaṭī* in Sanskrit (β Ursae Minoris or Kochab). If these two were joined by a straight line, this line would rotate like the hand of a clock and make a full circle in a sidereal day of 23 hours and 56 minutes.

The rotation of the *Dhruva-matsya* is known to earlier astronomers as well. Brahmagupta makes a brief reference to it

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1. DBAC 11: *pūrvam śṛṣṭyādau śrībrahmaṇākāśa ādhārarahitasya pravahānilākṣiptasya bhacakrasya samīcīnapaścīmābhimukha-paribhramaṇāya dakṣiṇottarayoh prāntasthite dve tārake dhruvatve niyukte | tayo ubhayor dhruva-samjñā kṛtā | yā dakṣiṇā tāra sā tu palāṁśaiḥ kṣitijād adhaṣṭhād vartate | yā tūttarā tāra sā palāṁśaiḥ kṣitijād uparito varīvarti | tatparito dvādaśatārakābhir matsyākāramaṇḍalam upalakṣyate | tasya dhruvamatsya-samjñā vihitā | tanmukhe pucche sthūle tārake dve dṛśyete | tayo madhye yā mukhaṣṭhā sā dhruvatārāyās tribhir aṁśair antaritā | yā pucchasthā sā tu trayodaśabhir aṁśair antaritā vartate | ubhe parasparam ṣoḍaśabhāgāntarite staḥ |*

in his *Brāhmasphuṭa-siddhānta*.¹ Bhāskara II, in his *Vāsanābhāṣya* commentary on his *Siddhāntaśiromaṇi*, speaks of the daily rotation of the *Dhruva-matsya* in somewhat greater detail:

“When the Sun is situated in the lunar mansion Bharanī, then at the time of his setting, the Polar Fish becomes horizontal. The star at its mouth will be in the west and the star at the tail in the east. It means that the Sun would be in line with the star at the mouth. At the end of the night, the star at the mouth reverses its position and comes to the east and the star in the tail goes to the west. Then will be seen the rise of the Sun who is again in line with the star at the mouth.”²

The *Dhruva-matsya* is a constellation of twelve stars. Of these the stars at the mouth and tail of the fish figure are α and β in the constellation Ursa Minor. The remaining ten stars should include some of the stars in Ursa Minor. But no Sanskrit text seems to have described this constellation in detail.³

To come back to the *Dhruvabhrama-yantra*, Padmanābha lays strong emphasis, at the beginning and at the end of his work, on the fact that, while other instruments make use of the Sun or of

1. *Brāhmasphuṭa-siddhānta* 11.3:

*bhāni catuspañcāśad dvau dvāv arkaindavo jinoktaṃ yat |
dhruvamatsyasyāvarto bhavati yato 'hnā tatas tad asat ||*

2. Bhāskara, *Siddhāntaśiromaṇi*, *Golādhyāya*, *Bhuvanakośa* 10,
Vāsanābhāṣya : *yadā bharanīstho ravir bhavati tadā tasyāstamayakāle
dhruvamatsyas tiryakstho bhavati | tasya mukhatārā paścimataḥ |
pucchatārā pūrvataḥ | tadā mukhatārāsūtre ravir ity arthaḥ |
atha niśāvasāne mukhatārā parivartya pūrvato yāti |
pucchatārā paścimato yāti | tato mukhatārāsūtra-gatasyaivārkasyodayo
drśyate |*

3. The *Purāṇas* mention a constellation called *Śiśumāra* or *Śimsumāra* which is said to be a representation of Viṣṇu. Thus *Medinīkośa* (p. 144, verse 199): *śiśumāro 'mbusambhūtajantau tārātmakācyute*. The star *Dhruva* is said to be at the tail of this constellation, whereas in the *Dhruvamatsya*, it is close to the mouth of the fish figure; cf. *Viṣṇupurāṇa* 2.9.5:

*uttānapādaputras tu tam ārādhya jagatpatim |
sa tārāśiśumārasya dhruvaḥ pucche vyavasthitaḥ ||*

other fixed stars, this is the only instrument which makes use of the Pole Star and that it is a multi-purpose instrument. Thus he states at the beginning of the work:

“All the instruments measure time etc. according to the Sun or according to the fixed stars. This one, however, shows time according to the celestial Pole. Therefore it is called the best of the instruments. ... Apart from the time of the night, it also indicates the ascendant (*lagna*), other astrological houses (*bhāva*), and the results in time (*kālaphala*) (oblique ascensions) related to these. The time of the night etc. are found by observing the Polar Fish (*dhruva-matsya*). Therefore the name *Dhruvabhrama* is appropriate.”¹

Again at the end of the work, he repeats that such an instrument based on the Pole has never been mentioned previously by any astronomer:

“[Others] taught previously how to measure time from the stars, but none [has taught how to find time] from the Pole star. Therefore, out of intellectual curiosity (*kautuka*), this has been done [by me].”²

This implies that this instrument was invented by Padmanābha himself. This is very unusual because Sanskrit *śāstra-kāras* do not usually claim originality. They never say that certain inventions or discoveries are made by them; they would rather say that these are derived from the writings of the past masters (*pūrvācāryas*), if not from divine sages (*ṛṣis*). Even the great Bhāskara does not claim originality for the *Phalaka-yantra*

1. DBAC 1: *sarvāṇi yantrāṇi sūryavaśān nakṣatravaśād eva kālādy-avayava-bodhakāni / idam pṛthag dhruvavaśāt kālāvabodhakam / tasmād yantravaram ity uktam / ... triyāmāsamayādibodhakam ādiśabdāl lagnādibhāvās tatsambandhīni kālaphalāny api bodhayati / anena yantreṇa rātreḥ samayādijñānaṁ dhruvamatsyālokanād evotpadyata ity ato dhruvabhramaṁ nāma suyuktam /*

2. The final verse, i.e. DBA 31:
*nakṣatrāt samayajñānaṁ tamisrāyāḥ puroditam /
dhruvāt kenāpi na proktam tad etat kautukāt kṛtam //*

which he was the first to describe,¹ nor does Gaṇeśa Daivajña for the *Sudhīrañjana-yantra* which had not been mentioned before him.

2.1 Construction of the Dhruvabhrama-yantra

The *Dhruvabhrama-yantra* consists of an oblong (*āyata-caturasra*)² plate with a narrow horizontal slit close to and parallel to one of the shorter sides, say at the top. Below the slit are drawn eight concentric circles, producing seven annuli or rings (*koṣṭhakas*). These annuli contain different scales and the legends pertaining thereto (see Figure 1). Padmanābha numbers these annuli serially, counting them from the outside.



Figure 1: *Dhruvabhrama-yantra*, made for Yado Joshi, resident of Ukala-grama (Akola), latitude 20 degrees. Front view. Raja Dinkar Kelkar Museum, Pune.

1. *Siddhāntaśiromaṇi*, *Golādhyāya*, *Yantrādhyāya*, verses 16-22. See also Subbarayappa & Sarma, *Indian Astronomy: A Source-Book*, pp. 97-98.
2. Padmanābha takes this occasion to give a learned discourse on the classification of the quadrilaterals (*caturasra*) in his commentary. This passage, which is of interest for the history of geometry, will be reproduced with a translation in the Appendix. Commentaries on Sanskrit astronomical and mathematical texts often contain such valuable digressions.

The outermost or the first annulus (*prathama-koṣṭhaka*) contains a scale of *ghaṭīs* which are the standard units of time (= 24 minutes) in traditional India. The scale is divided into 60 equal parts to represent 60 *ghaṭīs* in a day and night (*ahorātra*). These *ghaṭīs* are numbered in the following manner. At the topmost point of the circle, i.e. where it is closest to the horizontal slit, is marked the commencement of the 22nd *ghaṭī*.¹ For the sake of reference, if we divide the circle into 360 degrees from the topmost point where the 22nd *ghaṭī* commences, and number the degrees serially clockwise, then the *ghaṭī* scale and all other scales would commence from 234 degrees. The remaining six annuli are calibrated as follows:

2. The names of the 27 *nakṣatras* (as related to the signs in the next annulus) and their meridian altitudes which are provided in verses 21-26, after correcting these for precession (*āyana-d kkarman*).
3. Zodiac signs (*rāśi*) at the equator, i.e., 12 divisions in accordance with the rising times of the signs on the equator, i.e. their right ascensions (*svasvaghāṭī-pramāṇena nirakṣodayena*); each division is sub-divided into 30 degrees and numbered accordingly.
4. The names of these signs.
5. The names of the 27 *nakṣatras* (as related to the signs in the next annulus) and their true longitudes (*sphuṭa*), after correcting them for the observer's latitude (*ākṣa-dṛkkarman*).
6. Signs at the observer's latitude, i.e., 12 divisions in accordance with the rising times of the signs at the observer's terrestrial

1. DBA 4: *randhrasthabāhvardhagavṛttanemyām
cihnam tatas cākṛtinādikātaḥ |
aṅkyāḥ samāḥ ṣaṣṭir athādito 'dho
vṛttāntarāle prathame ca koṣṭhe ||*

"Make a mark on the circumference of the [first] circle where it touches the middle of the side of the slit. In the first annulus (*koṣṭha*) between the [first and the second] circles, make sixty equal [divisions] and number them from the [above-mentioned] mark, starting with *ghaṭī* twenty-two, and [going up to sixty, and thereafter] from one [to twenty-one]."

latitude, i.e. oblique ascensions (*svadeśīyāḥ* [*rāśayaḥ*] *svasvaghāṭībhir aṅkyāḥ*); each division is sub-divided into 30 degrees and numbered accordingly.

7. The names of these signs.

2.2 The Index

Loosely pivoted at the centre of these concentric circular scales is a metal index with four beaks (*cañcu*) or pointers which project into the four cardinal directions. These pointers should be at right angles to one another and of unequal length. The eastern pointer, which is the shortest, should reach up to the sixth annulus to point the degree of the zodiac sign rising at the observer's latitude (*yathā prāk-cañcukāgraṃ nijabhodaya-nijarāśiṣu prāptaṃ bhavati*). The northern pointer is of middle length and reaches the third annulus to point the signs rising at the equator (*madhya-cañcukāgraṃ nirakṣe prāpnoti*). The western pointer is the longest to reach the outermost annulus containing the *ghaṭī* divisions (*paścima-cañcukāgraṃ ghaṭīvṛtte prāpnoti*). The southernmost projection is actually not a pointer but the plumb. Either a plumb should be suspended from this projection, or it should be made considerably heavier than the others, so that it always points downwards and gives a vertical reference.¹

2.3 The Method of Observation

Padmanābha explains how this instrument is to be used at night:

“When the instrument is held in both hands like a mirror [in a vertical plane] so that these two stars situated at the mouth and the tail of the Polar Fish become visible at the same time through the slit meant for sighting, the disc pivoted at the pin in the centre is pulled downwards by the plumb into [a vertical] position and the tip of its eastern

1. Padmanābha tartly remarks that it is not necessary to specify the lengths of these pointers because the limits up to which circle the pointers should reach have been given: *cañcukāgrāṇām avadher niyamatvāt teṣāṃ pramāṇam anuktaṃ apy uktam eva bhavati*, “Although the lengths of the pointers are not specified, they are implied because the limits of their tips are fixed.”

pointer touches whichever subdivision (*avayava*) of whichever sign in its oblique ascension, that sign together with that subdivision will be the ascendant for that moment (*sāvayavam iṣṭakālalagnam*). It should be known that this ascendant is with precession (*sāyanāmśam*).¹

Thus, when the two stars α Ursae Minoris and β Ursae Minoris are sighted through the slit, the eastern pointer will indicate that point of a zodiac sign which is rising in the east at that moment. This is the ascendant for that moment (*iṣṭalagna*). The point at which the western pointer touches the *ghaṭī* circle is called “point of observation” (*vedha-cihna*). Let us call it A. Now find out the solar longitude for that moment from an almanac (*pañcāṅga*). Place the tip of the eastern pointer at the solar longitude with precession plus six signs (*sa-calana-lava-ṣaḍ-bha*). Note where the western pointer is situated now. [That point will indicate the time of the previous sunset]. Let us call it C. The distance CA equals the number of *ghaṭīs* elapsed (*gata-ghaṭikās*) in the night from the previous sunset up to the time of observation. On the other hand, if the tip of the eastern pointer is placed just at the solar longitude with precession (i.e. without adding 6 signs), then the corresponding western point will indicate the time of the next sunrise. Let it be B. Then the distance AB is tantamount to the number of *ghaṭīs* to come in the night from the time of observation up to the sunrise (*eṣya-ghaṭikās*).² Then the time of observation is CA *ghaṭīs* after the previous sunset and AB

1. DBAC 9-10: *te dhruvatimimukhapucchādhithite tārake vedhasuṣīramadhye yugapad āvrajatas tathā yantre karābhyām ādarśavad dhṛte sati tatkendrakīlasthasya lambākṛṣyamāṇa- cakrasya pūrvacañcukāgraṃ svadeśīyodaye yasmin rāśyavayave lagati tat sāvayavam iṣṭakālalagnam bhavati | ... tat sāyanāmśam iti jñeyam |*
2. DBAC 11-13: *evam ca sati paścimacañcukāgre nāḍyāṃ cihnaṃ kuryāt | tad vedhasaṃjñāṃ cihnaṃ bhavati | ... svadeśīyodayeṣu sāyanaṣaḍbhārkam upalikhya tatropari prākcañcukāgraṃ nidhāya paścimacañcukāgrasthanāḍīkāvayavacihnāt prākśādhitavedhacihnaṃ yāvad rātrer gataghaṭikāḥ syuḥ | ced yadi sāyanārkaśyaiva cihnopari prākcañcukāgraṃ kriyate tadāpara-cañcukāgra-sthanāḍīcihnaṃ yāvad vedhacihnād eṣyaghaṭikāḥ syuḥ |*

ghaṭīs before the next sunrise, the total duration of the night being CB *ghaṭīs*.

While the ascendant and the sidereal time of observation are determined thus with the help of the eastern and western pointers, the point at which the middle pointer touches the scale of the risings at the equator (*vy-akṣodaya*), is the culmination (*madhyama lagna*) with precession (*sāyana*). Then from the culmination (*viyad-lagna*) and the ascendant (*udaya-lagna*), other astrological houses (*bhāvas*) can be determined easily.

In horoscopy (*horāśāstra*), the zodiac is divided into twelve houses (*bhāvas*) which are different from the twelve signs (*rāśis*). The twelve houses are divided on the basis of four key points where the ecliptic intersects the local horizon and the local meridian. These are as follows:

1. "Ascendant" (*lagna*, *udaya-lagna*), i.e. the degree of the ecliptic which is on the eastern horizon;
2. "lower mid-heaven" (*pātāla*, *caturtha-bhāva*), i.e. the degree of the ecliptic which is on the lower meridian;
3. "Descendant" (*asta-lagna*, *saptama-bhāva*), i.e. the degree of the ecliptic which is on the western horizon;
4. "Culmination" or "mid-heaven" (*khamadhya*, *madhyama-lagna*, *viyad-lagna*, *daśama-bhāva*), i.e. the degree of the ecliptic which is on the upper meridian.

Of these the ascendant (*lagna*) and the descendant (*saptama-bhāva*) are diametrically opposite, i.e. at 180 degrees from one another; so also the culmination (*daśama-bhāva*) and the lower mid-heaven (*caturtha-bhāva*).

Thus the *Dhruvabhrama-yantra* is a multipurpose instrument with which the sidereal time, ascendant (*lagna*) and the culmination (*daśama-bhāva*) can be found for any moment at night. Furthermore, from the ascendant and the culmination, the other two astrological *bhāvas*, namely the *saptama-bhāva* and the *caturtha-bhāva*, can easily be found out by locating the

diametrically opposite points on the corresponding circular scales of the *Dhruvabhrama-yantra*.¹

3.0 Sine Quadrant on the Reverse Side

The *Dhruvabhrama-yantra* which we have described can be used only at night. Padmanābha desires that it can be used also in the daytime and prescribes that the reverse side of the oblong plate is fashioned as a sine quadrant (*Turīya-yantra*) (see Figure 2). The simple quadrant with a graduated arc was known in India at least from the time of Brahmagupta. The sine quadrant, however, was invented at Baghdad in the ninth century. Later on it was incorporated into the astrolabe. Along with the astrolabe, it must have reached India in the early centuries of the second millennium of the Christian Era. Padmanābha is the first one to describe it in Sanskrit. Later on it was discussed in several Sanskrit texts; there were also exclusive Sanskrit texts like Bhūdhara's *Turya-yantraprakāśa* which has been mentioned at the beginning of this paper.²

In the sine quadrant, the radial edges are divided sexagesimally and parallels are drawn from these divisions to produce a grid of sines and cosines of the angles marked on the arc. Angles measured on the arc can be graphically converted into the corresponding sines and cosines on the grid and thus several trigonometric problems can be solved with the sine quadrant.

But Padmanābha uses the sine quadrant just for measuring time. This is the method of construction of the sine quadrant according to Padmanābha:

"On the reverse side of the instrument, from the corner above Libra draw a quarter circle (*vṛti-turya*) with a radius slightly less [than the side of the square]. From the side containing the aperture, draw thirty sines at equal intervals like dangling strings.

1. On the astrolabe also these four points can be directly read off from the dial, when once the rete is correctly set for the moment.
2. Cf. Sarma, "Sine Quadrant in India: Sanskrit Texts and Extant Specimens."




Figure 2: *Dhruvabhrama-yantra*, made for Yado Joshi, resident of Ukala-grāma (Akola), latitude 20 degrees. Reverse side, with the sine quadrant.

Raja Dinkar Kelkar Museum, Pune.

“Below the centre, starting from the foot of the corner (*koṇa-pāda*), mark ninety equal degrees on the rim of the quadrant and number them. Having attached an index (*paṭṭī*) marked in thirty units, together with a plumb line (*lambasūtra*) at the apex of the quadrant, affix two sighting vanes (*kīla*) with holes at the two ends of the edge [of the instrument] on the side of the slit.”¹

1. DBA 14-16ab:

kadūnadoṣṇā vaṇigūrdhvakōṇato yantrānyapārśve vṛtityam
ālikhet |

tadrāndhrabāhoḥ khaguṇonmitajyakās tulyāntarālās ca
vilāmbasūtravat ||

kendrād adhaḥ koṇapadāc ca nemyām aṅkyāḥ samāḥ khāṅkalavās tu
sāṅkāḥ |

That is, from one of the radial edges thirty lines are drawn parallel to the other radial edge. The arc of the quadrant is graduated into 90 degrees. At the apex of the quadrant, an index is pivoted, which is marked with 30 divisions, and also a plumb line. Furthermore, two sighting vanes with holes are attached to one of the sides of the quadrant.

Holding the sine quadrant in a vertical plane, one observes the Sun or the stars through the two sights by tilting the quadrant appropriately. Where the plumb line touches the graduated arc is the altitude of the object sighted. With the help of the index and the parallel lines drawn on the quadrant, time can be measured in the daytime by sighting the Sun and at night by sighting a star whose meridian altitude is known. For this purpose, Padmanābha gives the meridian altitudes of the 28 lunar mansions which are valid for the latitude of 24 degrees. For those who live at other geographical latitudes, Padmanābha also teaches how to convert the given meridian altitudes for other latitudes (verse 27).

In the case of the *Dhruvabhrama-yantra*, it may be recalled that some of the circular scales are related to the oblique ascensions which pertain to a specific latitude. Therefore, it cannot be used at other latitudes, while the sine quadrant can be used at all latitudes. Padmanābha also teaches how to obtain time at one's own latitude with a *Dhruvabhrama-yantra* made for another latitude (verse 28).

4.0 Popularity of the *Dhruvabhrama-yantra*

When one studies Sanskrit texts on astronomical instruments, a question that arises naturally is whether any of these instruments have actually been constructed and made use of in observation. In Europe, such pre-modern instruments are carefully preserved and studied, because these extant specimens of astronomical instruments are, like the literary documents, important sources for the history of science and technology.

*tatturyakendre viniyojya paṭṭīm trimśatpadāṅkāṃ sahalambasūtrām ||
randhrordhvaḥūpari kīlayugmaṃ sarandhrakaṃ prāntagataṃ
vidadyāt |*

Since nobody has so far documented Indian astronomical instruments in this manner, I began to make a systematic study of these instruments some years ago. Like Indian manuscripts, paintings, sculpture and other artifacts, several pre-modern astronomical instruments also were taken to various European museums during the colonial period. Fortunately, in these foreign museums Indian objects are more carefully preserved than they are in India. It is also much easier for scholars to get access to these objects for study than is the case in India, provided of course they can reach these countries. I have so far located and studied about 450 Indian astronomical instruments which are preserved in about 100 museums and private collections in India, Europe and the USA. These will be described with full technical details in my *Descriptive Catalogue of Indian Astronomical and Time Measuring Instruments* which is under preparation.

Of the *Dhruvabhrama-yantra*, I found some twenty specimens in different collections. In these specimens, there is much variation in the outer form of the plate, in the design of the four-armed index and also in the configuration of the concentric scales. Though all the surviving specimens of the *Dhruvabhrama-yantra* belong to the nineteenth century, the wide variety in the style of execution, in the specification of the scales, and the wide geographical distribution indicate the popularity of the instrument which may be true in the earlier centuries as well.

Padmanābha, as we saw, prescribed an oblong plate for the instrument. A majority of the extant specimens have oblong plates. A finely made example is at the Raja Dinkar Kelkar Museum, Pune (Acc. No. KM 31-13). The plate measures 104 x 112 mm. On the front side (see Figure 1) is the *Dhruvabhrama-yantra* with a horizontal slit at the top, below which are seven concentric scales. At the centre is pivoted a beautifully crafted four-armed index. In the middle of the index is engraved a lotus with eight petals in each of the four layers. The shortest arm, on which a face is engraved, has a hole at the bottom for suspending the weight which keeps it in a vertical position always. On the reverse side (see Figure 2) is the sine quadrant (*Turīya-yantra*), where 24 vertical lines are drawn (instead of 30) which are partly obliterated. There is a degree scale on the arc. Beyond the arc is

the elegant outline of an eight-petalled lotus which matches with the lotus on the observe side. Originally there was an index, but it is now lost. The copper pin which held the index can be seen at the apex of the quadrant.

Fortunately there are some important inscriptions on this instrument which tell where and for whom this instrument was made. On the front, above the horizontal slit, is engraved *akṣabhā* 4/20. To the left of the slit is engraved *pa lāmśā* 20. This means that this *Dhruvabhrama-yantra* was prepared for the latitude of 20 degrees where the equinoctial shadow (*akṣabhā*), that is the shadow thrown by a gnomon of 12 *aṅgulas* at equinoxes measures 4 *aṅgulas* and 20 *vyaṅgulas*. On the reverse side, above the horizontal slit, is engraved *ukala-grāma-sthita yado josi*, "Yado Joshi, resident of Ukala village." Yado Joshi must be the astronomer for whom this instrument was made. It is very likely that Ukala, his place of residence, is the same as the modern Akola which lies roughly on the latitude of 20 degrees (lat. $20^{\circ} 42'$ N, long. $77^{\circ} 02'$ E). However, there is no inscription stating when it was made and by whom.




Figure 3: *Dhruvabhrama-yantra* made by Soni Morarjī for Paṇḍyā Premajī in 1815 at Bhuj, latitude $22^{\circ} 30'$. Paris Observatory.

While a majority of the *Dhruvabhrama-yantras* have the oblong shape, there are some in the shape of a quarter circle, imitating the outline of the quadrant engraved on the reverse. For example, there are two nearly identical specimens in quarter circle format. One of these is now preserved in the Museum of the History of Science at Oxford. The other is with the Paris Observatory¹ (Figure 3). There are inscriptions stating that a goldsmith named Morarjī made these for an astronomer called Paṇḍyā Premajī, on Saṃvat 1872 (elapsed) Śaka 1738 (current) Jyaiṣṭha vadi 11 (= Friday, 2 June 1815). The instrument was calibrated for the city of Bhuj, in Gujarat, situated on the latitude of 22 degrees and 30 minutes.



Figure 4: *Dhruvabhrama-yantra*, anonymous, not dated. Obverse.

Shri Sanjay Sharma Memorial Museum, Jaipur.

1. On this specimen, cf. Verdet.

Besides the oblong and quarter circle format, there are also specimens engraved on circular plates. The Sanjay Sharma Memorial Museum, Jaipur, has two such specimens, one of which is illustrated here (Figure 4). It has a diameter of 242 mm. The index is rather large, in the form of a stepped up rectangle, with pointed tips in the four cardinal directions. On the three arms are written, in careless script, the elements to be indicated by each arm. Thus the arms indicate, for any moment of the night, the culmination (*daśama-bhāva*), the ascendant (*lagna*) and the sidereal time in *ghaṭīs* respectively. To the southern arm are attached two formed strips of metal, with large slits in the middle. The two strips are joined by a hinge so that the second one can be folded back when not in use or stretched out when in use. These two strips weight the southern point and pull it downwards.

Likewise, there is much variation in the configuration of the circular scales. Of the seven scales prescribed by Padmanābha, three are essential, viz. the *ghaṭī* scale, the scale of right ascensions and that of the oblique ascensions. Often the instrument makers leave out the scales with *nakṣatras*. In one specimen at the Victoria and Albert Museum, London, the scale of the right ascensions is left out, so also the middle pointer in the index. Consequently, this specimen is designed to measure just the sidereal time and the ascendant.

As regards the four-armed index, each instrument maker used his own imagination and created highly interesting designs, as can be seen in Figures 1, 3 and 4.

Padmanābha prescribes a sine quadrant for the reverse side. But several specimens contain horary quadrants to measure time directly on separate scales for each season. The sine quadrant is more sophisticated but the horary quadrant is more practical.

The *Dhruvabhrama-yantra* attracted the attention also of some Muslim astronomers who are familiar with the elements of Sanskrit astronomy. They produced similar instruments with Persian legends and numerals. They called this instrument with the Persian name *Shabnumā-wa-Rūjnumā*, which means “night-indicator and day-indicator”, because the observe side of the *Dhruvabhrama-yantra* is the “night-indicator” and the reverse side

is the "day-indicator". We do not know who made such instruments first and when. All that we know are two specimens of this Persian version. One, made by Naṣīr al-Dīn Ḥusayn in 1803 is with the Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library, Patna.¹ The other, made by Mīrzā Afḍal 'Alī 'Āmil, is in the Rampur Raza Library.² This one is not dated, but must have been made in the nineteenth century, like many surviving specimens of the *Dhruvabhrama-yantra*.

Appendix

Classification of the Quadrilaterals

DBAC 2: āyataśabdena kim ucyate | caturasrāṇām eko bheda
 āyatam | pūrvaiś caturasraṃ ṣaṭprakāram uktam | tad yathā |
 prathamam samacaturasraṃ dvitīyam āyatam tṛtīyam
 viśamacaturasraṃ | tad api caturdhā | samānalambam
 asamānānalambam tulyakarmaṇam atulyakarmaṇam ceti | eṣām
 caturṇām madhye mukhyau dvau bhedaḥ | tulyātulyakarmaṇatve
 samalambam asamalambam ceti dvau bhedaḥ | evaṃ
 catuṣprakāram caturasraṃ uktam | etad uktam bhavati |
 sarveṣāṃ bhujānām dairghyasamatve karmaṇayoḥ samatve ca yac
 catuṣkoṇam utpadyate tat samacaturasraṃ ucyate | ubhaya
 bhujapratibhujayor dairghyasamatve karmaṇayoḥ samatve ca yad
 utpadyate tad āyatacaturasraṃ | bhujānām asamatve karmaṇayoḥ
 cāsamatve lambayoḥ samatve yad utpadyate tat
 samānalambaviśamacaturasraṃ | bhujānām asamatve
 karmaṇayor lambayor asamatve yad utpadyate tad
 viśamacaturasraṃ ity ucyate | tatha pūrvācāryaiś
 caturbhujasya kṣetraphalaṃ pṛthak pṛthak catuṣprakāram
 uktam | tad yathā |

samaśrutau tulyacaturbhujē ca
 tathāyate tadbhujakoṭighātaḥ |

1. For a description of this instrument, see Sarma, "A Brief Introduction to the Astronomical Instruments preserved in Khuda Bakhsh Library, Patna."
2. For a description of this specimen, see Sarma, *Astronomical Instruments in the Rampur Raza Library*, pp. 88.

caturbhuje 'nyatra samānalambe
lambena nighnaṃ kumukhaikyakhaṇḍam ||

atulyalambe bhujayogakhaṇḍam
bhujonitaṃ tadvadhavargamūlam |

dvitrāṇi khaṇḍāni vidhāya yad vā
teṣāṃ phalaikyam bhavati sphuṭam hi ||

sarvāsamānām iti tac caturdhā
kṣetraṃ pradiṣṭam trividham hi kaiścit ||

ity atrāyatam uktam |

What is an oblong (āyata)? It is a variety of quadrilateral (caturasra). Six varieties of quadrilaterals were mentioned by the ancients. The first is the square (sama-caturasra), the second the oblong (āyata) and the third the uneven quadrilateral (viśama-caturasra). The last one is again fourfold: having equal altitudes (samāna-lamba) and having uneven altitudes (asamāna-lamba); with equal diagonals (tulya-karṇa) and with unequal diagonals (atulya-karṇa). Of these four, there are two main varieties: those with equal altitudes and those without, the diagonals being equal or unequal. Thus the quadrilateral is said to have four varieties. In this context, the following needs to be stated (etad uktam bhavati). The quadrilateral, produced when the length of all [four] sides is equal and that of the [two] diagonals is equal, is called the square (sama-caturasra). That which is produced when the lengths of the two pairs of opposite sides are equal and when the two diagonals are also equal is called the oblong rectangle (āyata-caturasra). When the sides are unequal and the diagonals are also unequal but the altitudes are equal, the figure is called trapezium (samānalamba-viśama-caturasra). When the sides are unequal, and the diagonals and the altitudes are also unequal, the figure thus produced is called an uneven quadrilateral (viśama-caturasra). Therefore, the area (kṣetraphala) of the quadrilateral (caturbhuja) was taught in four different ways by the past masters thus:

“In the case of an oblong in which the diagonals are equal and the four sides are equal, [the area is] the product of the base (bhuja) and the perpendicular (koṭi). In other quadrilaterals, where the altitudes (lamba) are equal, [the area is] the product of

the altitude and half the sum of the base and the face (*ku-mukhaikya-khaṇḍa*).

“When the altitudes are [also] unequal, [the area is] the square-root of the product of half the sum of [all fours] sides diminished [severally] by [each] side. Alternatively, make two or three [triangular] segments; the sum of their areas will clearly become [the area] of [quadrilaterals in which] all [the elements] are unequal (*sarva-asama*). Thus the area is stated to be fourfold, or threefold according to some [authorities].”

Thus the oblong (*āyata*) has been explained.

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Artaud and Balinese Theatre, or the Influence of the Eastern on the Western Stage

Lyne Bansat-Boudon

बोदों-महाभागा फ्रेञ्च्-नाट्यनिदेशकस्य आर्तो इत्यस्य बहुमुख-
प्रज्ञाशालित्वं निरूप्य, विंशशताब्द्याः सर्वोत्कृष्टनाटककाररूपेण
नाट्यशास्त्रविशेषज्ञरूपेण च तं प्रतिष्ठाप्य परिणतावस्थायां बालिदेशीय-
दृश्यकाव्यसन्दर्शनेन तदीयनाट्यशास्त्रसिद्धान्ते सज्जातं विपरिणामं
विशदीकृत्य भारतीय-बालीय-नाट्यशास्त्रसिद्धान्तानां महत्त्वं, प्रभावं
सार्वकालिकत्वञ्च निगमयति।

Many are those who view the French poet Antonin Artaud (1896-1948) as the twentieth century's most radical influence on the Western stage. In *Le théâtre et son double* (*The Theatre and its Double*), the most famous of his writings, he attempts to redefine the nature and the purpose of drama, what the theatrical reaction of audiences should be — an experience to shake their certainty of everyday existence — and how actors should approach their work. Peter Brook (whose adaptation of the *Mahābhārata* was staged in the Théâtre des Bouffes du Nord, located in the heart of the Indian quarter of Paris), Grotowski, the Polish director,¹ the Royal Shakespeare Company, and many others have used Artaud's theories in their work, and in colleges of drama, everywhere, Artaud is obligatory reading.

The author of *The Theatre of Cruelty*² has met a cruel destiny. Indeed, Antonin Artaud was an exceptionally gifted man, a poet, a playwright, a drawer of talent, whose self-portraits are strikingly powerful, and most of all a man of the stage. Successively associated with the symbolist Lugné-Poe, director of the Théâtre de l'Œuvre, with Charles Dullin, who had just founded the Théâtre de l'Atelier, and with Georges and Ludmilla Pitoëff, at the Comédie des Champs-Élysées, Artaud founded and

1. In Artaud's wake, Grotowski staged *Śakuntalā* (1960), aiming at ironically showing to West the stereotyped image of Eastern theater that it generally builds.
2. One of the essays of *The Theatre and its Double*.

directed in 1926-28 the Théâtre Alfred Jarry (after the name of the founder of the Absurd Theatre). To the activities of theatre director and playwright (his adaptation of Shelley's *The Cenci* premiered in 1935), Artaud adds those of theoretician (*The Theatre and its Double*) and of actor in theatre and movies: notably, he appeared, in 1927, as Marat in Abel Gance's 'epic film', *Napoléon*, in 1928, in Carl Theodor Dreyer's *The Passion of Joan of Arc*, in the role of the monk Massieu, and, in 1935, in Gance's *Lucrèce Borgia*, as Savonarole, the vehement and doomed prophet — all 'ignited' roles. Although Simone Breton describes him as an actor 'beautiful as a wave, moving as a catastrophe',¹ he was also harshly criticised for the excesses of his acting, what was seen as the 'suracuité de son interprétation'.

Yet, in spite of so many talents, or, perhaps, because of them, Artaud suffered from nervous troubles, that is to say, from a bordering on insanity, which varied in degree and form throughout his life, taking him from asylum to asylum, till his death.

Although he associated for some time with the twentieth century's surrealist movement, he was too independent a spirit to remain linked with any school of thought. His only lasting link was with symbolist theatre (which appeared in France at the very end of the nineteenth century). In the light of my familiarity with Indian and Western aesthetics, it appears to me that symbolist theatre shares more than one feature with the aesthetics of Indian drama, although neither the theoreticians of the symbolist movement nor Artaud were aware of it. It may be noted, nevertheless, that, in their search for a genuine, archaic and ideal drama, the Symbolists included an Indian drama in their repertory, the *Mṛcchakaṭikā*, the best-known Indian play, to Western minds, after *Śakuntalā*.²

In 1931, Artaud attended a performance of Balinese theatre, given in Paris at the occasion of the Colonial Exhibition. It was, for Artaud, an aesthetic shock, from which proceeded all his

1. Letter of Simone Breton to Denise Naville, dated 3rd october 1924, in Henri Béhar, *André Breton, le grand indésirable*, Paris: Fayard, 2005.
2. On symbolist theatre, see Jacques Robichez, *Le symbolisme au théâtre. Lugné-Poe et les débuts de l'Œuvre*. Paris: L'Arche, 1957.

reflexion on theatre. In fact, his article entitled 'Sur le théâtre balinais' ('On the Balinese Theatre') is the first of all the essays which Artaud will later publish under the title of *The Theatre and its Double*, his *magnum opus*, in 1938.¹

Thus, it can be said that Balinese theatre has been the catalyst of Artaud's thinking on theatre. Artaud pays a vibrant homage to the performance:

The first Balinese theatre presentation derives from dance, singing, mime and music — but extraordinarily little from psychological theatre such as we understand it in Europe, re-establishing theatre, from a hallucinatory and fearful angle, on a purely independent, creative level.

Even though Artaud's text, which is as much a poem as a manifesto, reiterates his condemnation of contemporary Western theatre as verbal (i.e. verbose) and psychological (what Peter Brook will later call the 'deadly theatre'), yet, the emphasis is put on what had struck Artaud as corresponding to his own vision of 'real' theatre: 1) the idea of a pure theatre in which staging is preeminent; 2) the creation of a new physical language based on 'signs': the actors being no longer thought of as verbal articulators but as 'spiritual signs' and 'living hieroglyphs'; 3) a mental alchemy transforming a state of mind into an abstract gesture; 4) the spontaneous improvisation replaced by a mathematical precision extremely controlled and extremely ancient; 5) the requirement of extreme convention; 6) a theatre both popular and spiritual, akin to ritual; 7) the need of total theatre.

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1. It contains: 1) 'Le Théâtre et la peste' ('Theatre and the Plague') 1933; 2) 'La Mise en scène et la métaphysique' ('Production and Metaphysics') December 1931; 3) 'Le Théâtre alchimique' ('The Alchemic Theatre') 1932; 4) 'Sur le théâtre balinais' ('On the Balinese Theatre') October 1931; 5) 'Le Théâtre oriental et le théâtre occidental' ('Eastern and Western Theatre') between 1932 and 1935; 6) 'En Finir avec les chefs-d'œuvre' ('No More Masterpieces') 1933; 7) 'Théâtre et cruauté' ('Theatre and Cruelty') May 1933; 8) 'Le Théâtre de la cruauté' [premier manifeste] ('The Theatre of Cruelty' [First Manifesto]) 1932; 9) 'Deux Lettres sur la cruauté' ('Two letters on Cruelty'); 10) 'Le Théâtre de la cruauté' [second manifeste] ('The Theatre of Cruelty' [Second Manifesto]) 1933; 11) 'Un Athlétisme affectif' ('An Affective Athleticism') 1935; 12) 'Le Théâtre de Séraphin' ('Seraphim's Theatre') 1936.

From now on, I will extensively quote Artaud, in translation — an arduous task, for his words are those of a poet endowed with a sharp vision, words unusually suited to his unprecedented vision. What strikes the reader of Artaud who is aware of Eastern theatre, whether Balinese or Indian, is the soundness of Artaud's intuitions and his deep and immediate understanding of a form that was quite new to him.

I will start with a long description in which Artaud manifests the acute sensitivity of a spectator who is also a poet:

In fact the strange thing about all these gestures, these angular, sudden, jerky postures, these syncopated inflexions formed at the back of the throat, these musical phrases cut short, the sharded flights, rustling branches, hollow drum sounds, robot creaking, dances of animated puppets, is that: through the maze of gestures, postures, airborne cries, through their gyrations and turns, leaving not even the smallest area of stage space unused, the meaning of a new bodily language no longer based on words but on signs emerges. Those actors with their geometrical robes look like *living hieroglyphs*.¹

And, Artaud continues :

These spiritual signs have an exact meaning that only strikes one intuitively, but violently enough to make any translation into logical, discursive language useless.

Here, for the first time, the seminal concept of Cruelty appears, with the adverb 'violently'. Cruelty, the favorite concept of Artaud, is but the 'violence' inherent in true theatre, which permits us to discover the reality under, or above, reality. Thus Artaud observes in the *First Manifesto for a Theatre of Cruelty* (1932):

No theatre is possible without an element of cruelty as its basis. In our present state of degeneration, it is through our skin that metaphysics will enter our minds.

As already alluded to in his text on the Balinese Theatre ('... re-establishing theatre, from a hallucinatory and fearful angle

1. From now on I am emphasising Artaud's key-words or key-sentences by means of italics. The English translation with postface by Calder Publications (*The Theatre and its Double: Essays by Antonin Artaud: Translated by Victor Corti*, London: Calder Publications, 1970) has been a useful reading wherefrom I have borrowed several translations of Artaud's texts, sometimes with emendations.

...'), Artaud wishes to awake in the spectator a state of hallucination and fear, to 'bring him face to face with an action, but without practical consequences'.

Thus Artaud contrasts reality and realism: realism being condemned as the essence of Western theatre; reality, specially, a higher reality, or the highest, being celebrated as the essence of Eastern theatre. In other words, Western theatre is physical, Eastern theatre metaphysical, inasmuch as it 'impos[es] on our minds something like the idea of a metaphysics coined from a new usage of gestures and speech'.

I will limit myself to quoting passages in which Artaud's analysis corresponds strikingly to Indian dramatic aesthetics, which is even more remarkable inasmuch as he knew little or nothing about Indian dramatic theory — unless it was through the intermediary of his friend René Daumal. The surrealist poet, who had taught himself Sanskrit, indeed brought out in 1935 a translation of a passage in the first chapter of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, which recounts the origin of Indian theater.¹ Was any of this earlier discussed with Artaud? This, of course, is nothing but speculation, and it detracts not a bit from the power of Artaud's insights.

However that may be, one has the feeling, while reading *The Theatre and its double*, that the Indian universe inhabits a part of Artaud's imagination, as might indicate, for example, his notion of the actor as an 'affective athlete'² the basis of whose performance is breath control — a notion that perhaps reflects the influence of another of Artaud's contemporaries, René Guénon.

Thus I will attempt to show how the dramatic principles that Artaud has derived from Balinese theatre correspond to the strictures of Indian dramatic theory. For instance, a statement such as: 'The play does not develop through the sentiments but through states of mind, themselves ossified and reduced into gestures that are outlines' seems to echo Indian aesthetics, as applied to drama, namely the notion that *rasas*, which are the

1. *L'origine du théâtre de Bharata*, written in 1935, published in *Bharata: L'origine du Théâtre. La Poésie et la Musique en Inde*. Paris: Gallimard, 1970.

2. See 'An Affective Athletism' in *The Theatre and its double*.

sublimated *bhāvas* of ordinary life, are to be translated into *abhinaya*.¹

Not only has he recognised the formal perfection of the Balinese performance, that is, the perfection of its bodily gestures and facial renderings, but he has intuitively discovered the spiritual fountain from which emerges such a notion of gesture; in Indian terms, he has discovered the *sāttvikābhinaya* underlying the *āṅgikābhinaya*.² Likewise, he has understood that such a refined and conventional art is the product of a tradition:

One of the reasons for our delight in this *faultless* show lies precisely in the use these actors make of an exact amount of assured gesture, tried and tested mime coming in at the appointed place, and even more [and here comes the notion of *sāttvikābhinaya*] in the *spiritual clothing* [in French: 'enrolement spirituel'], that is, in the deep shaded study which governs the elaboration of those mimics, of those effective signs, giving us the impression that their effectiveness has not become weakened over the centuries.

And, about convention, Artaud rightly observes :

The Balinese theatre, with gestures and a variety of mime to suit all occasions in life reinstate the superior value of theatre conventions, demonstrate the effectiveness and greater active value of a certain number of well-learned and above all masterfully applied conventions.

I should add that the description applies as well to the very elaborate system of Indian dramatic conventions (*dharmī*), as expounded in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (thirteenth chapter). There are two orders of convention, the *nāṭyadharmī* presenting a higher degree of stylisation than the *lokadharmī*.³

One can marvel at such lucidity. A few hours performance is enough to understand that such a codified art, from which improvisation appears to be excluded, far from being dry and hollow repetition, becomes all the more vivid, deriving its

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1. On this process and the four registers of the *abhinaya*, see Lyne Bansat-Boudon, *Poétique du théâtre indien: Lectures du Nāṭyaśāstra*. Paris: Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient (Publ. EFEO 169), 1992: 109-117, 145-155.
 2. On the *sāttvikābhinaya*, see Lyne Bansat-Boudon, *op. cit.*: 148.
 3. On the two *dharmīs*, see Lyne Bansat-Boudon, *op. cit.*: 155-169.

wonderful richness and variety from stability itself. Artaud concludes:

We get a marvellous feeling of richness, fantasy, and bounteous lavishness emanating from this show regulated with a maddeningly awareness of the details.

In the same way, Artaud has grasped the main feature of this theatre: it is total theatre, as Indian drama also is ¹ — a concept that, from now on, Artaud will make his own, and which he will try to put into practice, as well as will also his 'post-modern' followers. How aptly he speaks of the correlations manifested in the Balinese presentation!:

The most imperious correlations burst forth from sight to earing, from intellect to sensitivity, from a character's gesture to the evocation of a plant's movements through the aid of the cry of a musical instrument.

And he concludes with an encomium of Eastern theatre, which is, at the same time, a condemnation of the Western:

Our theatre has never grasped this gestured metaphysics nor known how to make use of music for so direct, so concrete, dramatic purposes. *Our purely verbal theatre, unaware of the sum total of theatre*, that is, of everything that exists spatially, that is measured and circumscribed in space, having spatial density — I mean: movements, forms, colours, vibrations, postures, shouts —, *that theatre of ours could learn a lesson in spirituality from the Balinese theatre* with regard to what is indeterminable and depends on the mind's suggestive power.

I will stop my quotations here. As I have attempted to show, the triumph of the Balinese theatre celebrated by Artaud is to from extent that of Indian theatre as well. Whatever may be the historical relation of Balinese to Indian theatre, it is indubitable that they share the same principles, conventions, and the same idea of what makes for good theatre. Conceived as total art, theatre participates in and derives from a tradition which privileges a relaxed sense of time, an extreme artificiality of

1. On Indian drama as total theatre — text and acting, associated with song, music and dance — and the corresponding myth of origin, see Lyne Bansat-Boudon (ed.), *Théâtre de l'Inde ancienne*. Paris: Gallimard (Bibliothèque de La Pléiade), 2006: xxxiv-xxxv.

convention, and reserves a crucial place for the techniques of acting.

This Balinese presentation was not the first appearance of Eastern theatre in France. Already, on the occasion of the Universal Exhibition of 1889, a troupe of Javanese dancers gave performances in Paris. In 1906, Auguste Rodin, the famous sculptor, painted a Cambodian danseuse, a painting which anticipates Artaud's apt description twenty-five years later of the Balinese practice. Yet, the true meeting of Eastern and Western theatre awaited Artaud, his poetical vision and theoretical insight.

Let us recapitulate what Artaud retained from witnessing the Balinese theatre as he attempted to build his theory for renewing the Western stage. Theatre should be a theatre of exaggerated theatricality, making use of extreme convention, of stylised gestures, of masks, of shouts rather than words, a 'théâtre de la démesure' (as it is formulated in French), that is, a theatre of exaggeration, which paradoxically would be regulated excess, a theatre which is nothing but the actor, which can do without everything but the actor (that is, which can do without settings, props, etc.), a theatre in which the actor signifies — 'makes sign', or, in other words, makes sense.

Such was the impulsion given to Artaud's thought by the Balinese theatre. Yet, the introduction of cruelty makes Artaud's conception of theatre altogether original and distinct from the Eastern. A cruelty which is also that of his own destiny — his 'insanity' — as well as that of his time and place — Europe between the wars, source of the atrocities that will follow.

Could such a high idea of theatre be put into practice in the West? Wasn't it doomed to fail, just as failed, at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the symbolist ideal of 'pure theatre'?

Contrary to expectation, Artaud's demanding idea of theatre not only survived, but has a long and vivid posterity, mainly due to three concepts: the concept of total theatre, that of a theatre of cruelty, and that of a curative, that is, cathartic, theatre, able to disturb all routine, to reveal the true reality, to lance abscesses, as the metaphor of the plague does for Artaud

(see 'Theatre and the Plague'). It is in this way that Artaud renews Aristotle's concept of *catharsis*.

In the twentieth century, a body of critical and evaluative writing has developed which examines drama in all its aspects, especially its role as a factor in human evolution and as enriching life. Shaw, Stanislavsky, Piscator, Brecht, Grotowski, Kantor, Brook, are only a few of those who have written about the theatre, but no one has been more wide-ranging and powerful as Artaud — whose work and ideas have, incidentally, much influenced the last three named. According to Artaud, the fascination of the theatre, condemned by Saint-Augustine because of its power to drive men mad, lies in its ability to change the course of events: mankind prefers to live in an illusory world of security, believing that the fabric of social living and an ordered society protect it from the terrors of the unknown. The role of theatre must be to shake us out of our complacency and delusions of security.

The phrase most often associated with Artaud is the 'Theatre of Cruelty', title of a central chapter of *The Theatre and its Double*. Artaud's followers have tried to put this concept into practice. For instance, Peter Brook's 'Theatre of Cruelty' season, in 1964, gave London a taste of Artaudian theatre in its most didactic form. Theatre is pure poetry, disorientating the public from the certainties of everyday existence and taking them away. Artaud's notion is that the theatre must above all concern itself with subject matter that is relevant to its time, and not only not ignore the horrors of the moment, but, if possible, portray them as even more horrible, with the aid of imagination. This means that acting styles must be extremely physical, as primitive as possible in showing the essential brutishness of man.

On the other hand, Artaud's theatre is total theatre, a concept also envisaged by Piscator, Brecht and Claudel. In France, Jean-Louis Barrault, as actor and director, brought to the stage that total theatre, although without retaining its dimension of cruelty. Peter Brook, usually working with more limited means and a polyglot multi-ethnic company of actors, has created his own versions of total theatre, mainly by following the basic Artaudian principle of disturbing the audience's complacent

certainty that it is just sitting in a theatre watching a play. Before he moved to France, there was often vociferous political objection from parts of the British public and the tabloid press, especially to his 'Theatre of Cruelty' season and such plays as *Marat/Sade* and *US*, the latter an attack on the American conduct of the Vietnam war. There have also been other 'Artaudian' companies, such as Julian Beck's Living Theatre.

Artaud's theatrical ideas, when put into practice, have the effect of galvanising the audience, making it more alive and aware, sometimes politicising it, but above all bringing an element of magic into life, with pure poetry as its major component. Beckett, Ionesco and the later 'Absurdist' playwrights such as Fernando Arrabal owe something to Artaud as do the directors associated with total and poetic theatre.

In a century that has known unparalleled savagery, the concept of cruelty as a means of artistic concentration should not be so alien or difficult to understand. It is not (or not just) a matter of bloodshed or sadism, crucified flesh or martyred enemies, but rather, in Artaud's words, of a 'strict control and submission to necessity'.

Artaud's aim was to take the theatre out of the context of mere entertainment and into that of education, or rather initiation into a higher spiritual reality.¹ It is in this sense that Jane Goodall has considered Artaud a modern Gnostic.²

The discovery of Eastern theatre was decisive for Artaud's theories, and Artaud retained as principles of his 'Theatre of Cruelty' features which we know to be characteristic of the Balinese theatre. Yet Artaud's theatre is cruel, in the sense that such cruelty proceeds from a tragic vision of man and the universe, a tragic vision which is altogether unknown in Asian theatre, whether Indonesian or Indian.³ As a theorist on theatre, Artaud remains, in spite of his extreme sensitivity to other forms

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1. For Artaud's followers, that higher reality was mainly political.
 2. Jane Goodall, *Artaud and the Gnostic Drama*. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
 3. On the absence of tragedy in Indian drama, see Lyne Bansat-Boudon (ed.), *Théâtre de l'Inde ancienne*. Paris: Gallimard (Bibliothèque de La Pléiade), 2006: XLIII-XLVII and 1190-1192 (Notice on Bhāsa).

of thought or art, that is, to all forms of alterity, a man from West, for whom theatre is, in essence, tragedy.

To conclude, I would like to refer to an anecdote: it is said that, in Steven Spielberg's *Jurassic Park*, the computer generated pictures were animated thanks to preliminary work which consisted in splitting up gestures of the Balinese dancers on video — a story that suggests that such gestures may be considered archetypes of movement. This is another example of the ways Asian theatre goes on having an impact on our 'post-modernity'.

Royal Attributes of the Nirmāṇakāya Śākyamuni and the Dharmakāya Buddhas

Lokesh Chandra

लोकेशचन्द्रमहाभागः बाजे पिक्रान् महाभागया प्रणीतं “अलङ्कृतबुद्धः”
इतिशीर्षकं ग्रन्थं परिशीलयन् भगवतो बुद्धस्य क्षत्रियत्वम्
इक्ष्वाकुवंशीयत्वञ्च प्रतिष्ठाप्य, अत एव विभिन्नस्थलेषु बुद्धप्रतिमासु
छत्रचामरादिराजचिह्नोपलब्धिं व्याख्याय, बौद्धधर्मस्य अवान्तर-
सम्प्रदायभेदेषु तत्तदुपासनाक्रमस्य आधारेण आसनमुद्रादिषु वैलक्षण्यं
निरूप्य, सम्प्रदायभेदेन कालान्तरे बुद्धस्यैव वैरोचनादिसंज्ञाकरणं
प्रतिपाद्य तेषां मूर्तिकलावैलक्ष्यानि विशदयति।

Prof. Claudine Bautze-Picron has done a detailed and perceptive study of the bejeweled Buddha in her latest book "The Bejewelled Buddha." It has been published by Sanctum Books. New Delhi, in 2010 as their inaugural opus. The author has divided the assignment of royal insignia to the Buddha in four phases:

First phase from the first century BC to the third century AD at:

Bharhut: umbrella (chattra and garlands), umbrella and flywhisks (cāmara, p. 10).

Sanchi: umbrella and flywhisk

AP: flywhisk and garlands

Mathura: flywhisk, lions on a royal throne, umbrella (p. 13).

Second phase from the fourth to the sixth century AD at:

Gandhara and Greater Gandhara: (i) laurel wreath held by two cherubs (they have their counterpart in the Mediterranean tradition)

(ii) Umbrella and wreath

Maharashtra: umbrella and/or wreath

Phophnar and Sarnath: umbrella and garland

Third phase from the sixth to the eighth century AD at:

Bejewelled Buddha in Bamiyan, Fondukistan

Crowned Buddha from Parihasapura (p. 47)

Two 'shoulder-effulgences' representing Sun and Moon (p. 47)

Fourth phase from the ninth to the twelfth century

Bodhgaya, Kurkihar, Antichak and other places in Eastern India

The assignment of royal emblems had its origin in the royal kṣatriya caste of the Buddha, his being a scion of the most venerated dynasty of Indian history the Ikṣvākus, the politico-economic imperative of the Yüeh-chih/Kushans to don the imperial mantle and philosophical sophistication of Buddhism to counteract the Chinese concept of being barbarians, the Buddhist expedient means (upāya-kauśalya) of interiorisation of Solar deities prevalent in ancient NW India and other factors.

Buddha as a scion of the Ikṣvāku family

The royal connection of the Buddha is a frequent assertion in the Sūtras and other Buddhist texts. The very first stanza of the Buddhacarita of Aśvaghoṣa says: "There was a king of unconquerable Śākya. Śuddhodana by name, of the race of Ikṣvāku and the peer of Ikṣvāku in might." This has been translated from Tibetan and Chinese versions, as the Sanskrit is lost. Johnston (1936:2.1) has restored tentatively as:

*aikṣvāka Ikṣvākusamaprabhāvaḥ
śākyeṣv aśākyeṣu viśuddhavr̥ttaḥ.*

*priyaḥ śaraccandra iva prajābhyah
śuddhodano nāma babhūva rājā.*

Thus the Buddha was a descendant of the Solar Dynasty of the Ikṣvākus, from which came Lord Rāma. The commentary on Jātaka 1.49 says that the Bodhisattva saw that the khattiyas were the highest caste, so he selected the khattiya caste to take birth. Among them the Licchavīs, Mallas, Videhas and Śākya were noted for their well-organised system of government, with the

Śākyas excelling them all (EBu. 6.204). Naturally his choice fell on the Śākyas as the appropriate clan to incarnate. Sêng-yu compiled a History of the Śākya Family between the years 502-557 (T2040). He says: "In India the population is divided into four castes: the kṣatriya warriors, brāhmaṇa scholars and sages, vaiśya traders, and śūdra agriculturists. The first two classes are noble and the last two are low. The Buddha is never born in a class other than the first two. Having appeared in a troubled age when the warriors were most honored, the Buddha preferred to be born in this class." Here the kṣatriyas are mentioned first and the brāhmaṇas are second. Three passages in the Shih-chia ju-lai ying-hua shih-chi 'Life of Nirmāṇakāya Śākyamuni', compiled by pao-ch' eng in the Ming period from Chinese Sutras translated from Sanskrit from the third to the ninth century, state that the Buddha was born in the Śākya clan of the Kāma tribe (Lokesh Chandra, Life of Lord Buddha from Chinese Sūtras Illustrated in Ming Woodcuts. New Delhi, 2010:33, 175, 177). It is repeated in the 'Sutra on the Cause and Effect of the Past and Present' translated by Guṇabhadra between AD 435-443 (p. 174). the Buddha is an ex-prince of the Kāma tribe and the Buddha of the Śākya clan (p. 175). The same sutra affirms again: Siddhārtha, the son of Śuddhodana of the Kāma tribe, has become the Buddha of the Śākyas (p. 177). In the Mahāmāyūrī 93 a locality is called Kāmada. The Kāma tribe seems to have hailed from the area around the modern town of Kamdesh the tribal headquarters of the Kam Kafirs. about 2000 feet above the right bank of the Bashgal river, where Robertson spent an year in 1895 (George Scott Robertson, "The Kafirs of the Hindu-kush", London, Lawrence and Bullen Ltd., 1896, p. 19). "Katis and Kāma speak different dialects of the same language (Kati)" (Morgenstierne, some Kati myths and hymns, Acta Orientalia 1953:21.161). The migrations, history, kinship organisation, political leadership, social ranks among the Kam are discussed in the Cultures of the Hindu-kush, ed. Karl Jettmar and Lennart Edelberg (Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1974).

To revert to Sêng-yu who says that "having sprung up from the blood of Gautama the Younger, they took the name of Gautama and that of Kāma from the sugarcane field. Later the family adopted the clan name Śākya." Kāma has been discussed

above. The sugarcane field refers to the Ikṣvāku dynasty, from ikṣu 'sugar-cane.' The name Ikṣvāku occurs as early as the R̥gveda 10.60.7 and Atharvaveda 19.39.9. Their affluence, might and renown beyond the borders of India was due to the sugar that was in great demand and was a flourishing export from very ancient times.

The primacy of the kṣatriyas is well attested in the Pali Tripiṭaka. Whenever the four castes are referred to, the khattiyas always occur first, e.g. in Saṃyutta-nikāya 1.98, Dīgha-nikāya 3.82, Aṅguttara-nikāya 2.86, etc.

Dīgha-nikāya 3.97, Majjhima-nikāya 1.338, Saṃyutta-nikāya 1.153, 2.284 say : The khattiya is the best among folk Who put their trust in lineage.

The Buddha was a kṣatriya and his right to teach a new path was canonised by the presence of Brahmā who is the 'Lord of the Earth' (Brahmā Sahāmpatiḥ, sahā 'earth'). Brahmā addressed him as Tathāgata and requested him to deliver his message to humanity and other sentient beings. The way of meditation was evolved by the kṣatriyas as early as the Upaniṣads. The kṣatriyas assert their right to teach in general and in cases even brāhmāṇas. An interesting episode is that of the kṣatriya King Pravahana giving instructions to the brāhmāṇa Āruṇi in the Chāndogya-upaniṣad 5.3.7. Āruṇi says: "Because, as you have told me, O Gautama, this doctrine has never been in circulation among the brāhmāṇas upto the present time..." He refers to King Pravahana as Gautama. Lord Buddha was also Gautama. As a kṣatriya Buddha must have been steeped in the Upaniṣads. While the brāhmāṇas were involved in complex rituals of sacrifice to the Devas, the kṣatriyas were seeking enlightenment in the contemplation of Brahman, or in the expansion of consciousness (Brahman in from the root bṛnh 'to expand'), in the incandescence of being that is beyond matter and beyond mind. The Laṅkāvatāra distinguishes five vehicles of transcendence: devayāna: the way of ritual to the Devas or Vedic saṃskāra (brāhmāṇas), brahmayāna: the way of contemplation of Brahman (kṣatriyas), śrāvakayāna, tathāgatayāna: Buddhism, and pratyekayāna:

devayānaṃ brahmayānaṃ śrāvakīyaṃ tathāiva ca.

tāthāgataṃ ca pratyekaṃ yānān etān vadāmy aham.

(D.T. Suzuki, Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra Sutra, 1930:360, 408). The continuity of brahmayāna of the Upaniṣads in Buddhism was a kṣatriya phenomenon.

Earth Goddess as a symbol of sovereignty

The Earth Goddess plays an important role as witness in support of the Budhisattva on the greatest of all occasions, namely, the attainment of Enlightenment or Buddhahood. When Māra challenges the Buddha-to-be to provide witness to his Enlightenment, he touches the Earth as witness to his Bodhi. She emerges to attest the magnitude of his spiritual enlightenment (Lokesh Chandra, Dictionary of Buddhist Iconography 15:4295). Why did the Buddha invoke the Earth Goddess? She is the goddess who grants dominion to kings, and can be seen emerging between the feet of Caturānana Viṣṇu to bless the King and queen in Sculptures from e.g. Kashmir ca. 800 AD, Kashmir 9th century, Chamba 9th century (Pratapaditya Pal, Bronzes of Kashmir 1975: 9, 10, 84). The Earth was the Goddess of Regnum. Royal symbolism was a constant underlying milieu in the life of the Buddha and in the ongoing evolution of Buddhism.

The Tathāgata is surrounded by five great goddesses in the opening paragraph of the Suvarṇa-bhāsottama-sūtra representing learning (Sarasvatī), prosperity (Śrī), security (Hārītī), dynastic deity residing on the banks of Nairāñjana (mahākuladevatā), and Dṛḍhā or Mahāprthivī-devatā. The five have clear nuances of the concerns of the state. They indicate the princely modes of the mind of the Buddha. The Sūtra (ed. Joh. Nobel p. 3) says that they will protect the devotees of the Sutra with hoards of yakṣas (teṣāṃ rakṣāṃ kariṣyanti anekair yakṣa-koṭibhiḥ). The five goddesses occur twice:

nidāna p. 1 (in the assembly) p. 3 st. 13 (as protective goddesses)

Bodhisattva-samuccayā	mahākuladevatā	Nairāñjana-vāsinī
Sarasvatī	Mahādevatā	Sarasvatī mahādevī
Śrī	Mahādevatā	-----

Dr̥dhā	mahāpr̥thivī- devatā	Dr̥dhā	pr̥thivī- devatā
Hārītī	Mahādevatā	Hārītī	bhūta-mātā

Bautze-Picron has rightly remarked on p. 39 n. 94 that "the presence of the Earth-Goddess in the iconography of the Buddha constitutes a further link to his royal nature"

From Śākyamuni to Śākyasimha

There are two names of Buddha: Śākyamuni to denote his hieratic aspect as a sage, and Śākyasimha to stress his royal birth. He was not only a muni but also a simha 'lion'. The Bodhicaryāvatāra 7.55 says: "I have to conquer all. I am not to be conquered by anyone. I have to keep up this dignity, for I am a disciple (sutra) of the Jinasimha (=Śākyasimha)":

*mayā hi sarvaṃ jetavyam, ahaṃ jeyo na kenacit.
mayaiṣa māno voḍhavyo, jinasimha-suto hy aham.*

The term Śākyasimha occurs in the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra, Lalita-vistara and Mahāvastu. The ever-victorious march of Buddhism over vast geographic regions was due to the royalty of various ethnicities, and they were keen to accentuate the royal constituents in the iconography of the Buddha.

The Yüeh-chih strategy of Buddhism

The Yüeh-chih viewed the Buddha as a royal personage. Bautze-Picron says: "as a consequence of the Kuṣāṇa views of the royalty that the Buddha acts as if he were a king, and hence sits in pralambapādāsana on a throne in the way introduced by the Kuṣāṇa rulers" (p. 21). The Kushans were a clan of the Yüeh-chih. Benjamin (2002.v) points out that the probable ancestors of the Yüeh-chih established a powerful federation in present day Xinjiang and Ganur, based on trade in jade and horses. The Yüeh-chih enjoyed military superiority over their neighbours and established a strong kingdom. In 162 BC the Hsiung-nu inflicted a devastating defeat on them and converted the skull of the Yüeh-chih king into a drinking cup (p. 71). The Hsiung-nu expelled them and they migrated through the Ili Valley, Ferghana and Sogdia to northern Bactria. They conquered the Greek state of Bactria. In spite of the fact that the Yüeh-chih were the backbone

of the defence of China in supplying them Ferghana horses for the cavalry as well as bringing jade which was crucial for all imperial ceremonies, they were regarded as "barbarians" by the Chinese. This hurt their pride and diminished their status. They showed their cultural hegemony to the Chinese in the sophistication of Buddhist thought and its regal origins in the epic dynasty of the Ikṣvākus and thereby came to be respected as civilised. Monks headed by śramaṇa Shih-li-fang brought over two hundred Buddhist sutras to the capital of Ch'in Shih-huang-ti who ruled from 221-208 BC. He was the 'First Emperor' who united China by making the Great Wall, abolished all dialects of the Sinic family, created one spoken and literary language that has come down to this day, and had all the Confucian Classics destroyed. He did not accept the Sutras and all the monks were imprisoned. Later on, a Yüeh-chih crown prince instructed a Chinese envoy to the Yüeh-chih court and Ching Lu of the Imperial Academy in Buddhist Sutras in the year 2 BC (Zürcher 1972:24). Han Emperor Ming (ruled AD 58-75) sent Ts'ai yin and Academician Qin-Jing to invite Buddhist masters to China. They met Indian monks Kāśyapa Mātāṅga and Dharmaratna in the Yüeh-chih kingdom and escorted them to China in AD 67. The Emperor built the White Horse Monastery for them on the outskirts of the capital Loyang to preach, as stated in the Later Han Annals and in the Wei Annals (Tan Chung & Geng Yinzeng, *India and China: Twenty Centuries of Civilizational Interaction and Vibrations*, New Delhi, 2005: 287). The name of the monastery itself indicates that horses and Buddhism were a biunity in the Yüeh-chih mind.

Buddha depicted in bhadraśana of the Kushan Kings

The Yüeh-chih divided the kingdom of Bactria into five chiefdoms. Around 139 BC the imperial envoy of the Former Han dynasty Chang Ch'ien visited the Great Yüeh-chih of Bactria. The Kushans, who were one of the five chieftains, defeated the other four and established the Kushan dynasty in the mid-first century. Yüeh-chih monks Laugākṣin, Chih-ch'ien, Dharmarakṣa were the early translators of Sutras into Chinese.

The Kushans were proud of being of royal descent, and to them the worship of Buddha the great kṣatriya, was a matter of

dignity and of self-identity. They introduced the image of the Buddha sitting in bhadraśana on a throne in the way they sat (Bautze-Picron 2010:21). The term pralambapāda is a modern coinage of A.K. Coomaraswamy and it does not occur in any Buddhist text. The correct term is bhadraśana, which is common in Tibetan iconographic texts in a literal translation: bzañs.poḥi. ḥdug.stañs, and also as hor.ḥdug which means 'the āsana of the Hor or Central Asians' (N.G. Ronge & Loden Sherap Dagab, *Ikonoographie und Symbolik des tibetischen Buddhismus*, Teil AII. 222, Wiesbaden). Bhadra is a Sanskritisation of Bactria.

The annotations of Hsüan-tsang and I-tsing clarify that Bhadra is the name of a village in their time (see details in my *Trapuṣa and Bhallika, Cultural Horizons of India* 1993:3.140-147). The correct term bhadraśana should be used in place of the newly coined pralambapādāsana. Moreover, bhadraśana indicates the origin of the sitting posture. The Kushans consciously expressed their imperial style in many ways: they put a headline on the Brāhmī script to crown it as the imperial script. The Yüeh-chih and the Kushans worshipped the Buddha as a kṣatriya of royal blood in conformity with their imperial glory (as distinguished from clan Chieftains) and the regalisation of Buddha's iconography was an expression of their pride and power.

From the historic Buddha to the transcendental Buddhas

Bautze-Picron discusses the constant evolution of the images of various transcendental Buddhas, with the iconic attributes and mudrās becoming more specifically defined. Theogony was a fundamental process in the upāya-kauśalya strategy of Buddhism to link the outside with the inside. The alterities were not taken as opposing metasystems, but they were interiorised within the system. The outside was subjectified and it became the inside of the inside. The royal cults of the NW of India were heliotropic, dominated by solar worship. The heliotropic evolution can be tabulated as follows:

Maitreya



Amitābha



Rocana (of the Avataṃsaka tradition)



Vairocana

Mitra or Mithra became Maitraka (which gave the SinoJapanese Miroku) or Maitreya, who sat in the bhadraṣana posture of Bactria. He is also known as Ajita who is Mithra Invictus. In his Chinese translation of the Lotus Sutra, Kumārajīva translates Ajita as Maitreya. His paradise Tuṣ-āra (Tukhari-stan). The idea of a divine saviour in the future is prominent in the Iranian pantheon. Maitreya's mount is a peacock, which reminds us of the Peacock Throne of Iran down to the present. The stūpa represents the state: stūpa is Crown in the Ṛgveda, while his other attribute of the close-necked flask (kuṇḍikā) is the earlier wine-flask, as wine was used in Mithraic rituals. Later it became the bread and wine of the Christian sacrament. Mus (1935: 418f) takes up Śākyamuni and Maitreya in 'royal' ritual and the assimilation of the quality of the Buddha to royal dignity (p. 429).

Amitābha replaced Śākyamuni, and the historic Enlightenment was transcended into Supreme Illumination. The distant corridors of etymology provide links that are missing in the texts. Amita is 'infinite, transcendent' and -ābha is 'light, illumination.' The component -ābha can be seen in af of af-tab 'sun' (af 'sun', tab 'shine' Skt. tāpa, compare meh-tab 'moon' : meh 'moon' Skt. mās + tab 'shine') : an indication that the name Amitābha originated in the NW of ancient India. The Pure Land of Amitābha is transcribed as Hsü-ho-mo-t'i (=Sudhāmatī) in Chinese and translated as An-lo, in which the Chinese character for An is the same as the ethnic on for Parthia.

Amitābha evolved into Rocana, the thousandth of the thousand Buddhas of the Gaṇḍavyūha. No specific characteristics were attributed to him, except that he was an abhyucca-deva or colossus, a concept that must have come from Hellenised regions through the Tokharians who spoke a European language. "The gigantic images of Bamiyan inspired the Northern Wei colossi in Lung-men which were Lu-she-na (=Rocana) of Buddhābhadrā's translation of the Avataṃsaka done in 420-421 from a manuscript secured in Khotan.

Vairocana or 'Great Sun' as the Cakravartin

A further evolution was the several types of Vairocana with well-defined attributes. The family descent of Śākyamuni was a crucial factor in the development of heliocentric Buddhas, besides the imperial role of the Sun in the NW. As Lord Buddha was a scion of the Solar Dynasty of the Ikṣvākus, the transition from Śākyamuni to Vairocana was inherent in the lineage of the Enlightened One. Vairocana means 'The Sun', and the Sino-Japanese translation of Vairocana is Dai-nichi 'Great Sun'. By this time definitive iconic attributes, related to specific texts, had become the norm. Thus some types of Vairocana discussed by Bautze-Picron can be correlated to different textual traditions: Abhisambodhi-Vairocana, crowned, hands in samādhi-mudrā (different from the dhyāna mudrā), from the Vairocanābhisambodhi-sūtra main deity of the Mahākaruṇā-garbhadhātu-maṇḍala.

Bautze-Picron (p. 54 n. 41) says that this maṇḍala integrates two aspects of nirmāṇa-kāya in the Śākyamuni quarter and sambhoga-kāya in the central quarter of Abhisambodhi-Vairocana.

Śākyamuni represents the originating Buddha and the trikāya is not applicable here.

Vajradhātu-Vairocana, crowned, hands in bodhyagrī-mudrā AKA jñāna-muṣṭi-mudrā, from the Sarva-tathāgata-tattva-saṃgraha (STTS), main deity of the Vajradhātu-maṇḍala.

The bodhyagrī-mudrā is specified in the Niṣpanna-yogāvalī 19. It is illustrated in Śubhākarasimha's Gobu-shingon pantheon.

Durgati-pariśodhana Vairocana, hands in dharmacakra-mudrā, from the Sarva-durgati-pariśodhanatantra Sarvavid Vairocana with four faces, crowned, hands in samādhi-mudrā hold a cakra.

There are 37 types of Vairocana in my Dictionary of Buddhist Iconography 13:3770-3829. The author Bautze-Picron has taken into consideration the icons per se, without correlating them to the steady evolution of texts which contributed to ever-renewing (i) philosophical formulations, (ii) ritual to accompany the new thought system with new rites, mantras, mudrās, (iii)

new iconography of the main deity and its entourage. As pointed out above, every Vairocana belongs to a specific root-tantra. The Tibetan tradition of the Nyingma sect divides the evolution into two grand divisions of (i) inner tantras which include yab-yum deities in conjugal embrace, and (ii) outer tantras which pertain to Amitābha, and various manifestations of Vairocana. While the first are erototropic or derive from orgiastic practices, the second are phototropic or centred around solar worship.

State and sacred palladia

Vairocana in his designation as Ekākṣara Cakravartin (Jap. Ichiji Kinrin) sits on seven lions with the hands in bodhyagrī mudrā and is surrounded by seven constituents of the state. His symbol is a cakra in dhyāna-mudrā his hands are in bodhyagrī. He is illustrated in several Buddhist pantheons and his images are found in Japan. His representation from the Shoson-zuzō by Shinkaku (AD 1117-80, TZ.88:7) is illustrated below:

chattra

(imperial umbrella)

horse

(cavalry)

elephant

(one of the four constituents of the army)

queen

(stability of the dynasty)

VAIROCANA

prime minister

cintāmaṇi

(prosperity)

cakra

(imperium)

general

(defence)

The residence of Vairocana is quated with the metropolis of a cakravartin which has seven ramparts made of gold, silver, beryl, crystal, ruby, coral and one of all jewels. Kuśavatī is surrounded by such seven enclosures in the Dīghanikāya. Kuśavatī can stand for the capital (vatī) of the Kushans (kuśa). The central lotus enceinte of Vairocana in the Mahākaruṇāgarbha-maṇḍala has seven lines of different colours representing the seven precious metals and stones. The statues of the bejewelled Buddha have to be reconsidered in the light of comparative iconography. It is not "Buddha as Vairocana" (Bautze-Picron p. 141), but a new Transcendental Tathāgata/Jina/Buddha, representing a new order based on the Sarva-tathāgata-tattva-saṁgraha or other texts. The maṇḍala is an architectural structure, and hence the central parts of the "maṇḍalas are square" (Tucci 1949: 1.249), while the outer parts are round and represent the psychic elements: circle of flames (jvālāvali) to burn the sins, vajrāvalī to represent that the practitioner has become a vajrasattva, and the circle of lotuses (padmāvalī) that the devotee has attained the full purity of heart to approach the sanctum.

Bautze-Picron (p. 24) interprets devaputratvat in the inscription of one of the Sarnath images as: "the one who possesses devaputras, those born of the gods" I would like to translate the term as "like a devaputra." Devaputra is a translation of the Chinese 'Son of Heaven' for the Emperor. The portrait of Kaniška is inscribed mahārāja rājātirāja devaputro Kānishko, where he is the Indian mahārāja, Iranian rājātirāja, and Chinese devaputra. Thus the Sarnath image was like that of a devaputra or emperor. Statues were donated at Sarnath and Kauśāmbī early in the reign of Kaniška (John M. Rosenfield, The Dynastic Art of the Kushans, 1967:144).

The close connection of the state and Buddhist statuary is pointed out by Bautze-Picron (p. 56 n. 48). The crowns of various figures of the Vajradhātu-maṇḍala in the Gobushingan of Śubhākarasimha (AD 637-735) recall the crown of Sūrya from Khair Khaneh (Afghanistan) dated to the late fourth or early fifth century.

Internetting texts and iconics

Bautze-Picron uses the term vajraparyāṅkāśana. The Niṣpanna-yogāvali has vajraparyāṅkā and sattvaparyāṅka, where paryāṅka means a mode of sitting. The suffix āśana is tautology and should better be avoided. Correct technical terms have become known from a number of Sanskrit Buddhist texts. We need to study and correlate them to graphic representations. For this the vast Tibetan and Japanese oeuvre on theography will have to be compared.

The historic Śākyamuni and the multiple Transcendental Buddhas who evolved over the centuries like Maitreya, Amitābha, Rocana, and Vairocana have to be contradistinguished on the basis of attributes. As there are very few inscriptions in India that define their nomenclature, the texts in Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan as well as images in these regions can help us to name the specific Buddhas individually, rather than as developments of the historic Śākyamuni.

The book of Bautze-Picron is a model of a comprehensive approach, as well as of precision. She has covered India and SE Asia, and at times compared them with the extensive Sino-Japanese evidence. It is a crowning magnum opus on the culmination of the Buddha pare, from being surrounded by elements of royal paraphernalia to being fully jewelled and crowned. A work that provokes, raises questions, and inspires further study of the enigmas of mantrayāna, Uttarāpatha (NW of ancient India), the Kushans and the silence of Buddhist statuary over the centuries and climes, that once were the light that gave life to everything, and were the apotheosis of power and purity, of statecraft and spirituality.

Abbreviations

Benjamin 2007

Craig G.R. Benjamin, the Yuezhi: Origin, Migration and the Conquest of Northern Bactria, Brepols Publishers n.v., Turkhut, Belgium.

E Bu = Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, ed. G.P. Malalasekera and others, Colombo, 1961

Johnston 1936

E.H. Johnston, the Buddhacarita, Calcutta.

Mus 1935

Paul Mus, Barabudur: esquisse d'une histoire du Bouddhisme fondée sur la critique archéologique des texts, Hanoi

T = Taishō edition of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, ed. Takakusu Junjirō and Watanabe Kaigyoku, Tokyo, 1924-1929.

Tucci 1949

Giuseppe Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls, Rome.

TZ = Taishō Zuzō

Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō Zuzō, The Tripiṭaka in Chinese (picture section), ed. J. Takakusu & G. Ono, Tokyo.

Zürcher 1972

E. Zürcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China, Leiden

Celebrating Divinity in Pāñcarātra Tradition

Sudhir Kumar Lall

सुधीरकुमारलालमहाभागः वैखानसपाञ्चरात्रयोर्विशेषं विशदीकृत्य
पाञ्चरात्रागमानुसारेण रत्नत्रयातिरिक्तायाः ईश्वरसंहितायाः साहाय्येन
मेलकोटेस्थितनारायणस्वामिमन्दिरे भगवतो विष्णोः पञ्चदिनात्मक-
महोत्सवस्य अनुष्ठानं यथाशास्त्रं यथाप्रयोगं च विवृणोति।

Introduction

Viṣṇuism has Two Major Āgamic Schools – the Vaikhānasa and the Pāñcarātra. Although both the school are exclusively dedicated to the worship of Viṣṇu as the supreme lord, there are different sets of philosophical and ritualistic observances, which make them stand on separate pedestals. One major point of difference is Vaikhānasas' strict adherence to the Vedas, while the Pāñcarātras have a rather flexible and accommodative outlook. The famous temple of Tirupati Balaji in Andhra Pradesh is guided by the Vaikhānasa tradition and the Cheluva Narayanasvami temple at Melkote follows the Pāñcarātra code.

Festivals at temples form an integral part of the annual calendar of the temple and play an important socio-religious role for the people of that area. During the festivals, there is great pomp and show all around and they provide a grand platform for the people of all castes, creed and faiths either; to be a part of the festivities, or; savour the environment and ambience, silently as a spectator. But the sheer grandeur of the observance of the festival leaves the people spell-bound; and thus the festivals are a powerful expression of the collective consciousness of the devotees and act as a major vehicle of re-affirmation of their faith in divinity.

The Pāñcarātra textual tradition is based on its three gems or the ratnatraya, Viz., the Sāttvata Saṁhitā, the Pauṣkara Saṁhitā and the Jayākhya Saṁhitā. However, these three main or esteemed texts do not shed much light on the topic of observance of festival, with the sole exception of Jayākhya, which hints at the need to conduct the Mahotsava (20.384-386) and also the procession of the icon in a chariot (191-193b.) Our elaboration is based on the ĪśvaraSaṁhitā (or IS), another important Pāñcarātra treatise, which follows the tradition of the Sāttvata Saṁhitā and is the guidebook for the above-mentioned and many more temples of Karnataka.

Definition

Defining the term *utsava*, the IS says, “*sava* is said to mean misery by scholars, O eminent sages! That misery (*sava*) is removed (pulled out) and therefore, *utsava* is the name (for the festival).”¹ IS categorizes the festivals in three kinds: *nitya*, *naimittika* and *kāmya*. The festival which is conducted annually is known as the *nitya* festival.² The *naimittika* festivals are the ones which are conducted to alleviate the effects of natural calamities (such as earthquakes etc.), and to propitiate the deity with a view to avert or mitigate the evil influence in the event of serious portents, disease, danger from enemies or when there is some metaphysical phenomena, such as the icon laughs, cries rotates or moves its limbs.³


-
1. सव इत्युच्यते दुःखं विद्वद्भिर्मुनिपुङ्गवाः।
उद्धृतः स सवो यस्मात् तस्मादुत्सव उच्यते॥ 10.3॥
 2. नित्यो नैमित्तिकः काम्यस्त्रिविधः स महोत्सवः।
वत्सरे वत्सरे यस्तु क्रियते स तु नित्यकः॥ 10.4॥
 3. भूमिकम्पे दिशां दाहे महोत्पातेषु सत्सु च।
दुर्भिक्षे व्याधिते राष्ट्रे तथा वै शत्रुसङ्कटे॥
अनावृष्टौ च सर्वत्र नक्षत्रपतने च खात्।
हसने भगवन्मूर्तेरङ्गानां चलने सति॥
रोदने चासनाद् बिम्बे परिभ्रमति सत्तमाः।
व्यत्यासे शशिसूर्यस्य तथान्येष्वेवमादिषु॥
शान्त्यर्थं यत् प्रकुर्वीत स नैमित्तिक उच्यते॥ 10.5-7॥

The *kāmya* kind of festival is done on behalf of the people in order to achieve the four prescribed pursuits of life, viz. *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*.⁴

Mahotsava

Mahotsava, also known as *Brahmotsava* is a *nitya* kind of festival and is generally conducted once in a year. It further states that the festival is divinely supreme, when it lasts for nine days, is of middle kind, when it lasts for a week, and is of low kind, when it lasts for five days.⁵ This festival is nothing short of a symbolic creation, maintenance and dissolution of the cosmos. Day-by-day, for all the nine days of the festival, right from the first ritual of the *ankurarpana* to the last one of *mahākumbhaprokṣaṇam*, the act unfolds, is enlivened and finally the curtains are drawn, like a magnificent play. Out of its extant twenty-five chapters, the *IS* devotes two chapters (chapters 10 and 11) comprising 852 verses, to this important topic of the *Mahotsava*. In these chapters, it provides us with an extremely detailed data about the steps to be followed while performing the *Mahotsava*, along with exhaustive description of rituals and procedures, instructions and invocations, and, modes and materials; on a day-to-day basis for these nine days. One can virtually create the spatio-temporal ambience of the festival, if one studies this portion of the *IS* carefully, such is the vividness of the description. What follows is a gist of these two chapters, in which an attempt is made to understand the procedure for performing the *Mahotsava*.

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4. चतुर्णां पुरुषार्थनामुद्दिश्यान्यतमं फलम्॥
उत्सवोऽनुष्ठितः काम्यः सङ्कल्पितफलप्रदः॥ 10.8b, 9a॥
 5. नवाहं दैविकं प्रोक्तं सप्ताहं मध्यमं भवेत्।
पञ्चाहमधमं विद्यात् त्रिविधं चोत्सवं स्मृतम्॥ 10.14॥



Procedure

First of all, the *mṛtsaṅgraha* or the collection of the sacred soil and *aṅkurārpaṇa* (sowing of seeds) are undertaken on the eve of the commencement of the festival. On the first day and in an auspicious *muhūrta*, the beginning of the festival is marked by *dhvajārohaṇa* or the hoisting of the flag, is made of a fine cloth and its length is equal to the height of the *mūlabera* (main icon) and its width equivalent to the half of it. Garuḍa's figure is drawn on it, and it is to be consecrated. The power of the *mūlabera* is infused in the *utsavabera* and then the same is brought to a pavilion near the flagstaff. The flag is then raised to the top and tied followed by the thunderous beating of the kettle drums, which signify the commencement of the festival.⁶ It is to be noted here that the hoisting of the flag is done according to the star on the day of the *avabhṛtha* or the sacrificial bath, i.e., the day for the commencement of the festival is fixed taking into consideration the day of *avabhṛtha*. This ritual has the grains of the *śrauta* rites, which lasted for a period of beyond a day. On the last day, the priest performing the rite and the *yajamāna* along with others would proceed to some water-body and take a bath thereby signifying its completion. Similarly, in the *Mahotsava* also, a ceremonial bath is taken by the priest and everybody else on the ninth day of the annual festival, marking the culmination of it.

Not only mortals, even gods are invited to be a part of the festivities. In true Pāñcarātra fashion, *IS* says that the invitation to gods could be sung in either Sanskrit or Prākṛt or Dravidian

6. देवताह्वानवेलायां सर्ववाद्यानि घोषयेत्।

language.⁷ The invocations are done by the priest, his son or pupil should be sonorous and are to be performed in proper manner. After the hoisting of the flag, the deity is taken round the village and brought to the *yāgaśālā* or the ritual space of the temple. The four Vedas and the Ekāyana Veda are recited by trained scholars, who occupy their appointed spaces. Then the *kalaśa* (ceremonial pitchers) are placed in the *yāgaśālā*, which are consecrated and *proksana* (sprinkling) is done all around. The *abjanābhabhuvana-maṇḍala* is drawn there.⁸ The mention of this particular *maṇḍala* is not to be found in any other text, lending a special status to the IS.

God is then requested to alight there and is to be worshipped. The Agni (holy fire) lit here is to be worshipped by the priest for all the festival days and is to be tended till the day of *avabhṛtha*.⁹ Bali is offered to *dikpālas* (guardians of the directions) and at the *balipīṭha*. The *bali* shall be done twice a day up to the last day i.e. till *avabhṛtha* (ceremonial bath).¹⁰

The *icon* (processional icon) is to be mounted on vehicles and taken around the locality in the morning and the evening. This is a grand procession to be observed twice every day. The *utsavabera* is specially decorated with variegated robes, various ornaments and numerous garlands and is placed on the particular vehicle (different on each day) and taken in circumambulatory way, round the village, city or commercial place. The lord is lifted and surrounded by devout Vaiṣṇavas from all the castes. The Brahmins walking along should be steady-minded, wearing long robes, turbans, and host of beautiful things

7. देवतावाहिनीं गाथां संस्कृतां प्राकृतां तु वा॥ 11.36॥

8. IS. 11.134-170

9. प्रत्यहं धारयेदग्निं यावत्तीर्थदिनान्तिमम्।

अहोरात्रं प्रतिदिनं जुहुयादुक्तवर्त्मना॥ 11.177॥

10. एवं कालद्वये कुर्याद्बलिं तीर्थदिनान्तिमम्।

आरम्भदिवसे रात्रौ समाप्तिदिवसेऽहनि॥ 11.213॥

such as pearl strings, umbrellas, peacock plumes, fans(with golden handles), silken chowries and decorated staff etc.¹¹



The retinue of the god should also be accompanied by chorus of bards, sound of *vīṇā*, and flute, golden horns, and presence of courtesans, nautch-girls, well dressed citizens, chanters of the Vedas and Āgamas, scholars of classical and vernacular languages, singing eulogies of lord and people of all castes. The entourage should be majestic and along the course of circumambulation, the lord is offered *tāmbūla* as the mouth freshener and sandalæpaste mixed with camphor, various garlands, cool water and coconut water etc. to mitigate the fatigue.¹²

After the circumambulatory procession, the lord is led to the pavilion outside the temple, where offerings of *arghya*, *pādyā*,- *ācamana*, sandal-paste, garlands, lamps, incense, *nīrājana*, flour-cakes, *prthūka*, coconut water, *ācamana* and

11. वहेयुर्ब्राह्मणा यानं ध्यायन्तो विहगेश्वरम्।
 अथवा वैष्णवाः शूद्रा वहेयुर्भक्तिसंयुताः॥
 ग्रामे वा नगरे वापि पट्टणे वा मुनीश्वराः।
 प्रदक्षिणक्रमेणैव परिभ्रमणमाचरेत्॥
 ब्राह्मणैर्ध्रियमाणैश्च कञ्चुकोष्णीषधारिभिः।
 मौक्तिकैरातपत्रैश्च मायूरैश्च सुशोभनैः॥
 हेमदण्डसमायुक्तैस्तालवृत्तैस्तथाविधैः।
 पट्टनैर्विविधैश्चापि चामरैश्च सितासितैः॥ 11.222-225॥

12. IS. 11.226-242

tāmbūla etc. are offered to him, along with various gifts. A curtain is drawn so that the lord can relish the offerings without any visual disturbance. After this, he is taken inside the temple and the Vedas and Āgamas along with Tamil hymns are sung to him. Following a circumambulation inside the temple, he is placed on his designated place.¹³

The IS also prescribes the use of different vehicles for different days. God will mount on the following vehicles on respective śibikā, (palanquin) - first day; śeṣapīṭha (the serpent Ādiśeṣa) -second day; *candrabimba* (halo of the moon, at night) and *sūryamaṇḍala* (halo of the sun in the day time) æ third day; *puṣpamaṇḍapa* (floral pavilion) -fourth day; *Garuḍa* -fifth day;¹⁴ *yāna* (vehicle) -sixth day; *ratha* (chariot) -seventh day; and horse -eighth day.



It is to be noted here that on the eighth night, when the lord is mounted on the horse, the procession is carried out in a swinging motion, which is a visual feast. A happy lord could be seen indulging in royal yet, mundane activities like hunting, inspection of the town, love and quarrel between his two consorts, etc.¹⁵

13. IS. 11.243-253

14. वाहनारोहणं त्वेवं कुर्यादिवस्य नित्यशः।

प्रथमे शिबिकायानं द्वितीये शेषपीठिका॥

तृतीये चन्द्रबिम्बं च दिवा चेतसूर्यमण्डलम्।

चतुर्थे दिवसे प्राप्ते पुष्पमण्डपवाहनम्॥

पञ्चमे दिवसे प्राप्ते गरुडारोहणं भवेत्॥ इत्यादि- 11-260-263a॥

15. अष्टमेऽहिं तु तद्रात्रौ डोलारोहणपूर्वकम्।

अश्वारोहं ततः कुर्यात् मृगयां चापि कारयेत्॥

On the ninth day, the *avabhṛtha* (ceremonial bath) is taken in a lake or tank or some water-body. The priest takes the *tīrthabera* of the lord, worships it, stands in the navel-deep water and takes a dip with the *tīrthabera*. All the accompanying people also take bath simultaneously to be absolved of their impurities and sins.

En fin

On the tenth day, the *puṣpayāga* (worship with flowers) is held, in which the *tīrthabera* is brought and placed on the *cakrābjamaṇḍala*, duly decorated by a delightful spread of flowers. The flowers are sprinkled on him by the priest amidst the chanting of *Puruṣasūkta*. Routine rites of offering *arghya*, *pādyā*, *ācamana* etc. are performed, complemented by the sounds of musical instruments and chants from the Vedas and the major Āgamas. This is repeated twelve times.



The lord, along with his consorts, is taken round the village in a majestic procession and brought near the flagstaff. After offering *bali* to the lord, *Garuḍa* is worshipped and the ceremonial flag is brought down. The gods who were invited for the festival are honoured suitably and are given an endearing send off. The *utsavabera* with *Srīdevī* and *Bhūdevī* is taken inside the *sanctum sanctorum* and all of them are placed on their respective pedestals. All the priests, chanters etc. are duly honoured with generous gifts in cash and kin, and thus the grand *Mahotsava* comes to a close.

भक्तसन्त्राणलीलां च ब्राह्मे नगरशोधनम्।

प्रणयः कलहश्च स्यादेव्योर्देवेन वै मिथः॥ 11.312, 313॥

The Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts (IGNCA), Delhi, is resolutely pursuing the investigations into the inter-linkages between the śāstra and *prayoga* prevalent in ancient Indian traditions and has done extensive documentations of Vedic and Āgamic systems. This included documentation of temple rituals as prescribed by the *IS*, at the Varahasvami temple, Mysore, where all the said rituals were seen, observed and experienced by the author of this paper, urging him to write down this unique living tradition.



Reviews

Śṛgāraprakāśa Of Bhoja: Edited by M.M. Rewa Prasad Dwivedi & Sadashiv Kumar Dwivedi, jointly published by Indira Gandhi National Centre for Arts, New Delhi and Kalidasa Samsthan, Varanasi, 2007.

Sanskrit studies underwent a revolutionery change during twentieth century. Many lost works were rediscovered, theories were re-interpreted. Rare manuscripts were unearthed, and critical editions brought out. The discovery of the manuscripts of *Śṛgāraprakāśa Of Bhoja* around 1918 was as much an important event as the discovery of the manuscripts of Bhāsa plays in 1910. "History has been unfair to the *Śṛgāraprakāśa* - the greatest of the two dozen works of Bhoja" - writes Sheldon Pollock. It was in the process of rectifying this injustice to *Śṛgāraprakāśa* that Mahamahopadhyāya Kuppu Swami Shastri, a doyen amongst the pundits of this century, initiated efforts to bring out the text of this monumental work around 1921-22. One manuscript of *Śṛgāraprakāśa* was discovered in Malabar, and the Oriental Manuscript library of Madras procured a transcript of it. Meanwhile His Holiness Yatiraj Swami of Melkote came accross another fragment, and subsequently another copy of it. In 1924, Swamiji published three chapters (XXII-XXIV) of *Śṛgāraprakāśa*. This was an event in Sanskrit world, leading a great scholar like Mahamahopadhyaya Ganganah Jha to the following outburst -

śṛṅgārabhāsaṃ nṛpabhojanirmitaṃ
sammudritaṃ svāmivareṇyayatnataḥ
āsvādya cāmśena samastabandhaṃ
saṃsvādanāyollasatīva mānasam.

The editing posed knotty problems. While the manuscript material acquired by HH Swamiji of Melkote was edited and brought out by G. Josyer. Kuppu Swami Shastri, on the other hand, rightly chose his worthy disciple Dr. V. Raghavan to carry out research work on *Śṛgāraprakāśa*. No doubt, Raghavan's studies on *Śṛgāraprakāśa* created a new era of understanding the whole tradition of the history and growth of Literary theories in Sanskrit.

During the two millenniums of C.E. *Alaṅkāraśāstra* in India developed through three schools, situated in three different geographical areas. The first school developed in Kashmir where a galaxy of philosophers and theorists like Vāmana, Udbhāṭa, Ānandavardhana, Rudraṭa, Abhinavagupta, Kuntaka, Ruyyaka, Maṅkha and a host of others conceptualised its theoretical discourse. The second school belonged to the central part, particularly to Dhārānagarī (now known as Dhāra in Mālwa). The third school developed in South - at Kañcī. Bhoja is the worthiest representative of the Dhāra School, and he also enjoys the pivotal position here. He evolved new patterns - evincing synthetic approach. He systematised and re-organised the vast gamut of literary categories, concepts and principles. Unfortunately due to political turmoil, the great task of Bhoja could not culminate and even the mss. of his *magnum opus* the *Śṛgāraprakāśa* - became extinct. No manuscript of this monumental work of Bhoja was to be found in the area where he ruled. It was in Southern India that the most valuable treasure of manuscripts of *Śṛgāraprakāśa* could be unearthed. Josyer brought out a complete edition of *Śṛgāraprakāśa* in between 1955 to 1974 and Raghavan published the first vol. of his edition from Harvard in 1996 containing the first 14 chapters of *Śṛgāraprakāśa*. Josyer's edition contained lots of lacuna and corrupt readings, and Raghavan's edition remains incomplete till this date without the major part of Bhoja's work, i.e. chapters 15-36.

Rewa Prasad Dwivedi has not only utilised the existing manuscript material along with the four volumes of Josyer's edition and the first volume of *Śṛgāraprakāśa* published by Raghavan, he could also get access to the text that Raghavan had prepared for the next volume of his edition. Drawing from all available sources Dwivedi has made an attempt to present one of the most comprehensive editions in the history of Sanskrit textual criticism; he has applied his own scholastic acumen and norms for editing the text. Here he does not strictly adhere to the methodology of preparing critical editions of text that has been assiduously pursued by western scholarship and also by the generations of scholars of orientalism.

In the galaxy of the great Ācāryas Bhoja displays a rare acumen for a comprehensive and synthetic approach. There are

36 Prakāśas (chapters) in this voluminous work. Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharatamuni and Kāmasūtra of Vātsyāyana also have 36 chapters. While Bhoja, with his great concern for numerology chose numbers like 12, 24 or 64 for various categorisations, but he planned this voluminous work in 36 chapters. This is suggestive of the cosmic view of Śaivism. Drawing contrast with the Sāṅkhya system, the Śaivāgamas defined 36 categories through which the creation has evolved. Bhoja also might be having this cosmology in view while outlining his work.

At the very outset of his stupendous work, Bhoja starts with the definition of Vākya as a unit of discourse, having three species as medium - Sanskrit, Prakrit and Apabhraṃśa. Sanskrit Vākyas are of three types - (i) relating to Śruti or Śrauta, (ii) relating to Ṛṣis or seers, (iii) relating to this world (Laukika). The first category is further divided into two types - mantra and brāhmaṇa. The units of discourse relating to the seers are again of two types - Smṛti (revealed texts remembered) and Purāṇa (accounts of past). The units of discourse related to this world are again of two types - Kāvya and Śāstra.

In this way Bhoja further proceeds to analyse the units of discourse in Prakrit and Apabhraṃśa. Tools for analysis of language are enumerated with detailed definitions and illustrations. Naturally the first eight chapters in this work therefore are devoted to grammar forming a basis for rhetorics.

Having worked on the critical edition of complete works of Kālidāsa, Dwivedi has developed his own methodology for editing Sanskrit texts which does not exactly conform to the modern methodology under textual criticism, but stands in conformity to the traditional approach of commentators - the ṭīkākāras. He has modified the text to a certain extent to make it intelligible especially in the 8th Prakāśa, without distorting the original framework. The sentences have been organised and the lacuna filled by comparing the text with the texts like Vākyapadīya that Bhoja is referring, reproducing or citing. In fact the innumerable sources of Bhoja's treatise have been brought forth to this extant for the first time. Dwivedi has also rewritten the whole chapter 26th, that has been lost and could not be fully recovered to suit

the design as structured by Bhoja. This chapter is not included at all in Josyer's edition.

The appendices of Dwivedi's edition are extremely valuable to elicit the sources of Bhoja by the way of providing excerpts from texts like Nāṭyaśāstra and Vākyapadīya. Śṛṅgāraprakāśa is a rich store house of verses from Sanskrit and Prakrit. Bhoja has, as Dwivedi informs, quoted more than 650 verses from a single poet like Kālidāsa. The learned editors have provided here immensely valuable material for researchers by the way of listing such verses, quoted by Bhoja from poets like Kālidāsa and Bhavabhūti with references and sources in the appendices.

This complete edition of Śṛṅgāraprakāśa no doubt is a landmark in the path of Sanskrit studies in modern India. It will not only lead to recapitulation of studies on Bhoja in twentieth century, it will also resuscitate our understanding of aesthetics in a global perspective.

-- Radhavallabh Tripathi

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Poetic Visions of Buddha's Former Lives Seventeen Legends from Haribhaṭṭa's Jātakamālā - edited by Michael Hahn, 1 Indian Edition, Aditya Prakashan, New Delhi, 2011

Coming to the publication of a lost Haribhaṭṭa's Jātakamālā from Śṛṅgāraprakāśa is entering into another realm of aesthetics - the aesthetics of equilibrium that creates its own traditions through multifarious manifestations in literary texts as well as plastic and performing arts.

"Haribhaṭṭa returns to India" with this 'most suitable motto' for his book, Michael Hahn has really made an offering of one of the most important texts of classical Sanskrit literature by way of presenting the Indian edition of Haribhaṭṭa's Jātakamālā, Hahn has been doing researches on the manuscripts of Haribhaṭṭa's Jātakamālā and its translations and adaptations for more than three decades. The resume of studies on translations and adaptations of Haribhaṭṭa's Jātakamālā, that he has given in the beginning of his edition is quite revealing.

Haribhaṭṭa flourished in the fifth century and must have belonged to north-western part of India. Hahn points out that his *Jātakamālā* remained very popular in India and neighbouring countries for more than eight centuries. Tracing its history of its translations and adaptations in other countries, and searching the manuscripts, Hahn could recover this text, that had been otherwise lost to us, to the extent of seventy eight percent with the material from the Tibetan and Nepalese mss.

Āryaśūra had already composed a work of the same name and nature as that of Haribhaṭṭa. Michael Hahn rightly adjusts Āryaśūra as the 'direct model' of Haribhaṭṭa. Both are great masters of literary prose and Hahn has given a brilliant exposition of the literary beauty of Haribhaṭṭa's prose.

Hahn rightly views Haribhaṭṭa's text in context of the genre of *Campūkāvya*. In fact when Āryaśūra composed his *Jātakamālā*, he very aptly chose to adopt the form of *Campūkāvya* as it suited his aesthetic designs and thematic perceptions. Right from its inception, the genre of *campū* was deeply rooted in narratology that combined both prose and verse in the art of story telling. Stories from great epics assumed the forms of *ākhyāna* and *upākhyāna* when they were orally presented. The term *ākhyāyikā* for narrative suggests that this genre developed in oral traditions. Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya* refers to the *ākhyāyikās* - *Vāsavadattā*, *Sumanōttarā* and *Bhaimarathī*. He also alludes to *Granthikas* - the artists who narrated stories through reading. Narrating or reading out a story was a performance. The tradition of *ākhyāna* and *upākhyāna* was basically theatrical. Vātsyāyana in his *Kāmasūtra* groups *ākhyāyikā* with *nāṭaka* in the list of sixty four arts. Bhoja in his *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* precisely sums up the whole historical perspective when he defines *ākhyāna* and *upākhyāna*. An *upākhyāna* is a tale within a grand narrative told by one character to another for a specific cause and it becomes an *ākhyāna* when it is read out by a *granthika* and this reading, accompanied with *abhinaya* and singing forms an independent performance.

nalasāvitriṣoḍaśarājopacāravat prabandhāntaḥ.
anyaprabodhanārtham yadupākhyāti tadupākhyānam..

ākhyānasattām tallabhate yadyabhinayan paṭhan gāyan
granthika ekaḥ kathayati govindavadavahite sadasi.

*Śṛṅgāraprakāśa of Bhoja : Edited by M.M.
Rewa Prasad Dwivedi & Sadashiv Kumar
Dwivedi, 2007, XI.331-32, vol. I, p. 671)*

In fact campū must have developed in oral traditions. Bhoja who discusses these traditions in the context of ākhyāna and upākhyāna, himself composed the *Rāmāyaṇacampū*. The style of his own campū is deeply rooted in the art of story-telling. Both Āryaśūra and Haribhaṭṭa created an epoch in the history of Sanskrit literature, when they synthesised this tradition ākhyāna and campū with genre of avadāna and jātaka tales. They inculcated the philosophy of values of pāramitās in fold of gadyakāvya, thus forming a 'confluence of the secular and the sacred, a journey from the ordinary world of saṃsāra to the realm of nirvāṇa' - as Lokesh Chandra puts it in his Forward to this edition.

Haribhaṭṭa exemplifies the refinement of literary prose in the fourth and fifth centuries, like some of the inscriptions of Gupta period. This apart, he also provides important missing links for updating our knowledge of Indian traditions of art and culture. Lokesh Chandra has hinted upon the possibilities of further identifications of some of the avadānas or tales from jātakas as depicted in the murals of Ajanta and in as many as 1460 narrative reliefs of Borobudur.

Michael Hahn had done for us something that Rahul Sankrityana could do in the past century by way of rediscovering one of the most important texts otherwise lost in India. This publication will lead to a new understanding of the history of Sanskrit literature. Restoration of a work from its Tibetan translations is an arduous task and requires expertise and efforts different from editing a text from manuscripts in the same language. *Jātakamālā* of Haribhaṭṭa would also revive an interest in Jātakas which have been a part of Indian life style, frequently alluded to in conversations or moral arguments.

-- Radhavallabh Tripathi

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Thus Spoke Bhartrihari : Selections from Sanskrit Classical Verses translated by Ramesh Chandra Shah, Rajpal & Sons. New Delhi, 2010.

Ramesh Chandra Shah has been a professor of English and a well known literary figure in Indian literature. In his earlier work, *Ancestral Voices : Reflections on Vedic, Classical and Bhakti Poetry* (The Temones Academy, 2001, Indian Edition, 2006), a collection of his lectures delivered in UK, he presented of the voices of vedic and upaniṣadic seers and the seer-poets of post-vedic epic traditions as well as medieval bhakti-poets. Shah finds a continuity of spiritual traditions in the multiple streams of Indian literature. The studies presented by him aim at decolonising of the Indian mind. I cite these lines from his earlier work –

"Mainstream of Indian literature is not characterised by a historical or scientific curiosity about the natural or social reality, its distinctive tone and temper – its very flavour- is determined by the meditation on the highest ends of human life through traditionally recognisable forms"

("Ancestral Voices : Relections on Vedic, Classical and Bhakti Poetry, p.49)

His translation of verses from the three śatatas is a laudable attempt to make the world-view and perceptions of Bhartṛhari understandable to a wider readership.

Examining Bhartṛhari's poetic world, Shah says-

"We are compelled, in spite of ourselves, to admit the presence of authentic spiritual experience behind this utterance. This is something which could not have happened if the poet had not had a direct, unmediated experience of oneness with the Universal spirit where all dualities, - even the duality of man and woman – dissolve and disappear. One can call it union of opposites or just unity of being, as the poet W.B.Yeats preferred to phrase it."

With this understanding of Bhartrhari, Shah rightly detects a spiritual quality pervading the verses of even Śṛṅgāraśataka that are otherwise viewed as sensuous poetry.

In the process of making a creative translation, Shah has suitably evolved the craft and the diction matching the original. He has chosen his own rhythmic patterns; and in doing so, he establishes a cross-cultural dialogue, involving hermeneutics. He thus leads us to a journey in the internal landscape of Bhartrhari. This literary, and not literal, translation also provides an understanding of Bhartrhari's uniqueness, of the way Bhartrhari differs with the other poets who have composed Śatakakāvyas on the same lines. Instead of giving a word to word translation, Shah goes to provide the essence. We can understand the difference, when we compare his translation with one of the earlier translations of Tawney. Here is Tawney's translation of one of Bhartrhari's well-known stanzas

Where many dwellers once were seen, one only now survives,

Again that home is filled with store of joyous human lives.

Then all are swept away again, thus wielding night and day

As dice, destruction's wedded powers with the helpless mortals play.

(trans. by Tawney)

Reading these lines, we feel as if we are reading an 'Elegy in the Graveyard'. Shah omits details, makes it more precise and attempts to grasp the inner core. He renders this stanza in the following way –

The house where one lived, is with many filled

Where once lived many, Death his spite has spilled

Who joined with Time, with us as pieces plays

on the vast board, an ancient game is Willed.

Assimilating the ethos and philosophy of Bhartṛhari, Shah has used upper cases in the spelling of 'death', 'time' and 'will' (Death, Time, Willed)

The translator has appropriated Bhartṛhari's expressions for his own milieu. In another stanza, he converts Bhartṛhari's kiñcijjña (one who knows little) into a man whose head is filled 'with scraps of knowledge odd'. Then the stanza assumes added significance as a dialogue between a modern man and tradition –

With my head fill'd with scraps of knowledge odd
Pride-swollen thought myself I omniscient.
But when amid the learned first I trod
I knew my folly, down the fever went. (p. 23)

In the same way, 'parigrahaphalgutā' in Bhartṛhari's stanza becomes the worthlessness of forms. Shah thus establishes the relevance of Bhartṛhari in the changing contexts –

Behold the dog licking his favourite bone
Rotten and full of pus and nasty worms
How enraptured is he: so, we must own
That what we cling to most are worth less forms.

(p. 23)

I will cite two more stanzas. Both of them are from the Śṛṅgāraśataka, and in rendering both Shah makes an attempt to uncover the layers of inner quest which is a mark of Bhartṛhari's poetry.

sadā yogābhyāsavyasanavaśayorātmamanaso-
ravicchinnā maitrī sphurati kṛtinastasya kimu taiḥ
priyāṇāmālāpairadharamadhubhiḥ vaktravidhubhiḥ
saniḥśvāsāmodaiḥ sakucakalaśāśleṣasurataiḥ.

Here is Shah's rendering of this –

You are your own girl and your God as well,

When into meditation's depths you're sucked.
 Love's intimacies between Man and Woman
 Are no match for that self endangered spell. (p. 61)
 yadāsīdajñānaṃ smaratimirasañcārajanitaṃ
 tadā dṛṣṭaṃ nārīmayamidamaśeṣaṃ jagadapi.
 idānīmasmākaṃ paṭutaravivekāñjanajuṣāṃ
 samībhūtā dṛṣṭistribhuvanamapi brahma manute.

Ignorance caused by Eros - God of Love
 Had marred my vision, womanizing it,
 Self-knowledge unsexed me, restored my wholeness,
 Now I see SELF everywhere from this summit. (p. 61)

In the terminology of Rājaśekhara it is *parapurapraveśa* - entering Bhartṛhari's poetic world, and coming back with a message to the modern man. Bhartṛhari's poetry in this way assumes an added significance. After D.D. Kosambi's wonderful edition of his śatakas, a new English translation of Bhartṛhari by Ramesh Chandra Shah is quite meaningful in several respects.

-- Radhavallabh Tripathi



Introduction to Hindu Dharma : Sri Chandrasekharendra Saraswati, Introduction by Arvind Sharma; I Indian Edn., Motilal Benarasidas Pub. Pvt. Ltd. Delhi, 2010

Introduction to Hindu Dharma comprises translations of selected lectures by His Holiness Jagadguru Chandrashekharendra Saraswati, the 68th Shankracharya of Kanchi (1895-1994), also known as the 'Paramācārya,' who dedicated more than 87 years of his life as pontiff of the mutt - practicing and teaching 'sanātana dharma'. This work was originally published by World Wisdom - The Library of Perennial Philosophy, USA. The editor, Michael Oren Fitzgerald has taken pains to cull in the essence of Paramācārya's teachings in his own words. The text has been selected from more than 6500 pages of

his discourses that were recorded and transcribed and then translated into English. It is a gigantic task.

Introduction to Hindu Dharma covers a vast area - Vedic religion, Vedas. concepts of yajña, tapas and dharma; Nyāya, Purāṇas, saṃskāras etc., It is not only a very authentic exposition of the basic tenets of Hindu dharma, or sanātana dharma, it also opens a vista for interfaith dialogue by accepting the plurality of our tradition. Paramācārya envisages multiplicity in Indian traditions. The Vedas 'do not point to a single way and proclaim 'this alone is the path' nor do they affirm 'this is the only God' with reference to their own view of the Supreme Being'. (p.51) - he says. He also explains how a synthesis of karma, bhakti and jñāna can be achieved to evolve a holistic perspective. The three cardinal principles of life karma, bhakti and jñāna - are not opposed to one another but they are complimentary (p. 114).

Paramācārya deals with the tenets the fundamentals common to all religions. Discussing the nomenclatural anonymity with regard to the dharma being preached by him, says - 'There is no term as Hindu or Hinduism as such in our tradition'. He therefore uses the term *sanātana dharma*. The Ultimate Reality is termed as the *Paramātman* - the timeless truth. There is an orderliness in the cosmos. The cosmos is created out of vibrations of a Great Intelligence. The vibrations arising out of their own may be erratic. One must enjoin with this Great Intelligence.

These lectures also bring out the pragmatism with which Paramācārya has kept pace with his own times. He also addresses the problems of the day- foeticide to him is like devihatyā, a heinous crime. Dowry in any form is to be condemned. In fact, the sermons by Paramācārya are warnings for erring modern civilization - that 'after reaching its peak, it is bound to have a fall' (p. 30).

There are subtle interpretations based on his own experiences, investing the words spoken by Paramācārya with a rare authenticity and re-investing the spiritual traditions with a new significance. 'The purpose of life is to live a life full of love for all' (p.131) he says. 'No joy is greater than that the joy of loving others. the joy of loving gives us a transcendent feeling, a life in which there is no love for others is a life lived in vain.' (p.

131). It is here that Paramācārya envisages the philosophy of love at a cosmic level. As there is sorrow when the loved ones depart, therefore one must love the One that does not depart. It is a subtle exposition of the concept of Ānanda as discussed by the seers of Upaniṣads.

Paramācārya sees that intellectual arrogance is on increase in our times and the ignorant are being deprived of their one asset, humility (p. 48). But then, he goes to the other extreme – He would like to revert the wheels of progress. The Varṇāśramadharmā with all its rigors should be re-established in India -- His Holiness insists and he sees no other way out for saving this country. He firmly believes that Varṇadharmā is necessary for sustenance of civilization. There is a fervent appeal in many lectures to restore the old order of varṇadharmā. 'If by god's grace the old system is restored' – he says (p. 109)- 'it will bring inward purity to all'. Denying the relevance of logistics and achievements of modern man, Paramācārya recommends that – 'religious texts should be taught right from the childhood, before a boy develops reasoning. If you start teaching these texts to him when he is grown up, he may discard them'. (p. 44). He criticizes the whole education system as it has no provision for teaching religious texts right from the beginning.

The idea of plurality of Indian traditions is relegated to a backward position in Paramācārya's denial of logic and questioning spirit and his insistence of rigidity of rituals. The rites should be performed because they are prescribed in the Śāstra – he says. "Conducting a ritual without knowing its significance, it occurs to me, is more important to me than knowing the meaning of the words"

With his own idea of bringing back the glorious past, Paramācārya wants to see that 'the brāhmaṇas should again start living on the river sides and eat leaves' – (p. 105). One may ask him - will all the brāhmaṇas of this country find places on the banks of holy rivers for their inhabitancy now? What about the rivers that are shrinking and vanishing and their banks converted into modern colonies? Is there is room for conversions and re-entry in the system that Paramācārya advocates? What about gender equality, divorces and social justice? Perhaps the

Paramācārya had answered many such questions but the team of editors, to their discretion, did not include them in this volume, they have painted a picture of Hindu dharma by presenting select pieces from the enormous mass of records of the lectures of Paramācārya, obviously to present a one sided picture.

--Radhavallabh Tripathi

Being Different: An Indian Challenge to Western Universalism-
Rajiv Malhotra, Harper Collins Publishers India, 2011

'*Being Different: An Indian Challenge to Western Universalism*' by Rajiv Malhotra is a path breaking book filled with profound original insights on various subjects related to Indian religious, spiritual, cultural and historical traditions. It is a research-oriental reference volume for the intellectuals, philosophers, researchers, and general readers who are curious to know Indian thought and Identity. The book reverses the gaze to look at the West, repositioning *dhārmic* civilization from being the observed to being the observer. Rajiv Malhotra, the author of famous book 'Breaking India' is an Indian-American researcher and thinker, writing and speaking on current affairs as they relate to civilizations, cross-cultural encounters, religion and science. He has done an extensive study of Indian culture and history, Western civilization and religion, and comparative philosophy and faith. He has been churning a wide range of issues and ideas related to his thesis from different sources for the past two decades, and to show this, his book's cover has an attractive picture of the churning of the ocean by Devas and Asuras. 'Being Different' is the result of intensive research on Indian and Western philosophical systems and histories, with especial focus on how India essentially differs from the West, in cultural, spiritual matrix and in world outlook.

Posting his comments online on 'Being Different' Prof. Don Wiebe, of Trinity College in the University of Toronto has said that "Malhotra espouses an 'audacity of difference' in any such enterprise that defends both the distinctiveness and the spiritual value of Indian thought and that effectively reveals the cultural

chauvinism of much western thought in its encounters with other cultures”.

In his introduction Rajiv Malhotra discusses his concept of the current research. To quote his own words ‘I am simply using the *dhārmic* perspective to reverse the analytical gaze which normally goes from West to East and unconsciously privileges the former’. On the reason of the study he says, ‘this reversal evaluates Western problems in a unique way, sheds light on some of its blind spots, and shows how *dhārmic* cultures can help alleviate and resolve some of the problems facing the world today’.

Rajiv Malhotra initiates a debate through this work on the following propositions: (1) Western claims of universalism are based on its own myth of history, as opposed to the multi-civilizational worldview needed today. (2) Historical revelations are the foundations of western religions, as opposed to *dharma*'s emphasis on individual self-realization in the body here and now. (3) The synthetic unity of western thought and history is in contrast with the integral unity that underpins *dharma*'s worldview. (4) The West's anxiety over difference and need for order is unlike the *dharmic* embrace of the creative role of chaos. (5) Common translations of many Sanskrit words are seriously misleading because these words are non-translatable for sound and meaning.

In the Introduction the author explains that this book is about how India differs from the West. He challenges certain cherished notions, such as the assumptions that Western paradigms are universal and that the *dhārmic* traditions teach ‘the same thing’ as Jewish and Christian ones. For while the Vedas say, ‘truth is one, paths are many’, the differences among those paths are not inconsequential. He argues that the *dhārmic* traditions, while not perfect, offer perspectives and techniques for a genuinely pluralistic social order and a full integration of many different faiths, including atheism and science. They also offer models for environmental sustainability and education for the whole being that are invaluable to our emerging world.

The author states that the term *Dharma* is not easy to define because it has several dimensions, and its oft-used translations

as 'religion', 'path', 'law', 'ethics' all fall short in substantial ways. In the book '*Dharma*' is used to indicate a family of spiritual traditions originating in India which today are manifested as Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism. On page 5 he explains that 'the *dharma* family has developed an extensive range of inner sciences and experiential technologies called '*adhyātma-vidyā*' to access divinity and higher states of consciousness. *Adhyātma-vidyā* is a body of wisdom and techniques culled from centuries of first-person empirical inquiry into the nature of consciousness and undertaken by advanced practitioners. India's spiritual traditions spring from *dharma* which has no exact equivalent in Western frameworks.

The first chapter entitled 'the audacity of difference' begins with the statement that 'the cultural and spiritual matrix of *dharma* civilizations is distinct from that of the west. This distinctiveness is under siege, not only from unsustainable and inequitable development but also from something more insidious: the widespread dismantling, rearrangement and digestion of *dharmic* culture into Western frameworks, disingenuously characterized as 'universal' (p.12).

The chapter 2 deals with 'Yoga: freedom from history' and talks about two ways of knowing the divine. All civilizations ask existential questions such as: Who are we? Why are we here? What happens when we die? Can we transcend death and if so, how? What is the ultimate reality or truth, and how can we reach it? The approaches to these questions and the answers offered by the two civilizations differ profoundly. In the Judeo-Christian traditions, revelation comes 'from above', and its content is strictly God-given (p. 55). But according to the *dhārmic* traditions, man is not born into original sin, though he is burdened by his past conditioning, which makes him unaware of his true nature. Fortunately, he has the innate capacity to transcend this condition and achieve *sat-chit-ānanda* in this life. Since the ultimate truth is attained experientially, and passed from practitioner to practitioner, it follows that knowledge of the divine is varied and that more than one lineage may be true. Author quotes Sri Aurobindo to explain several ideas; and refers to Itihāsa, Purāṇa, Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata to present the Indian outlook on history, myth and knowledge etc.

On 'Integral unity versus synthetic unity' an authentic discussion at length is done in the chapter 3 of the book. The various *dhārmic* schools, despite some profound differences in theory and practice, all attempt to account for some form of unity. The resources for its realization are built into the various spiritual disciplines. Unity is inherent in existence, according to all dharma systems. This sense of an underlying unity is strong and allows for a great deal of inventiveness and play in understanding its manifestations. As a result, there tends to be a great diversity of paths and philosophical understandings without fear of chaos. Western worldviews, where religious or secular, begin with the opposite premise: the cosmos is inherently an agglomeration of parts or separate essences. The debates on this subject are not about how and why multiplicity emerges out of underlying unity, but about how unity can emerge out of multiplicity. Such a unity is not innate; it must be sought and justified again and again, and resulting synthesis is always unstable. The starting points and conclusions of Western religion and science are in even contradiction, which essentially makes Western civilization an uneasy and tentative synthesis of incompatible building blocks (p.7-8).

In the fourth Chapter author shows that 'people from *dhārmic* cultures tend to be more accepting of difference, unpredictability and uncertainty than westerners. The *dhārmic* view is that so-called 'chaos' is natural and normal; it needs, of course, to be balanced by order, but there is no compelling need to control or eliminate it entirely nor to force cohesion from outside. The West, conversely, sees chaos as a profound threat that needs to be eradicated either by destruction or by complete assimilation (P.168). Rajiv Malhotra proclaims further (p.177) with pride and confidence that 'Western scholars find it difficult to acknowledge fully the merits of Indian Systems of thought, even when the influence of these systems on West is irrefutable'. Chaos arises when one experiences phenomena which do not lie within one's psychological and cultural comfort zones. In this reference the author narrates immense Indian creativity, adaptability, and ability to absorb what's new. The example of Kumbha-melā is given to demonstrate self-organized diversity (p.179). The two opposite sides are needed for churning

of the milky ocean in order to obtain nectar for eternal life(p.184).

The author points out several distortions in the western-mind created by their use of faulty English equivalents of Sanskrit words, in the fifth chapter. Sanskrit is important for its profound creative potential. It unites the great and little traditions (p.240). The meanings of Sanskrit words are embedded in its cultural context and also in the history of how that word evolved over time. Malhotra is firm in his view that 'the unique experiences of different cultures are not always interchangeable, and the words used to refer to those experiences must remain intact. Many cultural artifacts have no equivalent in other cultures, and to force such artifacts into the moulds that the West finds acceptable or familiar – to appropriate them – is to distort them. This too is a form of colonization and cultural conquest' (p.221).

This chapter contains excellent insights on Sanskrit language, and its structure. It also explains in brief why Sanskrit words are not easily translatable. Generally Sanskrit texts and words need a context for their proper interpretation. Meaning changes many times. If a meaning is not taken correctly, it is not possible to understand the concept hidden in that word. Highlighting the richness of Sanskrit, the author emphasizes that the 'non-translatability of key Sanskrit words attests to the non-digestibility of many Indian traditions. Holding on to the Sanskrit terms and thereby preserving the complete range of their meanings becomes a way of resisting colonization and safeguarding *dhārmic* knowledge'(p.249).

Many examples of popular Sanskrit translations into English, that are false or misleading, are given in this context. The Sanskrit words Brahman, Ātman, Śiva, Vedas, Dharma, Jāti, Aum, Duḥkha, Avatāra, Śakti, Kuṇḍalinī, Guru, Devatā, Yajña, Karma, Mokṣa etc. are referred to and elaborated. Their common mis-translations are explained and criticized in detail. Great emphasis is given on the use of original Sanskrit terms for the preservation of their uniqueness and understanding.

The Western claim of universalism is mainly refuted in the sixth and last chapter entitled 'Contesting Western Universalism'.

According to such claims, the West is both the driver of history and its goal, providing the template into which all other civilizations and cultures must fit. This chauvinism is virtually invisible from within the Western perspective itself (p. 308). Such a universalism fails to address human needs; the most it can achieve is a kind of synthetic unity of civilizations under the rubric of the West. The volume concludes with a negation of Western claims of universalism, while recommending a multi-cultural worldview.

The last essay is in the form of conclusion which talks about *pūrva-pakṣa* and the way forward. One needs to engage in *purva paksha* or 'reversing the gaze', to shed light on how this leads to the misapprehension and denigration of India and *dhārmic* traditions. *Pūrva-pakṣa*, the traditional technique of analysis encourages to become truly knowledgeable about alternative perspectives, and to approach the other side with respect. Using this ancient practice the author mentions the importance of 'difference', and thus criticizing the Western view of its own universalism as the only legitimate view. Rajiv Malhotra insists on preserving difference with mutual respect – not with mere 'tolerance'. The book addresses the challenge on differences, and talks about unexamined beliefs that both sides hold about themselves and each other. As Dr. Kapila Vatsyayan, renowned scholar of our times has rightly said about the book, 'Through seven chapters Rajiv Malhotra pursues a central argument to highlight the imperative need to respect difference'. The learned author gives detailed endnotes and illustrative bibliography and two Appendices. His homage to Gandhi is admirable.

Finally, it can be said that '*Being Different- an Indian Challenge to Western Universalism*' is a book that every Indian should read to understand his or her true identity in the world. Also the non-Indians should read to know what truly India and Indians are like. It gives an opportunity to westerners to see themselves through the lens of another worldview. It dismantles many myths of false claim of a single universalism that is in the west's possession. It proves that India is distinct in its civilization and therefore, is able to manage intense differences on the planes of culture, philosophy, language, religion and thought. The book makes us proud of our great seers, thinkers and ancestors. It is a

memorable book for critiquing Western systems of thought and highlighting Indian ideals of humanity. 'Being different' will certainly turn to be a milestone in the long intellectual corridor of the intercultural debates of our times.

- Shashi Tiwari



*Vyutpattivāda of Gadadhara Bhattacharya with the commentary
"Vidvanmanoramā" by Prof. Ramanuja Tatacharya.*

*(French Institute of Pondicherry and
Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, Tirupati, 2011)*

The Indian system of sentence analysis has a long history. Developed, basically, for the analysis of Vedic sentences by Ritualistics (Pūrvamīmamsakas), it was soon adopted and popularized by other systems also. Panini, the pioneer grammarian, whose techniques have been used in Natural Language Processing, Śabara, Yāska, Bhartṛhari, Patañjali are some of stars in the illustrated galaxy of this system. Thus the Indian Linguistics was a fully developed science since ancient times.

Though Vyākaraṇa holds exclusive right over the area of formation of words etc. there are some areas which overlap between the Nyāya and Vyākaraṇa such as interpretation of Kāraṇas, Meaning patterns of compound words, case endings where the later Naiyāyikas have made a very great contribution to the science of Word/Sentence analysis. Works like *Bhūṣaṇasāra*, *Laghumañjūṣā*, and *Paramalaghumañjūṣā* etc. can be classified as "Theoretical works" make an ample demonstration of this literature though early works like *Mahābhāṣya* and *Vākyapadīya* can also be counted in the same group. Navyanyāya's war with Vaiyākaraṇas with regard to the "Theories of Sentence/word" i.e. Śabdakhaṇḍa, where there is a high debate, can be seen in the works like *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, its commentaries and independent works like *Ākhyātavāda* etc. The same rivalry between Naiyāyikas

and Vaiyākaraṇas continues to the date and can be seen in traditional Vidvatsabhās.

The Neo-Logicians i.e. Gangesha, Raghunatha, Jagadisha, Gadadhara and Gokulanatha etc. from thirteenth century to late eighteenth century, have contributed to this system in a unique style. They gave a turning point to the analysis of sentence to such a great extent by which the Śābdabodha output looks like an outcome of artificial language used in computer programming. This theory of parsing the sentences and words invented by Neo-logicians in 16-18th centuries is a shining example of Indian intellectual tradition. *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, *Vyutpattivāda*, *Śaktivāda*, *Padavākyaratnākara* and *Vibhaktyarthanirṇaya* are the Neo-Logicians' texts in which their respective authors exceeded all the preceding theoreticians in explaining the principles of extracting the correct meaning of a sentence in an unambiguous way. Even among them *Vyutpattivāda* outshines all other works and enjoys a great popularity. This popularity can be gazed by the fact that many commentaries and translations written on it, and this work has been prescribed as text book for both Nyāya and Vyākaraṇa courses.

Vyutpattivāda has to be studied in this background by comparing *Vyutpattivāda* with the preceding and succeeding works. The sources of *Vyutpattivāda* have to be verified while special care has to be taken on many kecit, yat, anye etc. whom Gadadhara refutes time and again in this great work. It is normal to expect such information from commentators of *Vyutpattivāda* and Prof. Tatacharya has done full justice by writing a comprehensive commentary called "*Vidvanmanoramā*" on it.

Preceding commentaries on *Vyutpattivāda* written by other scholars either ended on parts or misled the students. *Rāmarudrī* of Ramarudra, which is standard one, ended in third Kāraka. *Prakāśa* of Laskshminatha Jha is also very brief and leaves the latter parts of text unexplained. Sudarshanacharya's *Ādarśa* was a good effort but it fell short in quality. Pandit Baccha (Dharmadatta) Jha's commentary on *Vyutpattivāda*, which is of Krodapatra type and iron groundnut made only for the diamond

teeth, is a source text for all other succeeding commentaries. Prof. Tatacharya has extensively used Baccha Jha. Prof. Tatacharya also quoted many views of *Vibhaktyarthanirnaya* (p. 224 etc.).

Prof Tatacharya, who is one of the most distinguished śāstra scholars and whose commentaries on Nyāya texts are “must reads” for Nyāya students of our generation, used his full experience and knowledge in producing a most comprehensive and lucid commentary.

The first part of this commentary, on the first two *Vibhaktis*, is published by the French Institute Pondicherry and Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeeth Tirupati. Both the institutions are to be thanked for this wonderful job. This work succeeds the “*Sābdabodhamīmamsā*” an encyclopedia on Śābdabodha by Prof. Tatacharya earlier published by French Institute.

Special feature of this commentary is that it employs the shadow style (*chāyāvyākhyā*) which covers the text as a whole which is most readable. Words are taken as *pratīka* only occasionally. Prof. Tatacharya has a keen eye on correct readings. He is the one and only one among the scholars of Nyāya, who normally turn a blind eye towards bad readings But Tatacharya has shown the how vulgate readings are confusing. (For example see *dhātvartha-tāvacchedaka-koṭipraviṣṭe eva dvitvānvayāt* [p.241-3] where he has suggested the correct reading as *dhātvarthatāvacchedake eva dvitvānvayāt*.

Some notable places where Prof. Tatcharya's excellency is seen are as follows- *padārthah padārthena anveti* (p.12), *kriyāviśeṣaṇānām karmatvicāra* (p.45-46), *gurumatavicāra* (p.79), *kalañjapadārtha* (p.81), *pratibadhyapratibandhaka-bhāvavicāra* (p.103), *anumitim prati śābdasāmagryāh pratibandhakatāvicāra* where he quotes his father's view (p.112), *prathamārthavicāra* (p. 131) where he has discussed the *prātipadikārthasūtra* (2.3.46), *sāṅkaryavicāra* (p.134), *Miśramatavicāra* (p.391) where he has

explained the context of Pakshadhara Mishra and Gangesha, upasatpadārthavicāra (p.395-398) where he has explained the Mīmāṃsā context of word “upasad” etc.

This is a “must collect work” for all sastra lovers. French Institute and especially Dr. Francois Grimal who as the head of Indology of IFP has been instrumental in this work deserve special thanks so as Dr. Lakshminarasimham who assisted Prof. Tatacharya very well.

--Veeranarayana Padurangi

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